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Preface to the Online Publication in 2019 
 
 
 
This is the electronic publication of my PhD thesis at the University of Basel, which was 
submitted to the PhD committee on September 28, 2016, and successfully defended on De-
cember 15, 2016. It is one of the outdated customs of German-speaking academia that a 
PhD thesis must be published in order to complete the formal procedure of a doctoral degree. 
Considering the fact that there is no central digital repository for PhD theses (comparable to 
ProQuest, EThOS, or YÖK databases) in Switzerland, I regard this so-called «e-dissertation» 
at the digital repository of the University Library of Basel as a means of documentation. 
While I am still revisiting and reviewing my research to prepare a revised book manuscript 
with an academic publishing house, this electronic publication (and its few mandatory hard 
copies) serves to complete this formal PhD procedure. 
Therefore, I resisted to do any far-reaching revisions and updates on this e-dissertation that 
considerably alters and changes the thesis. Most changes on this online version are matters of 
orthography, grammar, and punctuation. At few occasions, I slightly adjusted or corrected 
the content and citations, however, without including new publications after 2016.1 Hence, 
differences in page numbers between this version and the original thesis are minimal. Unfor-
tunately, at the time of the completion of my thesis, I wasn’t aware of the PhD thesis of Erol 
Ülker which provides my «Young Turk Aftermath» a complementing perspective from 
within İstanbul.2 I had also missed Samuel Hirst’s excellent article on the early history of 
 
1 For instance, Taner Akçam’s recent research on the Talat Pasha telegrams confirmed my cautious 
predictions that a critical review of these documents was overdue. Taner Akçam, Killing Orders: Talat Pasha’s 
Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 
2 Erol Ülker, “Sultanists, Republicans, Communists: The Turkish National Movement in Istanbul, 1918–
1923,” (PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 2013). 
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Soviet-Kemalist relations.3 Şuhnaz Yılmaz’s recent publication on Enver Pasha’s exile activi-
ties is also not cited, as it was published shortly after I had submitted my dissertation.4 Among 
forthcoming publications, Betül Aslan is publishing an important book on Kemalist-Union-
ist-Bolshevik relations based on some of the same material that I used from the archives in 
Ankara. Osik Moses’ forthcoming PhD thesis on the assassination of Talat Pasha will surely 
offer further insights as well. After completing my PhD, I published “Elusive Forces in Illu-
sive Eyes: British Officialdom’s Perception of the Anatolian Resistance Movement,” (Middle 
Eastern Studies 54, no. 5 (2018): 788–810), which mostly draws on my research from my 
PhD thesis, but does not correspond to any particular chapter.  
Acknowledgments are listed in the original Preface below. Nevertheless, I would like to thank 
Paul Dumont for praising my PhD in his recent publication.5 Also Maurus Reinkowski con-
tinued mentoring and supporting me after my PhD. Moreover, I am grateful to the Institute 
for Area Studies at Leiden University for employing me as a university lecturer for modern 
Turkish history and culture after Professor Erik Jan Zürcher’s retirement. Unfortunately, my 
lovely aunt Rukiye Arslan tragically passed away in 2018, to whom—along with my late 
father, my mother, and my other aunt—I had dedicated my thesis. Therefore, I had to adjust 
the original dedication page. Finally, I would like express once again my ever-deepening grat-
itude to my wife Özge Barut whose support has been indispensable ever since.  
Alp Yenen 
Leiden, August 2019  
 
3 Samuel J. Hirst, “Transnational Anti-Imperialism and the National Forces: Soviet Diplomacy and Turkey, 
1920–23,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 33, no. 2 (2013), 214–26. 
4 Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Revisiting Networks and Narratives: Enver Pasha’s Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic Quest,” in 
Subversives and Mavericks in the Muslim Mediterranean: A Subaltern History, ed. Odile Moreau and Stuart 
Schaar, 143–65 (University of Texas Press, 2016).  
5 «Tel est le cas, en particulier, de la monumentale thèse de Alp Yenen consacrée aux années d’exil des chefs 
du Comité Union et Progrès, au lendemain de l’effondrement de l’Empire ottoman en octobre 1918 et à la 
fermentation idéologique sur laquelle ces individus ont imprimé leur marque. Soutenue en 2016 à l’université 
de Bâle, sous la direction de Maurus Reinkowski, cette thèse, encore inédite, est le fruit d’une enquête 
minutieuse, fondée sur l’exploitation des archives allemandes, russes et turques.» Yet, I must kindly remind 
that my use of Russian archival sources has been limited to published and quoted documents. Paul Dumont, 
“L’instrumentalisation de la religion dans l’Empire ottoman à l’époque de l’expansion européenne (1800–
1914),” European Journal of Turkish Studies 27 (2018). https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/5933.  
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Preface 
 
 
 
This manuscript is my PhD thesis at the University of Basel. This work could not have been 
started, continued, and completed without the support of my Doktorvater Maurus Reinkow-
ski. His intellectual wisdom, liberal and sensible guidance, and moral and material support 
were irreplaceably crucial for this project. I am tremendously indebted to him for his trust 
and care. Emeritus Professor Paul Dumont kindly accepted to be my second advisor. I feel 
lucky to have found a co-advisor who himself researched on the same topic several decades 
ago. I am grateful for his critical comments in our joint colloquiums at Basel and Strasbourg.  
This PhD thesis has its roots in my MA thesis, “Berlin unter dem Banner des Islams: Die 
jungtürkische Exilpolitik in Berlin (1918–1922) und die Propagandazeitschrift Liwa-el-Is-
lam,” (Munich: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2009). Long due acknowledgements are 
in order to Professor Christoph K. Neumann for his keen guidance and to Emeritus Professor 
Hans-Georg Majer for his much-appreciated comments. I had the chance to publish some 
of the earlier results of my research as chapters in edited volumes. Nevertheless, “The Exile 
Activities of the Unionists in Berlin (1918–1922),” in Türkisch-Deutsche Beziehungen: Per-
spektiven aus Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, edited by Claus Schönig, Ramazan Çalık and 
Hatice Bayraktar, 71–94 (Berlin: Klaus-Schwarz-Verlag, 2011), can mostly be ignored, as 
the editors published my conference manuscript instead of the reviewed version I had sub-
mitted. I had the chance to discuss some of my conceptual ideas in “Approaching Transna-
tional Political History: The Role of Non-State Actors in Post-Ottoman State-Formation,” 
in Transnational Actors – Crossing Borders: Transnational History Studies, edited by Steffi 
Marung and Matthias Middell, 261–70 (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2015). A 
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glimpse into my research topic was given in my “The Other Jihad: Enver Pasha, Bolsheviks, 
and Politics of Anticolonial Muslim Nationalism during the Baku Congress 1920,” in The 
First World War and its Aftermath: The Shaping of the Middle East, edited by T. G. Fraser, 
273–93 (London: Gingko Library Press, 2015). I explored some of the general ideas of my 
dissertation in my “The ‘Young Turk Zeitgeist’ in the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Af-
termath of World War I,” in War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State, edited 
by M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad, 1181–1216 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
2016). None of these publications correspond to any chapter of the dissertation, but, needless 
to say, I benefitted from their content and conceptions.    
Of course, no such project can be realized without financial support. I am greatly in debt to 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation for granting me a doctoral scholarship for 31 months. Since 
February 2013, I’ve been working at the University of Basel as an assistant lecturer in Islamic 
& Middle Eastern Studies at the Department of Social Sciences. I owe once again gratitude 
to Maurus Reinkowski for his trust in me as well as for the warm atmosphere he provided at 
the Seminar für Nahoststudien in Basel.  
The Graduate School for Social Sciences (G3S) at the University of Basel and the MUBIT 
Inter-University Doctoral Cooperation in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies (Basel/Zurich) 
allowed me to benefit from a more structured PhD program. I found much pleasure in taking 
advanced courses, attending research colloquiums, and even organizing myself doctoral work-
shops. I thank those professors whom I had the honor to get to know as teachers: Erik J. 
Zürcher, M. Hakan Yavuz, Kemal Kirişçi, José Casanova, Meropi Anastassiadou, Bettina 
Dennerlein, Ulrich Rudolph, Michael Provence, Hasan Kayalı, Jack Goldstone, Isa Blumi, 
Axel Paul, Mithat Sancar, Cyrus Schayegh, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, and others. I would like to 
thank the program coordinators Dr. Günter Schmidt (G3S) and my dear colleague Dr. Selen 
Etingü (MUBIT). From my time at the University of Freiburg, I would like to thank Pro-
fessor Johanna Pink for inviting me to take part at the doctoral colloquium. Dr. Tilman 
Lüdke introduced me to the inspiring and thrilling book Peter Hopkirk, Setting the East 
Ablaze: Lenin’s Dream of an Empire in Asia, 1984. 2nd ed. (New York: Kodansha Interna-
tional, 1999). Professor Tolga Esmer gave many important advices on studying rumors in 
politics during his fellowship at the University of Freiburg. I owe also many thanks to my 
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treasured colleague Professor Tim Epkenhans for his constant support and for sharing his 
impressive knowledge about Central Asia and many other areas with me.  
Thanks are also in order to those who facilitated my archival research. At the Prime Ministry’s 
Ottoman Archives in İstanbul, I would like to thank Fuat Recep for his assistance. I have 
spent much time in the archive of the Turkish Historical Society (TTK). I am truly indebted 
to Mrs. Semiha Nurdan, the chief archivist at the TTK, for her generous hospitality and for 
her professionalism as an archivist. I also had the chance to work at the archives of the Turkish 
General Staff’s Directorate for Military History and Strategic Studies (ATASE). Especially, I 
would like to thank Mesut Üstünbaş for his support and assistance. From my time at ATASE, 
I would like to thank Professor Michael Reynolds for all those invaluable conversations dur-
ing our lunch breaks, eating balık ekmek in Ankara. İlhami Bebek, a retired archival clerk at 
ATASE and a freelance researcher, was kind enough to look over my shoulders during his 
spare time. He has devoted much appreciated attention to my project. At the archive of the 
Institute of the Turkish Revolution History at the University of Ankara, I would like to thank 
my colleague Hakan Yaşar for his companionship and his support. One thing that made my 
stay in Ankara particularly joyful was that my dear uncle İzzet Yenen and my cousin and 
good friend Ali Yenen hosted me at their home.  
The archivists of the Deutsches Museum in Munich were immensely helpful by carefully pre-
paring the documents that I had requested. Archivists at the German Military Archive in 
Freiburg, Munich City Archives as well as the Political Archive of the Auswärtiges Amt were 
also a great help. For sharing his material and knowledge regarding German archival docu-
ments, I would like to thank my colleague Gerhard Grüsshaber. I am also indebted to my 
colleague Sarah Djavid-Khayati for introducing me to the Federal Archives of Switzerland. 
My good friends Murat Kaya and Dr. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan deserve also thanks for facili-
tating my research at the National Archives in London. I have benefitted immensely from 
the private papers of late Gerhard Höpp located at the Zentrum moderner Orient (ZMO) 
which included many archival documents and other sources. May he rest in peace.  
For support in various ways I would like to thank (in alphabetical order): Alexander Balistreri, 
Ali Bademci, Alp Eren Topal, Alptuğ Güney, Anna Dippert, Anna Vakali, Enis Erdem Ay-
dın, Joël László, Kerem Uygun, Osik Moses, Stefan Ihrig, Thomas Volk, and Yavuz Köse. I 
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would like to thank also Professor Zafer Toprak for hosting me at his private library in İstan-
bul and giving me valuable advices.  
Such a project would have been unbearable without the intellectual companionship of some 
very good friends. I was fortunate enough to have Olmo Gölz by my side throughout this 
shared time of dissertation writing. Murat Kaya was my living encyclopedia on the Young 
Turks throughout the project. Ramazan Hakkı Öztan was patient and kind enough to read 
to whole dissertation one chapter after another and gave invaluable suggestions.  
Last but not least, my loving wife Özge deserves special praise for her patience and caring 
spirit as well as for fulfilling my life.  
I am sad that my late father Kaya Yenen could not read these lines. I hope to have cherished 
his memory and believe that his love for adventure and storytelling inspired me. I dedicate 
this book to my «Golden Girls». I would like express my gratitude for my mother Betül and 
my aunts Rukiye and Ayşegül for everything they have done for me and the completion of 
this project. 
 
Alp Yenen 
Freiburg im Breisgau, September 2016 
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Note on Terminology, Translation, and Transliteration 
Use and choice of words can be a sensitive issue. This is especially the case in mapping the 
political geography. For instance, my European sources used exclusively Constantinople, 
whereas my Ottoman-Turkish sources rather İstanbul. I use both terms interchangeably, but 
used the former historic term more regularly in the pre-1923 context and İstanbul in a more 
contemporary and general sense. Needless to say, there is no Byzantine irredentism behind 
my preference. It was a choice of style mainly for the sake of contextualizing İstanbul as a 
cosmopolitan imperial city. The same rule applies to similar places such as Smyrna (İzmir) 
and Alexandretta (İskenderun), etc. Wherever I felt that the Greco-Roman term was rather 
alienating than convenient, I preferred the Turkish spelling as in Trabzon instead of Trebi-
zond. This is also the reason why I preferred Ankara over Angora, because the Turkified ver-
sion more precisely represents the political connotations of the city. I sometimes also stuck 
to the original Ottoman province names as in Diyarbekir instead of its Republican alteration 
Diyarbakır. Outside the Ottoman Empire I followed a similar logic and used the commonly 
known names of places in English language, thus rather Munich, Berne, Damascus, and St. 
Petersburg instead of München, Bern, Sham, or Petrograd. Wherever I felt that it was necessary 
to clarify, I gave other (local or current) versions in brackets. My usage of the term Turkestan, 
a term that is practically vanished today, is also not based on any notion of pan-Turkism, but 
rather on its common use for Central Asia in the sources.  
It is no secret that the European sources from the beginning on and increasingly more Otto-
man sources since the 19th century used Turkish and Ottoman as well as Turkey and Ottoman 
Empire interchangeably. Nevertheless, I strictly differentiate between the terms «Turkish» 
and «Ottoman» as well as «Ottoman Empire» and «Turkey». One exception is that I used the 
political-spatial neologism Ottoman Turkey to describe the Ottoman Empire’s remaining and 
disputed territories in the liminal period after the end of World War I in November 1918. 
After 1921, I used Turkey and Turkish in referring to the polities and policies of the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey. I use the term Soviet Russia for the former territories of the 
Russian Empire, where during the Russian Civil War new Soviet republics were founded and 
later merged into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922.  
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The terms Young Turks (from the French Jeunes-Turcs, in Turkish: Jön Türkler) and CUP 
(Committee of Union and Progress, in Turkish: İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti) are mostly used 
interchangeably in the literature. However, I tried to give some nuances wherever necessary. 
For instance, when I talk about the Young Turk generation or the Young Turk movement, I 
rather refer to a general category of an intellectual movement or a social group that went 
beyond the membership to the CUP. When referring to a certain characteristic, community 
or polity exclusively associated with the CUP, I rather speak of CUP paramilitaries or CUP 
networks. Though, I claim no consistency in these nuances and used them also interchange-
ably, whenever it was convenient. Needless to say, there is no such thing as Young Turkish 
(as in place of the German jungtürkisch). For some reason, the agent noun Unionist (a direct 
translation of the very widely used İttihatçı) has gained only limited currency outside the field 
of Ottoman and Turkish Studies (even less the loan word experiment İttihadist). Thus, I used 
«Unionist» mostly in the Ottoman-Turkish context, mostly in contrast to Kemalists and 
other factions and parties. Like many contemporary Western sources, I use the term Kemalist 
as an alternative term for the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, without 
implying that they were already adherents of Kemalism of the 1930s. Depending on the 
context, the Ottoman-Turkish usage of İslam can mean Islam, Islamic, and Muslim. I choose 
to translate the post-war CUP organization under study as the Union of Muslim Revolution-
ary Societies (İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı) and not Union of Islamic Revolutionary Soci-
eties as it has been commonly translated so far—including my previous work.  
Islamicate loan words of Arab origin are spelled in the main text according to their original 
Arabic pronunciation and spelling, thus jihad instead of cihat. Throughout the text, I used 
Ottoman honorific titles following the first name such as Pasha (a lifelong title awarded to 
generals and ministers), Bey (similar to Mister, commonly a Muslim government official), 
and Efendi (indicating either nobility, property, authority, or mastery). Other foreign lan-
guage expressions and loan words with no suited translation as well as original quotes in 
foreign languages are given in italics. Italics are also used to express emphasis and to underline 
some conceptual keywords. Quotes and so-called «scare quotes» are given—following the 
Swiss rule—in «guillemets».  
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Transliteration of non-Latin scripts is certainly one of the blessings and curses of area studies. 
I’ve once argued (more or less satirically) that meticulous transliteration of the Arabic-
scripted languages is the «initiation rite» and boundary marker of German-speaking Islamic 
and Middle Eastern Studies.6 I apologize for that I did not use a detailed transliteration sys-
tem in this book. This was rather for reasons of convenience than a matter of conviction. For 
Ottoman, Arabic, and Persian words and names I preferred a simplified transliteration system 
based on the transliteration chart of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES).7 
Colleagues shall excuse that I didn’t use any diacritical marks including the Arabic letters 
ayn (‘) and hamza (’), thus not ‘ulamā’, but simply ulama. For the sake of convenience, I 
simply used the modern Turkish for transliteration for Ottoman-Turkish documents. I also 
omitted the use of circumflexed vowels (â, î, and û) indicating palatalization. Thus, not 
Talʿat, Talaat or Talât, but simply Talat.  
Following the same rule, I write all Ottoman-Turkish personal names in their modern Turk-
ish version. However, I made certain exceptions to my own rule. When a person did not live 
to see the Turkish language reform in 1928 that romanized the Ottoman-Arabic script, I 
preferred the Ottoman orthography of the name without the devoicing of Arabic consonants. 
Thus, I call the former Minister of Finance Mehmed Cavid instead of Mehmet Cavit, who 
died in 1926, but I write Mithat Şükrü (Bleda) instead of Midhat Şükrü for the former Sec-
retary General of the CUP, who died in 1956. As far as I could identify them, the modern 
Turkish family names (since 1934) are given in brackets as in Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)—the 
only obvious exception being Kazım Karabekir, who adopted his assumed name as surname. 
For Ottoman Arabs as well as other non-Turkish Muslims I tried to be faithful to their orig-
inal tongue in transliterating their names, for instance rather Shakib Arslan, instead of Şekip 
Aslan, for the Ottoman-Druze deputy of Hauran, and so forth. For the sake of clarity, I 
standardized all the different romanized variations of an author’s name in the bibliographic 
entries. Thus, instead of various scattered entries such as Dschemal Pascha, Djemal Pasha, and 
Cemal Paşa, all the different editions of Cemal Pasha’s memoir are under the latter name.  
 
6 Alp Yenen, “Wissenschaftlichkeit und Bequemlichkeit,” SGMOIK Bulletin, no. 11 (2011): 7. 
7 http://ijmes.chass.ncsu, du/docs/TransChart.pdf 
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For the Romanization of Cyrillic scripts in Russian, Azeri, and Uzbek words and names, I 
use the basic scholarly transliteration systems, but I claim no consistency. For Armenian 
names and terms, I preferred the Western Armenian pronunciation, thus Tashnag and not 
Dashnak in referring to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Heghapokhagan Tash-
nagtsutiun, ARF).  
All translations, unless otherwise noted, are mine.  
In citing primary sources which use the Ottoman Rumi calendar, I simply converted the dates 
to the Gregorian calendar without additionally giving the Rumi date. The Ottoman Rumi 
calendar was a solar Julian calendar that started with the year of the Hijra in 622 CE—
therefore precisely 584 years and thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar. The thirteen-
day difference was equalized by the CUP government in March 1917. Thus, for the period 
under study there was only the difference in years and March 1 being the beginning of the 
year. On few other occasions where I cited sources with other lunar or solar Hijri calendars, 
I gave the Gregorian date in brackets.  
For the specifics of pronunciation of Turkish words and names the following chart may be 
of help: 
A, a  a as in rather 
C, c  j as in jungle or the German dsch as in Dschungel 
Ç, ç  ch as in church or the German tsch as in Tschüss 
E, e  e as in yes 
G, g  a hard g as in goal 
Ğ, ğ  a so-called soft g that lengthens the preceding vowel 
I, ı  unrounded i as in radium 
İ,i  ee as in teeth 
J, j  similar to French j as in jour or s as in vision 
O, o  o as in more 
Ö, ö  same as the German ö as in Köln 
S, s  like a hissed s as in sound 
Ş, ş  sh as in shoot or the German sch as in schön 
U, u  oo as in zoo 
Ü, ü  same as the German ü as in München 
Z, z  sibilant z as in zickzack  
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List of Abbreviations 
For reasons of aesthetics and convenience, I decided to avoid an alphabet soup in the body 
text and omitted acronyms as much as possible, but the following could not be forgone:  
ARF Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun) 
Cheka Soviet Emergency Commission (Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya) 
Comintern Communist (Third) International 
CUP Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti) 
GHQ General Headquarters 
IR International Relations (as an academic discipline) 
n.d. no date 
POW Prisoners of war 
SIS British Secret Intelligence Service, later MI-6 
US United States of America 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Sojuz Sovetskich Socialističeskich Respublik) 
WWI World War I 
 
Abbreviations of Archives and Archival Collections Used in the References  
ADM Archives of the German Museum (Archiv des Deutschen Museums), Munich 
JW Junkers-Werke Papers 
AMAE Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Les Archives du Ministere des Affaires 
Étrangères), Paris 
ATASE Turkish General Staff’s Directorate for Military History and Strategic Studies 
(Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı), Ankara 
ATAZB Atatürk Kolleksiyonu 
İSH İstiklal Harbi Kolleksiyonu 
BA-MA German Military Archives (Bundesarchiv, Militärarchive), Freiburg im Breisgau 
N Nachlass  
BAR Federal Archives of Switzerland (Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv), Berne 
BayHStA Bavarian Central State Archives (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv), Munich 
Abt. IV Abteilung Kriegsarchiev 
HS Handschriftensammlung 
BCA Prime Ministerial Republican Archives (Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi), Ankara 
BOA Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), İstanbul 
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BL British Library, London 
IO India Office Records and Private Papers 
PA-AA Political Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes), Berlin 
NL Nachlass  
StdAM City Archive Munich (Stadtarchiv München) 
PMB Polizeiliche Meldebogen 
TİTE Institute of the Turkish Revolution History (Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü), Ankara 
TNA The National Archives, Kew Gardens  
CAB Cabinet Papers 
FO Foreign Office Papers 
WO War Office Papers 
TTK Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu), Ankara 
CP Cemal Paşa Kolleksiyonu 
EP Enver Paşa Kolleksiyonu 
ZMO Center for Modern Oriental Studies (Zentrum Moderner Orient), Berlin 
NGH Nachlass Prof. Dr. Gerhard Höpp 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
On October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed the armistice of Mudros, which put an 
end to the World War I in the Middle East. Few days right after, on the night of November 
2, a small group of men from the leading political party of the war-time government of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, in 
short CUP), fled the empire in a German torpedo-boat into a self-imposed exile. Among 
these men was the so-called Young Turk triumvirate, which included the former Minister of 
Interior and Grand Vizier Talat Pasha, the former Minister of War and Generalissimo Enver 
Pasha, the former Minister of the Navy and war-time Governor of Syria Cemal Pasha. In 
their entourage there was also half a dozen of men from the éminence grise of the Committee 
and some of the most brutal racketeers of the war-time administration. These men were not 
running without a reason. They were later court martialed by the post-armistice government 
to death sentences in absentia for warmongering and for crimes against humanity in the per-
secution and extermination of Ottoman Armenians—or what is today known as the Arme-
nian Genocide.  
Yet, even before the CUP leaders left the Ottoman Empire, they had already activated their 
contingency plans for the post-Armistice resistance. After leaving Constantinople, Enver, 
who desired to reach the Caucasus from Crimea, wished to unite with the remaining Otto-
man troops and continue the fighting. But he could not cross the Black Sea due to an ill-
fated series of storms, shipwrecks, and diseases. The others travelled to Germany and were 
caught out by the November Revolution. While they could not find the Germany they hoped 
to settle down in their quite exile, they still found some sort of semi-legal support from their 
old friends within the German officialdom. They went hiding in sanatoriums and small 
apartments in Berlin, Munich, and Swiss cities.  
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Despite the fact that they were internationally wanted as war-criminals and that it was an 
open secret that most of them were residing in Berlin, they remained relatively untouched in 
their political exile. When the Young Turk leaders went into exile, they did not disappear 
from the realm of politics either. Their reputation as reckless professional revolutionaries as 
well as their national and transnational underground networks of Turkish and Muslim par-
tisans would make them relevant as political actors in the turmoil of the aftermath of World 
War I. 
In the spring of 1919, they started to organize themselves politically. The partition of the 
Ottoman Empire had caused protest movements throughout the Muslim world, and in for-
mer Ottoman lands uprisings emerged against the Great Powers. The CUP leaders saw a 
great opportunity in uniting these anticolonial insurgencies and liberation movements. They 
got in touch with other Muslim activists in European exile. In Berlin, they met with the 
Bolshevik leader Karl Radek, who invited them to come to Soviet Russia to seek for assistance 
from the Bolshevik regime. Their German friends from the German military-industrial com-
plex invested efforts to connect to Soviet Russia with the help of their Young Turk friends in 
order to subvert the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. After multiple airplane crushes and 
two imprisonments in Lithuania and Latvia, the CUP leaders, first Cemal and then Enver 
finally reached Moscow in the summer of 1920, however, with a delay of one year. After 
secret meetings in Berlin, they founded in Moscow the Union of Muslim Revolutionary So-
cieties (İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı). The aim of this organization was to mobilize and 
unite the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements against European imperialism. While 
Cemal went to Afghanistan to modernize the Afghan forces for an Indian expedition, Enver 
participated at the Congress of the Eastern Peoples in Baku in September 1920, a Bolshevik 
event to mobilize the Muslim countries against Western imperialism and colonialism. The 
relations to Soviet Russia were, however, troubled as the CUP leaders were no communist 
revolutionaries. The relations to their former colleagues in Ottoman Turkey, who were lead-
ing a resistance movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Pasha, were 
similarly plagued by mistrust and rivalry. Hence, a return to Ottoman Turkey was less an 
option. From the spring of 1921 onwards, their movement became increasingly isolated and 
they were soon effectively persecuted by their old and new enemies. In March 1921, Talat 
who was managing the networks in Europe was killed by an Armenian avenger in Berlin. 
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Soon some other CUP leaders responsible for the Armenian deportations also fell victim to 
similar assassinations. Cemal, who wished to return to Ottoman Turkey, was killed by Ar-
menian hitmen in July 1922 in Tiflis (Tbilisi). Meanwhile, Enver had turned his back on the 
Soviets and had joined the Basmachi insurgency in Russian Turkestan. In August 1922, En-
ver was killed in action fighting the Red Army. As the most prominent figures of this group 
were all killed by the end of 1922, their story and their political movement came to an end.  
*** 
This is their story—in short. Frankly, this story is not novel. I did not need to stab into 
historiographical darkness. Nonetheless, I had my share in shining a light on many dark spots 
and even more opaque areas and ill-lit parts, as it will be discussed throughout this book. Yet, 
I was fortunate that others before me told this story in different qualities and dramaturgies. 
I will spare the reader of a detailed literature assessment, nevertheless, I would like to praise 
some of the literature. Praise goes, first of all, to an unconventional body of literature. Long 
before academic historians devoted attention to this topic, semi-academic and popular histo-
rians from Turkey continuously discovered new sources and passionately told the story anew 
for popular readership.1 It was only with the publication of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s very 
popular three-volume Enver Pasha biography that this story found its first critical and com-
prehensive study which placed the topic also on the agenda of academic studies.2 Aydemir’s 
 
1 These popular histories include works by academic and non-academic historians that by style or design 
aim at a broader popular audience than an academic readership. This is, of course, a very broad category, and 
I don’t use it derrogatively. See, for instance: Ziya Şakir Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adamı: Talat, Enver, 
Cemal Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943); Feridun Kandemir, Yakın Tarihten bir Sahife 
Cemal Paşa’nın Son Günleri, ed. İbrahim Öztürkçü (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınları, 2012); Feridun Kandemir, 
Şehit Enver Paşa Türkistan’da (İstanbul: Barıman Yayınevi, 1945); Cemal Kutay, Enver Paşa Lenin’e Karşı 
(İstanbul: Ekicigil Matbaasi, 1955); Cemal Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlindeki Son Günleri,” Tarih Konuşuyor 
1, no. 2 (1964): 133–36; Tekin Erer, Enver Paşa'nın Türkistan Kurtuluş Savaşı (İstanbul: Mayataş Yayınları, 
1971); Ali Bademci, 1917–1934 Türkistan Milli İstiklal Hareketi Korbaşılar ve Enver Paşa, 2 vols. (İstanbul: 
Ötüken Neşriyat, 2008); Cemal Kutay, Şehit Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Gurbet Hatıraları, 2nd ed., 3 vols. 
(İstanbul: Kültür Matbaası, 1983); Tevfik Çavdar, Talat Paşa: Bir Örgüt Ustasının Yaşam Öyküsü (Ankara: 
T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1995); İrfan Ülkü, KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa (İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 
1996); Yusuf Gedikli, ed., Enver Paşa: Hayatı ve Makaleleri (İstanbul: Nesil Yayınları, 2007); Hikmet 
Özdemir, Üç Jöntürk’ün Ölümü: Talat, Cemal, Enver (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007); Nevzat Kösoğlu, Şehit 
Enver Paşa (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2008); Kaya Karan, “İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı,” in Türk 
İstihbarat Tarihi: Yıldız İstihbarat Teşkilatı ve Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan MİT’e, 133–50 (İstanbul: Truva 
Yayınları, 2008); Murat Çulcu, Paşaların Asya Misyonu, 1914–1922: Talat, Enver, Cemal ve Mustafa Kemal 
(İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2013). For the development of popular history in Turkey see: Ahmet Özcan, 
Türkiye’de Popüler Tarihçilik: 1908–1960 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2011).  
2 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972). 
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book (or at least its last volume) became obsolete, as popular historian Murat Bardakçı re-
cently published a tremendously well-researched biography of Enver Pasha.3 Main debates in 
the popular histories still center around the legacies of the CUP leaders, especially Enver, in 
Turkish history.  
Academic scholars deserve credit as well. Masayuki Yamauchi was the first scholar to use the 
private papers of the CUP leaders in conjunction with foreign diplomatic and intelligence 
documents.4 His work and approach has been inspiring for this project. There are several 
research areas that made contributions to the study of Young Turks after 1918. The critical 
revision of the Young Turk era since the late 1970s made way for new perspectives on the 
CUP’s role during the Turkish War of Independence that went beyond the Kemalist para-
digm.5 The story of the Young Turk fugitives has received attention also by historians stud-
ying the international history of the post-war years, especially in the intersection of Turkish-
Russian-German relations.6 The history of socialist movements in Turkey offered also many 
 
3 Murat Bardakçı’s book is not a biography in the strict sense of the word as it deals in detail only with the 
exile years of Enver, but his life before that is covered in a long historical introduction as well as in narrative 
flashbacks. Murat Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015). 
4 Yamauchi’s book is a edited volume of Enver Pasha’s private papers, so that I refer here to the book’s 
excellent commentary section on the historical background of the documents. Masayuki Yamauchi, The 
Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of 
Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991), 9–71.  
5 For some of the pathbreaking studies in this context see: A. A. Cruickshank, “The Young Turk Challenge in 
Postwar Turkey,” Middle East Journal 22, no. 1 (1968): 17–28; Paul Dumont, “La révolution impossible: Les 
courants d’opposition en Anatolie 1920–1921,” Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 19, 1–2 (1978): 143–74; 
Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National 
Movement 1905–1926 (Leiden: Brill, 1984); Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler III: İttihat ve 
Terakki (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 566–90. Enver and Mustafa Kemal relations receive very 
much attention among academics as well, which traditionally depicts Enver’s activities abroad as a foreign 
intervention. See: Yusuf H. Bayur, “Mustafa Suphi ve Milli Mücadele’ye El Koymaya Çalışan Bazı Dış 
Akımlar,” Belleten, no. 140 (1971): 631–638, 652–654; Francesco Sidari, “Mustafa Kemal, Enver Pascia e il 
movimento panturco (1919–1924),” Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali 46, no. 183 (1979): 413–37; 
Selim İlkin and İlhan Tekeli, “Kurtuluş Savaşında Talat Paşa ile Mustafa Kemal’in Mektuplaşması,” Belleten 
44, no. 174 (1980): 301–45; Saime Yüceer, “Enver Paşa’nın Yurt Dışındaki Faaliyetleri (1918–1922),” Askeri 
Tarih Bülteni, no. 24 (1988): 71–87; Salahi R. Sonyel, “Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919–22,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (1989): 506–15; Saime Yüceer, “Enver Paşa’nın Anadolu’da İktidarı Ele 
Geçirme Çabaları,” Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi 9, no. 33 (2007): 202–26; Mustafa Gencer, “Jöntürkler ve 
Mustafa Kemal Paşa (1908–1926),” in İlkadım’dan Cumhuriyet’e: Milli Mücadele, ed. Osman Köse 
(İstanbul: Samsun İlkadım Belediyesi Yayınları, 2008), 47–53. 
6 Paul Dumont, “L’axe Moscou-Ankara: Les relations turco-soviétiques de 1919 à 1922,” Cahiers du monde 
russe et sovietique 18, no. 3 (1977): 165–93; Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, “Fellow Travellers: Enver Pasha and the 
Bolshevik Government 1918–1920,” Asian Affairs 13, no. 69 (1982): 288–96; Mustafa Gencer, “Jöntürkler 
ve Almanya (1918–1923),” in XIV. Türk Tarih Kongresi: Ankara: 9–13 Eylül 2002, Kongreye Sunulan 
Bildiriler, vol. 3, 4 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006), 19–32; Bülent Gökay, A Clash of 
Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918–1923 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997); 
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insights into the relationship of the CUP and the National Forces to Bolshevism.7 The Union 
of Muslim Revolutionary Societies found also attention in studies on pan-Islamism in the 
Great War era.8 Although the international academia has not yet produced a comprehensive 
(monographic) study on this topic,9 through continues contributions from distinct but con-
nected research fields a certain common understanding has been reached among academics 
regarding the general content and relevance of this episode—best summarized in Şuhnaz 
Yılmaz’s work.10 There is a fascination for this story—certainly more in Turkish popular 
history than in international academia—that yet deserves scrutiny.  
The fascination with this episode did not necessarily come around only in retrospect. Con-
temporary observers devoted a great deal of attention as well. Newspapers around the world 
 
Arsen Avagyan, “Kemalistler, İttihatçılar ve Bolşevikler I: Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Ankara-Sovyet İlişkileri,” 
Toplumsal Tarih 23, no. 159 (2007): 14–23; Arsen Avagyan, “Kemalistler, İttihatçılar ve Bolşevikler II: 
Mustafa Kemal’e Karşı Enver Kartı (1920–1922),” Toplumsal Tarih 23, no. 160 (2007): 38–47; Sabine 
Mangold-Will, Begrenzte Freundschaft: Deutschland und die Türkei, 1918–1933 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 
2013), 31–130. See also the studies on Enver Pasha’s participation at the Basmachi rebellion: Nermin 
Menemencioğlu, “Enver Pasha in Turkistan 1918–1922,” Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, no. 67 
(1988): 253–61; Glenda Fraser, “Enver Pasha’s Bid for Turkestan, 1920–1922,” Canadian Journal of History 
22, no. 2 (1988): 197–211; Salahi R. Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 1 (1990): 52–64; Aydın İdil, Enver Paşa’nın Son Savaşı: Basmacı Hareketinin 
Önderi Seyyid Enver Emir-i Leşker-i İslam (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2013). 
7 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar I: (1908–1925) (İstanbul: Berdan Yayınları, 2000), 74–83; Mete 
Tunçay, “Mesai”: Halk Şuralar Fırkası Programı 1920 – Ek: Halk Zümresi Siyasi Programı (Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1972), 1–38; Paul Dumont, “La fascination du Bolchevisme: 
Enver Pacha et la Parti des soviets populaires 1919–1922,” Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 18, no. 2 
(1975): 141–66; Emel Akal, Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm, 3rd 
ed. (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Türkiye Sosyal Tarih ve Araştırma Vakfı, 2008); Emel Akal, İştirakiyuncular, 
Komünistler ve Paşa Hazretleri: Moskova-Ankara-Londra Üçgeninde (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013).  
8 Zafer Toprak, “İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı (İttihad-ı Selamet-i İslam) ve Panislamizm,” in Türk-Arap 
İlişkileri: Geçmişte, Bugün ve Gelecekte, I. Uluslararası Konferansı Bildirileri (18–22 Haziran 1979 Ankara) 
(Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1979), 174–81; İbrahim Olgun, “İttihatçıların Kurtuluş Savaşı 
Sırasında Anadolu’ya Sızma Teşebbüsleri ve İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı,” in VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi 
11–15 Ekim 1976: Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983), 
1967–76; Martin S. Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 69–72; Gerhard Höpp, Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg 
1915–1945: Geschichtlicher Abriß und Bibliographie (Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 1994), 25–32; 
Selçuk Gürsoy, “İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri ve Liva el-İslam Dergisi,” Toplumsal Tarih 9, no. 49 (1998): 37–46; 
Zafer Toprak, “Bolşevik İttihatçılar ve İslam Kominterni: İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı (İttihad-ı Selamet-
i İslam),” Toplumsal Tarih 8, no. 8 (1997): 6–13; A.L. Macfie, “British Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest 
in Mesopotamia, 1919–21,” 35, no. 1 (1999): 165–77.  
9 I exlude here Yamauchi’s book, as it is not a monography in the strict sense of the word.  
10 Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Paşa as an Expatriate,” Middle Eastern Studies 35, 
no. 4 (1999): 47; Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “In Pursuit of Elusive Glory: Enver Pasha’s Role in the Pan-Islamic and 
Basmachi Movements,” in Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor 
of Norman Itzkowitz, ed. Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 
185–202. 
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as well as diplomatic and intelligence services continued to report about «Young Turk in-
trigues» in the years that followed the Great War. Their acquaintances from these years wrote 
many pages in their memoirs about them. It was, however, the settlement of the post-war 
order in 1922, or 1923 respectively, and the historiographical narratives this rupture shaped 
in Kemalist Turkey, Soviet Russia, and the Colonial Arab Mandates that made this peculiar 
episode rather marginal and polarizing in the official historiographies of the region.  
To begin with, Enver, Talat, and Cemal are burdensome protagonists to deal with. As much 
as they meant trouble by then, the sound of their names still makes eyebrows raise. Their 
reputation and legacy are highly disputed in post-Ottoman nationalist discourses. They are 
depicted either as heroes or villains in different narratives. For instance, Enver Pasha is con-
sidered at the same time as a hero of Turkestan and a traitor of the Turkish War of Inde-
pendence. Similarly, Cemal Pasha is the despot of Syria and reformer of Afghanistan. Talat 
Pasha is either a great statesman or a Zionist agent—or even worse. Talat Pasha is considered 
as the Architect of the Armenian Genocide as much as the whole CUP leadership is held 
responsible for deliberately exterminating the Ottoman Armenians. 
Scholars working on the post-war Young Turk activities ten years ago or more could have 
easily omitted in their accounts the uncomfortable question of the Armenian massacres of 
1915.11 As late Donald Quartaert noted, since 2005 «the elephant in the room» has been 
unveiled.12 Today, more than hundred years after the tragic events of 1915, the intellectual 
and moral hegemony inside and outside the academia has come to accept the Armenian Gen-
ocide as a historical reality—regardless of whether one finds the term genocide appropriate 
or not.13 The genocidal outcome of the deportations and the CUP’s central role in it can no 
 
11 For instance, Erik Jan Zürcher admitted how he was mistaken to assume that his Unionist Factor «was 
about something else» and for not engaging with the reasons and consequences of this «empty landscape» of 
Anatolia. Erik J. Zürcher, “Renewal and Silence: Post-War Unionist and Kemalist Rhetoric on the Armenian 
Genocide,” in The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building, 195. 
12 Donald Quataert, “The Massacres of Ottoman Armenians and the Writing of Ottoman History,” Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 37, no. 2 (2006): 249.  
13 Without denying the genocidal quality of the Armenian case, for instance, Christian Gerlach rather 
proposes the more complex analytical concept of «extremely violent societies». Christian Gerlach, Extremely 
Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 5–8. Hilmar Kaiser speaks of «full extermination» in his case-study of Diyarbekir Armenians, which, as 
he argues, went even beyond conventional genocide. Hilmar Kaiser, The Extermination of Armenians in the 
Diarbekir Region (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014), 10. Thomas de Waal uses the term 
genocide «but with mixed feelings» and problematizes the politicization of the term throughout the book. 
Thomas de Waal, Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide (Oxford: Oxford 
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more be denied. Wherever the CUP leaders went and whatever they undertook after the end 
of the war, they carried a heavy political baggage for being stigmatized as fugitive war-crimi-
nals. They possessed an infamous reputation as brutal dictators and fierce revolutionary lead-
ers. At the end, the Armenian Question was the reason, why the Young Turk leadership left 
the Ottoman Empire in the first place, and as in most cases, it was the Armenian Question 
that brought upon their end.  
Despite or perhaps precisely because of their disputed legacy, these men still get attention. 
Fundamentally seen, they are transgressive actors. It is the transgression that is common to 
both the extraordinary transcendence of a triumphant hero and the illegitimate disruption of 
social order by a perpetrator.14 Thus, they are both heroized villains and villainized heroes, 
constituting the two sides of the same narrative coin.15 Yet, I’ve no interest in rehabilitating 
their reputation or further demonizing them. Their story is disputed, because it takes place 
in the midst of dramatized imaginations of the past. Especially Enver Pasha, as the most 
energetic and iconic figure of the bunch, has continued to polarize in a special way. In 1932, 
a connoisseur of the Islamic world wrote: There is hardly a household between Gibraltar 
and China where Enver’s name has not been pronounced with hatred or love, or with mel-
ancholy or disappointed hopes.16 The situation has not chance much in the existing Turkish 
historiography. Enver is depicted either as a desperate and clumsy charlatan scheming de-
structive machinations or as a quixotic adventurist following a tragic but prideful quest. Yet, 
as one of the leading historians of the Young Turks, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, noted, Enver’s 
history needs to be put in context:  
In the light of recently published documents, [Enver Pasha’s] activities during the armi-
stice are needed to be reconsidered not so much as his individual endeavors, but rather 
as the activities of the cadre of the [Committee of] Union and Progress. However, in 
 
University Press, 2015), ix. For an excellent discussion see also: Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Studying Mass Violence: 
Pitfalls, Problems, and Promises,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 7, no. 1 (2012): 
68–80.  
14 Bernhard Giesen, Triumph and Trauma (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 18. 
15 It is important to differentiate between protagonist and hero in this context. While the former implies a 
certain text function, the latter embodies social ideals. Hans J. Wulff, “Held und Antiheld, Prot- und 
Antagonist: Zur Kommunikations- und Texttheorie eines komplizierten Begriffsfeldes. Ein enzyklopädischer 
Aufriß.,” in Weltentwürfe in Literatur und Medien: Phantastische Wirklichkeiten – realistische Imaginationen; 
Festschrift für Marianne Wünsch, ed. Hans Krah and Marianne Wünsch (Kiel: Ludwig, 2002), 431–48. 
16 Essad Bey, Die Verschwörung gegen die Welt: G.P.U. (Berlin: E.C. Etthofen-Verlag, 1932), 224.  
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interpreting Enver Pasha’s actions even as adventurism [maceracılık], one needs take into 
account that the era he lived in was an era of adventurists [maceracılar çağı].17  
As much as its protagonists occupy disputed memories, it is the complexity and ambiguity 
of their interactions and their place in the geopolitical setting that deserves further attention. 
Masayuki Yamauchi, who conducted one of the most comprehensive studies on this subject 
so far, sees the relevance of this episode in that «[t]hese were colorful and even dramatic years, 
marked by the eventful role that Enver played in German-Soviet-Turkish relations […].»18 
This final Young Turk episode is, indeed, part of a more complex history that is connected 
to larger currents in Europe, Middle East, and Russia. Another leading historian of the Young 
Turks, Erik J. Zürcher, similarly underlined the particular historical context and urged not 
to jump to fast conclusions based on teleological wisdom:  
One of the most amazing episodes in the history of the Young Turks is the resilience they 
showed after the crushing Ottoman defeat in World War I. A significant number of 
officers and party bosses were determined to resist the attempts of the victorious Entente 
to dismember the country. The Unionists who had fled abroad, in particular Enver, im-
mediately started to organize support for the resistance and to plan a worldwide struggle 
against British and French interests through a network of former agents resoundingly 
called the ‹General Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies›. It is easy to dismiss these 
plans hatched in Berlin coffee houses as fanciful and adventurist, but then again: only a 
couple years earlier Lenin had been hatching plans for worldwide revolution in Zürich 
coffee houses and been dismissed as a dreamer. Mustafa Kemal’s defiance of the British 
and French in Anatolia was also dismissed as reckless adventurism by many at the time. 
The point is that from the moment the armistice was concluded the Young Turks found 
the energy and the determination to continue the struggle. This is something unheard of 
in any of the other defeated countries of World War I.19 
The fact that the Young Turks were among the losers of the Great War in 1918 and then, 
again, among the losers of 1922, does not imply that they followed a linear trajectory from 
bad to worse. Nor that they were predestined to fail from the very onset. Between 1918 and 
1922, as this book will illustrate, the CUP leaders achieved to maintain their respected and 
feared reputation as professional revolutionaries with wide-reaching networks and seditious 
capabilities. The question is, how and why did the fugitive CUP leaders remain to be per-
ceived as relevant and powerful actors in the eyes of their supporters and enemies? And what 
led to their failure and fall? The answer lies not only in understanding how they operated 
and interacted as a clandestine movement, but also in appreciating how they made sense of 
 
17 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Enver Paşa,” in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 11, 44 vols., 261–64 
(İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1988–2013), 11:264.  
18 Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 1. 
19 Erik J. Zürcher, “The Young Turk Mindset,” in The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building, 121–22. 
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their own enterprise and the world around them as well as how others made sense of their 
intentions and actions.  
*** 
Although it will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, I want to briefly illus-
trate my approach and conceptualization. Instead of seeing the whole episode within tradi-
tional boundaries of Turkish history, I rather contextualize the story of the CUP leaders as a 
transnational history of the aftermath of World War I. In reading the immediate post-war 
years, I stress the necessity of appreciating the social complexities, historical contingencies, 
and dynamic structures. Political movements of this time were particularly characterized by 
cross-border connections, fluid political identities, and liminal ideas. I believe it is necessary 
to embed the political activities of the fugitive CUP leaders within the connected context of 
anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements of the immediate post-war years.  
In conceptualizing the political interactions of the fugitive CUP leaders, I use the term trans-
national contentious politics, as they were acting across national borders in order to make po-
litical claims and to mobilize a global Muslim movement. The clandestine nature of their 
organizational behavior and their elusive networks in different settings and milieus clouded 
their activities with confusion and suspicion in the eyes of their critical observers. An onto-
logical premise underlies the confusions and suspicions. Transnational contentious politics, 
especially its more seditious, illicit, and clandestine forms, are considered as a transgression 
of the nature of the (international and national) state system where states possess the only 
legitimate means of sovereignty. Thus, peculiar epistemologies emerged when political actors 
and observers tried to make sense of clandestine forms of transnational contentious politics.  
The perception and representation, hence sense-making, of clandestine forms of transna-
tional contentious politics might sometimes resemble the logic and style of conspiracy theories 
in describing so-called international conspiracies. As I will show in great detail throughout 
the book, there was an influx of gossips, rumors, and conspiracy theories about the alleged 
and actual machinations of the CUP leaders in intelligence and press reports of the time. The 
wave of unrest in Muslim countries after the armistice was imagined as a great conspiracy of 
the CUP in conjunction with Russian Bolsheviks and German militarists. Since the Young 
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Turk refugees were, in fact, involved in conspiratorial activities, some of these reports con-
tained accurate information or at least offered a kernel of truth. Most of the interpretations 
were, however, rather bizarre and product of paranoid or deceptive fantasies. In a process 
approach, I will show the disconnect between the actual conspiratorial plots of the CUP and 
the rumors and conspiracy theories found in official intelligence and public newspaper re-
ports. By questioning the cultural foundations of political sense-making of both conspirators 
and conspiracy theorists, I will elaborate the role of perceptions and misperceptions as well 
as representations and misrepresentations, thus sense-making, in politics.  
There is a communicative process of sense-making between the epistemic communities of 
conspirators and conspiracy theorists, as I will demonstrate. In what I call a dialectic of 
conspiracy, the intersubjectivity between conspirators and conspiracy theorists constitute a 
dynamic process that can affect the contentious interactions among actors who are operating 
in a world of uncertainty. Even before the actual conspiratorial intentions of the CUP leaders 
were even put in action, the prevailing conspiracy theories made them very real in the 
perceptions of others. Thus, a peculiar chasm opened up between what was going on and 
what was believed to be going on. Their notoriety made the Young Turk leaders first prized 
as professional revolutionaries, but soon started to haunt them by making them dangerously 
rogue in the eyes of their allies and enemies, resulting in their political isolation and 
persecution.  
***  
For the sake of form, perhaps some short remarks on the sources are in order. A mixed corpus 
of published and unpublished archival documents as well as newspapers and other contem-
porary publications were consulted in reconstructing the outside perception and representa-
tion of the fugitive CUP leaders. In addition to these outside sources, there is plenty of pri-
mary documents such as letters, private papers, diaries, and memoirs authored from the mem-
bers of the Young Turk exile community and their acquaintances, allowing a unique glance 
at their organization and collective mindset. Especially the amount of letters accessible as 
published and unpublished sources is beyond expectations. In face of such a corpus of letters, 
I argue that they constitute what I call a Young Turk republic of letters, by that I mean a 
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transnational epistemic community of people somehow connected to CUP’s communication 
networks, interacting and communicating with each other mostly by mail and telegraph.20  
Dispersed in a post-war geography of war and revolution, the Young Turk movement and 
their friends corresponded among each other by way of letters delivered either by mail or 
entrusted couriers or wired by telegraph. Letters from far places like Afghanistan or Turkestan 
found eventually their way to Berlin or Switzerland. With restricted options for mobility and 
political gatherings in exile, the republic of letters was for the Young Turk leaders’ main space 
of interaction, where plans were hatched, actions were discussed, the past was reimagined, 
and the future envisioned anew. For the historian, these letters establish the chronology of 
the events and the epistemology of the community. Additional context and information can 
also be found in other private papers such as diary journals. For instance, Cavid Bey’s diary, 
in which he usually noted, when he received and wrote a letter, confirms and complements 
the content and context of the letters.21  
One collection of private papers has been published by the CUP’s former publicist Hüseyin 
Cahit Yalçın in a series from October 15, 1944, to April 1, 1945, in the newspaper Tanin.22 
Both Cemal Pasha’s and Enver Pasha’s private papers are located at the archive of the Turkish 
Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu, TTK).23 A relevant part of Enver Pasha’s papers at 
 
20 This is, of course, a tongue-in-cheek reference to the «res publica literaria» of the 17th and 18th centuries in 
Europe that connected a transnational epistemic community of intellectuals and scholars. See, for instance: 
Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
21 Cavid Bey’s diary, which is today located at the archive of the Turkish Historical Society in Ankara, was 
first published in an abridged version as a series in the newspaper Tanin from August 11, 1945, to December 
22, 1946. This edition has been published in: Cavid Bey, Felaket Günleri: Mütareke Devrinin Feci Tarihi, 2 
vols., ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2000). The full diary has been recently 
published as Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, 4 vols., ed. Hasan Babacan and Servet Avşar (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014–2015). 
22 These letters are probably from the private papers of Cavid Bey or Dr. Nazım Bey—someone, who was 
close to Hüseyin Cahit and perhaps was already passed away in 1940s. Unfortunately, it is not known to me, 
where the original letters are held today. There is some censorship and omission in the letters noted by the 
editor in footnotes or brackets, other than that we are pretty much depended on the bona fides of the editor 
Hüseyin Cahit and his Unionist bias. Nonetheless, the general chronology, content, and style of the letters is 
undoubtly authentic and correspons to the other collection of letters that survived. Copies of some of the 
letters which were found in archives are identical to those in this collection. For the sake of accessibility, I 
used the edited version, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds., İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli 
Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002).  
23 I went through most of the related material in the Enver Pasha collection at the TTK. Cemal Pasha’s papers 
were catalogued only in broad typological categories in different boxes at the time of my visit, therefore I 
could only cursorily use these documents.  
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the TTK archives was published by Masayuki Yamauchi.24 Also Arı İnan published a selected 
collection of hundreds of letters from Enver Pasha’s papers at the TTK.25 The other half of 
Enver Pasha’s private papers are at the family archive of Enver’s grandson Osman Mayapetek. 
These private papers are curated by journalist and popular historian Murat Bardakçı, who 
has recently published them in two volumes.26 Murat Bardakçı also published hundreds of 
letters and other documents from his own collection of private papers of senior CUP mem-
bers like Talat Pasha, Cavid Bey, Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), and others.27  
Many documents and letters from the officials of the Ankara Government are integral part 
of the Young Turk republic of letters as well. I had access to some of these documents in the 
Turkish Military Archives (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı, ATASE)28 
as well as at the archive of the Institute of the Turkish Revolution History (Türk İnkılap 
Tarihi Enstitüsü, TİTE) at the University of Ankara. Countless other letters and documents 
from the private papers of senior officials of the Ankara Government has been published in 
their memoirs or in edited volumes.   
Speaking of memoirs, these offer productive co-texts to the letters and illustrate the retro-
spective processing of memory. Although Talat and Cemal left behind memoirs that were 
published posthumously, these memoirs do not have any valuable content regarding their 
 
24 Masayuki Yamauchi edited and published nearly two hundred letters in transliteration. Yamauchi, The 
Green Crescent under the Red Star. For the Turkish translation see: Masayuki Yamauchi, Hoşnut Olamamış 
Adam – Enver Paşa: Türkiye’den Türkistan’a (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995). For some of the minor 
misreadings in Yamauchi’s edition see: Bardakçı, Enver, 588–589, note 129. When I made reference to the 
letters from the TTK archives that were also in Yamauchi’s selection, I gave the page number in the 
Yamauchi’s book and the call number in the Enver Pasha Collection (EP) at the TTK archive.  
25 İnan’s selection covers the correspondance between Enver Pasha, his brother Kamil Bey, and his wife 
Naciye Sultan. There is no chronological focus, the letters are from the years 1909–1922. For some reason, 
İnan does not mention the origin of her sources, but they are definitely from the Enver Pasha Collection at 
the TTK archives. Arı İnan, ed., Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997). 
26 Bardakçı, Enver, 29, 403–566; Murat Bardakçı, ed., Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Naciye 
Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yazdığı Sürgün Mektupları (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 
2016). 
27 Murat Bardakçı, ed., Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan 
Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hususi Yazışmalar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009); Murat Bardakçı, ed., 
İttihadçı’nın Sandığı: İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Özel Arşivlerindeki Yayınlanmamış Belgeler ile Atatürk ve 
İnönü Dönemlerinde Ermeni Gayrimenkulleri Konusunda Alınmış Bazı Kararlar (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası 
Yayınları, 2013). 
28 Some of these letters has been also published in various studies and document collections. See: Hülya 
Baykal, “Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile Cemal Paşa arasında Yazışmalar,” Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi 5, no. 14 (1989): 379–439; Atatürk Özel Arşivinden Seçmeler, 4 vols. (Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1992–1996). 
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activities in the post-war years.29 Although the CUP leaders are mentioned in numerous 
memoirs of their friends, foes, and acquaintances, there are two memoirs that cover the exile 
activities of the Young Turk leaders from beginning to end and need to be introduced be-
forehand. Arif Cemil (Denker) was the correspondent of the CUP’s mouthpiece Tanin in 
Berlin and after the war he became the assistant of Talat Pasha in exile. He published his 
memoirs under the title «The [Committee of] Union and Progress Leaders’ Adventures in 
Foreign Lands» (İttihad ve Terakki Rüesasının Diyar-ı Gurbet Maceraları) as a series in the 
newspaper Tevhid-i Efkar in Constantinople from May 14 to July 13, 1922.30 Thus, the series 
was published in a time as Cemal and Enver were still living and struggling abroad so that 
the series attracted a great deal of attention.31 The second memoir is that of Emir Shakib 
 
29 These memoirs were written during their exile in Germany as apologetic accounts to clear their name from 
the allegations of war-crimes. See: Hülya Adak, “Identifying the ‘Internal Tumors’ of World War I: Talat 
Paşa’nın Hatıraları [Talat Paşa’s Memoirs], or the Travels of a Unionist Apologia into ‘History’,” in Räume 
des Selbst: Selbstzeugnisforschung transkulturell, ed. Andreas Bähr, Peter Burschel and Gabriele Jancke 
(Köln: Böhlau, 2007), 151–69. A detailed account on the publication stories of Cemal Pasha’s and Talat 
Pasha’s memoirs can be found in Hikmet Özdemir, Ermeni İddialari Karşısında Türkiye’nin Birikimi (Ankara: 
TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2008), 31–38. Talat Pasha’s memoir was published in 
different versions based on different manuscripts in Turkish and German. The Turkish manuscrict was first 
published as a series in the Constantinople newspaper Yeni Şafak from November 29 to December 29, 1921. 
This version was republished in Talat Pasha, Hatıralarım ve Müdafaam (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006). A 
back-translation from the German translation was published by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in Tanin from April 3 
to June 1, 1945. See also: Talat Pasha, Talat Paşa’nın Hatıraları, ed. Enver Bolayır (İstanbul: Güven Basım ve 
Yayınevi, 1946). For more background information see: Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 266–67. 
Cemal Pasha’s memoirs were first published in German after his death and than in English and Turkish in 
the same year. Cemal Pasha, Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes, 2nd ed. (München: Drei-Masken-
Verl, 1922); Cemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman: 1913–1919 (New York: George H. Doran 
Company, 1922); Cemal Pasha, Hatırat, 1913–1919 (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan ve Şürekası Matbaası, 1922). 
There are currently several editions of Cemal’s memoirs in the Turkish book market. Cemal Pasha, Hatırat, 
ed. Metin Martı (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2001).  
30 Later he also republished his memoir in the weekly journal Hafta in 1934. For the sake of easier access for 
the readers, I used the edited version, Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel 
Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1992). Arif Cemil also authored a historical novel on the very same 
subject, which tells the fictionalized story of a two of Azerbaijani adventurers, who try to smuggle arms from 
Germany to Enver Pasha in Turkestan. Arif Cemil Denker, Esrarengiz Kervan: Bir Teşkilat-ı Mahsusacı’nın 
Romanı (İstanbul: Hitapevi, 2015). Before that in the early years of the war he was also associated with the 
activities of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. See: Arif Cemil Denker, Birinci Dünya Savaşında Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (İstanbul: 
Arma Yayınları, 2006). 
31 There were immediately harsh reactions in Constantinople newspapers, criticizing the Arif Cemil and the 
CUP leaders. For the whole debate see: Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 151–80. The series 
attracted also the attention of the leaders of the National Struggle. See Karabekir’s recollection and the 
correspondence with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the summer of 1922 regarding Arif Cemil’s claims that the 
National Struggle was organized by the CUP: Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 
1960), 1068–70. Arif Cemil’s series was simultaneously published in Armenian translation in the newspaper 
Verchin Loor (May-June 1922), cited in Jan Kirakossian, The Armenian Genocide: The Young Turks before the 
Judgment of History (Madison: Sphinx Press, 1992), 176. Arif Cemil’s series was also one of the main sources 
in Omer Kiazim, Angora et Berlin: Le complot germano=kémaliste contre le Traité de Versailles (Paris: L’Édition 
Universelle, 1922). 
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Arslan. Emir Shakib Arslan was a Druze prince from Lebanon and an Ottoman deputy. 
Arslan was an active voice of Ottomanism and pan-Islam and later in his life became a sup-
porter of (pan-) Arab nationalism.32 In his autobiography, Shakib Arslan contributed a re-
markable section to the exile activities of Talat, Cemal, and Enver.33 These memoirs are, of 
course, biased and apologetic, but invaluable as a primary source in supplying vivid and nar-
rative co-texts. Young Turk memoirs needs to be read, as Erik Jan Zürcher demonstrated, 
critically against the grain of post-Ottoman teleologies and interpersonal rivalries.34 Still to-
day, Young Turk memoirs has a popular readership in Turkey, where «politics of memoirs» 
remains to be a vibrant field between competing political identities.35  
Enver Pasha’s final quest along the Basmachi rebels in Turkestan constitute a particularly 
important episode in Enver’s popular heroization as the martyr of pan-Turkism.36 Neverthe-
less, I will only remotely deal with Enver’s activities within the Basmachi insurgency in Tur-
kestan. The reason for this omission is a matter of focus. I argue that Union of Muslim 
Revolutionary Societies was practically dissolved at the time of Enver’s volte-face to the anti-
 
32 There are countless works on Shakib Arslan. For a brief sample see: E. Lévi-Provençal, “L'Emir Shakib 
Arslan,” Cahiers de l’Orient contemporain 9-10 (1947): 5–19; William L. Cleveland, Islam against the West: 
Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985); Mahmoud 
Haddad, “The Ideas of Amir Shakib Arslan Before and After the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire,” in Views 
from the Edge: Essays in Honor of Richard W. Bulliet, ed. Neguin Yavari et al. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004), 101–15; Axel Havemann, “The Impact of the First World War on Lebanon’s History and 
Memory: The Case of Shakīb Arslān (1869–1946),” in The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of 
the Eastern Mediterranean, ed. Olaf Farschid, Manfred Kropp and Stephan Dähne (Beirut: Ergon Verlag, 
2006), 213–21. For a recent biographical survey see: Mehdi Sajid, Muslime im Zwischenkriegseuropa und die 
Dekonstruktion der Faszination vom Westen: Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Šakīb ʾArslāns Artikeln in der 
ägyptischen Zeitschrift al-Fatḥ (1926–1935) (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2015), 37–153. 
33 Shakib Arslan, Sira dhatiya, ed. Sauthan a.-N. Nasr (Al-Muhtara: Ad-dar at-Taqaddumiyya, 2008), 173–
207. This chapter of the book was first translated into Turkish as Shakib Arslan, Şehit Enver Paşa ve 
Arkadaşları, ed. Aziz Akpınarlı (Samsun: Samsun İl Matbaası, 1948). There have been numerous editions of 
this Turkish translation by various publishing houses in the recent years, I used the following: Shakib Arslan, 
Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2005).  
34 Zürcher’s innovative reading of memoirs was first demonstrated in Zürcher, The Unionist Factor, and this 
approach remains still to be the core of his methodology. There was a boom of political memoirs by the 
Young Turk generation in 1950s and 1960s due to a relaxation of the political pressure of the Kemalist 
hegemony. These memoirs laid the foundations of an alternative history-writing that went beyond the 
«official» history in Turkey. Erik J. Zürcher, “Young Turk Memoirs as a Historical Source: Kazım Karabekir's 
İstiklal Harbimiz,” in The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building, 17–18. 
35 See the excellent survey by Doğan Gürpınar, “The Politics of Memoirs and Memoir-Publishing in 
Twentieth Century Turkey,” Turkish Studies 13, no. 3 (2012): 537–57. 
36 Kurt Okay, Enver Pascha, der große Freund Deutschlands (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1935); Egon von 
Bahder, Enver Pascha: Kampf und Tod in Turkistan (Berlin: Verlag ‘Die Wehrmacht’, 1943); Kandemir, Şehit 
Enver Paşa Türkistan’da; Kutay, Enver Paşa Lenin’e Karşı; Erer, Enver Paşa'nın Türkistan Kurtuluş Savaşı; 
Kösoğlu, Şehit Enver Paşa. 
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Soviet insurgents. Enver’s efforts to regroup the movement after the death of Talat Pasha had 
ended up in the disintegration of the organization. When Enver attempted to intervene into 
Anatolian affairs, the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies literally became a stalking 
horse for the Committee of Union and Progress and lost its purpose. Enver’s decision to 
break with the Bolsheviks and join the Basmachi insurgents was an individual move out of 
frustration and misinformation that ultimately cut him loose from rest of the networks. From 
there on, Enver’s story becomes indeed an individual (biographical) quest and an integral 
part of a history of national liberation of Turkestanis—both aspects lie, however, beyond the 
focus of this study.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is, again, no lack of available sources on the Tur-
kestan episode. Enver Pasha’s private papers in the publications of Yamauchi, İnan, and 
Bardakçı offer countless sources in addition to the great amount of unpublished material in 
the TTK archives. Certain Soviet documents on Enver’s activities, which are said to be una-
vailable for researchers to this day, has been leaked and published in Turkey after the fall of 
the Soviet Union.37 The Young Turk republic of letters continues to deliver invaluable in-
formation on the Turkestan episode as well.38 Yet, most of the latter sources has been carefully 
studied in recent years.39 I leave the study of the Basmachi movement to another occasion 
 
37 It is said that the Enver Pasha dossiers were briefly opened to scholars after the fall of the Soviet Union, but 
were restricted shortly thereafter allegedly because of the pressure of Moscow. Part of these documents were 
published in Ülkü, KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa. Similarly, Uzbek author Nabican Bakiyev was allowed to 
conduct archival research in KGB archives and archives of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
in the years 1988–1991 and wrote a historical novel on Enver Pasha and the Basmachi movement, in which 
he also published and quoted some of the secret documents. The book is composed of imaginary letters by the 
author to Enver Pasha’s son Ali Enver (since Bakiyev did not know his name he named him Cengiz instead), 
informing him of his late father’s achievements in Turkestan. It was first published as a series in the journal 
Sharq Yulduzi in 2004. As a monograph it was first published in Turkish translation in Nabican Bakiyev, 
Enver Paşa’nın Vasiyeti, ed. Çağatay Koçar (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006). I am grateful to the Dr. 
Bakiyev for sharing the Uzbek edition of book with me. Nabican Bakiyev, Chingiz Afandiga Maktublar: Envar 
Poshoning Vasiyati (Tashkent, 2006). 
38 There are three additional memoirs from Enver Pasha’s staff officers in Turkestan who published their 
memoirs. See: Muhiddin Bey, Bekirağa Bölüğünden Türkistan’a Yaver, ed. Yusuf Gedikli (İstanbul: Ufuk 
Ötesi Yayınları, 2003), first published as a series in the newspaper Vakit, from November 12 to December 23, 
1923; Yaver Suphi Bey, Enver Paşa’nın Son Günleri, ed. Mehmet Kuzu (İstanbul: Çatı Yayınları, 2007), first 
published as a series in the newspaper Yeni Sabah, from October 24, 1938, to January 2, 1939; Abdullah 
Recep Baysun, Türkistan Milli Haraketleri. İstanbul: Zaman Kitabevi, 1943. I cited the the most recent 
edition, Türkistan İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı, 2001). 
39 Ali Bademci is perhaps the most knowledgeable historian on Enver Pasha’s Basmachi episode in Turkey 
who published the private papers and memoirs of Enver’s Turkestani fellow combatants who had found 
refuge in Turkey. Bademci, 1917–1934 Türkistan Milli İstiklal Hareketi Korbaşılar ve Enver Paşa; Ali 
Bademci, Sarıklı Basmacı: Türkistan’da Enver Paşa’nın Umumi Muhaberat Müdürü Molla Nafiz’in Hatıraları 
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and perhaps rather to area specialists in Soviet and Central Asian studies.40 Instead of analyz-
ing the Basmachi movement from within, I will rather put it in a wider context and elaborate 
on the impact of Enver’s individual actions within the broader context of international affairs 
and transnational networks as well as discuss the political sense-making of this episode in 
contemporary rumors and conspiracy theories. 
*** 
This introduction will be followed by a theoretical and conceptual chapter, Making Sense of 
Transnational Contentious Politics at the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1918–1922, that will 
explain the historiographical approach, theoretical assumptions, and key concepts of the 
book. Each chapter of the main story is designed more or less as a stand-alone essay with an 
analytical or thematic focus. In their narrative composition, the chapters diachronically fol-
low a story-line. The Prologue begins with the eleventh hour of World War I, as Grand Vizier 
Talat Pasha made an official visit to Germany. This episode showcases the continuities and 
discontinuities in their path from empire to exile. Chapter 1 deals with political maneuvers 
of the CUP, as they fled into an exile. For the CUP regime, going into exile meant escaping 
the consequences of their wartime policies. Chapter 2 shows trajectories and continuities of 
paramilitary violence and pan-Islamist propaganda from war to resistance. Before the CUP 
leaders left the Ottoman Empire, they activated their underground and resistance networks 
to continue the fighting against armistice and occupation. Chapter 3 showcases how war and 
revolution bring about their own contingencies and discusses how various local factors in 
Germany and Russia affected the exile activities of the CUP leaders in the winter of 1918-
1919.  
 
(İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2010). Murat Bardakçı’s chapter Turan or Islam? from his recent biography of 
Enver Pasha, in which he made use of Bademci’s expertise and used the extensive dairly-like letters of Enver 
Pasha to his wife Naciye Sultan as well as other available Turkish sources, should be consulted at first place. 
Bardakçı, Enver, 291–375. 
40 For a study on the Basmachi movement that is based on Soviet archival documents see: Aleksandr Igorevič 
Pylev, Basmachestvo b Srednej Azii: Etnopoliticheskij Srez (Vzgljad iz XXI Veka) (Bishkek: Yuchenym Sovetom 
Gumanitarnogo Fakul’teta KRSU, 2006). Though only a semi-academic study, a number Soviet documents 
are used and published also in İdil, Enver Paşa’nın Son Savaşı. There is a plethora of research on the Basmachi 
movement so that an overview is not possible at this place. For a contemporary Soviet account on Enver 
Pasha’s subversive activities in Turkestan see: D. Soloveichik, “Revoliutsionnaia Bukhara,” Novyi Vostok, no. 2 
(1922): 274–284, cited in Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923 (London: Macmillan, 
1961), 338.  
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The dialectic of conspiracy is the central topic of Chapter 4. Although the CUP leaders had 
barely began reorganizing themselves politically, wild rumors and conspiracy theories already 
started to surface in public and official documents in the spring and summer of 1919. Trans-
national relations of the CUP leaders are mapped out in Chapter 5. Their relations to Bol-
sheviks, Entente states, Arabs in Syria, and Kemalists in Anatolia demonstrate the disconnec-
tions between intentions and perceptions. Chapter 6 deals with the relation of CUP leaders 
to their friends from the military-industrial complex in Germany. Enver’s first flight attempt 
to reach Moscow and the complications that followed delivers a picture of CUP-German 
relations that challenges the conventional wisdom. Further contingencies of transnational 
mobility are illustrated in Chapter 7, where Enver’s various flight attempts are unfolded. As 
it will be argued, the delay in reaching Moscow had political consequences. The ambiguous 
status of CUP leaders as non-state actors caused misperceptions with mixed results in their 
dealings with Soviet Russia, Kemalist Turkey, and Weimar Germany. In Chapter 8, the Baku 
Congress is discussed as a space of contentious visions. Not only Enver’s difficult relationship 
with the Bolshevik leadership first became apparent, but also near and distant observers had 
conflicting perceptions of what the congress politically represented. Chapter 9 goes into the 
organization of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies and contrasts the reality and 
fiction in the organization of transnational contentious politics.  
The assassination of Talat Pasha and its public aftermath is considered in Chapter 10 as a 
showdown of transnational contentious politics. The Operation Nemesis of the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation that assassinated Talat will be mirrored in their organization and 
activism to the CUP networks. The increasing isolation of the CUP leaders is the topic of 
Chapter 11. The CUP leaders found themselves stuck between national and international 
rivalries. In their attempt to enhance their hand, they gambled away their remaining political 
credit as Enver attempted to enter Anatolia and later joined the Basmachi insurgency. This 
was practically the end of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Chapter 12 is de-
voted to the final activities of the CUP leaders. Cemal’s efforts in reforming the Afghan army 
as well as his personal diplomacy with Berlin, Paris, Ankara, and Moscow shows the limits 
they reached as transnational actors. Enver’s break with the Soviets strategically limited the 
political maneuverability of remaining CUP networks abroad. Historiographical implications 
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as well as the historical consequences of the Young Turk aftermath will be summarized and 
addressed in the final Conclusion.
The Young Turk Aftermath 
19 
Making Sense of Transnational Contentious Politics at the End of the 
Ottoman Empire, 1918–1922 
«The war of the giants has ended, said Winston Churchill at the end of World War I and noted 
dismissively, the quarrels of the pygmies have begun.»1 However, those so-called «quarrels» proved 
to be of far greater consequence than the battles won and lost by the Great Powers in the trenches 
of Central European battlefields. The aftermath of World War I began as early as with the Russian 
Revolution in 1917 and then later with the armistice of 1918 and ended as soon as with the diplo-
matic settlement of 1922.2 I shall argue that the story of the fugitive CUP leaders tells an alternative 
history of the aftermath of World War I, in which a new world order was shaped after a complex 
period of war and revolution.  
As revolution and war comes generally not without the other, this was also the case after the Russian 
Revolution and the end of World War I.3 A wave of revolutions, wars, coup d’états, civil wars, mass 
violence, independence struggles, and numerous processes of state-formations emerged after 1917, 
respectively 1918.4 More than war and revolution, however, it was Western diplomacy that sealed 
the final deal. Thus, the map of the world in 1923 does not even remotely pay justice to the diverse 
moments and movements of anticolonial resistance that saw the light of the day during the after-
math of World War I. In this great phase of upheaval—as imperial historian John Darwin calls 
these years—the broader geography of Eurasia saw the end of the continental empires of the Ho-
henzollerns, Habsburgs, Romanovs, Ottomans, and Qajars.5 It is, of course, tempting to see forces 
 
1 Quoted in Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20 and ‘the Miracle on the Vistula’, 
New ed. (London: Pimlico, 2003), 21. 
2 I follow here David Fromkin that the settlement of 1922 marked the point of no return for the fate of the 
Middle East. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the 
Modern Middle East, 20th anniversary ed. (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 2009), 9–10. To be sure, the 
aftermath of World War I in the Middle East did not end in 1922. For instance, the year 1923 saw the Treaty of 
Lausanne with Turkey and the year 1924 saw the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, both major incidents for the 
history of Middle East. In addition, some uprisings continued to occur in Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Turkestan 
throughout the 1920s.  
3 Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 44. 
4 For overviews see: Peter Gatrell, “War after War: Conflicts, 1919–23,” in A Companion to the First World War, ed. 
John Horne (London: Blackwell, 2010), 558–75; Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Vectors of Violence: 
Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War, 1917–1923,” The Journal of Modern History 83, no. 3 (2011): 489–
512. To be sure, revolts and uprisings occurred also elsewhere in this time, for instance in Mexico and China.  
5 John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400–2000 (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 
402. For a comprehensive overview see: Alfred J. Rieber, The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of 
Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 532–614.  
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of nationalism behind the collapse of empires.6 This process of post-imperial nation-building and 
state-formation was discursively catalyzed by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin’s declaration on the 
rights of nations and US President Woodrow Wilson’s 14-point program, both legitimizing the 
right of self-determination for nations.7 In the East, the Russian Revolution replaced the former 
Russian Empire with Soviet Russia and a bloody civil war ensued.8 The downfall of the German 
and Austria-Hungarian empires brought the revolution to Central Europe, where socialists fought 
for new republics and reactionists violently defended the old orders and borders.9  
The face of the connected Muslim regions from North Africa over Middle East to Central and 
South Asia, which were long subjected to Western imperialism and colonialism received perhaps 
the most radical transformation of all.10 Nearly ten years of wars, revolutions, revolts, colonization, 
 
6 Especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union and rise of post-Soviet nation-states, nationalism gained more 
currency in explanations of imperial collapse. See, for instance: Rogers Brubaker, “Aftermaths of Empire and the 
Unmixing of Peoples,” in After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building, the Soviet Union and the Russian, 
Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, ed. Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 155–80; 
Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914–1923 
(London: Routledge, 2001). For a critical and comparative assessment see: Wesley Hiers and Andreas Wimmer, “Is 
Nationalism the Cause or Consequence of the End of Empire?,” in Nationalism and War, ed. John A. Hall and Siniša 
Malešević (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 212–54. Previously rather military and economic 
explanations were prominent, such as Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). 
7 Erez Manila rightly notes the fallacies of a Wilson vs. Lenin approach, but rather to underline Wilson’s superior 
impact in the colonial debates of early post-war years: It may be tempting, for example, to construe the ideological 
essence of 1919 as a clash between Wilsonian and communist internationalism; Wilson vs. Lenin is the influential 
phrase that Arno Mayer coined some decades ago. But while the Wilson versus Lenin framework is helpful, as Mayer 
used it, for understanding the struggle over the European Left at the time, it cannot be extended to the colonial 
world in 1919. Socialist ideas were influential among some colonial intellectuals at the time, and the Russian 
Bolsheviks also used the language of self-determination, but until late 1919 Wilson’s words carried far greater weight 
in the colonial world than Lenin’s. Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International 
Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6–7. See also: Arno Joseph Mayer, 
Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918 (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 
1969).  
8 Jon Smele, The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916–1926: Ten Years that Shook the World (London: Hurst, 2015); Peter 
Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2002). 
9 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, eds., War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); Klaus Weinhauer, Anthony McEllgott and Kirsten Heinsohn, eds., Germany 1916–
23: A Revolution in Context (Bielefeld: transcript, 2015); István Déak, “Habsburg Empire,” in Barkey and Hagen, 
After Empire, 129–41. 
10 There is some analytical value in seeing the Great Game geographies of Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and India 
and the Eastern Question geographies in the Ottoman Near and Middle East and Colonial North Africa in a 
connected framework. See also: Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 8–9. It is even more a pity that Malcolm Yapp, 
although himself a historian of the Great Game region, neglected this geography and concentrated solely on the 
Eastern Question in his Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East: 1792–1923, 8th ed. (London: 
Longman, 1996), 301–51.   
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genocides, famines, diseases, and mass migrations irreversibly changed the political landscape, de-
mography, and social fabric of the Middle East. The last Islamic empires of the Ottomans and 
Qajars (though the latter was no more an empire in the strict sense of the word) disappeared from 
the political maps.11 They were replaced with newly created nation-states—few of them by their 
own efforts and others by Great Power decrees.12 The downfall of the Ottoman Empire was a 
decade-long cataclysmic process that was destructive and creative at the same time.13 The after-
math of World War I was a period of state-making for Muslim elites and rulers in this connected 
geography, where many states were founded and only few survived.14 As David Fromkin writes, for 
the history of the Middle East these years that followed the Great War were «creative, formative 
years, in which everything seemed (and may indeed have been) possible.»15  
The victors of the Great War were not spared from upheavals either. The French Republic was not 
welcome in the newly possessed Syria and suffered from uprisings in its older possessions in North 
Africa.16 British Empire had reached limits of its imperial overextension. Never was British impe-
rial history more closely entwined with world history and vice versa, wrote Adam Tooze on the 
Great War era, an entanglement that continued perforce into the post-war period.17 On the one 
hand the Irish War of Independence, the Third Anglo-Afghan War, and the uprisings in India 
haunted the British Empire in its old possessions. On the other hand, the more recently «liberated» 
Arab lands from the Turkish yoke, namely Egypt, Transjordan, Hejaz, Palestine, and Iraq, were 
plagued with anticolonial revolutions and revolts in the immediate years after the war. The Crisis 
 
11 Maurus Reinkowski, “Das Osmanische Reich – ein antikoloniales Imperium?,” Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies 
in Contemporary Histors 3, no. 1 (2006): 34–54. 
12 James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, 2nd (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 171–
96. 
13 Hans-Lukas Kieser, Kerem Öktem, and Maurus Reinkowski, “Introduction,” in World War I and the End of the 
Ottomans: From the Balkan Wars to the Armenian Genocide, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser, Kerem Öktem and Maurus 
Reinkowski, 1–26 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 5–6.  
14 Stefan Reichmuth, “Der Erste Weltkrieg und die muslimischen Republiken der Nachkriegszeit,” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 40 (2014): 184–213; Stefan Reichmuth, “The Transformation of Muslim Societies and the 
Reorganization of Muslim Statehood during and after the First World War,” in The World during the First World 
War, ed. Helmut Bley and Anorthe Kremers (Essen: Klartext, 2014), 47–58; Alp Yenen, “Approaching 
Transnational Political History: The Role of Non-State Actors in Post-Ottoman State-Formation,” in Transnational 
Actors – Crossing Borders: Transnational History Studies, ed. Steffi Marung and Matthias Middell, 261–70 
(Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2015), 268–69. 
15 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 9. 
16 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2008), 145–72. 
17 J. Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order 1916–1931 (London: Allen Lane, 
2014), 20. 
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of Empire in the aftermath of the Great War interconnected seemingly unrelated affairs in far-
away regions with each other. Edwin Samuel Montagu, the State Secretary for India, noted in 1921: 
The concessions which look likely to be necessary in Ireland harden public opinion against any 
new concessions in Egypt. Anything that is done as to complete independence of Egypt might 
appear to encourage Indian extremists.18 
While European diplomats were discussing the new face of the Middle East in peace conferences 
in London, Paris, and San Remo, subaltern voices and forces were challenging the post-war settle-
ment from below.19 The partition of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious powers caused an 
unexpected shock throughout the Muslim world. Indian Muslims expressed their resentment and 
organized protest movements.20 Palestinian historian Awad Halabi speaks of liminal years, since 
the Ottoman regime was not replaced by the Mandate system over night. This liminality was 
manifested in the connections Palestinians maintained with the Ottoman empire, as Halabi ar-
gues, many Muslims continued to respect Ottoman religious authority as personified by the Sul-
tan-Caliph [and] Palestinians also viewed Turks not as former oppressors but as fellow Muslims 
waging a similar struggle against European occupation […].21  
Michael Provence aptly challenged the conventional wisdom by illustrating connections in time 
and space within the Ottoman world that went clearly beyond alleged national boundaries and 
post-imperial ruptures: Ottoman officers and veterans led all the movements of armed resistance 
and national liberation, however defined or articulated, between 1918 and 1948 in the Middle 
East.22 I follow Provence’s argument that we should not view the post-Ottoman revolts as separate 
movements of national liberation but rather as locally conditioned elements of a single, undiffer-
entiated struggle.23 Different groups of local insurgents in the Middle East shared cross-border 
 
18 Edwin Samuel Montagu, telegram to Lord Reading, November 4, 1921, quoted in John Gallagher, “Nationalisms 
and the Crisis of Empire, 1919–1922,” Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 3 (1981): 368. 
19 For a detailed assessment of the historiography of the emergence of modern states in the Middle East, see: Charles 
D. Smith, “The Historiography of World War I and the Emergence of the Contemporary Middle East,” in Middle 
East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century, ed. Israel Gershoni, Amy Singer and Y. Hakan Erdem 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 39–69. 
20 Azmi Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877–1924) (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 184–
204; M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1999). 
21 Awad Halabi, “Liminal Loyalties: Ottomanism and Palestinian Responses to the Turkish War of Independence, 
1919–22,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41, no. 3 (2012): 22. 
22 Michael Provence, “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (2011): 207. 
23 Provence, “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East,” 207. 
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Ottoman-Islamic solidarity, mutual inspiration as revolutionaries, and zeal to fight the colonial 
occupation. Elsewhere, I called this common spirit a Young Turk zeitgeist.24 I argue for the ne-
cessity of an alternate reading of this period, with a particular focus on political interconnections, 
fluid political identities, and shared world of anticolonial movements of the Middle East.  
The outcome of the aftermath of World War I resulted in the climax of Entente and Soviet expan-
sion over the connected Muslim lands. The CUP leaders were engaged in an anticolonial struggle 
for the liberation of the Muslim world from foreign rule and belong to the losers of this brief era. 
Although I am far from championing the CUP leaders as the spearhead of post-war anticolonial 
Muslim nationalism, they still need to be embedded in this historical context of anticolonial and 
liberation movements. As I will show, they perceived and framed their struggle as part of a global 
struggle of Muslims and other oppressed people against the Western (and later Soviet) imperialism. 
The Young Turk generation had an ambivalent relationship to imperialism and anti-imperialism 
and this became once again clear after they left their empire behind.25 
The story of the Young Turk exile tells an alternative history of the aftermath of World War I. By 
alternative, I mean a transnational history. The political activities and interactions of the fugitive 
CUP leaders can be traced in a connected geography from the Ottoman Empire to Germany and 
to other European metropoles, from East Europe to Russia, from the Caucasus to Central Asia and 
Afghanistan. The exile activities of the CUP leaders provide a transnational perspective because 
their movement transcended the rigid boundaries of the national. Yet, their interactions remained 
below the standards of what is considered international relations, i.e. interstate relations. Thus, the 
aspect of transnationalism comes into picture. By contextualizing the political processes in connec-
tion to their socio-political settings and in interaction with their near and distant political partners 
and adversaries, I show that their history is remarkably intertwined with the global moments and 
movements of the aftermath of World War I in a connected human geography.26  
 
24 Alp Yenen, “The ‘Young Turk Zeitgeist’ in the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I,” in 
War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad, 1181–1216 (Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016), 1203. 
25 Although Young Turk regime had its own imperial ambitions and civilizing missions in the Ottoman Empire, 
nonetheless, it is undisputable that anti-imperialism and anticolonialism (as well as anti-Westernism) was a major 
force in the Young Turk movement. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 302–5. 
26 For global movements and moments see: Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Introduction: 
Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s,” in Competing Visions of 
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According to historian Akira Iriye, transnational history is the study of movements and forces that 
cut across national boundaries.27 There is a certain paradox, when transnationalism is defined by 
overcoming national boundaries, but simultaneously by making itself depended on the existence of 
national norms and structures.28 One can argue that modern social sciences and history-writing 
were born with the original sin of methodological nationalism, namely that nations, nation-states, 
and nationalism predetermine scholarly methodologies and epistemologies.29 Although overcoming 
methodological nationalism is important, the reality of nation-states remain irrefutable at the same 
time.30 In Asia and Africa, where nation-building and nation-state formation were late-comers, the 
concept of transnationalism can be even more problematic, as scholars of area studies rightly 
cautioned.31 For the sake of convenience, I will, nevertheless, stick to the term transnational, be-
cause it programmatically challenges the methodological nationalism and lies on mental maps in-
stinctively somewhere between the local (national) and the global (international).32 I define trans-
national history simply as history of trans-spatial mobility and cross-cultural encounters of actors, 
ideas, and commodities between distinctly defined political, cultural, and territorial spaces.33  
 
World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1–25. 
27 Akira Iriye, “Transnational History,” Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (2004): 213. 
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History,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 159–80. 
29 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, 
Migration and the Social Sciences,” Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 301–34. 
30 For a critical assessment see: Daniel Chernilo, “Social Theory’s Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality,” 
European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 1 (2006): 5–22; Daniel Chernilo, “The Critique of Methodological 
Nationalism: Theory and History,” Thesis Eleven 106, no. 1 (2011): 98–117. 
31 The alternatively proposed term translocality is meant to underline the local experiences of the Global South 
across and within different spaces. Ulrike Freitag and Achim v. Oppen, “‘Translocality’: An Approach to Connection 
and Transfer in Regional Studies,” in Translocality: The Study of Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective, ed. 
Ulrike Freitag and Achim v. Oppen, 1–21 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 3, 12. Translocality was originally coined by the 
renowned scholar of anthropology, Arjun Appadurai. For his definition see: Arjun Appadurai, “The Production of 
Locality,” in Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, 178–99 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), 192.  
32 If one looks implicitly for an umbrella term covering all the different forms of local or global exchanges, 
interactions, and experiences between two or more distinct political, cultural, and territorial spaces, then trans-
spatiality would be the suited term. Unlike translocality, transnationalism, and globalism, space/spatial/spatiality 
does not have a direct antonym or dimensional alternatives. However, I do not see the necessity of imposing an 
alternative term, where transnationalism serves the purpose.  
33 Transnational history became a fashionable new paradigm in Europe since the 2000s. For survey of the field: 
Margrit Pernau, Transnationale Geschichte (Stuttgart: UTB GmbH, 2011), 36–84. Different European 
historiography trends and research initiatives, such as Histoire croisée, Transfergeschichte, and geteilte Geschichte, 
supplied programmatic research agendas towards a transnationalization of history-writing by going beyond 
traditional comparative history. See: Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire 
Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45, no. 1 (2006): 30–50; Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen 
Schriewer, eds., Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt: 
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The promise of transnational history might also turn hollow, since it offers primarily a self-reflexive 
perspective instead of a theory or method.34 Hannes Siegrist warned that transnational history de-
mands a profound acquaintance of social theories and history-writing methods, because the multi-
plication and entanglement of spatial entities, narrative perspectives, and complex interactions is 
an analytical challenge which needs to be processed accordingly.35 Also new analytical tools, such 
as network analysis, might not always deliver the desired explanatory leverage. If a network is a 
network, because it is a network, then there is danger of tautology. If one is inclined to find con-
nections, one will find those. The obsession with networks and interconnections in history is some-
times even not far from conspiracy thinking (Verschwörungsdenken), as it will discussed later.36 
Tracing entanglements and networks in transnational or global history might lead to a self-serving 
fetish, if not appropriately evaluated and conceptualized, as global historian Sebastian Conrad 
warns:  
It is not enough to prove relations and links. […] Rather, it must therefore go to analyze exactly 
what role did the entanglements have, how much was their influence, for which groups, in what 
respects. And also the resulting limits must be defined more rigorously, both in terms of the 
effect of transfer processes and the limits of networking.37   
To come back to the protagonists of our story, the fugitive Young Turk leaders—despite being 
marginalized political actors cast away from the decision centers of post-war settlement—continued 
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to extend their political networks and influence others. This deserves an explanation beyond the 
banality of transnationalism and the tautology and conspiracy thinking of the network approach. 
*** 
Political science and political sociology offer a particular conceptualization of transnationalism 
worth a glance from a historian’s perspective. Transnational relations were first paradigmatically 
approached under the lead of two prominent scholars of International Relations, Joseph Nye and 
Robert Keohane, who defined transnational interactions as cross-border activities, in which at least 
one non-state actor is involved.38 This non-state clause is still the basis of all definitions of transna-
tional relations in its political sense.39 Hence, the nation in political transnationalism, refers 
rather to a (nation-) state, than to an ethnic-religious nation.40 The study of transnational relations 
led to a critical assessment of the interrelation between national and international structures and 
the agency of networks and social movement organizations.41 The organization of such non-state 
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actors with each other rather resembles non-hierarchical and reciprocal networks than the organiza-
tion of states and community of states.42 Political Scientists Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, 
define non-state actors as «largely or entirely autonomous […] from political impulses beyond state 
control and direction» and «operating as or participating in networks which extend across the 
boundaries of two or more states—thus engaging in transnational relations» in order to «affect 
political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions».43 Trans-
national politics breaks with the alleged homogeneity and hegemony of the state, because it is based 
on the political reality that people interact in foreign and multiple settings and also beneath or 
beyond the mandate of states.44 By introducing new political actors outside state control and direc-
tion, different phenomena [such] as overlapping authorities, split loyalties, and divided sover-
eignty must be taken into consideration.45  
Empirically seen, most non-state actors are, however, rather ambiguous in their nature and do not 
neatly fit into the state vs. non-state binary. There are several shades of gray when it comes to 
statehood, such as quasi-states, pseudo-states, or para-states.46 There are also other non-state actors 
that are rather working on behalf of or in conjunction with state actors without being part of them. 
These gray areas are surely more common than the pure ideal type of the non-state actor.  
Non-state actors vary also by their functions and intentions, hence normativity. As former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned, however, not all non-state actors are good.47 Since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the transnational capacity of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars as well 
 
42 For networks see: Walter W. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” Reseach in 
Organizational Behavior 12 (1990): 295–336. 
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World Politics, eds. Daphne Josselin and William Wallace. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 3–4. 
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47 Quoted in Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-
State Actors (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 8. The literature on non-state actors is mostly about the good or 
idealized non-state actors, such as humanitarian, philanthropist, or environmental organizations, where the scholars 
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as the role of violent and armed non-sate actors in conflicts became irreversibly evident.48 Thus, 
various groups such as rebels and guerrillas, militias and paramilitaries, assassins and terrorists, clan 
chiefs and warlords, criminal organizations and smuggling bands, and mercenaries and private se-
curity companies are considered as non-state actors as well.49  
Since these kind of non-state actors are conducting organized violence outside the autonomy of 
states, they challenge the state’s monopoly over legitimate means of physical force—to speak with 
Max Weber.50 This means also that non-state actors are capable of conducting warfare across state 
borders.51 This is a clear transgression of the classical political theory—and myth—of the West-
phalian sovereignty, namely the nationalization of war (Verstaatlichung des Krieges) since the 
Westphalian Peace of 1648.52 According to the ontology of politics in the Westphalian age, trans-
national (and non-state) politics has been considered a subversion of the norm, although they have 
always been a part of its reality. Late Fred Halliday rightly noted:  The erosion of the Westphalian 
system rests upon a contemporary optic, and illusion.53  
To be sure, organized violence is not the sole reason for states to be suspicious of political activities 
of non-state actors. If legitimate means of physical force means coercion, then its counterpart is 
subversion—violent or non-violent. Subversive acts and movements, such as social revolutions, 
social movements, strikes, oppositional activism, secret meetings, even if they are not violent in 
their intention and organization, can similarly be condemned and coerced by state actors as such.54 
Not every «political entrepreneur» needs to be a «violent specialist»—to put it in Charles Tilly’s 
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terms.55 It is rather subversion, contention, and transgression that makes non-state actors a thorn 
in side of states. Leading scholars of political sociology and comparative politics coined the term 
contentious politics to describe a variety of related phenomena as a genre of politics as well as a shared 
research agenda:  
Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's 
interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which gov-
ernments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Contentious politics thus 
brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics. 
[Emphasis in original]56  
According to Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, similar causes and effects operate across the whole 
range of contentious politics, from viciously violent to pristinely peaceful.57 Thus, from non-vio-
lent resistance to terrorism, there is an analytical common ground of contentious politics. Tilly and 
Tarrow also underline that it is important to look beyond the nation-state at processes such as the 
shift of some contention to international institutions, the framing of local issues as the results of 
global problems, and the formation of transnational networks, and movements coalitions.58 The 
asymmetric transnational relations between non-state actors and state actors is one important issue. 
Non-state actors engage in transnational relations with state actors to put international pressure on 
an opponent state.59 State actors can also maintain transnational relations with non-state actors in 
order to intervene into foreign domestic politics or to delegate conflicts.60  
*** 
To look for transnational contentious politics and non-state actors in history is not an analytical 
anachronism. The years between 1880 until 1930s are considered as the so-called first golden age 
of non-state actors where competing visions of world order were advocated by non-governmental 
organizations and non-state actors.61 The years that followed the catastrophe of the Great War 
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witnessed the rise of internationalist organizations and transregional civil society initiatives.62 The 
difference between modern transnational non-state actors and their historical precursors is indeed 
vast due to recent developments in communication technologies, but they are strongly similar and 
comparable in their core functions and structures.63 The rise of non-state actors, transnational net-
works, and global streams in the Belle Époque was not limited to Western societies. Muslim nation-
alism had become a pan-Islamic proto-nationalism, as Nikki Keddie noted, that increasingly united 
transnational anticolonialist Muslim movements under a corporate identity.64 Muslim actors and 
networks were active in global circulation of people, ideas, and commodities.65 Especially the in-
terwar years witnessed a rise of transnational networks of Muslim activists and communities in 
Europe.66  
Moreover, violent non-state actors have a history—and not just a history. As late Fred Halliday 
once noted, international relations, not just in the late twentieth century but in its entire 500 years 
of development, has been shaped and driven by non-state actors.67 Noel Malcolm speaks in the 
context of 16th century Mediterranean politics of irregular powers, conjoined in a complex system 
of inter-power relations with the regular ones..68 Following late Charles Tilly’s premise that there 
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is an analogy and continuation between war-making and state-formation, then we must take into 
consideration that most state actors can be traced back to successful violent non-state actors in their 
origins.69 This rethinking of the non-state makes these actors, according to Halliday, not only 
heroes and villains in different narratives of international politics, but also the original shapers 
and supporters of the modern state-system from a historical perspective.70 Yet, available typologies 
of political science such as violent non-state actors does not fully conceptualize political actors of 
state (re-)formation in history. Elsewhere, I argued for the necessity of thinking about revolutionary 
non-state actors in studying processes of war and revolution who shaped and reshaped the states and 
the state system.71 But in order to analytically appreciate the non-statehood of revolutionaries (and 
to differentiate them from purely intra-state actors in coups d’état or local revolts), we need to 
underline the aspect of transnationalism and follow those revolutionary actors and forces that 
crossed the boundaries and borders of existing states.  
Transnational mobility was, however, not necessarily a cause célèbre for the interstate community 
in the post-war era. Stefan Zweig’s cosmopolitan World of Yesterday, where one could travel without 
a passport across national borders and continents, quickly perished after World War I.72 The year 
1920 saw the emergence of the modern passport regime at the first League of Nations Conference 
on Passports and Frontier Formalities.73 Revolutionary states were no exception to this rule, as they 
similarly strived to control the freedom of movement of domestic and foreign subjects.74 Anxiety 
that state sovereignties were spatially penetrated by illicit transnational travelers, such as spies, 
(counter-) revolutionaries, and refugees, led to the development of border and passport regimes. 
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The hegemony of states claims also the monopoly of the legitimate means of movement, as his-
torical sociologist John Torpey noted, that is, their development as states has depended on effec-
tively distinguishing between citizens/subjects and possible interlopers, and regulating the move-
ments of each.75 Measures to control mobility by passports, visas, and border controls «directly 
reflect the continuing dominance of the sovereign state in world politics», as Mark B. Salter noted 
in his study of passports in international relations.76 Hence, the mobility of transnational actors are 
subjected to structural limitations and opportunities of their trans-spatial settings, which are mostly 
imposed by state coercion and surveillance—or the lack thereof.  
State actors also claim monopoly over legitimate means of secrecy. Only the state can define what 
is private and what is public as well as what is secret and what is not secret. The trend towards 
political transparency started, according to Michel Foucault, with the Enlightenment: 
A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear of darkened spaces, of the pall 
of gloom which prevents the full visibility of things, men and truths. It sought to break up the 
patches of darkness that blocked the light, eliminate the shadowy areas of society, demolish the 
unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts, monarchical caprice, religious superstitions, tyran-
nical and priestly plots, epidemics and the illusions of ignorance were fomented.77 
As states define the obligations and limits of political transparency and defend their own political 
secrets from illicit eyes, clandestine activities of non-state actors outside state control and surveil-
lance naturally poses a threat to the sovereignty of states. Conspiratorial and revolutionary politics 
constituted a major challenge to the ontology of interstate system. As scholar of International Re-
lations Martin Wight noted: «Revolutionary politics tend to break down the important distinction 
between diplomacy and espionage.»78 Therefore, clandestinely organized transnational contentious 
politics has been the incubus of state actors. The more violent, the more subversive, the more con-
tentious, the more transnational, and the more clandestine a movement was in the eyes of states, 
the more threatening it was against the natural order of the interstate system. 
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In understanding this ecological nature of politics—whether national, transnational, or interna-
tional—I believe that it is essential to appreciate its complexity. According to political scientist 
Robert Jervis, complexity often display nonlinear relationships, outcomes cannot be understood 
by adding together the units or their relations, and many of the results of actions are unintended. 
Complexities can appear even in what would seem to be simple and deterministic situations.79 
International history is full of interconnections and complex interactions, as Jervis writes.80 Com-
plexity comes with the price of uncertainty. Thus, perception and misperception are important 
factors that increase the ambiguity and complexity in politics.81 In a Foreign Policy essay, Stephan 
Walt listed «Misperception and Miscalculation» as one of the five teachings of International Rela-
tions worth remembering: 
[…] you can’t really understand international politics and foreign policy without recognizing 
that national leaders (and sometimes whole countries) frequently misunderstand each other and 
often do remarkably stupid things. One country feels threatened and reacts defensively, leading 
other countries to falsely conclude that it has vast and dangerous ambitions that must be coun-
tered. Sometimes it works the other way, however, and a relentless aggressor manages to fool 
others into believing that its aims are limited. Or states tell themselves self-serving, sanitized 
narratives about the past—one where they never did anything bad to anyone and their oppo-
nents are always at fault—and then they get surprised when other states don’t see the historical 
record in the same way.82  
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Making sense of the actions and intentions of other actors is even more difficult in revolutionary 
times, where structures are open to changes and remain uncertain.83 Thus, understanding the com-
plexity in history and politics requires an appreciation of contingencies and chance coincidences.84   
In my understanding, transnational political history reconstructs, explains, and evaluates conten-
tious interactions between non-state actors and state actors in complex processes.  
The Young Turk generation had inherited and flourished its own culture of conspiracy.85 The 
CUP since the Revolution of 1908 was no stranger to contentious politics and clandestine political 
violence.86 Their exile in 1918 meant a return to their former (non-state) contentious repertoire as 
so-called komitadjis (committee men) consisting of clandestine networking, subversive perfor-
mances, culture of partisanship, and transnational mobilization. By telling their story in the after-
math of World War I, I will illustrate the challenges of transnational contentious politics in inter-
national affairs.  
*** 
In historically mapping the transnational contentious interactions, it is important to go beyond the 
interplay of structures, agents, and contingencies and engage with the role of cultures, discourses, 
and emotions.87 Conceptions and perceptions needs to be taken into account in order to under-
stand how contentious actors are making sense of what has been going on and what to do next. 
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This is the point, however, where waters get muddied. From the moment the CUP leaders disap-
peared into a clandestine exile, Enver Pasha as the notorious man of action of the bunch in partic-
ular and the CUP as a secret society in general became the subject of wild rumors and more personal 
gossips.88 The rumors fueled the imperial anxieties of the Entente powers, especially Britain, in 
their unruly Muslim possessions, where the Young Turks were rumored to be the deus ex machina 
of the anticolonial Muslim uprisings. The stories told about them corresponded ironically to the 
CUP’s leaders’ own wishful-thinking as they also saw themselves leading a world revolution against 
Western imperialism and colonialism. Historian Michael G. Smith wrote that «the power of ru-
mour and news to signify and invest an event with diverse meanings depend[s] on their diverse 
audiences. Smith defines rumors, following the sociology of rumor by Tamotsu Shibutani, as im-
provised news and comes to the conclusion: Arising especially in times of colonial crisis, war and 
revolution, they circulate between the fluid oral culture of gossip and the established print culture 
of newspapers.»89 The rumors about the machinations of the CUP being behind the Muslim up-
risings went so far that conspiracy theories were collectively constructed in public news coverage and 
in intelligence reports. A British official claimed for instance that Enver Pasha directs the [Anato-
lian resistance] movement from [Azerbaijan]. Pan-Islamic, Bolshevist, Pan-Turkish and all disgrun-
tled forces are looked for help and all are being toyed with.90 In reality, Enver hasn’t been in 
Azerbaijan yet, nor was he directing the movement in Anatolia. Rumors mixed with fantasies had 
turned to conspiracy theories. Truth and legend about Enver Pasha are so in inextricably mixed, 
as one scholar rightly noted, that it is difficult to be sure where one ends and the other begins.91  
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Both Conspiracy and conspiracy theory are certainly stigmatizing and derogative terms.92 When I 
say conspiracy, I mean clandestine contentious politics: secret networks of collective actors engaged 
in transgressive intentions and illicit initiatives for political means.93 When I say conspiracy theory, 
I mean cognitively or purposefully constructed narratives and stories that claim to make sense (or 
nonsense) of the political complexity by seeing concerted and coordinated agency of secret forces 
behind the scenes.94  
Conspiracy theories always existed in history in one way or another, but in modernity they became 
marginalized in making sense of the social world. The modernity’s ambivalent interplay between 
political secrecy and political transparency lies at the heart of the problem. Eva Horn writes:  
Conspiracy theories offer answers to unanswerable questions permeating a political culture that 
breeds scandals and reveals secrets almost on a daily basis—without ever reaching a point of 
clarity or ultimate truth. The secrecy effect opens up a space of speculation, conflicting versions, 
distrust and paranoia: suddenly there are secrets everywhere; every political decision points to 
hidden vested interests; every ordinary or extraordinary event is controlled by clandestine net-
works.95  
Modernity’s landmark achievements in scientifically establishing a transparent social order, such as 
police investigation, judicial process, intelligence analysis, political briefing, investigative journal-
ism, and social-scientific inquiry have all an ironic family resemblance to conspiracy theories.96 
Richard Hofstadter, in one of the pioneering works on conspiracy theories, wrote:  
What distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts (though it is 
occasionally true that in his extravagant passion for facts the paranoid occasionally manufactures 
them), but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in 
the recital of events.97 
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In their core, conspiracy theories are stories that try to make sense of—both in terms of understand-
ing and explaining—complex circumstances and transformations.98 Both conspirators and conspir-
acy theorists create their own epistemic communities, i.e. networks based on shared beliefs and a 
common policy enterprise.99 As much as gossip creates particular sociopolitical configurations, it 
is the same with conspiracy theorization that aims to define in-groups and out-groups.100 In pro-
cesses of sense-making, I differentiate between cognitive conspiracy theorization and deceptive con-
spiracy theorization. The first results from cognitive and deductive efforts by subjects in making 
sense of allegedly unrelated but somehow suspicious incidents by searching for unconventional and 
concealed connections. The cognitive conspiracy theorist sees itself as the investigative subject and 
in its more paranoid versions also as the victim of an unjust conspiracy that needs to be unveiled 
and battled.101 Deceptive conspiracy theorization is based on conscious and misleading efforts to 
construct esoteric or distorted narratives on real or false conspiracies. Therefore, deceptive conspir-
acy theorization constitutes in itself an act of conspiracy. If the cognitive and the deceptive con-
spiracy theorization are clinically inseparable, then we are dealing with a conspiracy ideology 
(Verschwörungsideologie).102  
Yet, there are also real conspiracies in politics.103 Not all conspiracy thinking is a popular fantasy, a 
nerdish hobby, or a social paranoia of the postmodern subject, as cultural studies have underlined 
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in recent years.104 Conspiratorial politics did not cease to exist with modernity—in the contrary.105 
The impulse to secrecy and to learn the secret is the first tendency of any power, as Carl Schmitt 
wrote, who then went on to quote Hannah Arendt saying: Real power begins where secrecy be-
gins.106 Philosopher Karl Popper spoke of conspiracy theory of society, where totalitarian regimes 
rule by conspiracies and legitimize their rule with conspiracy theories.107 Others see conspiratorial 
politics not only in totalitarian regimes, but in all modern societies, where the power elite govern 
the rest behind the façade of free market, democracy, and civil society.108 Thus, conspiracies or 
what some political scientists call parapolitics, i.e. informal means, illicit interactions, and secretive 
structures of power, are part of—perhaps the dark side of—modernity, if not politics altogether.109  
If the underlying complexities of a (potentially) real conspiracy is being rigorously reduced and 
oversimplified by the conspiracy theorist, then it is necessary to yearn for the complex. Although 
everything is somehow interconnected in social complexity, things are seldom orchestrated by a 
single center, as it is often claimed by conspiracy theorists. If conspiracy theories try to make sense 
of political complexity by reduction and simplification, then the key in contrasting and comparing 
conspiracy theories and conspiracy plots lies in understanding and appreciating social and political 
complexities. Real-life conspirators, contrary to the imagination of conspiracy theories, are not 
monolithic or unified actors that act abidingly according to secret orders and doctrines. Political 
conspirators mostly rival cooperate, counter, and compete with each other in the illicit markets of 
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power.110 A common overgeneralization in conspiracy theorization is how conspirators are imag-
ined as omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent. In reality, clandestine contentious politics are 
generally modest and restricted in their operational reach and organizational longevity.111 Moder-
nity’s obsession with the idea of engineering imagines the social world as a machine, social life as 
mechanisms, conspiracies as machinations, and conspirators as political engineers that push some 
buttons to manipulate the machine with pre-designed outcomes in distant places and times. Thus, 
every incident is imagined as planned, designed, calculated, and executed by human agency—thus 
engineered against the nature. In reality, however, political engineering—not unlike social or de-
mographic engineering—generally suffers from miscalculations, misperceptions, chaotic execution, 
and unintended consequences.112 Not only conspiracy theorists suffer from misperception and mis-
calculation, but also the conspirators can be very much clumsy, blind, and stupid too.  
This approach to the CUP’s transnational contentious politics is rather disillusioning. They were 
struck by ill-fate and misfortune. They were limited by the structures of national borders. They 
were disorganized in their organization. The Committee’s leadership was contested. They were 
distrusted by friends and foes. They were cut away from their resources. Their movement campaign 
was disconnected from its social movement base. They were revolutionaries away from their revo-
lution. They were insurgency leaders without insurgents. Yet, they were powerful—both in the eyes 
of their supporters and in the eyes of their enemies—at least powerful enough to cause trouble, find 
support, and attract the surveillance of intelligence agencies. Powerful enough to be politically iso-
lated and persecuted. In short, they were powerful enough to be feared.   
*** 
The currency of their power was knowledge. And this knowledge had to be generated, processed, 
and transmitted through space and time. The interplay between what Reinhart Koselleck called 
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space of experience and horizon of expectations opened certain paths of political sense-mak-
ing.113 Memory about their revolutionary past supplied the foundation of their reputation and at-
tributed them a certain potential as professional revolutionaries. Encounters with their political 
chutzpah and political gambling, while they were constantly looking for ways to turn the tables, 
dazzled and deceived their observers. True and false rumors about their clandestine and revolution-
ary activities in exile aggrandized their existing intentions and actions. Knowledge about coinci-
dental and circumstantial events, especially massive uprisings in the Muslim world, were rational-
ized as concerted consequences of the CUP’s alleged actions and machinations. More than their 
actions, it was their discourse that brought them into the center of things. 
There is a communicative process between the epistemic communities of conspirators and conspir-
acy theorists, what I call a dialectic of conspiracy. One of the most important epistemic communities 
involved in collective and official conspiracy theorization is intelligence services.114 «Intelligence is 
a game between hiders and finders, as Robert Jervis put it beautifully, and the former usually have 
the easier job. Intentions, furthermore, often exist only in a few heads and are subject to rapid 
change.»115 In face of ambivalence, uncertainty, and complexity of incidents, intelligence officers—
or political analysts in general—try their best to make sense of what is going on and what are the 
causes. They try to predict the possible consequences and prescribe future policies. Thus, intelli-
gence reports need to be verified by the historian as well. For instance, after coming across awkward 
rumors in British and French intelligence reports about the CUP leader’s activities in Berlin, Zafer 
Toprak pointed out the reciprocal relationship between intelligence and counterintelligence, and 
urged for caution in trusting these reports at face value.116  
 
113 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004), Translated and with an Introduction by Keith Tribe, 255–75; Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur 
Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), 349–75. 
114 When I say intelligence service (or for instance, British Intelligence), I don’t necessarily refer to a specific 
governmental secret intelligence service (like the SIS/MI6 in the British case) that is distinct from the same state’s 
diplomatic, military, and security services, but rather use the term more general in labeling the collective epistemic 
community within a state apparatus that is gathering, communicating, and assessing information in order to make 
sense of foreign and domestic political affairs. Hence, my usage of the term intelligence simply means a body or piece 
of information gathered, produced, or processed by state officials. For the cacophony of different definitions of 
intelligence see: Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence’,” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 
15–22.   
115 Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2010), 2. 
116 Zafer Toprak, “Bolşevik İttihatçılar ve İslam Kominterni: İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı (İttihad-ı Selamet-i 
İslam),” Toplumsal Tarih 8, no. 8 (1997): 6–7. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
41 
The context and culture of the intelligence production (and conspiracy theorization) is an im-
portant force. In most cases, I dealt with, it was the context of the British Empire that provided the 
imperial regime of culture and knowledge.117 New studies on British imperialism and intelligence 
in World War I revealed cultural misconceptions and political miscalculations in the making of 
post-Ottoman Middle East.118 Although, I will only occasionally make reference, the culture of 
French imperialism and intelligence offices were not better off when it came to misperceptions and 
miscalculations, either.119 Secret intelligence reports as well as public news coverage constructed 
bizarre conspiracy theories in explaining the unrest in occupied Muslim lands after World War I as 
a result of an orchestrated Muslim menace by Bolshevik propaganda and other cabals, including 
the CUP.120 For example, a British official said: 
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it is the gospel of the latest form of C.U.P. Bolshevism directed against the British Empire more 
especially in India and Egypt. It shows more clearly than everything I have seen yet how this 
movement is connected up with every form of revolutionary activism throughout the world: 
C.U.P., Bolshevism, Indian and Egyptian nationalism, anti-Zionism, Sinn Fein, the extreme 
Labour Party, Japanese Asiaticism, [and] Persian democracy.121  
The problem was interpretation, as intelligence historian John Ferris concluded, Britain suffered 
from too much and too little intelligence, and a complex foe. [emphasis added] Ferris explains the 
problem resulting mostly from deceptive conspiracy theorization on behalf of the conspirators 
helped to form the conspiracy ideology within the British Intelligence: 
Its enemies were in a real conspiracy, but a dysfunctional one, resting on opportunism and ig-
norance. They lied to each other, and enabled one another’s fantasies. There was not just one 
fantasy, or conspiracy, but many of both. The conspiracy was more dangerous in its parts, than 
the whole; even so, it was a problem, which might become serious. Britain had good intelligence 
on the conspiracy, which it understood better than did any of its members, but this blessing was 
mixed. It understood real dangers; equally, excellent intelligence on fantasy made the British 
fantasists as well. With imagination and forged documents, the conspiracy could reach the heav-
ens, or at least, Ireland.122 
Beyond deception, deterrence, and paranoid fantasies also cultural hegemonic discourses were af-
fecting the assessment of raw intelligence. Edward Said taught us that the Orient is constructed 
by the discourse of Orientalism as the cultural other of the Western world in order to legitimize 
the West’s imperial hegemony over the Oriental rest.123 The Orient was imagined—among many 
derogative things—as a space of old intrigues and mysteries. Knowledge, intuition, and guile was 
required for the Orientalist expert to explain and beat the «Oriental intrigues». Priya Satia calls this 
an «intuitive intelligence epistemology». There was an epistemic community of Orientalists, Arab-
ists, and all types of gentleman spies that shaped the epistemology of conspiracy thinking in the 
British officialdom.124 Imperial intelligence in Britain or elsewhere was produced through commu-
nication networks of central and peripheral power brokers and filtered through various cultural and 
social scripts.125 In the context of British official conspiracy thinking, the Young Turks were from 
the beginning on a matter of misconception, often seen through Orientalist categories and ethnic 
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prejudices. Since winners write history, some of these misconceptions on the Young Turks has 
survived in modern historiography.126 Slogans such as pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism, and pan-
Turkism were in their origin and logic nothing but Orientalist conspiracy theories, before they 
were adopted by Eastern elites as anti-Western strategies.127 
The conspirators were once called with the fanciful label Enver & Talaat & the CUP-Jew-
German-Bolshevik combination.128 Young Turks and Bolsheviks were imagined as Jews or Free-
masons: there is or ever has been any dividing line between the CUP and bolshevism. The force 
behind all these movements is the same.129 All revolutionary or heterodox movements in history 
were imagined in the popular culture of the time as sinister world conspiracies.130 These conspiracy 
theories were not restricted to British officialdom, as the British and international press made sim-
ilar conspiracy theories public as well. In the aftermath of World War I, also other socio-psycho-
logical factors, such as imperial anxieties and post-war trauma, came to color the analyses.131 British 
officials were obsessed with the fear of mutinies and conspiracies in their Eastern dominions and 
these fears reached their climax in 1919, when the Rowlatt Act against Anarchical and Revolution-
ary Crimes was released in British India and soon later the Amritsar massacre of 1919 took place.132 
Muslim uprisings became the bête noir of the epistemic community of British Intelligence. To be 
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sure, not only the British were guilty of conspiracy thinking. The officials of the Ankara Govern-
ment similarly constructed and circulated wild rumors about the alleged machinations of the fugi-
tive CUP leaders allegedly intervening into Turkish politics. Kazım Karabekir Pasha, the com-
mander of the Eastern Anatolian front, believed that the CUP had a secret agenda (gizli mesai) 
that would result in anarchy and Bolshevik invasion.133 The CUP leaders themselves, like most 
Muslim nationalists of the time, cherished the Occidentalist conspiracy ideology that the British 
intrigues were practically behind all the misery and misdeeds in the Muslim world.134 
Conspiracy theories—manifested in interpersonal gossip, popular rumors, propaganda publica-
tions, intelligence reports, political analyses, and news coverage—construct the public and official 
perception of a real conspiracy. Like a shadow on the wall, the reflection of a conspiracy in its 
conspiracy theorization is either larger or smaller than the illuminated object. According to Ranajit 
Guha, one of the pioneering scholars of Subaltern Studies, there is a negative mirror image of in-
surgents and their collective consciences in the intelligence reports and governmental documents.135 
In contrast to the Indian peasant insurgents which Guha has studied in British official documents 
for the lack their own sources, the internal sources of the CUP leaders offer an internal perspec-
tive.136  
Once mirrored with the private papers of the CUP leaders, the conspiracy theories and rumors are 
revealed to be mostly disconnect and distorted from the political reality of their time and space. 
Nevertheless, following the social constructivist motto, what is perceived as real is real in its con-
sequences, conspiracy theories can alter political and social reality. I argue that the dialectic be-
tween conspirators and conspiracy theorists can alter the intersubjectivity and interrelation among 
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actors who are operating in a world of uncertainty. Contentious interactions usually feature a com-
petition among the political actors to dominate the framing of what is going on.137 Both sides read 
the signs and signals of the other side to make sense of what is going on and what to do next. Even 
more propaganda and marketing tactics are essential in the public discourse of contentious move-
ments.138 Hence, conspiracy theories as contentious stories of social reality can change the course 
of contentious interactions—for good or bad. The attention which the Young Turk leaders received 
contributed to their notoriety, but it was also a factor that increasingly limited their space of move-
ment. This explains, why and how the Young Turk fugitives were (mis-) perceived as potentially 
powerful actors and were consequently supported and also feared and persecuted.  
Like professional revolutionaries, social scientists seldom clearly understand quite what they are 
doing, noted once a scholar of revolutions.139 Making sense of transnational contentious politics 
was not only a challenge to contemporary actors and observers, but it is still a burden for the his-
torian who needs to deal with similar difficulties in making sense of uncertainties and complexities 
of distant times and places as well as with supposing intentions of distant and bygone minds. If we 
follow philosopher of history Hayden White’s argument that the craft of history-writing is not far 
from story-telling, then I am, too, guilty for being a story-teller.140 After long being dismissed as a 
folk-science, the narrative method in history and social sciences was rehabilitated in the narrative 
turn.141 The narrative is a descriptive and explanatory tool—or simply the practice of telling stories 
about connected sequences of human action.142 The narrative tends to favor human agency in 
consequently structured episodes.143 According to Hidemi Suganami every explanation that has a 
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beginning, middle, and an ending is a form of narrative. And the narrative is a mode of sense-
making, that helps both to understand and explain, the two sides of the same narrative coin, 
because explaining means nothing but making understandable—thus making sense.144 In my 
narrative, I have followed what anthropologist Clifford Geertz coined as thick description, wher-
ever this was possible for me as a historian, I tried to describe the underlying multiplicity of com-
plex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which 
are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit.145 Since the density of sources allowed a closer zoom 
in on the protagonists, I am mostly writing a microhistory of a small and spatially dispersed network 
of people. I will contextualize and connect their microhistory with larger social, cultural, and formal 
currents.146 In contrast to a classic microhistory, I must note that the actors I study were, however, 
also part of macrohistorical elites of their time.147 The narrative method becomes especially effective 
in appreciating time as a dynamic setting of social change, which is essential for historians in illus-
trating continuities and discontinuities as well as for the social scientists in tracing path-depend-
encies and processes.148 I will show that the common fallacy in most of the previous studies was 
in the lack of temporal concordance between the intelligence reports and political performances. 
There was a lap of time between intentions and actions as well as between actions and reactions 
that becomes essential in understanding the dialectic course of interaction. By reconstructing the 
processes in their interactive development, the dialectic of conspiracy becomes apparent.
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Prologue: 
From Empire to Exile: 
Young Turks at the Eleventh Hour of World War I  
The period from 1908 to 1918 has been a turbulent ten years for the Young Turk regime, 
certainly more for the Ottoman people. The Young Turk opposition movement had its ori-
gins in a secret society founded by Muslim students at the military academy in 1889. Since 
then the movement developed first in Parisian exile into a coalition of Ottoman oppositionals 
and then merged with a clandestine revolutionary organization based in Ottoman Macedo-
nia, where a range of figures such as a post office clerk by the name of Talat Bey or junior 
military officers like Enver Bey and Cemal Bey played influential roles in consolidation of 
the committee networks.1 In July 1908, fearing that the Great Game between Britain and 
Russia would bring the Eastern Question in Macedonia to a closure, some secret cells of the 
Committee of Union and Progress in the Ottoman army in Macedonia, including men such 
as Enver Bey, went to mountains and revolted against the autocratic but increasingly semi-
colonized regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. In fear of derailing the empire into total chaos, 
Sultan Abdülhamid gave in to the military revolt and announced the restoration of the con-
stitution of 1876, one of the major demands of the Young Turks and other opposition move-
ments. This event went into history as the Constitutional or Young Turk Revolution of 
1908.2 Although, the military revolt was not a revolution in the narrower sense of the word, 
the restoration of the constitution resulted in a revolution of the political, social, and cultural 
system of the empire.3  
Immediately after the revolution, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, Bulgaria declared inde-
pendence, and Crete declared unification with Greece. The new regime could not do much 
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besides protesting and boycotting foreign powers.4 The counterrevolution of 1909 and its 
brutal repression by the CUP-led army factions ended up in the «brutalization of political 
life».5 In face of all the perceived external and internal threats, the CUP’s role in the capital 
became more and more dominated by the ideology and tactics of its guerrilla group. Mean-
while uprisings in Yemen and Albania were continuing to trouble the empire in its central 
and peripheral Muslim lands.6 The Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 demonstrated the Ot-
toman Empire’s vulnerability and isolation in the international arena. There, the CUP’s mil-
itary arm lead by Enver Bey started a campaign of unconventional warfare with Libyan tribes.  
In 1912, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria surprised the Ottoman Empire by over-
running its European territories in the First Balkan War.7 The CUP which was by then in-
creasingly forced into opposition took over the imperial government with a violent coup 
d’état in early 1913. This marked the beginning of CUP’s imperial rule, which would irre-
versibly alter the face of politics, economy, military, and society in the Ottoman Empire.8 
The Second Balkan War against Bulgaria allowed the CUP regime to recover some of its 
former territories, but most of the European provinces of the empire were lost and the Mus-
lim communities of the Balkans were persecuted and displaced.9 The Balkan Wars are retro-
spectively considered as the prelude to World War I due to the brutalization of warfare and 
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societies in imperial shatter-zones.10 For the Young Turks, the loss of their homeland in Ot-
toman Macedonia was particularly bitter and caused deep resentments towards Great Powers 
and Ottoman Christians.11 After the Balkan Wars the empire became more Muslim than 
ever, resulting in the Islamization Ottoman imperial identity and a growing interest in the 
empire’s Arab provinces.12 The Ottoman Empire was now ruled by the so-called Young Turk 
triumvirate of Enver, Talat, Cemal Pashas as ministers of war, interior, and navy. This rep-
resented, however, not a trinity of authority, but the competition of three fractions.13  
*** 
Before World War I began, the Ottoman calculations were more focused on a looming con-
flict with Greece which could have well re-started the third round of the Balkan conflict.14 
Foreign and local Greeks were accordingly subjected to economic boycotts and persecution, 
and local minority populations were intended to be exchanged between the two states across 
the Aegean Sea.15 Before the beginning of World War I, their isolation within the interna-
tional system and zeal to reinvigorate the empire had pushed the Young Turk regime towards 
the Germans as their Western ally, the latter looking for ways to extend their «grab for world 
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power».16 In hope of a short war with German victory in Europe, the Ottoman Empire en-
tered World War I in November 1914 with an unprovoked bombardment of the Russian 
fleet in the Black Sea. The entrance to war on the side of the Central Powers was a deliberate 
and secret decision by a small circle of Young Turk leaders headed by the new Minister of 
War Enver Pasha and in correspondence with their German allies, which even excluded the 
Navy Minister Cemal Pasha.17 Soon after the Ottoman entrance to war, the Young Turk 
regime declared global jihad to mobilize Muslim nationalist insurgencies against the Western 
colonial powers.18 Ottoman-German propaganda and intelligence operations were set in or-
der to revolutionize the Muslim populations of Britain, France, and Russia.19 The British in 
Egypt and the Russians in Transcaucasia possessed former Ottoman territories, which were 
also seen as gates to further colonized Muslim lands in North Africa and Central Asia. The 
Eastern front was soon lost to the Russians after a catastrophic defeat of Enver at Sarıkamış.20 
Cemal’s attempt to recover Suez from the British ended also in a fiasco. It became clear that 
reconquest of former Ottoman territories was a difficult task to accomplish. Despite various 
infrastructural and material deficiencies the Ottoman Army managed to defend key positions 
against the Allied attacks, most notably in the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia, thus pro-
longing and troubling the war effort of the Entente.21 
Especially, the Russian-Ottoman frontier became a zone of geopolitical contest, mass vio-
lence, and demographic engineering.22 Imperialist ambitions and nationalist anxieties as well 
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as militarist and partisan mindset magnified and connected the disconnected events of local 
Armenian resistance and Russian-Armenian voluntary battalions in the eyes of Young Turk 
decision-makers in a conspiracy theory. Allegedly a major Armenian conspiracy was threat-
ening the survival of the empire.23 Accordingly, the contingencies of war led to the perception 
of new internal enemies and enabled new ways to handle them.24 The mass arrest of Arme-
nian political leaders on April 24, 1915, and the brutal deportation of the Armenian popu-
lation of Anatolia that followed was decided by a small circle of CUP leaders and later offi-
cially ordered and personally executed by the Minister of Interior Talat Pasha and his staff.25 
Such policies of persecution and displacement resulted in a complex process of genocidal 
violence and demographic engineering in different locations of the empire, resulting in the 
extermination of the majority of Armenian and Assyrian population of Eastern Anatolia and 
the confiscation of their land and property by state and military officials, paramilitary bands, 
and local Kurdish perpetrators.26 The extermination of Anatolian Armenians was meant to 
serve national as well as imperial interests of the Young Turk regime by creating a new na-
tional home for Ottoman Muslims in the new center of the empire and by eliminating the 
imagined Armenian «belt» from Cilicia to Transcaucasia that cut through the empire and 
was open to imperialist foreign interventions.  
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On the home front, displacement and persecution had resulted in human and social catas-
trophes.27 For the army the main problem remained mobilization and desertion with severe 
consequences for the rural population.28 Famine and diseases also plagued the whole em-
pire.29 Especially Greater Syria suffered from famine and conscription. The execution of a 
group of Arab nationalists for treason by Cemal Pasha, the acting military governor of Da-
mascus, caused deep resentments among the Arab elites, still visible even today.30 The Arab 
Revolt of Sharif Husayn of Mecca in 1916 was more a British intelligence operation than a 
nationalist movement, but caused a further legitimacy crisis for the empire in its Arab lands 
and plagued the Southern front of the empire.31 Nonetheless, the Young Turk regime in 
general and Cemal in particular invested energies and resources to integrate the Arab prov-
inces to the center of the empire.32  
The Russian Revolution of 1917 came as an unexpected rescue that offered an opportunity 
for a positive outcome from the war, since one of the major enemies of the Ottoman Empire 
had collapsed and ceased hostilities.33 This did not only release the occupied territories of 
Eastern Anatolia from Russian military rule, but also opened up new opportunity spaces in 
Russian Transcaucasia. The publication by the Bolsheviks of the secret plans of the Entente 
to disintegrate and parcel the Ottoman Empire, also confirmed the Young Turk regime’s 
imperial anxieties and fueled their zeal in preserving the empire. Despite the diplomatic gains 
at Brest-Litovsk, it was still in the air that a prolonged war might not end for the benefit of 
the Ottoman Empire.  
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The summer of 1918 had been especially plagued with crises for the Young Turk regime.34 
On the war front, the British forces were advancing on Damascus and the Ottoman military 
efforts were now re-directed towards Transcaucasia. As for the domestic politics, a cabinet 
crisis since early summer continued to remain unresolved regardless of a political opening 
towards the opposition and the easing of censorship on the press. In addition, a new sultan, 
Vahideddin, was in power whose political standing towards the CUP lacked assurances, if 
not outright hostile. Most important of all, the Ottoman people, after four years of warfare, 
were severely suffering from conscription, exhaustion, disease, famine, and loss of morale—
not to forget the brutal persecution and displacement of Ottoman Christians. This was the 
desperate situation, as the Grand Vizier Talat Pasha decided to make an official visit to Berlin 
in September 1918. According to Ambassador Bernstorff, the Grand Vizier Talat Pasha was 
under so much pressure to deliver good news from his visit to Germany that if this were not 
the case he might even resign as Grand Vizier.35 
*** 
The main issue on Talat Pasha’s agenda before his trip to Europe was to bring home the 
prospect of a «general peace» (sulh-u ummumi) settlement. Talat feared that separate peace 
agreements of Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Germany with the Entente would make otto-
man Empire’s position difficult at the negotiations with the victorious Allies. On his way to 
Berlin, Talat held at Sofia and Vienna and preached for a collective peace before winter. Yet, 
behind his public statements about bringing peace, in closed-door meetings Talat was nego-
tiating the spoils of war, namely territorial compensations for the Ottoman Empire. The 
Ottoman Empire was the only ally of the Central Powers that had lost homeland territory to 
the Entente.36 Some Habsburg officials in Vienna suggested that the Ottomans should look 
for a compensation in the Caucasus.37 This fell, of course, on sympathetic ears. Young Turk 
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imperialism had already an eye on the Caucasus. Only Germany posed opposition to Young 
Turk plans.  
When Talat Pasha arrived in Berlin on September 7, 1918, the semi-official newspaper, 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung welcomed Talat as «the loyal friend of the German people 
and strong bearer of the alliance.»38 At this hour of war, loyalty could not be praised and 
preached enough—or as Hindenburg put it, it would not be easy to find a substitute for 
Enver or Talaat Pasha, who were completely and absolutely loyal to us.39  
The question of Transcaucasia was not yet settled between Germany and Ottoman Empire, 
while Ottoman troops together with Azerbaijani forces were ambitiously marching towards 
Baku, despite German opposition.40 Germany and Soviet Russia had recently signed a sup-
plementary treaty to the Brest-Litovsk treaties that double-crossed the Young Turk regime’s 
advance into the Caucasus.41 The alliance was at its breaking test. Rudolf Nadolny from the 
Russian-Persian department of the Auswärtiges Amt saw in the Ottoman advance into the 
Caucasus an expression of Young Turk imperialism in the form of pan-Islamism and pan-
Turkism: 
If we want to reach complete agreement with the Turks, which is indispensable in the 
anticipation of the return of the Entente at the peace settlement, then one needs to get 
rid of pan-Turanism and pan-Islamism insofar as they were expressed imperialistically 
[my emphasis]. The pan-Germanism in the way our enemies see it and also the pan-
Slavism brought enough bad fortune to us. It is not necessary that pan-Turanism, even 
though it is only a travesty of the other two considering its lack of power (Ohnmacht), 
destroys our Orient policy (Orientpolitik).42  
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At the end, Nadolny came to a harsh conclusion: «It would be the best, if one would only do 
away Enver and all his pan-Turanian and pan-Islamist apparatus (the family clan and Ali 
Bash Hamba [i.e. the Young Tunisian leader and Director of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa]).»43 Ironi-
cally, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul von Hintze noted: «we have bred pan-Islamism and 
fed pan-Turanism».44 Talat Pasha proposed, however, a different solution for the Caucasus 
than expected.45 The Young Turk regime opted for the establishment of friendly buffer states 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Russians instead of pan-Turkist irredentism in the 
Caucasus.46 Before Talat, Ottoman deputy Emir Shakib Arslan was sent by direct order of 
Enver Pasha to Germany in June 1918 as a consultant to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. 
Enver gave secret assignments to Arslan to work for the independence of Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, and especially Dagestan.47 The Young Turk regime’s aim was to push Russian in-
fluence out of the Caucasus for the feared probability that Russia might soon recover and 
pose once again a threat to the Ottoman Empire.48 Eventually, the conquest of Baku by 
Ottoman and Azeri troops on September 15 changed the whole debate.49 The Young Turk 
regime had once again created facts on the ground before negotiating them.  
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*** 
Shortly before his departure from Berlin on September 27, Talat Pasha received the newly 
arrived Georgian delegation at the Hotel Adlon. In his memoires the Georgian Deputy Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, Zourab Avalishvili, remembers how Talat persuaded the Georgians 
repeatedly: «Give up the Germans—be with us».50 Talat spoke of a «great policy in the East» 
which meant—according to Avalishvili—the formation of a Caucasian Confederation as a 
buffer between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, «and, mainly—the political organization of 
the Turkish East, from Anatolia to Turkestan.»51 This was, indeed, the next point on Talat’s 
Berlin agenda. The opportunity spaces that Talat desired to exploit went even beyond the 
Caucasus as far as Turkestan. He has a new project, Paul von Hintze noted. He wants to 
militarily organize Turkestan (where 14 million Muslims live according to him) in order to 
make them take part in the war supposedly against England and Russia. He demands German 
officers and petty officers.52 Apparently, Talat presented his idea also to the Kaiser, Hinden-
burg, and Ludendorff. Either seriously or out of courtesy, said Talat, they all three have 
approved it.53 Hindenburg was skeptical about the promise of Russian Muslims as potential 
recruits, because  
Russia had not drawn on these Mohammedans for regular military service, and now they 
were to fight under the Crescent. The number of the prospective volunteers, as commu-
nicated to us, revealed all the wealth of Oriental imagination. Further, if the Turkish 
reports were to be believed, we had to assume that the Mohammedan peoples of Russia 
had for long had no more intense longing than to form one great and self-contained 
Mohammedan nation in the Turkish Empire.54 
There were two major reasons behind the plans for the military organization of Russian Mus-
lims. First, Britain was considered as the main adversary of the Ottoman Empire in the Mid-
dle East. According to Talat’s proposal, «one needs to take into consideration that those or-
ganized forces (in Turkestan) will, in case needed, enable to put pressure on England by 
dispatching these forces to the Indian border.»55 Second, these proposed Turkestani forces 
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could also be used against Soviet Russia. In spite of the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia was still 
perceived as a potential threat by the Young Turks—«the enemy of yesterday and the enemy 
of tomorrow», in Talat’s words.56  
The negotiations with the Germans have not yet come to a conclusion reported Talat Pasha 
in a letter to the Sublime Porte. Nevertheless, they have confirmed in writing that they do 
not oppose to our [efforts in] building governments in Northern Caucasus and Turkestan 
and forming alliances with them.57 By the end of the negotiations, Talat achieved a promise 
from the Germans not to object into Ottoman Empire’s interventions into Muslim Russia.58  
*** 
«The whole Wilhelmstrasse was there, as the Georgian diplomat Avalishvili remembers Talat 
Pasha’s parting ceremony at the Anhalter Bahnhof, in shining top hats with strained and 
serious expressions on their faces.»59 Talat had left his mark. As Hindenburg remembers: 
«Absolutely loyal from the political point of view, [as] he met us first in 1916, and [as he] 
said good-bye to us in the autumn of 1918.»60 While Talat’s return plans were still in the 
making, the Auswärtiges Amt had informed their colleagues at the German embassy in Sofia 
that they did not want Grand Vizier to stop by in Sofia for an official visit on his way home.61 
The secret news that Bulgaria was in an attempt to plea for a separate peace reached the 
German official circles on September 25, 1918.62  
On their way, Talat Pasha received an invitation by Tsar Ferdinand to the palace in Sofia, 
followed by a second telegram that canceled the invitation. There would only be a reception 
at the train station. Talat assumed that if the Tsar cancels such an invitation, something bad 
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must have happened.63 When the train arrived at the Central Railway Station of Sofia, Talat 
left the train to talk with Nedyalko Kolushev and the Prime Minister Aleksandar Malinov.64 
«It is finished, said the Prime Minister said to Talat. The 11th Division have broken; Bul-
garia is done and we have sued for an armistice.»65 Malinov hopelessly declined Talat’s offer 
to send two Turkish divisions from Constantinople.66 The Bulgarians would go for a separate 
peace according to Wilson’s principles. The Allied Army of the Orient under the command 
of General Louis Franchet d’Espèrey had defeated the Bulgarian forces at the battle of Dobro 
Pole in Macedonia. On September 25, the Bulgarian government decided to plea for an 
armistice, which was to be signed under unconditional terms on September 29.67 Talat pro-
tested: «You are wrong to have done this; we should all have asked for an armistice together. 
What terms shall we be given now?»68 After one hour of talk with Malinov, Talat was invited 
to the palace. But the Tsar had also no solutions that could appease the Ottoman Grand 
Vizier. After that Talat returned to the train. As he was crossing by the compartments where 
some of his friends were curiously awaiting his return, he could only say: «We’re screwed!» 
(Boku yedik!).69 Back in his own cabin, he said to the others: «I wish I were dead today».70  
Talat Pasha’s Berlin trip in September 1918 remarkably illustrates, what the imperial regime 
of the CUP was perceiving and misperceiving as well as planning and trying in the final hours 
of World War I. Talat Pasha’s trip to Berlin was meant to bring home a peace agreement. 
Instead, the Young Turk regime was still very much concerned with bargaining over the 
spoils of war and looking for opportunities and resources to change the course of an ostensibly 
ill-fated and costly war or even finding ways to make the impending peace process as trou-
blesome as possible for the Entente powers. Not only Talat, Enver was also behind some of 
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the geopolitical misconceptions.71 The opportunity spaces of Muslim Russia were imagined 
by Enver to offer potential resources for prolonging the war and mobilizing resistance for its 
aftermath.72 These resources were hoped to be utilized for an anticolonial struggle against 
British India and, if necessary, also against Russia. In a way, the Young Turk leadership un-
knowingly prepared the ground for their future political ventures from empire to exile. 
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1. Escaping the Consequences:  
The Political Maneuvers of the CUP at the Brink of Armistice 
Talat Pasha arrived at the Sirkeci Station from his Berlin trip on September 27. The Bulgar-
ian surrender, which Talat had discovered at his stop in Sofia, was already the talk of the 
town in Constantinople. Talat informed his close associates in confidence about the details 
of the Bulgarian surrender.1 Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), the Secretary General of the Central Com-
mittee of the CUP, belonged to those who received Talat soon after his arrival. On the morale 
of Talat, Mithat Şükrü wrote in his memoirs:  
There were great differences between the Talat who went to Berlin and the Talat who 
returned from Berlin. It was as if Talat was now another Talat. He was depressed and 
exhausted as if he had suffered a severe illness for five or ten days. He wasn’t smiling, he 
couldn’t hold his head high. Nothing could solace the Talat who returned to us in this 
condition, and how could it […].2 
Despite his depressed mood, Talat gave a press conference that day to calm the situation. 
The penetration of the Bulgarian front and the setbacks we are facing at our Southern front 
is not as important as assumed, told Talat the journalists. There also some good news. New 
forces have been formed from the Turks of the Caucasus and Central Asia, said Talat in 
hope appease the curious crowd. These will soon be brought to the aid of the fronts and 
stability will be reestablished. As I was in Berlin I solved all our conflicts with the Germans 
regarding the Caucasus.3 As soon as the journalists left, Talat revealed in private the gravity 
of the situation to Ahmet Emin (Yalman), a promising young journalist with a PhD from 
Columbia University: «What I told you all was to avoid a sudden outbreak of alarm and 
panic among the people. The truth is that everything is over, we’ve lost the war. Tomorrow 
is full of unknown probabilities.»4 
Unlike Talat, Enver maintained his hopes. On the day of Talat’s return, Enver sent a tele-
graph to Zeki Pasha at the German headquarters to convince the Germans to send German 
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or Austrian troops to rebuke the Bulgarians.5 Although, the Bulgarians signed an uncondi-
tional surrender on September 29, Talat apparently kept his poker face in front of the Ger-
man officials at the embassy. Talat was according to chargé d’affaires of the German Embassy 
still «hopeful» on September 30. He even proposed to set up a coup d’état against the Bul-
garian government with the help of Muslim Bulgarians in order to keep the alliance intact.6 
Once again, Talat’s komitadji repertoire was delivering options—realistic or not. Talat said, 
if the Bulgarians make a deal that would enable an invasion of the Ottoman capital by the 
Entente forces, than it is a lost case for us. In this case I would resign for that I don’t want 
to conclude such a peace.7 
Bulgaria was geopolitically very critical for the military defense of the Ottoman capital. The 
Bulgarian border lied only few hundred kilometers away from Constantinople and this was 
a cause for general concern within the government.8 In the words of Celal (Bayar), the later 
president of the Republic of Turkey and by than a young member of the CUP, «the catas-
trophe was knocking on the door».9  
Next morning, on October 1, even more terrible news reached the Ottoman capital. Damas-
cus was lost to General Edmund Allenby’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force.10 Syria’s loss was 
probably expected by the Young Turk regime, but not the other news that reached the Grand 
Vizier’s ears. Talat Pasha received a telegram sent by the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, 
Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, reporting that also Germany was at the brink of calling an armistice. 
Talat, who was there in Germany and talked to the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff 
only few days ago, could not believe that the Germans were giving in for a separate peace 
agreement.11 With Germans surrendering, the war was finally lost for the Ottoman Empire. 
When Cemal Pasha was asked by his adjutant: «Sir, is everything over?» Cemal could not 
hide his tears. Few moments later recovered from the sorrowful feelings of loss and defeat, 
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Cemal went being himself again; he was trying to convince the police director on the tele-
phone to persecute Nüzhet Sabit for publishing an offensive pamphlet, as if nothing had ever 
changed.12 But things were indeed about to change rapidly and radically. On October 2, in 
a letter to his brother Nuri (Killigil) Pasha in the Caucasus, Enver Pasha also acknowledged 
that the war was now a lost cause and wrote: «Since we are concluding peace, it means that 
we’ve lost the game.»13  
The «game» they played had come to a bitter closure. Now against the odds of a «tomorrow 
full of unknown probabilities»—as Talat Pasha put it beautifully—the CUP had to under-
take urgent political maneuvers in order to take precautions and make preparations for the 
worst. The defeat and armistice meant the end of the CUP rule. Prosecutions and persecu-
tions of the CUP cabinet for the war crimes they committed was on the horizon. The CUP 
leadership rejected to face the consequences of a future court martial. Fearing their own pros-
ecution, they would opt to flight. They would leave the empire and go into exile. They had 
a heavy load of political baggage they were to carry to their exile, while leaving behind even 
a heavier legacy in Ottoman Turkey.  
*** 
The broader picture of the events in late September 1918 makes the German surrender less 
surprising. The culmination of events on different fronts made the German military leader-
ship’s expectations for the long-awaited victorious peace (Siegfrieden) disappear painfully. 
This sudden change of mind within the military leadership remained long disputed in the 
popular imagination making way for the right-wing and militarist conspiracy theories of the 
«stab-in-the-back legend» (Dolchstoßlegende). According to this «national myth», the armi-
stice was a treacherous conspiracy of the—usual suspects—social-democrats, Jews, and Free-
masons, who stabbed the undefeated German military in the back through a surrender. In 
reality, however, mutinies among the soldiers and sailors as well as strikes and desperation on 
the home front were emerging; there were no more reserve resources to continue prolonged 
fighting; and after the Western front was breached and the American forces appeared on the 
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horizon, the disillusionment became inescapable. On September 29, Ludendorff revealed to 
the Kaiser at the War Council in Spa that the war was now a lost cause and it was time to 
maneuver into the armistice negotiations both diplomatically and domestically. Otherwise 
not only the defeat but also the annihilation of the remaining troops was at stake.14 Thus, 
Germany gave in for peace. The new German Chancellor Prince Max von Baden sent a tel-
egram to Talat Pasha on October 9, writing that only the «unswerving determination for 
defense» will help the both defeated governments secure «honorable peace» conditions, but 
diplomatic courtesies did not much help to change the catastrophic situation.15 Talat’s cabi-
net had already resigned on October 7.16 Germany, followed by Austria-Hungary and Otto-
man Empire respectively, gave into Wilson’s principles, but the victorious Entente had less 
interest in granting concessions at this moment of victory.17 
It was common wisdom that the defeat in World War I meant the defeat of CUP. In the last 
ten years since the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the paramilitary rebels who ended up 
being imperial rulers had just realized—but, of course, without truly blaming themselves—
that they had brought along the ruin of the empire they had originally sworn to save. The 
CUP leaders were up to their throat in trouble now—to say the least. The prospects of the 
upcoming armistice with the Allies was casting a dark shadow on the future of the CUP. The 
Young Turk triumvirate in particular has long been subjected to a strong antagonization—
or even demonization—discourse by the Entente propaganda and the Ottoman opposition. 
Everybody knew that prosecutions and persecutions were awaiting the CUP. Their commit-
ment to the Central Powers’ collective war effort and the ruthless handling of war and society 
would make a strong case against them at the military tribunals.  
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Fellow CUP members were indeed concerned about their prominent friends and encouraged 
them to get away before the arrival of the Allied forces. For instance, Rauf (Orbay) Bey and 
Enver’s adjutant Kazım (Orbay) Bey were both worried about Enver’s life and honor.18 Rauf 
Bey had also talks with Cemal Pasha about his security in those days.19 Kara Kemal was 
concerned about Talat Pasha and advised him to disappear for a while.20 Dr. Nazım told 
years later that the fear of retaliations from Greeks and Armenians was the major concern.21  
Shakib Arslan tells that the CUP leadership heard of rumors that Sultan Vahideddin had a 
secret agreement with the British to persecute and execute the CUP leaders.22 Later Sultan 
Vahideddin denounced the CUP leaders for the Armenian massacres in an interview to the 
Daily Telegraph.23 The personal safety and reputation of the CUP leaders was seen as a matter 
of national pride by many CUP members and precautions were needed to be taken. There 
were even rumors of a failed assassination attempt against Enver and Talat in the newspa-
pers.24 There were three options on the table: Either they would hide and wait in Constanti-
nople or they would retreat to Eastern Anatolia and start a resistance movement there. In the 
worst scenario, they would leave for exile and come back, when the conditions would allow 
it.25 Either way, they would escape the looming prosecutions. 
On October 14, Field-Marshal Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) Pasha was appointed as the new Grand 
Vizier.26 He was not a CUP member nor had he been in favor of the decision for war, but he 
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was a generally respected commander without any serious feuds with the CUP or the German 
military command.27 In forming the new cabinet, the CUP utilized some committee mem-
bers with a rather unblemished record in war-time decisions, such as Rauf (Orbay), Fethi 
(Okyar) and Cavid in hopes to ensure an unnoticed continuation of the Committee’s influ-
ence in the armistice.28 Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Pasha was proposed as Minister of War, 
but the new Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha claimed this office for himself.29  
Talat Pasha soon approached the newly appointed Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, because he 
feared the Allied prosecutions after the armistice. İzzet Pasha’s promise was not much relief. 
«As long as I am in the cabinet, I will never turn you in to the enemy», he assured. «But who 
knows how long I will remain in the cabinet?» he rightly questioned.30 Talat’s concerns were 
not without a reason. Talat knew very well that he would be accounted for the extermination 
of Ottoman Armenians, once the Allies take over the Ottoman Empire or the long-sup-
pressed Ottoman opposition becomes vocal again. On October 27, German Naval Attaché 
Grancy was reporting that the «radicals» were trying to replace the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha 
with Tevfik Pasha «in order to make Talaat Enver and others accountable.»31 
It was pretty much obvious that Talat and other CUP leaders and their murdering henchmen 
would end up at the gallows. Thus, the Central Committee of the CUP, consisting of Eyüp 
Sabri (Akgöl), Ziya Gökalp, Mithat Şükrü (Bleda), Kara Kemal, Bahaeddin Şakir, Dr. 
Nazım, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) and others, decided to bring a number of CUP leaders into 
safety.32 Nonetheless, many accounts agree that Talat somehow accepted to face his fate. 
According to the accounts delivered by several CUP members, Talat remained long reluctant 
to run away.33 According to Mithat Şükrü, Talat’s initial reaction to the end of the war was: 
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«I have to answer to my country with a clear conscience. If they wish so, they should hang 
me…»34 Even until now Turkish nationalist scholars celebrate these words as a marker of 
Talat’s strong integrity and claim that he did not simply run away from his responsibilities.35 
Talat was known for making such bold claims. For instance, when Portuguese Prime Minis-
ter João Franco went into exile in 1909, the reaction of Talat Bey at the Ottoman Parliament 
was: «We do not leave the country; we work until we die.»36 As a remarkably smart politician, 
Talat knew very well when to say what. Therefore, his boldness should be read with caution. 
For instance, at the opening day of the final congress of the CUP on November 1, 1918, 
Talat held a shockingly straightforward speech about the harms committed during his gov-
ernment such as the Armenian massacres.37 Although his apologia contains the blueprints of 
Turkey’s official arguments in rejecting the genocide claims, he presented himself as prepared 
and willing to account for the wrongs committed under his responsibility:  
It’s not that I will deny the horrors. My desire is only to tell the truth and get rid of the 
exaggerations. The deportation incidents did occur, but none of those were enacted ac-
cording to a premeditated decision by the Sublime Porte. One could not have tolerated 
movements during a great war that were disturbing the freedom of movement and threat-
ening the salvation of the people and the security of the army by starting insurgencies 
behind the fronts. In Erzurum, there were Armenian paramilitaries obstructing the move-
ment of the army. Whenever these got in trouble, they were receiving help and protection 
from the Armenian villages. The churches were stash houses for weapons. The deporta-
tions were out of desperation. It’s not that I will argue that the deportations were exe-
cuted orderly everywhere or that it didn’t cross the boundaries of the imperative. In many 
places, animosities broke out for this reason. Evil has been done that we had by no means 
anticipated. Certain officials enacted cruelties and violence beyond measure so that a 
great deal of innocents was victimized unjustly. I admit that it was the duty of the Gov-
ernment to prevent them. In cases where the horrors could not be prevented, it was nec-
essary to search, find, and punish the wrongdoers. Sometimes this has been done, but it 
wasn’t sufficient. It would have been appropriate to conduct general investigations and 
launch persecutions, but it wasn’t easy to do these in times of war. Among them there 
were some, who committed these cruelties without being carried away by any feeling of 
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animosity and [interest in] profit, but only for the purpose of serving the homeland. 
Their minds narrow, their ideas limited, there were many of those, who were under the 
force of their fanatic feelings. Could it have been appropriate to open a chasm between 
the two trends in the homeland in the course of a war, when the homeland was more 
than anything in need of unity, in a time when we had wished to create men out of stone 
to send them to the front? I believed that it wasn’t right. I took every responsibility and 
postponed all kinds of investigations for after the war.38 
The irony of this confession—if it may count as such at all—is that at that time it was already 
decided by the Central Committee of the CUP to get Talat Pasha and other CUP leaders 
out of the Ottoman capital. On that very same night Talat and his friends were to disappear. 
Talat could take the blame, because he knew that he and other leaders were escaping anyway. 
Taking blame also meant to save the reputation and future of the remaining CUP members 
and enable their continued influence. Talat finished his speech with the following address: 
As you know, the Bulgarian front collapsed so that we have no more connection to our 
allies. Our armies have been crushed in Syria. The war has ended with our defeat. […] 
Therefore, we gave the resignation of the cabinet to the Sultan. 
Our policies have failed. Therefore, it wasn’t possible for us to keep the government 
offices by any means. Therewith, as the executive committee we collectively resign from 
the executive and administrative positions of the Committee of Union and Progress and 
leave and entrust the committee to its true and legitimate owner, the Congress Commis-
sion.39  
At the end of the congress, it was decided to officially shut-down the party.40 In its place the 
congress founded the ill-fated Renewal Party (Teceddüd Fırkası).41 As the party congress was 
still taking place, Talat, Enver, Cemal and some of other notorious CUP members left the 
Ottoman Empire for political exile in Europe, from which most of them would ever again 
return. Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir even sugarcoated the option of flight by comparing it to the 
hijra of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina.42 This was, of course, a very self-
praising apologia, revealing the daring conceptualization of their own political sacrality. They 
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saw themselves as blessed (and burdened) with a sacred mission for the sake of nation and 
empire. 
*** 
On a night in late October, General von Seeckt had a dinner with Enver Pasha. Concerned 
about his protégé’s future, von Seeckt made Enver a special offer. In a letter he wrote to his 
wife, he said: 
I promised him that he, Talaat, and some others will have a place and shelter on every 
ship I have on hand. It is, of course, completely doubtful, whether it will come to that. 
Yet, it is reassurance for them to know.43 
On October 27, Bernstorff reported from the German Embassy in Constantinople to Berlin 
that the CUP leaders announced the desire to leave the country and asked for the help of the 
Germans. According to Bernstorff, Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha was involved in these negotia-
tions though he had also his doubts because of possible blowbacks against his government. 
As a reassurance İzzet Pasha demanded a declaration that the émigrés should be extradited 
back to Ottoman Turkey by Germany in case the Ottoman Government would come up 
with such a request in the future. This was a hopeless inquiry.44 In his memoirs, İzzet Pasha 
writes that he did not help the CUP leaders leave the country and that he even did «everything 
in his hands to prevent it.»45 Nonetheless, the German reports tell that the Grand Vizier 
worked behind the curtains to facilitate the exfiltration of the CUP leaders.46 The German 
officials gave permission for Enver and Talat to take refuge in Germany: 
To Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha, who concluded the alliance with us and bore it loyal 
on our side, our country stands open. If they believe they need to fly away from Turkey 
because of political persecution, Your Excellency wants to be helpful by any means.47 
Why would Germany help Enver and Talat escape the consequences of armistice and give 
them refuge in Germany? In the end, these men meant trouble. Some Turkish historians 
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believe that by helping the CUP leaders to escape, the German military officials were hoping 
to hide war secrets from the Entente.48 Genocide scholar Vahakh Dadrian goes one step fur-
ther and sees the reason behind the German support as a decisive measure by General von 
Seeckt and Bronsart von Schellendorf to cover German complicity in the Armenian Geno-
cide.49 A rather more nuanced explanation is that the German support for granting them 
refuge was based solely on the notion that Enver and Talat have been loyal partners to Ger-
many and they felt indebted to these men. It was an obligation of honor. Lieutenant Com-
mander of the German Navy and naval historian Hermann Lorey sees the motivation behind 
the German support also as a matter of loyalty to those friends of Germany:  
At the instruction of the Auswärtiges Amt the Germanophile leaders of Turkey were 
underhandedly given the chance by the Mittelmeerdivision to leave the country unop-
posed. For the German Reich it was obvious duty to reciprocate the same loyalty to those 
men, who in the long years of a tiresome war stuck inviolably to their ally, and to help 
them continue to work for their fatherland from abroad.50 
The war and the defeat had caused a strong anti-German atmosphere in Ottoman Turkey.51 
Even German official reports admitted at the end of the war that all that Propaganda did not 
achieve to create pro-German sentiments in Ottoman Turkey.52 Therefore, Talat and Enver’s 
commitment on behalf of the collective war-effort was treasured and their German colleagues 
felt indebted to them. 
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Nevertheless, the Armenian Question played an essential role in German support, but quite 
an opposite one as some suggests. When it came to the selection of the group of fugitives, the 
Auswärtiges Amt was strictly against granting asylum to those, «who do not desire to flee from 
the responsibility in the persecution of Armenians by running away.» It is further argued that 
In the critical time we did everything in our power to prevent the horrors (Greuel), and 
shall not make ourselves guilty afterwards by releasing the perpetrators from their pun-
ishment.53  
Peculiarly, Enver and Talat were not seen as «perpetrators». This does not mean that the 
Auswärtiges Amt believed that Enver and Talat had a clean record in the suffering of the 
Armenians—quite the contrary in fact. This political immunity was granted primarily to 
Enver and Talat due to their treasured loyalty to Germany as war-time allies.  
On the other side, for the internal decision-making of the Young Turk leadership, complicity 
in the Armenian deportations did play a major role in the selection of those who should leave 
the empire. A remarkable episode in Mithat Şükrü’s memoir, whether accurate or not, is 
worth quoting. As the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CUP, Mithat 
Şükrü was initially considered among those who were selected to leave the country. But 
Mithat Şükrü’s wife objected to Talat Pasha about his husband’s leaving, because in her un-
derstanding only those who were associated with the Armenian deportations had to leave: 
- Talat Bey, did Mithat have anything to do with the Armenian deportation affairs?  
- No, he was not involved in anything. 
[…] 
- If Mithat has no share in the measures that were taken, then what is the reason that he 
leaves together with you? As I understand, there will be no advantage in his leaving. It is 
your decision, but if he would stay in İstanbul… 
- I understand, madam. […] You will not bear separating from Mithat…  
[…] 
- No, don’t get me wrong, I just don’t want him to fall into the situation of being wrongly 
accused of having committed a crime… If you would allow, he shall stay here…  
- Of course, madam, he shall stay, he shall stay. We would have taken him with us only 
to keep his company around anyway…54 
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One might argue that Mithat Şükrü tells this story only to clear his own name.55 Possibly—
but it still implies that it was no secret that they were selected because of their involvement 
in the Armenian deportations and persecutions. The selection based on complicity in the 
Armenian massacres does not necessarily imply that these men were picked only to hide the 
secrets of a genocidal campaign, but perhaps rather to save those friends who were more 
threatened by court martial prosecutions. Going into exile meant rather escaping death pen-
alty, not necessarily covering up traces of complicity.  
Destroying evidence against their case was a matter dealt separately. Although the evidence 
is rather suggestive, all signs point to a collective if not coordinated destruction and removal 
of official and internal documents. Noticeably, the CUP left behind no archive or a collective 
body of internal documents, except for dispersed collections of personal papers. According 
to testimonies of other CUP members at the post-war Military Tribunals, Dr. Nazım took 
away a chest full of documents from CUP’s headquarters and Talat Pasha took some docu-
ments from the Minister of Interior. These documents are believed to have been burnt before 
leaving Constantinople.56 British intelligence believed that Kara Kemal brought some other 
Committee documents to bank vaults throughout Switzerland already in January 1918.57 
Also General von Seeckt is accused of taking some official Ottoman documents with him to 
Germany, but it is perhaps a little speculative that the German military was involved in co-
ordinated measures of hiding Ottoman documents related to the Armenian massacres.58 
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Peculiarly, Cemal Pasha was not initially granted asylum by Germany like Enver and Talat. 
This was not necessarily due to Cemal’s role in the Armenian deportations. Hilmar Kaiser 
demonstrated that Cemal acted against the deportations and persecution of the Armenian 
population.59 Cemal’s exclusion by German officials was based rather on a general distrust 
towards him by German military command since he was considered to be somewhat of anti-
German orientation. It was a matter of being a friend of Germany or not. The Navy Attaché 
Grancy requested subsequently to warrant the same asylum concessions promised to Enver 
and Talat also to his naval colleague Cemal, « [b]ecause it would be outrages [unmöglich] to 
let Djemal fall alone.»60 
The men who were selected to leave the empire first of all included the Young Turk trium-
virate of Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha. They were accompanied by CUP’s 
éminence grise Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım. Both belonged to the initial Parisian 
circle of Young Turks in exile and played a role in the merge of Parisian and Macedonian 
branches of the CUP before the revolution. Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was the Director of the 
Political Brach of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and he is considered as the one of the main initiators 
of the persecution and extermination of Armenians.61 Dr. Nazım similarly worked mostly 
behind the scenes and his name is also associated with the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. In the last 
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cabinet he served as the Minister of Education. Talat personally insisted on taking Dr. Ba-
haeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım into exile with him.62 Dr. Nazım and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir 
were considered even by fellow CUP members as being «the most sectarian komitadji» of the 
CUP.63 It is more or less clear that these two men had blood on their hands and why they 
were among the selected.64 Less clear is why necessarily Dr. Rüsuhi (Dikmen) was selected. 
He was for sure an influential member of CUP’s Central Committee, but beyond that there 
is not much information on his affairs.65 Also notorious CUP men who worked in local 
administration were among the selected. Former Governor of Trabzon Cemal Azmi Bey was 
known for his brutal handling of the non-Muslim community of the Black Sea region.66 
Former Police Commissioner of Constantinople Bedri Bey was responsible for the arrests and 
deportations of the Armenian community leaders of Constantinople in 1915. Former Gov-
ernor of Beirut Azmi Bey not only belonged to Cemal Pasha’s entourage in Syria, but he was 
known for being the Police Commissioner of Constantinople prior to Bedri Bey.67 Murat 
Bardakçı writes that Talat’s young brother-in-law Hayreti also accompanied them, indicating 
that Talat was able to pick anyone he desired.68  
The selection process of this small circle of committee men who were chosen to leave the 
empire on a German vessel was—as many other things in Young Turk decision-making—
rather a fait accompli of a small network of trusted fellows based on personal ambitions and 
fears. Germans had little to say and did not even know for sure whom they all assisted to 
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escape.69 There were complaints among the German officials that former police commission-
ers like Bedri and Azmi Bey70 were also on board, who were associated with the murder of 
Mahmud Şevket Pasha in 1913, who was still treasured as a great friend of Germany. But the 
main objection was again: «In other ways as well, we intend to deny our help to those office-
holders, who are compromised in the Armenian Question or as exploiters.»71 But by then, it 
was already too late for this objection. The Germans had already assisted these men to get 
away and deporting them back to Ottoman Turkey would have aroused more attention.72  
*** 
In the late evening of November 2, the Military Attaché of the Habsburg Empire, Joseph 
Pomiankowski was urgently requested to see the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha at his residence. 
The Grand Vizier was down in bed with influenza under heavy pillows as he received Pom-
iankowski. The Grand Vizier told that Topal İsmail Hakkı Pasha had disappeared. İsmail 
Hakkı was the Ministerial General Intendant of the Ottoman Empire and his name was 
broadly associated with allegations of corruption, black-marketing, and profiteering.73 The 
war-profiteer İsmail Hakkı was to be arrested, when he suddenly disappeared, as İzzet Pasha 
explained. Before İsmail Hakkı, there were news in Constantinople newspapers that Azmi 
Bey and Bedri Bey, both former police commissioners of Constantinople, tried to get away 
with a German vessel on September 27 and that they were then detained around Büyük-
dere.74  
According to İzzet Pasha’s information, İsmail Hakkı received the help of an Austria-Hun-
garian captain and escaped to Odessa. Therefore, Pomiankowski had to contact the officials 
in Odessa and hand in İsmail Hakkı to the Ottoman Empire.75 This allegation happened to 
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be wrong, however. According to Pomiankowski, İsmail Hakkı had escaped with German 
help.76 In fact, İsmail Hakkı fled to Odessa on Monday, October 28, 1918, on the German 
steamship General but the news spread around on November 2.77 The German embassy was 
approached by the Ottoman Foreign Minister to arrest İsmail Hakkı and deport him back 
to Turkey if he tries to enter German borders.78 The Auswärtiges Amt decided to ignore the 
Ottoman request.79 Later İsmail Hakkı fled to Switzerland via Romania, Poland, and Ger-
many undercover as a mute Ottoman Greek.80 There were rumors that he already shipped 
some money to Switzerland before his departure.81 When Pomiankowski met with the Grand 
Vizier next time, Ahmet İzzet Pasha was already out of his sickbed, but in great distress. To 
Pomiankowski’s question, what had happed, İzzet Pasha answered fiercely: «What, you don’t 
know it yet? The Pashas are gone, despite all the precautions!»82 
The final decision for the exfiltration of the Young Turk leaders from the Ottoman capital 
was made very late. Therefore, the preparations were rather abrupt. On November 1, during 
a meeting at the staff of the Mittelmeerdivision, the youngest of the Admiralty staff officers 
present at the meeting, Herrmann Baltzer, volunteered for the operation. The exfiltration 
operation took place on the evening of November 1, around 10 pm. Baltzer was accompanied 
by Captain Kurz.83 The whole operation was executed in great secrecy and stealth.84  
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First, Talat Pasha and five of his colleagues were to be picked up at İhsan Namık (Poroy)’s 
villa in Arnavutköy, where they were invited to a last supper. They were drinking heavily and 
discussing passionately in the final hours before their departure.85 The moment as they got 
on board of the motor boat, is described in Baltzer’s words as follows:  
As soon as we tied up at the landing stage, a group of Turkish gentlemen carefully ap-
proached us and said the arranged keyword ‹Enver›. It was the former Minister President 
Talaat Pasha, the former prefect of Istanbul [Bedri Bey] and five other gentlemen. Each 
of them had only a small suitcase with them. At my invitation they disappeared in the 
cabin of the yacht und at that moment I saw that they changed their Fez for a European 
travel hat.86 
After that Enver Pasha and his colleagues were picked up.87 Ziya Şakir (Soku) writes that at 
that moment there was a prearranged electricity blackout in whole Constantinople.88 On 
their way to Boyacıköy to collect Cemal Pasha—according to Baltzer’s narrative resembling 
spy-thrillers—the propeller of the motor boat got caught in the nets of local fishermen. Luck-
ily, the propeller could then shred the net into pieces and got loose.89 After picking up Cemal, 
they were brought to the port of Tarabya, where they got on board of the former Russian 
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torpedo boat R-01.90 The CUP leaders shipped off to Sevastopol that night leaving the em-
pire behind.91 Baltzer was later interrogated by the Allied officials, «if he knew, when and 
how the Turkish ministers shipped out!», but he did not give away his secret.92 
In many narratives from memoirs to recent works of history, it is said that the CUP leaders 
left with a German submarine. As we have seen, this is not true, it was the torpedo boot R-
01. Probably in processes of sense-making, the more secretive image of submarine found 
more appeal in conspiracy theories, coffee shop rumors, and urban legends rather than a 
regular torpedo boat.93 Therefore, this false gossip reproduced itself again and again from 
historical accounts to scholarly works.94 Other newspapers wrote that they were wearing 
women’s clothes to hide their identity, which also suited the imaginary world of Constanti-
nople rumors.95  
***  
On October 26, 1918, Emil Ludwig, a German newspaper correspondent in Constantinople 
and an author still famous for his psychological biographies, tried to predict the future paths 
of Talat and Enver in a newspaper column. He believed that Talat had a stronger personality 
than Enver, the latter being more concerned with social mobility and prestige. For Emil 
Ludwig, Talat was too strong to simply disappear. While Talat would return, Enver might 
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disappear into oblivion, he believed.96 Emil Ludwig was not the only one speculating about 
the future of the Young Turk leaders. At the end of World War I, there were many theories 
about what would happen to men like Enver and Talat. Their disappearance would cause a 
major debate in the Ottoman capital.  
Before Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas left Constantinople with a German torpedo boot, 
they left official letters to Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, explaining their «leave of absence» and 
thanking for his support.97 The official letters to the Grand Vizier were written in order to 
avoid accusations of absence without leave or desertion. Besides İzzet Pasha himself within 
his cabinet fellow CUP comrades Minister of Navy Rauf (Orbay), Minister of Finance Cavid, 
and Minister of the Interior Fethi (Okyar) were also informed that the Young Turk triumvi-
rate was planning to leave the Ottoman capital, though they were not initiated to its details.98 
Since the CUP leaders communicated their plan to leave the country to the Grand Vizier 
and some ministers, some of their followers—then and now—tend to downplay the subver-
sive and fugitive nature of their escape. Fellow CUP member Muhittin Bey argues, for in-
stance, that even the simple fact that the Grand Vizier was informed «is enough to assure that 
they should not be regarded as fugitives».99 This is, of course, mere apologia. The CUP lead-
ership was running away to save their own neck. Regardless of the knowledge of government 
officials, they practically became political fugitives from the moment they left the Ottoman 
borders and waters behind.  
Especially, the Minister of Interior Fethi (Okyar) Bey was under fire for letting them go and 
for not delivering concrete information about their whereabouts.100 Although himself a 
prominent CUP member, Fethi was never shy with criticism. He explained to the newspaper 
Ati, what their escape really meant politically: «Although I am personally a friend of theirs, I 
have never advised them to escape. Because with their escape they have condemned them-
selves.»101  
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Once the news broke out in the capital that the CUP leaders left the empire, «all hell broke 
loose» (kıyamet koptu) in the words of journalist Ahmet Emin.102 It was a political scandal of 
first order. It was fiercely debated in the Ottoman media-scape, which was liberated only 
recently from CUP’s censorship and retaliation measures.103 Even some CUP members re-
garded their flight as cowardness. It was argued that they should have stayed and faced the 
consequences, however fierce and unjust these may come. Only few members with more loyal 
bounds to Enver and Talat were openly defending them.104 The letters to the Grand Vizier 
were—at least partly—leaked to the press and were debated publicly.105 If Talat was promis-
ing to face the consequences when the right time comes, as he promised to the Grand Vizier, 
then this was the time, the newspaper Vakit argued.106 The same newspaper wrote, if Enver 
Pasha’s understanding of «serving the homeland» meant corruption, famine, and meaningless 
sacrifice of hundreds of thousands, then he shall better not promise the Grand Vizier to 
return back to his duty for the homeland in the future.107  
The political crisis unleashed by the Young Turk triumvirate’s disappearance opened a public 
debate on CUP’s war-time policies. From their allegedly submissive relation to Germany over 
their despotic and brutal rule to corruption allegations, the CUP was under heavy criticism. 
The image of CUP seen by the former opposition as a criminal band of thugs, tyrants, and 
megalomaniacs was now all present in Constantinople newspapers.108 They were illustrated 
by Ali Kemal, the notorious anti-CUP journalist, as «vagabonds, perpetrators, impudants», 
who came to power «with the help of their ruffians [külhanbeylerinin yardımıyla]», and were 
subscribed to «Napoleonism» and «imperialism [cihangirlik, literally world-dominance]».109 
In a poem mocking Enver Pasha and Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s adventurous activities abroad, the 
 
102 Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, I, 314–315. 
103 For detailed surveys of the press coverage see: Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 95–172; 
Demirbaş, “Liderlerinin Yurt Dışına Kaçması Üzerine İttihat ve Terakki İçinde Meydana Gelen Tepkiler,” 
131–45; Kocaoğlu, Mütarekede İttihatçılık, 72–82; Kaya, “İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Yurtdışına Kaçışları 
ve Bunun İstanbul Basınındaki Yankıları,” 181–201 
104 Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, 549.  
105 Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 104. 
106 Vakit, “Eski Hükümet Erkanının Firarı: Şiddetli Tedabir ve Takibat,” November 5, 1918.  
107 Ibid..  
108 Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 95–172. 
109 Sabah, November 5, 1918, quoted in Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 98–100. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
81 
humor magazine Diken asked: «While the enemy was ploughing the homeland / What busi-
ness in India and China we had?»110 Man of letters Cenab Şehabeddin criticized the Teşkilat-
ı Mahsusa as «rogue and false» and pointed its dubious role of behind the call for jihad.111 
Refik Halit (Karay)’s polemic essay «Gentlemen, Where Are You Going?» most remarkably 
represents the climax of public resentments against the CUP and the disappearance of its 
leaders: 
O bloody minded Pashas with clubs in hands and sabers in belts, where are you going 
from rooftop to rooftop? 
[…] You weren’t ministers, you ruled as overlords. You weren’t directors, you ruled as 
ringleaders. You weren’t governors, you ruled as provost marshals. You ran rings around 
swashbucklers. You made tyrants marvel you. […] 
[…] You weren’t satisfied with grand vizierates, high commands, ministries. Those 
greedy to become sultans, you almost had the Friday prayers in Damascus and Aleppo 
called on your names and minted coins with your names on them… You had the gal-
lantry, you had the chivalry, you had the braggery, the swaggery and the arrogancy, you 
had it all… Now, where are you going like a sneaky weasel from roof to roof? 
Yes, where are they going? These parvenus, who reached grand vizierships with one step 
from the neighborhood coffee houses, ministries after one leap from the tavern benches, 
governorships with single move from the rowdy barracks, where are they going?112 
The political scandal caused by their disappearance brought the end of İzzet Pasha’s cabinet 
on November 9.113 The departure of the CUP leaders from Constantinople meant the be-
ginning of the end of the CUP.114 The Committee organization and their political legacy, 
however, could not simply go away overnight. Despite all criticisms in the newspapers, Cenab 
Şehabeddin called attention to the fact that 
Unfortunately, the Unionist [İttihatçı] clubs absorbed almost entirely the homeland’s 
less-literate segments. The police are Unionist, the soldiers are Unionist, the departments 
are Unionist, everybody is Unionist.115 
Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha immediately requested from the German Chancellor in a 
letter written on November 6 and delivered on November 11, the arrest and deportation of 
Enver, Talat, Cemal, Bahaeddin Şakir, Nazım, Azmi, and Bedri. The Grand Vizier warned 
 
110 Diken, November 14, 1918, quoted in Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 101. 
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112 Refik Halit, “Efendiler Nereye,” Zaman, November 6, 1918. See also: Bardakçı, Enver, 573–75.  
113 Waldburg, report (Constantinople) to the Auswärtiges Amt, November 19, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 276. 
114 Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, 556.  
115 Hadisat, November 8, quoted in Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 145.  
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Germany not to deliver the «coup de grâce» to its ally by protecting these men.116 The Grand 
Vizier even told German diplomats that because of their assistance in exfiltrating the CUP 
leaders, the German military officials in Constantinople might be held ransom until the CUP 
leaders are handed over.117 But the German Government responded that the return of Enver 
and Talat was «out-of-question» and the whereabouts of the others was not known to the 
German officials.118 Internal documents from the Auswärtiges Amt illustrate a dispute about 
this fait accompli: We disapprove entirely if local German military authorities have helped 
Dr. Nasim, Bahaeddin, and Djemal escape that Bedri and Azmi are also compromised in the 
Armenians or Arab Question was not known here.119 
Since the extradition agreement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire of January 11, 
1917, excluded political reasons, the Grand Vizier’s proposal was based also on claims that 
these men had been involved in enrichment and corruption.120 In response to the allegations 
by the Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha that Talat and others were involved in corruption 
and self-enrichment, Foreign Minister Wilhelm Heinrich Solf is quoted as saying that «Talaat 
Pasha is the most honest man in the world».121 After it became clear that Talat and Enver 
were untouchable and the latter perhaps not even in Germany, the Ottoman Embassy con-
centrated its efforts on the arrest of the remaining fugitives, Cemal Pasha, Dr. Nazım, Bedri 
Bey, Azmi Bey, and Bahaeddin Şakir. Therefore, these men left Berlin. Most of them went 
to Munich, but sooner or later returned back to Berlin.122 There were also again and again 
false rumors in newspapers that Bahaeddin Şakir was arrested or similar stories.123 
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According to information the Auswärtiges Amt received from Cosswa Anckarsvärd, the Swe-
dish Ambassador and the protective power of German interests in Constantinople, the per-
secution of Talat and Enver would rather «come to nothing» (im Sande verlaufen), but Ba-
haeddin Şakir, Nazım, Cemal, Bedri, and Azmi will get a «short shrift» (kurzen Prozeß ma-
chen).124 There is especially rich evidence on Ottoman demands to extradite Bahaeddin Şakir 
and Cemal Azmi Bey.125  
The German officials agreed to cooperate on the extradition of the remaining fugitive leaders, 
but requested detailed legal documentation from Constantinople.126 This was a promise on 
the paper and certainly a stalling tactic. There is no indication what so ever that the German 
state departments were involved in proactive investigation measures to find the fugitive 
Young Turks. German officials simply claimed that the whereabouts of these men were not 
known to German officialdom.127 Ottoman Ambassador Rıfat Pasha countered that he him-
self passed by Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir Bey and Azmi Bey, while he was promenading on the 
Herkulesbrücke the day before, implying that these men were walking freely in the middle of 
Berlin.128 The Auswärtiges Amt talked its way out by claiming that the ambassador’s former 
information that Cemal Pasha was residing in Bavaria—which he actually was—misled the 
police on a wrong trail. The Germans accused the Ottoman Government for not delivering 
any solid documentation in the last four months for this otherwise very «abnormal» prosecu-
tion.129 Rıfat Pasha had to admit that the communication with the Sublime Porte was in fact 
problematic, but insisted that the extradition agreement could be interpreted as such to arrest 
these men without a prior documentation dispatched.130 German diplomats closed the debate 
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by mentioning passed possibilities to send the documents, for instance by the ship Akdeniz, 
which arrived at Hamburg at the beginning of last April.131 Rıfat Pasha was given the blame 
by the Ottoman Government for not effectively working for the extradition of the fugitive 
ministers in Berlin and was ordered back to Constantinople.132 After Rıfat Pasha’s departure, 
the Ottoman Embassy was closed.133  
Meanwhile, a serious witch-hunt was set on course in Ottoman Turkey persecuting and pros-
ecuting notorious CUP members.134 The CUP was held responsible not only for the war-
crimes, but also for the recent post-armistice disorder in the disputed provinces.135 The Act-
ing Grand Vizier and Sheikh-ul-Islam Mustafa Sabri Efendi was reported in British report as 
follows:  
He spoke about Public Security. He said that there were certain people who wished to 
disturb it; that these people belonged to that class which was ‹Committee of Union and 
Progress – coloured›; that they were bad people; that they had opposed the Delegation 
to Paris desiring to be represented thereon, and that they were attempting to influence 
the Sultan. He added that these people must be got rid of and that the Government 
would like to be able to count on the Allied Authorities to help them.136  
There was also certain ambition on behalf of the Entente to put the CUP leaders on trial, 
but the Armenian Question had already lost its public centrality.137 On February 3, 1920, 
the Allies submitted a list of 890 war-criminals to the German Government for the Leipzig 
tribunals. This original list included the names of nine fugitive CUP leaders associated with 
Armenian massacres, but these names were later removed by the British.138  
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Not only in Leipzig but also in Constantinople, Military Tribunals of 1919 and 1920 were 
prosecuting the CUP leaders and their accomplices.139 Immediately after the disappearance 
of the CUP leaders, the war-time cabinets of Said Halim Pasha and Talat Pasha were sent to 
trial.140 Later in the spring of 1919 many prominent CUP members were arrested and de-
tained at the political prison Bekirağa Bölüğü.141 Meanwhile, a commission in Beirut issued 
in February 25, 1919, an arrest warrant for Cemal Pasha for his crimes during the war.142 
The court hearings of the Military Tribunals published by then in Constantinople newspa-
pers remain an important source that continue to reveal the facts and rumors about CUP’s 
shadowy and brutal businesses. At the same time, the unashamed zeal of the anti-CUP poli-
ticians and the Allied occupation forces behind the process created a disputed legacy of the 
tribunals.143 Anyhow, the fugitive CUP leaders and their fellow men in exile were all sen-
tenced to death penalty in absentia by the Military Tribunal, although never to be legally 
executed.144 Until the assassination of Talat in March 15, 1921, the CUP leaders would enjoy 
a relatively safe exile in Germany far away from their past sins. 
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2. «The Holy War Will Continue!»: 
Continuities and Contingencies of Organized Resistance after 
World War I 
Sometime in mid-November 1918, Ottoman deputy Emir Shakib Arslan arrived at the port 
of Nikolayev at the Black Sea. He was coming from Berlin and had an outright troublesome 
journey behind him. Arslan was sent to Berlin on behalf of Enver Pasha on a diplomatic 
mission last June, negotiating with the Germans on matters related to the Caucasus question. 
In early October, Enver sent a ciphered telegraph to Shakib Arslan in Berlin, in which Enver 
advised Arslan to leave Germany and return to Constantinople before the armistice.1 When 
Arslan was on his way back to Constantinople on October 15, he was taken out of the train 
at Oderberg and mistakenly detained. Later the Auswärtiges Amt ordered to release him and 
formally apologized.2 After an odyssey via Constanta and Odessa Arslan arrived at Nikolayev. 
From there he was planning to go to Constantinople by ship. At the harbor, he saw a bunch 
of men in white turbans leaving a German vessel. These were Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa activists 
leaving the Ottoman Empire before the arrival of the Entente. Among them there was Sharif 
Salih from Tunisia3 and Arslan’s future collaborators Abdel Aziz Shawish4 and Dr. Ahmad 
Fuad5 from Egypt as well as more than a dozen other Tunisian and Egyptian activists. Instead 
of going back to Tunisia and Egypt to start resistance movements, as long planned, these 
men were going to Germany and Switzerland. Having worked for their anticolonial cause 
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within the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, the Young Turk regime’s propaganda and unconventional 
warfare apparatus, they were now turning to a different kind of activism. From the security 
of exile, they were hoping to continue their struggle for the independence of Egypt and Tu-
nisia along Wilson’s principles. From these men Arslan learned that Enver, Talat, and Cemal 
Pashas had secretly left the Ottoman Empire after the armistice was concluded.6 
*** 
The Armistice of Mudros between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente was signed on Oc-
tober 30.7 Although the armistice did not meet with reactions of tremendous dislike and 
betrayal as elsewhere among the populations of the Central Powers, the diplomatic ambiguity 
embedded into the armistice opened up the possibility for the Allies to occupy strategic po-
sitions as well as any other Ottoman territory if «disorder» or «threat» were to occur.8 Alt-
hough the CUP leaders disappeared mostly because they feared their own fate at the hands 
of the Entente, one cannot deny that these men saw themselves also in a self-imposed patri-
otic duty. The Young Turk regime could not easily accept the empire’s doomed fate at hands 
of the Entente. The collective ideology of the CUP, claiming to be destined to save the empire 
by any means, hindered the possibility for a serious processing of their defeat and crimes. 
They had proven themselves over the last ten years as sore losers, unable to accept political 
defeat. Every time they had lost politically, they turned to coercive or subversive measures to 
turn the table.  
In the face of the question, whether to flight or fight, the Young Turks decided for both. 
Before their rule was over, they spent the power they still possessed in their best interest. 
Consequently, before their departure they invested their para-official power to prepare the 
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fight against the armistice. Just as they had engineered their rise to power, they would once 
again rely on political engineering to safeguard their claim to power. In their mindset, this 
resistance movement would not only save the empire from occupation and disintegration, 
but serve the usurpation of the CUP in Ottoman Turkey. It was primarily Enver Pasha that 
proposed the idea of continued struggle after the armistice. Enver appears from the onset on 
to be have been vocal about leaving the country (or at least the capital) before the arrival of 
the Allies. He had even officially asked for permission to leave for Europe, which was met 
with great criticism in the parliament.9 Enver was talking openly also to his German friends 
about his plans to lead a guerrilla war against the occupation from the Ottoman hinterlands. 
General von Seeckt wrote to his wife in a letter after a dinner with Enver in Constantinople:  
He must go away, if a completely new regime comes here and especially if the English 
become the overlords here. He has too many enemies. Where he would go, he doesn’t 
know yet. He wants to stay in the country, but it will be difficult and even as a superior 
brigand chief (als besserer Räuberhauptmann) it is not advisable.10  
*** 
The CUP’s plans for resistance were threefold. First and foremost, the CUP leaders Enver, 
Talat, and Cemal gave their followers orders to go underground and start organizing armed 
resistance networks in Ottoman Turkey. Second, Enver Pasha ordered the armies in the Cau-
casus, which were under the command of his family «clan» members to ignore demobilization 
orders and continue the struggle by creating a new base in Azerbaijan. Third, the CUP, es-
pecially Enver again, ordered their agents to give their propaganda activities in the Ottoman 
Arab provinces and in the connected Muslim world a final boost by calling for solidarity with 
the Ottoman Empire and continuing the holy war against the empire’s enemies. 
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In his memoir, Lieutenant Colonel of the Cavalry (Süvari Yarbay) Hüsamettin (Ertürk) from 
the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa11 tells that a secret meeting took place at the villa of Enver in Ku-
ruceşme sometime in October.12 Like many memoires, Hüsamettin’s story seems to mix his 
recollection of the events with retrospective insights and motivations, but his narrative of this 
meeting illustrates the political maneuvers the Young Turk leaders initiated before their dis-
appearance.13 Hüsamettin tells that Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, Cemal Pasha, and Kara Kemal 
were present at this meeting. There is reason to believe that the underground branches of the 
CUP were organized in a patronage system with loyalty ties to a certain patron.14 Kara Kemal 
belonged to Talat’s followers within the CUP and he was colloquially called the «küçük (little) 
efendi», while Talat the «büyük (great) efendi». Kara Kemal had served as Minister of the 
Commissaries in the last war cabinet and he was the mafia-like patron of the commerce 
guilds.15 Before leaving Turkey, Talat ordered Kara Kemal to organize an underground re-
sistance network of the CUP called Karakol Cemiyeti (the Sentinel Society) in Constantino-
ple.16 The mission of the Karakol was later formulated in the article 4 of their program as 
follows: 
The activities of Karakol inside the country are confined to protect and, where non-
existent, establish national unity and territorial integrity by legitimate means, behind the 
scenes. When faced with oppressors of freedom and justice, however, we shall resort to 
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revolutionary ways. We shall fight and die as free men rather than live as prisoners in 
shame.17 
The motto of the Karakol was first considered to be «The General Revolution of Asia against 
European Capitalism and Imperialism» (Avrupa Kapitalizm ve Emperyalizmi Aleyhine Asya 
İhtilal-i Umumisi), but it was then changed to «It Guards the Human Rights and the Na-
tional Independence» (Hukuk-ı Beşer ve İstiklal-i Milliyi Muhafaza Eder), to underline its 
primary national orientation.18  
While Talat Pasha instructed Kara Kemal at one corner of the room, Hüsamettin was in-
structed by Enver Pasha to take charge of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.19 Still today, there is a lot 
of mystery surrounding the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Retrospectively, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa became 
the embodiment of all the shadowy aspects of Young Turk politics—whether actual or ac-
cused.20 Especially, the role of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the Armenian massacres muddies the 
waters, although the use of some semi-official paramilitary bands in the massacres is undeni-
able.21 The private papers of Talat do not remove the ambiguity either. Talat wrote in a letter 
to Enver in July 1919: 
They accuse our friends [from the CUP who were detained by the British in Malta] 
because of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. Allegedly [Gûya, my emphasis] it was the Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa that did all the Armenian and Greek deportations and other evils. And it [i.e. 
 
17 Quoted in Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923, 100.  
18 Aslan, “Yeni Belgeler Işığında Karakol Cemiyeti, Uşak Kongresi ve Karakol Cemiyeti'nin Bolşeviklerle 
Yaptığı Anlaşma,” 36 
19 Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, 165.  
20 On the conflicting interepretations of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the literature see: Safi, “History in the Trench,” 
89–106. 
21 The role attributed to the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in the Armenian Genocide scholarship is very prominent. See 
for instance: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Role of the Special Organization in the Armenian Genocide During 
the First World War,” in Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and 
Australia during the Two World Wars, ed. Panikos Panayi (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 50–82. For a recent take 
based on new Ottoman archival sources, see: Taner Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The 
Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012). Other scholars who are closer to the Turkish position reject that Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was responsible for 
the extermination of Armenians and see it strictly as a counterinsurgency force. See for instance: Guenter 
Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
Press, 2005), 82–88; Edward J. Erickson, Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency (New York: 
Palgrave, 2013); Ahmet Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-ı Şarkıyye Dairesi) Tarihi (İstanbul: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014). Breaking the ranks, genocide scholar Hilmar Kaiser rejects the notion of 
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa as «a poor man’s SS» in Emine Kart, “Historian Challenges Politically Motivated 1915 
Arguments,” Today’s Zaman, March 22, 2009, and argues against a coordinated operation of Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa in the mass killings in Diyarbekir province, despite showing that some rogue Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa 
militants and similar set of paramilitary bands took part in the massacres. Hilmar Kaiser, The Extermination of 
Armenians in the Diarbekir Region (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014), 426–27.  
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Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa] was subjected allegedly [tâbi’ imiş] to the Central Committee of the 
[Committee of] Union and Progress.22  
In its core Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was an «unconventional warfare organization» working in the 
intersection of the Ottoman army and the CUP regime and within and beyond Ottoman 
territories assigned to special paramilitary operations, clandestine networking, and propa-
ganda activities.23 In the meeting back in Kuruceşme, Hüsamettin Bey remembers Enver’s 
instructions to him as follows: 
We are soon leaving the country. The reason is, it is certain that the Armistice will first 
and foremost demand us from the Ottoman State. But they will not take away our or-
ganization, our men, and more importantly our ideals. We find solace in this. […]  
[…] we will leave for Russia with a submarine via Odessa. I will go the Caucasus, then 
visit Moscow. Our friends will go to Berlin. Our struggle against the Entente will con-
tinue. I hope to receive help from Moscow. The Bolsheviks are enemies of these capitalist 
and victorious states. They would support us. After Moscow, I will return to the Caucasus 
again. […] 
[…] Now the second phase of this World War is about to begin. You remember, we had 
won the Balkan War also in its second phase! 
Maybe this time it might take longer and it might be more sorrowful, but they will not 
be able to destroy this state. […] You will officially dissolve the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa but, 
in reality, this organization will never cease to exist.24 
Indeed, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa did not seize to exist with the armistice, but went underground 
and contributed to the Anatolian resistance movement.25 On November 15, Hüsamettin was 
officially commissioned by the Minister of War for the liquidation of the Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa.26 
It was therefore in the Caucasus, where Enver Pasha saw his near future. Enver explained in 
a letter to his uncle Halil (Kut) Pasha that he «would soon get bored of unemployment» and 
thus he made plans to leave for Azerbaijan, for which he sent a large amount of money in late 
 
22 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), July 1, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed. Talat Paşa’nın 
Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve 
Hususi Yazışmalar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 157.  
23 Polat Safi, “The Ottoman Special Organization – Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: An Inquiry into its Operational and 
Administrative Characteristics” (PhD thesis, Bilkent University, 2012). See also: Yücel Yiğit, “The Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa and World War I,” Middle East Critique 23, no. 2 (2014): 157–74. 
24 Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, 165–67.  
25 Safi, “The Ottoman Special Organization – Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa,” 324–25. See also: Criss, Istanbul under 
Allied Occupation, 1918–1923, 94–98.  
26 On the liquidation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa see: Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-ı Şarkıyye Dairesi) Tarihi, 
18–26. 
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October to his uncle’s army in Transcaucasia.27 Enver asked both Halil Pasha and his brother 
Nuri (Killigil) Pasha to give reports about the situation in Azerbaijan. Halil Pasha’s response 
was rather disillusioning: 
I am sure that the people here will not be able to serve the purpose and accomplish any-
thing without our government’s mediation and not even with our soldiers accompanying 
them. Tomorrow when other powerful governments will have influence here, the people 
who embraced us by claiming that we are their kin will first turn their back on us. Unless 
there is a personal urgency on your behalf, I do not approve that you come to Azerbaijan 
area to work here by your own will.28 
But Enver would choose to ignore these remarks. In Crimea, on his way to the Caucasus, 
Enver was hoping to find support from Cafer Seydahmet (Kırımer) Bey’s29 connections to 
the Crimean People’s Republic—in Enver’s words: the «Islamic Republic» of Crimea.30 It 
was later rumored that Enver Pasha received 45.000 Lira in the name of the Crimean Re-
public.31 Hüsamettin recalls in his memoir that secret instructions were delivered via agents 
to Enver’s uncle Halil Pasha and brother Nuri (Killigil) Pasha in Azerbaijan, and to Çerkes 
Yusuf İzzet Pasha in Dagestan. Regardless of the official orders coming from the Ottoman 
capital, the battalions in Erzurum and in the Caucasus were not to be demobilized or dis-
armed.  
One thing that calls for attention is that when Talat and Enver gave orders to Kara Kemal 
and Hüsamettin, they were no more officially in power within the Ottoman officialdom. 
They had no more the mandate of the government or that of the Sultan. But in the eyes of 
their fellow committee men such as Kara Kemal and Hüsamettin as well as in their own self-
esteem, they were distinctively qualified to represent the nation, the state, and the empire. 
This para-official nature of their politics constituted the ambiguity of CUP’s power in the 
eyes of its followers as well as their enemies. They did not need to be in office to have power 
 
27 Enver Pasha (Constantinople), letter to Halil Pasha (Gyumri/Gümrü), October 8, 1918, quoted in Şevket 
Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), III, 446.  
28 Halil Pasha, letter (Gyumri/Gümrü) to Enver Pasha (Constantinople), October 10, 1918, quoted in 
Aydemir, Enver Paşa, III, 443–445.  
29 Ömer Özcan, ed., Kırım Türklerinin Siyasi Önderi Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer: Hayatı ve Eserleri (Ankara: 
Türk Ocakları, 2008). 
30 For Ottoman Empire’s relations to the Crimean Republic see: Hakan Kırımlı, “Diplomatic Relations 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, 1918–21,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, 
no. 4 (1998): 204–7. 
31 Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan 
(İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 553–55; Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya: Atatürk’ün Doğumundan Ölümüne 
Kadar (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1969), 128.  
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or to constitute a paramilitary force and pseudo-governmental polity.32 As Enver revealed to 
Hüsamettin, the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha was also initiated to these plans and would support 
the resistance behind the curtains. The Grand Vizier was indeed trusted with overseeing the 
implementation of CUP’s contingency plans, but did not necessarily support such risky un-
dertakings.33 Anyhow, the mention of Grand Vizier’s complicity was rather an internal cer-
tification attempt, blurring the lines between the CUP and the Ottoman officialdom. The 
CUP’s contingency plans were an open secret and once again a fait accompli. In his letter of 
leave to Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, Enver Pasha openly declared that he was planning to go to 
the Caucasus and work there for «Muslim independence».34  
*** 
During the war, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa had been involved in missions in Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Tripoli, and Egypt in French and British North Africa; Iran, Baluchistan, Afghani-
stan, and India in the British East, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Crimea, Bukhara, and Khiva in 
Russia, and Rumelia in Greece.35 Therefore at the end of the war, there was a large group of 
Muslim and Arab activists residing at the Ottoman capital. They were either brought, invited, 
or recruited by the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. They were accommodated in the medreses of the Fatih 
district. There were nationalist intellectuals, mujahidin, sheikhs, tribal chieftains, and clerics 
among them—all waiting to be deployed to Muslim lands to lead anticolonial resistance and 
pan-Islamic propaganda activities.36 The most famous of them was the Libyan Sheikh Ahmed 
al-Sharif al-Senussi, who was brought from Tunisia with a German submarine.37 The Arab 
activists in Constantinople were to be transported back to their home countries, before the 
arrival of the Entente, as Enver ordered to Hüsamettin. For this task German military com-
mand agreed to provide a submarine. Most of them, however, fled to German or Swiss exile, 
 
32 This ambiguity led many people to see the origins of the Turkish «deep state» (derin devlet) reaching back 
to the CUP. For a discussion of this deep state continuities see: Ryan Gingeras, “Last Rites for a ‘Pure 
Outlaw’: Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish ‘Deep State’,” Past & Present, 
no. 206 (2010): 121–44.  
33 Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923, 101–3.  
34 Enver Pasha, letter to Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, November 3, 1918, Ahmet İzzet Furgaç, Feryadım, 2 vols., 
ed. Süheyl İ. Furgaç and Yüksel Kanar (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992–1993), II, 287–288.  
35 Safi, “History in the Trench,” 95–96. 
36 Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, 165.  
37 Claudia A. Gazzini, “Jihad in Exile: Ahmed al-Sharif Al-Sanusi 1918–1933” (M.A. thesis, Princeton 
University, 2004), 32. 
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since their homelands were all occupied by the Entente. Afghan liaison officers working with 
the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa against the British were also sent in November to Germany.38 Simi-
larly, Iranian nationalists from the «Turkish-Iranian Muslim Union» had to leave the Otto-
man capital and sent back to Iran. «All these men served our Empire,» as Enver explained to 
Hüsamettin, and added that «they will do it in the future as well!» Serving Islam meant serv-
ing the Empire. Further directives were also delivered to Commander-in-Chief of the Africa 
Groups in Tripoli, Prince Osman Fuad Efendi, not to surrender under any condition. «Be-
cause,» as Enver concluded, «the holy war will continue!»39 It is even rumored that Enver 
himself considered to go to Libya instead of Caucasus to help the anticolonial struggle there, 
where his brother Nuri Pasha had been active during the war and Enver himself during the 
Italian-Ottoman War in 1911.40 Enver gave Hüsamettin Bey one last key information about 
the reorganization of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa:  
From now on, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s name will be ‹General Revolutionary Organization 
of the Muslim World› [Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilal Teşkilatı]. Our communication will 
always circulate under this title. You are the Chief of the İstanbul Branch of this organi-
zation. I am the founder, and I select you. Soon the central board of this organization 
will meet in Berlin. I give you the names of the board members. These are Talat Pasha, 
Doctor Bahaeddin Şakir, and Nazım Bey. Allah may help you!41  
If Hüsamettin’s account is not only based on retrospective reimagination, the «General Rev-
olutionary Organization of the Muslim World» was nothing but the prototype of the «Union 
of Muslim Revolutionary Societies», which the CUP leaders later found in their exile years 
as their new political organization.42 There is reason to believe that CUP’s political reorgan-
ization in the aftermath of World War I was premediated and prepared before they left Con-
stantinople, because it was in its core the continuation of existing policies and repertoires.  
There is an organic connection between the Young Turk imperialism in World War I, its 
unconventional warfare organization embodied in the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, and the CUP’s 
 
38 Minister of War, letter to the Auswärtiges Amt, April 23, 1919, PA-AA, R 13759, 346. 
39 Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, 166–67. «Çünkü cihad-ı mukaddes devam edecektir!» 
40 Cemal Kutay, Üç Paşalar Kavgası (Istanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1964), 256–57. In January 1919, the British 
Intelligence even suspected that the Enver Pasha was hiding in North Africa or Spanish Morocco. Masayuki 
Yamauchi, ed., The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 (Tokyo: 
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991), 9. 
41 Peculiarly, Cemal Pasha—even though present in the room—was not declared a board member. Ertürk, İki 
Devrin Perde Arkası, 168.  
42 In fact, elsewehere in his memoir Hüsamettin uses the General Revolutionary Organization of the Muslim 
World as synonymous to Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, 161.  
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transnational anticolonial activities and support for national resistance struggles after the ar-
mistice. Muslim transnationalism was an important part of the continuation of CUP’s activ-
ities from empire to exile. Contrary to common wisdom, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa represented ra-
ther Muslim transnationalism than Turkish nationalism. The transnational dimension of the 
existing policies of anticolonial resistance and pan-Islamic propaganda enabled the Young 
Turk leaders to hold on to their political agenda, even well after losing their imperial positions 
and status as state actors. These established networks and ideas of Muslim nationalist parti-
sanship transcended the structural boundaries of state, nation, and empire, and became the 
official cause of their transnational politics. In his official report about the official liquidation 
of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Hüsamettin wrote: 
After the Armistice it would not have been possible [otherwise] to see that the outcry and 
activity of the whole Muslim world and Muslim countries were directed against the pro-
posals of the Europeans for the Ottoman State. The time and efforts spent for this pur-
pose show not only, what a right move the foundation of this department [i.e. Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa] has been, but will herald and demonstrate the resolute state of affairs of the 
Ottoman State and the Muslim world in the upcoming episodes in a very near future.43  
These anticolonial and Muslim nationalist resistance plans were voiced mostly by Enver Pa-
sha and his associates.44 These ideas of Enver that «the second phase of this World War is 
about to begin» or that «the holy war will continue» or that the «struggle against the Entente 
will continue» are based on Hüsamettin Bey’s recollection, thus questionable to a certain 
degree in their wording. Nonetheless, they are in accordance with Enver’s general political 
ideology and his framing of political issues before, during, and after World War I. Even as 
early as August 1914, three months before the declaration of the Ottoman jihad of 1914, 
Enver believed that  
War with England is now within the realm of possibilities. Contact [the local Arab lead-
ers]. Since such a war would be a holy war [böyle bir harb mukaddes olacağına] ... it will 
definitely be pertinent to rally the Muslim population ... in [neighboring] Iran under 
Russian and English rule to revolution. […] I invite everyone to come to the state’s de-
fence in this war [in which] Muslims will rise up [and] end Christian rule over Muslim 
peoples.45  
 
43 Quoted in Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-ı Şarkıyye Dairesi) Tarihi, 22.  
44 Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 
1992), 13. 
45 Enver Pasha, letter to Cavid Pasha (4th Army Headquarters in Baghdad), August 7/8, 1914, quoted in 
Mustafa Aksakal, “‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” War in History 18, 
no. 2 (2011): 196. 
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Four years later in October 1918, this anticipated «holy war» had still not taken hold in the 
Muslim lands ruled by Britain, France, and Russia. Therefore, the jihad of 1914 has been 
trivialized as nothing but hot air ever since.46 However, this seems not to have bothered En-
ver’s optimism about the rise of anticolonial Muslim nationalism.47 In 1920, as we will see 
in later chapters, Enver would still claim: «Let’s see, what Allah will bring upon us. Is there 
hope for the future? The World War did not end yet. No matter what happens, I am sure it 
will end with the redemption of Islam.»48 There is a consistency in Enver’s idea of anticolonial 
Muslim nationalist struggle from 1914 (or even as early as 1911) to early 1920s.49 The former 
imperial schemes were now to be formulated as post-imperial, anticolonial, and transnational 
politics.  
*** 
These three countermeasures, paramilitary resistance networks, continued military struggle 
in the imperial shatter-zones, and anticolonial Muslim nationalist agitation, were not novel 
initiatives, but rather reorganization and reformulation of existing imperial policies and war-
time practices as transnational contentious politics. A British memorandum in January 1920 
saw strong continuities of CUP’s policies and influence inside and outside Ottoman Tur-
key—of course, not without exaggerating: 
It is fair to assume that the Committee of Union and Progress in one form or another 
will continue to control Turkish politics and the Sultan and his Government. Their pol-
icy is imperialistic both at home and abroad; it definitely against any form of foreign 
interference (whether British or French). At home their policy is that of a centralised 
bureaucracy and of Turkification, so far as the subject races of Turkey are concerned. As 
regards foreign policy they employ two weapons, (a) Panislamism (religious); (b) 
Panturanianism (secular and nationalist). […] Both are employed according to circum-
stances against the Christian rulers of Mohammedan countries and all who threaten 
Turkish independence. […] 
 
46 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and 
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years-after-world-war-i-by-alp-yenen/. 
48 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım (Orbay) Bey, September 23, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 570, 
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The Committee’s strength is the strength of these two ideas. These ideas cannot be con-
trolled by the physical power of the Allies nor can the Allies physically control the Com-
mittee. All the members and its organization are not known. Its ramifications are wide.50 
Although imperial paranoias were exaggerating the CUP’s influence on the Government and 
the Sultan, the overall assessment was rather accurate. The CUP was following an «imperial-
istic» policy that was directed against «Christian rulers» of the Muslim world. The CUP was 
an intangible movement that could not be «controlled by physical power». Indeed, the 
Young Turk model would soon become the viral contentious repertoire and zeitgeist of an-
ticolonial Muslim uprisings in the post-war Middle East.51 A British Cabinet Paper claimed 
after the end of the war: 
The C.U.P., in fact, have [sic] not given up the game. The war may lead to the opening 
of the Straits and the partition of the Ottoman Empire. But it has immensely weakened 
the orderly forces of civilization, and loosened the hold of Europe over large areas of the 
Moslem world. There may still be room in this World for Enver.52 
The CUP’s contingency plans and initiatives for armed resistance to the armistice were to fall 
on fertile ground especially in Ottoman Turkey. A National Struggle (Milli Mücadele) started 
in Anatolia that successfully challenged the armistice settlement.53 There were several factors 
that contributed to the rise of a resistance movement in Ottoman Turkey. A certain «culture 
of paramilitarism» had emerged in Anatolia, in most cases brought in by Muslim immigrants 
persecuted from the Balkans and Caucasus, further complicating the already existing inter-
communal conflicts of Anatolia.54 Armed resistance had a special place also in the space of 
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experience of the Young Turk generation, which were shaped by the experience of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency as well as foreign intervention and intercommunal violence in Mace-
donia with brutal lessons learnt and implemented during the war years in Anatolia.55 The 
recruitment of criminals from prisons, tribal bands, and sectarian orders to form irregular 
bands and local militias had further contributed to paramilitarization of larger segments of 
Anatolian Muslims at the end of the war, especially in rural regions of intercommunal diver-
sity.56 The problem of desertion whereby vast numbers of soldiers began to make a living out 
of brigandage and plunder would ironically benefit the upcoming post-war resistance move-
ment both by offering some—more or less willing—manpower to the resistance and by trou-
bling the occupation forces.57 Although, Anatolia was now mostly homogenized after the 
persecution of Ottoman Christians, there were still areas of intercommunal contestation, 
which were at this «Wilsonian moment» perceived as a threat by the Muslim nationalist seg-
ments of the society. Especially in areas with large Greek and Armenian populations one 
observes the mushrooming of local committees of the «National Defense League» (Müdafaa-i 
Milliye Cemiyeti), i.e. CUP-fashioned civil societies of intercommunal vigilantism, racketeer-
ing, and paramilitary mobilization.58 Although there was no single initiator of the Anatolian 
resistance, the CUP’s underground networks as well as its tangible and intangible political 
legacy played a major role in the organization and mobilization of a nation-wide resistance 
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movement.59 Reports would flood the British occupation forces claiming that the National 
Struggle «appears to be directed by agents of the C.U.P.»60  
To be sure, paramilitary resistance to the armistice regime was not genuine for Ottoman 
Turkey. For instance, in Germany the resistance option was also a matter of discussion, but 
rather more publicly debated.61 Paramilitary violence in the aftermath of World War I, espe-
cially in the contested and lost territories of Central and Eastern Europe, was a major phe-
nomenon.62 There was indeed a «mobilizing power of defeat» in these regions.63 But nowhere 
else was the transformation of imperial military warfare structures to national resistance net-
works as seamless and successful as in the case of Young Turks. Erik Zürcher writes: 
One of the most amazing episodes in the history of the Young Turks is the resilience they 
showed after the crushing Ottoman defeat in World War I. A significant number of 
officers and party bosses were determined to resist the attempts of the victorious Entente 
to dismember the country. […] The point is that from the moment the armistice was 
concluded the Young Turks found the energy and the determination to continue the 
struggle. This is something unheard of in any of the other defeated countries of World 
War I.64 
The events unfolded with the armistice devastated the hopes of most of the Ottoman Mus-
lims for a just settlement with the Allies. The consequences of the armistice resulting in oc-
cupation and the harsh persecution of the CUP members throughout Ottoman Turkey 
would later justify in the eyes of many the decision of the Young Turk leaders to have left 
 
59 In the historiography of the Turkish War of Independence there is a tiresome debate regarding who 
initiated the resistence movement. The standard Kemalist narrative gives Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) the single 
agency, which has been criticized as early as by other leaders of the resistance movement. Leftist Kemalists 
romanticize the social mobilization of the popular masses and lower classes as a true people’s revolution. 
Given the role played by military and civil elites, this is a problematic generalization. Conservative revisionist 
authors argue that Sultan Vahideddin was the mastermind behind Mustafa Kemal’s movement, in which the 
former was later betrayed by the latter. The Sultan’s «hidden hand» is rather wishful-thinking, but 
conservative authors are correct in underlining the the symbolic power of Sultanate and Caliphate as well as 
Islam in the social mobilization in Anatolia. Post-nationalist and post-Kemalist historians underline the role 
of the CUP behind Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara government and understand the mobilization of collective 
action as a result of conflicts and coalitions between central and local power holders.   
60 General Sir G. F. Milne, letter (Constantinople) to Vice-Admiral Sir A: Calthorpe, June 30, 1919, FO 
371/4158, 105780, in Bilal N. Şimşir, ed. British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol.1: April 1919 – 
March 1920 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1973), 35. 
61 The impetus for the debate was delivered by Walther Rabenau, „Ein dunkler Tag,“ Vossischer Zeitung, 
October 7. 1918, see Michael Geyer, “Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levée en Masse 
in October 1918,” Journal of Modern History 73 (2001): 459–527.  
62 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, eds., War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
63 Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War, 
1917–1923,” The Journal of Modern History 83, no. 3 (2011): 491. 
64 Erik J. Zürcher, “The Young Turk Mindset,” in The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building, 121–22.  
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the empire. In an ironic way, history would prove their anxieties and ambitions right. The 
Allied occupation of Constantinople and the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia would give 
the Young Turks credit and opportunity once again to save the day.65 The occupation of 
Constantinople, which included also Greek forces, was celebrated by the Ottoman Greek 
masses, which in return resulted in the resentments of the Muslim population of the capital.66 
The whole social system of Constantinople and also of Anatolia collapsed due to the eco-
nomic afterpains of war. With the persecution of the CUP’s racketeering apparatus without 
an instant substitute in effective governance, general lawlessness and disorder emerged in the 
cities.67 A British Intelligence report from Switzerland in June 1919, quotes the former Min-
ister of Justice Necmettin Molla (Kocataş) saying: 
The Allies have perhaps rendered us a service by deciding upon the partition Turkey and 
by allowing the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. These measures will contribute to the awak-
ening of the Muslim world. We shall defend ourselves by every means in our power and 
are now organizing action.68 
Also Vice-Admiral Calthorpe reported to London from Constantinople that «the Greek oc-
cupation of Smyrna […] threw the whole of the Turkish people into the Orbit of the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress, a faction which, but for these events, was rapidly being broken 
up.»69 Retrospectively, the CUP leaders’ escape was reasoned as a farsighted plan to dodge 
the looming doom of the Allied occupation and a secure way of organizing resistance.70 In 
its core, however, if one looks beyond the patriotic discourse and teleological reasoning, the 
CUP’s contingency plans against the armistice were simply the result of sore losers not giving 
up the game after defeat and loss. Talat Pasha admitted to Enver Pasha assuming common 
consent: «Instead of committing a suicide, I think it is appropriate to sell our blood with a 
high-price tag.»71 The majestic plural of «our blood» was spoken in a context that once again 
ambiguously unified Talat, Enver, Muslim people, and the Ottoman Empire in one body 
and one purpose. Quitting government positions, closing down the official party, and going 
 
65 Cruickshank, “The Young Turk Challenge in Postwar Turkey,” 18. 
66 Waldburg, report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the state of affairs in Constantinople after the armistice, 
February 12, 1919, PA-AA, R 13805, 200. 
67 Vala Nureddin, Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969), 43. 
68 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 73 
69 Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe, letter (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (London), July 31, 1919, FO 
406/41, 166–167, no. 80, in Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol.1, 64–65.  
70 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 35. See also: Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene, 549–50.  
71 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), May 22, 1919, in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı 
Metrukesi, 154.  
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into a clandestine exile meant being a revolutionary non-state actor—once again. This was a 
return to their original modus operandi, when they started their political life back in the Ha-
midian days as so-called komitadjis. Dr. Nazım, for instance, was planning to cross the Greek 
border to unite with Yörük tribes from the Kalkış villages around Salonika to whom he had 
ancestral relation. He was planning to cross over to Anatolia with their militias.72 Even their 
choice for their new cover names in their clandestine exile were obviously inspired by their 
former pseudonyms during their underground struggle against the Hamidian regime in Ot-
toman Macedonia.73 The rebels and conspirators who became rulers were now once again 
rebels and conspirators. 
 
72 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, Osmanlı İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 325–26. 
73 Talat Pasha took his nom de guerre from the pre-revolutionary days in Saloniki, «Sai», but Talat used several 
versions as well, such as «Cafer Sai» or «Ali Sai», and on few occations «Hayri» and «Hamdi». In some 
memoirs one finds also «Ali Sami» or «Ali Salih», instead of «Ali Sai». In Arabic «sai» means the traveler or the 
courier. Allegedly Talat Pasha picked this name because he believed that he was himself a «traveler». See: 
Cemal Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlindeki Son Günleri,” Tarih Konuşuyor 1, no. 2 (1964): 133. Enver was most 
of the time «Ali», but also used «Abbas» as well as «Süavi», the latter being a reference to his personal idol 
from Young Ottomans Ali Süavi. Cemal was Halid. Nazım was «Rüstem» or «Ramiz» and Bahaeddin Şakir 
«Yakub Kadri». See also: Aydemir, Enver Paşa, III, 492, 526; Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red 
Star, 81; Murat Bardakçı, ed., Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde 
Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hususi Yazışmalar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 152; Murat 
Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 163 
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3. The Dawn of Chaos: 
Paths of Clandestine Exile in Times of War and Revolution  
On the morning of November 3, 1918, the R-01 arrived in Sevastopol.1 Admiral Albert 
Hopman in charge of the Schwarzmeer-Flotte in Sevastopol received a confidential message 
that Talat, Enver, and Cemal were on board of the torpedo boot. One can observe a general 
commitment to the secrecy of the operation. Hopman wrote: «As much as I wanted to shake 
hands with my old friends, I had to avoid it for the sake of secrecy.»2 The fugitive CUP 
members who were accommodated in Hotel Kist together with officers of the Admiralty, 
were committed to the tradecraft of secrecy as well. In Sevastopol, the CUP leaders Enver, 
Talat, and Cemal did not even reveal the identity of their fellow comrades to the German 
officials «due to the protection of the incognito that the travelers asked for».3 At the hotel, 
once Hopman came across Enver, who was hiding behind dark sunglasses. The two men 
passed by each other as they were two strangers.4 
Apparently, the fugitives were not sure, how to proceed with their political life in exile. They 
believed that after three or four months they would be able to return to Ottoman Turkey. 
Before they left, Talat Pasha told Dr. Nazım: 
I sold the automobile. I had rented a farm which I also sold. I believe that I have eight or 
nine thousand lira. To avoid allegations that I’m taking away money, I accounted it. In 
any event, we will stay in Europe for three-four months […]. Therefore, the money 
would be enough.5  
 
1 Albert Hopman, Tagebuch und Aufzeichnungen (Sewastopol' 1918), in Winfried Baumgart, ed. Von Brest-
Litovsk zur deutschen Novemberrevolution: Aus den Tagebüchern, Briefen und Aufzeichnungen von Alfons Paquet, 
Wilhelm Groener und Albert Hopman, März bis November 1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1971), 634.  
2 Albert Hopman, Das Kriegstagebuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers (Berlin: Scherl Verlag, 1925), 312.  
3 Berchem, teleghraph (Kiev) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), November 9, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 38.  
4 Hopman kept his friendship to Enver Pasha as the latter was hiding in Berlin. Hopman, Das Kriegstagebuch 
eines deutschen Seeoffiziers, 312. Later aslo Cemal Pasha would hide suspiciously behind dark glasses on the 
photograph on his Prussian passport issued for P. Michailowitsch, see the passport issued by the Berlin Police 
Director Maul on February 11, 1920, TTK, CP 01-01. 
5 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, Osmanlı İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 323. 
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Legend has it that they had a debate on their way to Sevastopol.6 According to what Shakib 
Arslan heard, Talat Pasha held a dramatic speech, declaring the «end» of their political future: 
Our political life has ended. The nation’s hatred and wrath, whether justified or not, now 
turned against us. The shortest and most appropriate way for us to take is the road that 
leads to Europe where we need to sit in a corner in a retreat. None of us shall make even 
the slightest move for any reason whatsoever. We shouldn’t desire after anything. We 
should observe the events the time will bring along. If one day an opportunity would 
arise, of course, we would take advantage of that opportunity. But in our current state 
and in world’s conditions today, there is nothing for us but to simply retire to a corner 
away from any kind of tyranny and any kind of selfishness. In fact, we are not guilty in 
our conscience. Because we wanted to save our nation and raise our country, but luck 
was not on our side. Therefore, we need to handover our duties to others.7 
However, Enver Pasha had other plans than simply disappearing and waiting for better times, 
since he was planning to go to Transcaucasia and start a resistance movement there. Enver 
and Talat’s different approaches to contentious politics, probably resulted from their differ-
ent backgrounds and personalities. Whereas Enver was a man of action who opted for mili-
tary or paramilitary tactics, Talat seems to have taken the defeat and exile harder and pro-
posed to hide and wait for better times to return to civil politics at home or abroad.8 As it 
seems, other fugitives did not necessarily realize how serious Enver was about going to Trans-
caucasia. The train they took to Germany via Simferopol (Akmescit) was travelling only dur-
ing the day time. After they had their first over-night stop, they were surprised to find out 
on the morning of their departure to Germany that Enver was not around.9 Azmi Bey told 
later to Shakib Arslan:  
If Enver Pasha had revealed me his true agenda, I wouldn’t let him go alone, but rather 
accompanied him. Yet, on that morning at our departure station, when we looked for 
him, we could not find Enver Pasha and assumed that he was gone.10  
 
6 Arslan probably learned about these discussions later in Berlin when he met the CUP leaders there. Thus, 
Arslan’s narrative shows possibly the internal discourse within the Young Turk fugitive community in Berlin 
rather than the actual debate that took place. 
7 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu 
Kütüphanesi, 2005), 73–74. See also: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 
vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), III, 472. 
8 Murat Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 167. 
9 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 327–28. 
10 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 75. In another version, Enver Pasha 
unawaitedly says goodbye to the others. Ziya Şakir Soku, Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adamı: Talat, Enver, Cemal 
Paşalar (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap Deposu, 1943), 204. 
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In Sevastopol, Enver Pasha told the German officials his wish to go to Poti in the Caucasus.11 
The Auswärtiges Amt reported that while Talat Pasha and his fellows were traveling from 
Sevastopol to Germany, Enver was planning to go to Transcaucasia.12 Regarding Enver’s 
request the German Embassy in Constantinople answered that a «possible journey of Enver 
to Transcaucasia is preferably to be hindered, because this would cause a cabinet crisis and 
might result in the appointment of an Entente-friendly minister.»13 The German Embassy 
was more interested in maintaining the relatively German-friendly government of İzzet Pasha 
than allowing Enver to start his own vengeance against the armistice. Similarly, the German 
military officials in Kiev had concerns in assisting Enver to reach his brother in the Cauca-
sus.14 Enver remained in Simferopol where he was accordingly advised by the German offi-
cials to go to Germany instead.15 
*** 
While Enver was in the Crimea, his uncle Halil (Kut) Pasha was also on his way back to the 
Caucasus as the newly appointed ambassador to Armenia accompanied by the Armenian 
delegation on the steamer Reşid Pasha. Halil had returned to Constantinople from the Cau-
casus sometime in late October 1918. He had been in Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia 
negotiating with different parties after the siege of Baku. In Constantinople, he had only 
briefly met Enver Pasha without having the time talk to each other.16 After that Halil had an 
appointment with Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha. In Grand Vizier’s office, an Armenian delegation 
was also present with Halil’s «old Armenian friends». The Armenian delegates were appar-
ently pleased to see Halil and insisted that he should be assigned as the new ambassador to 
the Armenian Republic. Although Halil Pasha had been a self-proclaimed persecutor of Ar-
menians in his Caucasus campaign, after the foundation of the Armenian Republic, which 
the Young Turk regime supported, he made an official visit to Yerevan. There Halil had 
 
11 Albert Hopman, Tagebuch und Aufzeichnungen (Sewastopol' 1918), in Baumgart, Von Brest-Litovsk zur 
deutschen Novemberrevolution, 637. 
12 Auswärtiges Amt, Handwritten Note, November 5, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 19. 
13 Waldburg, letter (Constantinople) to Auswärtiges Amt, November 3, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 17–18.  
14 Lersner, telegram (Spa) to Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), November 5, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 24. 
15 Berchem, teleghraph (Kiev) to the Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin), November 9, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 38. 
16 Halil Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütülmare Kahramanı Halil Paşa’nın Anıları, 
ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2007), 196–97. 
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somehow developed good relations with the Tashnag leadership.17 Therefore Halil Pasha ac-
cepted the position of ambassadorship in Yerevan and shipped off together with the delega-
tion.  
Halil’s ship was approached at the port of Zonguldak by a torpedo boat. The Ottoman naval 
officer from the torpedo boat told Halil Pasha that Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas were 
missing and suspected to be on the same streamer. After a search on the ship that failed to 
find the fugitives, Halil Pasha was ordered to return to the capital. Back in Constantinople, 
when Halil asked the Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha, why he was ordered to return to the capital, 
the Grand Vizier answered: «If Enver and you would have united in the Caucasus, you could 
have caused a lot of trouble to the state […].»18 Even the slightest possibility that these two 
men would meet and collaborate in the Caucasus was a potential threat that needed to be 
contained. 
After the German Navy declined to transport Enver Pasha to the Caucasus, he took the mat-
ters in his own hand and sailed off with a small boat. Admiral Hopman remembers that after 
a storm Enver was stranded in Crimea «with a Tatar sailing boat».19 In Simferopol (Akmescit) 
Enver found shelter in Seyyid Abdülcelil Hattatof’s house, probably a Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa as-
set.20 From Crimea, Enver wrote a letter to his brother Kamil, on November 12, 1918: 
You know how things turned out. We’ve lost the war and the English would come to 
İstanbul according to the separate armistice we made. Instead of seeing the English there, 
I decided to go to the Caucasus to serve Islam. I came to Crimea from İstanbul via 
Ukraine. Here, I am waiting for transportation this past week. I can’t find any. We will 
see, how it will work out?21 
 
17 Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş, 184–93. See also: Tatul Hakobyan, Armenians and 
Turks: From War to Cold War to Diplomacy (Yerevan: Lusakn, 2013), 34–37, cited in Thomas de Waal, Great 
Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 71–72. 
For further context see also: Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, 4 vols. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1971–1996), I, 58–59. 
18 Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş, 198–99. See also: Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the 
Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 327. 
19 Hopman, Das Kriegstagebuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers, 312. 
20 This is the post address Enver Pasha gave his brother in Enver Pasha, letter (Crimea) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), 
November 12, 1918, TTK, EP 01-34, in Arı İnan, ed. Enver Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları (Ankara: İmge 
Kitabevi, 1997), 71. See: Bardakçı, Enver, 165 
21 Enver Pasha, letter (Crimea) to Kamil Bey (Berlin), November 12, 1918, TTK, EP 01-34, in İnan, Enver 
Paşa’nın Özel Mektupları, 71.  
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To put it mildly, things did not really work out for Enver in Crimea. In a conversation with 
Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha held in Moscow in 1921, Enver described what happened in Cri-
mea as follows:  
By counting on the power of our armies in the Caucasus I would have established a 
transitory government with Baku being its center. I would have then tried to restore the 
fatherland with my forces depending on the severity of the peace conditions which our 
enemies had proposed and pressured on us. But after I landed at the shores of Northern 
Caucasus [read: Crimea] I got sick and had to stay at a village for a long time. During 
this time, the commanders [in the Caucasus] lost faith in me and followed the orders of 
the İstanbul Government and returned partly to Erzurum and İstanbul. When I got back 
on my feet, there was no more a force there to carry out my vision.22 
Later in 1921, in a Young Turk propaganda journal published in Berlin, Enver Pasha wrote 
anonymously in third person: «In the winter of 1918-1919 he failed four times to reach the 
Caucasus from Crimea by sea and in his last attempt even the poles of the sail boat broke, 
tossing him around in the storms of Black Sea for three days, only to find himself back in 
Crimea away from the shores of Caucasus.»23 After that he was sick with typhus for two 
months.24 The sickness was followed by a depression.25  
The ports of Odessa and Batum were occupied by the Entente powers on November 21, 
further limiting Enver Pasha’s freedom of movement in the Black Sea.26 Also the land route 
from Crimea and Caucasus was blocked due to the Russian Civil War, when Crimea and 
Ukraine were the setting of clashes between the Whites and Reds. Legend has it that Enver 
tried to reach Caucasus by land, but the roads were blocked and Enver ran into the forces of 
Anton Denikin’s White Army.27 The Crimean Tatars chose to fight alongside the Red Army. 
Only in late April 1919, Crimea was conquered by the Red Army.28 The direct experience of 
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HS 3158.  
26 Waldburg, report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the state of affairs in Constantinople after the armistice, 
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1971), 16. 
28 Jon Smele, The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916–1926: Ten Years that Shook the World (London: Hurst, 2015), 
101. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
107 
Russian Civil War seems to have affected Enver’s political perception of this global moment 
of revolution. By February 1919, Enver had still not reached Caucasus. Talat did not approve 
Enver’s attempt to go to the Caucasus on his own, because he found it to be reckless and ill-
considered. In a letter to Enver, Talat made once again clear that he did not support Enver’s 
individual actions and advised him to come to Berlin: 
I believe that no useful result will be reached from you wandering around like a rogue. 
Even if you achieve to reach the Caucasus there will be still no benefit and I fear that you 
will jeopardize your life. I’ve no right to intervene in your business and ideas, you can act 
as you want; but I think that it is rather appropriate that you would come to Germany 
and that you would assess the situation from here and act by watching future develop-
ments.29 
*** 
Meanwhile, Talat Pasha had long arrived in Berlin, but like Enver he did not miss any revo-
lutionary experience. When Talat and his fellow travelers set foot on German soil at the 
German border on November 8, the news of the November Revolution reached them.30 The 
German surrender was a watershed, which, coupled with a chain of revolutionary events 
changed the political system of Germany drastically from Reich to Republik—a revolutionary 
process which Talat and his Young Turk friends ended up observing very closely.  
The German revolution was already on the air since the last days of October. Mutinies had 
already started among the sailors in Kiel and revolts were about to spread to other major 
German cities. At the border town they arrived, the Young Turk refugees heard that a general 
strike was called for the next day, so that they stayed at the border town. On November 9, 
out of fear of a looming social revolution in the magnitude of the Bolshevik example, Chan-
cellor Max von Baden announced that the Kaiser Wilhelm had abdicated. The Kaiser imme-
diately deserted to Holland to exile. This was, however, not enough to settle the revolutionary 
rising. Later that day, Social Democrat leader Philipp Scheidemann declared the German 
Republic and Friedrich Ebert as the new Chancellor. Meanwhile, Karl Liebknecht declared 
the Socialist Republic. Due to the opening of the political system after the German surrender, 
 
29 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Crimea), February 26, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed. Talat 
Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki 
Belgeler ve Hususi Yazışmalar (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 162.  
30 Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 180. 
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Liebknecht was released from prison on October 23 together with other political prisoners.31 
Liebknecht had founded the Spartacist League and was pushing for revolution. On the night 
of November 9, the November Revolution finally broke out.32  
Next day on November 10, the fugitive Young Turk leaders arrived with a freight train at 
Berlin, which was the battleground of revolutionary clashes. There was a contest for social 
space between the police, the military forces, and the Freikorps on the one side, and the rev-
olutionary organizations on the other.33 This was the situation in Berlin, which Talat and his 
friends arrived at.34 They rented some rooms in a small hotel at Alexanderplatz. Arif Cemil 
(Denker), who was in Berlin in these days, narrates the atmosphere of Berlin on the day of 
their arrival as follows:  
At Alexanderplatz, which was close to worker districts, there was such a dangerous scene 
that it was nearly unpassable on that day. Because the police headquarters was on that 
place, the revolutionary workers were trying to occupy the police administration. The 
police and soldiers situated in the building were defending it from inside so that there 
was a rain of bullets in the whole place. Basically, everywhere in Berlin was messed up. 
On the Unter den Linden Avenue, which had been the setting of great patriotic events 
in the last thirty years, now revolutionary people and workers were patrolling back and 
forth on trucks with red flags in their hands. To terrorize the people every now and then 
they were firing out of their truck with their rifles or machine guns a volley shot to the 
air. They were proclaiming the downfall of German grandeur and pride to the world. 
When Talat Pasha and his fellows went to Berlin with many hopes from Germany, the 
German capital and whole Germany was in this condition.35  
Dr. Nazım remembers that even their hotel was getting hit by the bullets.36 In his first letters 
from Berlin to Enver Pasha in Crimea, Talat Pasha described the situation in Berlin as fol-
lows: 
Only after ten days we left you, we arrived at Berlin. The day before the Socialists took 
over the Government by a revolution. On the day of our arrival the revolution continued. 
Some men were killed. Today the Government is in the hands of the Social Democrats. 
The famous Liebknecht is the leader of a group called Ispartakus [sic, Spartacus] and any 
given moment they try to overthrow the Government. Their program is based completely 
 
31 Jörn Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs (München: C.H. Beck, 2014), 884. 
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Kapp-Putsch (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985). 
33 Mark Jones, “The Crowd in the German November Revolution 1918,” in Germany 1916–23: A Revolution 
in Context, ed. Klaus Weinhauer, Anthony McEllgott and Kirsten Heinsohn (Bielefeld: transcript, 2015), 37–
57. 
34 Peculiarly, Kurt Okay’s description of Enver Pasha’s arrival at Berlin resembles rather Talat Pasha’s arrival. 
Kurt Okay, Enver Pascha, der große Freund Deutschlands (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1935), 331–32. 
35 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 17–18.  
36 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 328. 
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on Bolshevik principles. The Government is very weak. There is no equivalent organiza-
tion or force.37 
The November Revolution did not necessarily make Talat Pasha more sympathetic about 
socialist ideas, but it manifested the revolutionary momentum of the time, which made many 
things considered to be impossible suddenly appear possible. The revolutionary atmosphere 
of Berlin continued to occupy Talat’s mind. In July 1919, Talat wrote to Enver:  
Since some days the Spartacists emerged again. Today, general strike was announced. 
There is no train to Berlin [from Neubabelsberg]. Towards the evening they told me on 
the telephone that there will be clashes between the Spartacists and the government. The 
police want Erçberg [sic, Minister of Finance Matthias Erzberger] to resign which is an-
other mistake. There is no one strong here except for Noske.38 I’ve met him, we ate 
together. He is a seriously energetic man, but the Spartacists are vehemently against him. 
Let’s see, what will happen. It is said that the Spartacists are spending a lot of money to 
win over the soldiers and even won over some of them.39 
Few days after their arrival at the Hotel in Alexanderplatz, Talat Pasha checked in at the 
Sanatorium of Dr. Sinn near Neubabelsberg, where he stayed until autumn 1919.40 Dr. 
Nazım and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir went to Bavaria after two weeks in the Sanatorium.41 Talat 
was diagnosed with diabetes. The doctors prescribed a strict diet. Whenever Talat became 
sloppy with the diet, his conditioned worsened and he got sicker.42  
Talat Pasha had no passport, when he arrived to Berlin. The Ottoman Government had 
ordered the Berlin Embassy not to issue any passports to the fugitive ministers. Legend has 
it that Talat was searched by the police one day and it was a problem that he could not 
identify himself. Apparently, Social Democrat Party leader Friedrich Ebert gave a reference 
letter to the police, stating that Ali Sai Bey—Talat’s cover name—is permitted as a resident 
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Metrukesi, 158.  
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in Germany under the guardianship of the Soldier’s and Worker’s Councils (Asker ve Amele 
Cemiyetleri, probably Soldaten- und Arbeiterräte).43  
Talat Pasha’s presence in Berlin became the talk of the town, especially within the Turkish 
community of Berlin. The nationalist orator Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) Bey was the pres-
ident of the Turkish Club located at Kantstraße 8.44 A nationalist agitator associated with the 
CUP, Hamdullah Suphi was inflicting revolutionary ideas to the Turkish students.45 Soon 
Turkish naval cadets arrived at the Turkish Club, who had taken part with their German 
comrades in the Sailors’ Revolt in Kiel. These men would later associate themselves with the 
Spartacist movement and found the Workers and Peasants Socialist Party of Turkey (Türkiye 
İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası).46 The Turkish Club had become the home for long nights of 
heated debate on revolutionary topics between the socialist students and Hamdullah Suphi’s 
nationalist students.47  
On the night of November 19, these debates reached their climax. Turkish and German 
sailors barricaded the Kantstraße and let only members of the Turkish Club pass. First Ham-
dullah Suphi held an inflammatory speech accusing the fugitive CUP leaders with national 
treason and theft of state funds.48 After Hamdullah Suphi, novelist Safveti Ziya Bey accom-
panied with an Armenian clerk from the Ottoman Embassy announced that he founded a 
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45 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 19. See also: Gerhard Müller, report on Turkish Club to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, November 22, 1918, and Hamdullah Suphi’s telegram to the the German Chancellor 
Friedrich Ebert, November 19, 1918, PA-AA, R 13758, 230–32. 
46 For this group see: Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar I, 293–307; Ingeborg Böer, Ruth Haerkötter and Petra 
Kappert, eds., Türken in Berlin 1871–1945: Eine Metropole in den Erinnerungen osmanischer und türkischer 
Zeitzeugen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002) Sabine Adatepe, 203–7; Rasih Nuri İleri, Kurtuluş, 1 Mayıs 1919 – 
Şubat 1920: Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası Organı Kurtuluş Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi’nde – 1976 
(İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2007); Emel Akal, Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve 
Bolşevizm, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: TÜSTAV Türkiye Sosyal Tarih ve Araştırma Vakfı, 2008), 96–99. See also: Vala 
Nureddin, Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969), 62–65. 
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committee which would claim the arrest and deportation of fugitive CUP leaders from Ger-
many for the murder of 800.000 Armenians. In a memorandum signed, this committee re-
quested from several German ministers and high officials the arrest and deportation of the 
CUP leaders, who were responsible for the «Armenian massacres» and committed «crimes 
against reason and humanity».49 Also other Turkish communities, such as the Ligue Ottomane 
de Paix at Liberation in Geneva, sent telegraphs to the German Government.50 Also a group 
of Turkish women under Fatma Halil from Geneva protested Germany.51 Safveti Ziya Bey’s 
memorandum was also published in Berlin newspapers and later criticized by other members 
of the Turkish community in Berlin, who supported the right of asylum granted to the Young 
Turk leaders.52 Former editor of the newspaper Müdafaa—and in Talat’s words a «convert 
from a Jew» (Yahudiden dönme)—Mehmed Zeki Bey was also among those responsible for 
this «infamy» (kepazelik) against Talat.53  
Arif Cemil writes that the students and cadets, enraged by Hamdullah Suphi’s agitation, were 
on the brink of hunting down the CUP leaders in Berlin.54 A similar story is also told in 
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Shakib Arslan’s memoir that these enraged students were planning to lynch or assassinate 
Talat Pasha.55 Apparently Hamdullah Suphi changed his position, fearing that his words 
might lead the Turkish sailors to irresponsible acts. The Auswärtiges Amt reported that there 
were two meetings at the Turkish Club on November 26, one organized by Safveti Ziya with 
twelve participants and the other by Hamdullah Suphi with seven participants. A serious 
debate arose between the two agitators. While Hamdullah Suphi was arguing for extradition 
for political reasons, Safveti Ziya had allegedly a personal vengeance against the CUP leaders 
and plied for more radical measures such as building people’s court and sentencing these men 
to death. Suphi also warned the club members not to break good relations with Germany. 
But according to the German informant, Suphi had now difficulties in convincing the Turk-
ish sailors, who were more interested in Safveti’s radical demands.56  
Arslan writes that the Turkish Students Association in Berlin organized a protest rally de-
manding the deportation of the former Ottoman ministers back to Ottoman Empire. Ac-
cording to Shakib Arslan’s narrative, Talat Pasha decided to have a talk with the students. 
Arslan sarcastically notes that Talat was known for easily watering his eyes when it came to 
matters of national politics. In tears he told his version of the story of the Armenian depor-
tations and the students apparently changed their mind.57 Only after some of the students 
and cadets left Germany, the tense atmosphere among nationalists and socialists at the Turk-
ish Club ended.58 The revolution in Germany was, of course, not an exciting experience for 
every Turkish student. The Red Cross and Red Crescent societies believed that those students 
under the age of 16 were «in great distress ever since the signing of the Armistice and some 
may be eloquent witnesses of the complete downfall of Germany.»59 
 
55 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 111. 
56 Gerhard Müller, complementary report to the Auswärtiges Amt on the meetings of the Turkish Club, 
November 26, 1918, PA-AA, R 13805, 189–91. 
57 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 111–12. 
58 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 34. For Talat Pasha’s relation to some of the Turkish students 
in Berlin see: Ahmed Güner Sayar, “Talat Paşa Berlin’de,” Tarih ve Toplum, no. 101 (1992): 263–64. For 
thews of Ottoman citizens leaving Germany see: “Abschied der Türken von Deutschland,” Der Neue Orient 
5, 5–6 (1919): 177.  
59 High Commisioner Calthorpe, report (Constantinople) to Lord Curzon (London) on the payments by 
Turkish nurses to Turkish students, July 10, 1919, FO 4142/107162. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
113 
*** 
Cemal Pasha was once again the odd guy of the triumvirate. He was for some reason in 
dispute with Talat Pasha and the two soon took separate ways. According to his police regis-
tration record, Cemal—undercover as Bosnian engineer Cevdet Ahmed Halid—first settled 
in Switzerland in November 19 and then moved to Munich in March 1919 under the as-
sumed surname Babowitsch.60 On April 6, 1919, the Bavarian Soviet Republic was pro-
claimed in Munich. Thus, Cemal also did not miss the revolution. Cemal was friends to 
some members of the George Circle (George-Kreis) since the war years. The George Circle 
was a romantic-nationalist network of men of letters devoted to the charismatic mentorship 
of the German poet Stefan George. Cemal stayed at historian Erich von Kahler’s house in 
Heidelberg for a short period of time in early 1919. The Kahlers even introduced Cemal to 
Stefan George and the two discussed philosophical matters related to state structures.61 Es-
pecially, Professor Arthur Salz from the George Circle helped Cemal to settle in Munich.62 
In Munich, Arthur Salz asked Cemal to give shelter Rosa Meyer-Leviné, the wife of Eugen 
Leviné, the leader of the Munich Communist Party and the Soviet Republic in Munich, who 
was hiding from the police.63 Rosa Meyer-Leviné wrote in her memoir: «My host was a Turk, 
a man of some distinction whose friendship with Salz dated from the German-Turkish war 
alliance. He occupied as a sub-tenant a luxurious flat, complete with a devoted servant».64 It 
was these networks around Arthur Salz and others like Paul Weitz that probably enabled 
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Cemal to become vocal again. In the Frankfurter Zeitung, Cemal declared that he was «not 
responsible for the Armenian atrocities» and he even punished those who were responsible.65 
The writing, translation, and posthumous publication of Cemal Pasha’s memoir was all con-
nected to Arthur Salz.66 Apparently Cemal had also further good connections in Munich, so 
that he was considered to be a semi-official «guest of honour» of the Town Major, Police 
Director, and the State Soldier’s Council.67 The reason for Cemal’s move from Switzerland 
to Germany after the arrival of his family was mostly for financial reasons. After moving to 
Munich, Cemal wrote in a letter:  
Life in Munich is unbelievably cheap. Especially if you take into consideration the dif-
ference between Swiss Francs and German money, you might say that you live here nearly 
for free. My wife and myself, two children and one servant, we stay altogether as five 
people in three rooms at a guest house. Although the rent includes accommodation and 
meals, we pay less than a hundred marks a day. According to today’s money rate it makes 
15 francs, three francs per person.68 
Inflation and other economic factors accompanied by political reasons were an important 
force making post-war Germany rather attractive for Muslim revolutionaries and revanchists 
of different color to come to Germany.69 
*** 
Contrary to Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha seems to have seriously considered the option of re-
turning to Constantinople. The Ottoman Ambassador in Berlin Rıfat Pasha wrote to the 
Sublime Porte: «Among them only Talat Pasha approached me and declared his regret to 
have left İstanbul and says to announce the Imperial Government that he would return as 
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soon as [the roads] are open.»70 The Frankfurter Zeitung, where Young Turks’ close friend 
Paul Weitz was working, announced for instance that Talat was seriously considering to go 
back to Constantinople and give himself in to the Ottoman Government, once the railroads 
are open again.71 Also in a letter he wrote to Enver, Talat said: «To my opinion we should 
return, when the roads are opened.»72 
The exile of the fugitive CUP leaders had an ambiguous nature. Their situation was different 
than that of Wilhelm who abdicated and went to Netherlands or that of the Habsburg mon-
arch. Whereas the Ottoman Sultan was allowed to stay and reign, the CUP leaders were those 
who opted for exile. Late political scientist Dankward Rustow stated that the CUP leaders 
were residing «semi-legally» in Germany, whereas Bolshevik leader Karl Radek, who met with 
Talat and Enver in Berlin in the summer of 1919, stated that they were rather «semi-illegally» 
in Germany.73  
In a letter to Enver Pasha in July, 1919, Talat Pasha wrote: «I don’t live here secretly. Nazım 
Bey and everybody else knows that I am at a sanatorium in Neubabelsberg.»74 Despite the 
regime change, Talat soon assumed that there was no threat to him in Germany and advised 
also Enver to come to Berlin:  
There is no danger for you here. Therefore, you can come here without revealing yourself. 
Then you can proceed according to the situation. I regard it as possible that you can 
travel by land from here to the Caucasus. But if you think it is possible from there, then 
may Allah give peace upon you.75 
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4. Intriguing Rumors:  
Young Turks and the Uprisings from Morocco to India in 1919  
«The escape of the Pashas lies in the spotlight», as one German press report from Constanti-
nople noted, «and since nothing positive can be ascertained over their whereabouts, the most 
preposterous rumors are circulated […].»1 With the disappearance of the CUP leaders into a 
clandestine political exile, false rumors and conspiracy theories about their whereabouts and 
whatabouts started to mushroom everywhere from newspapers to intelligence reports. Alt-
hough the Young Turks have always been the source for wild rumors and conspiracy theo-
ries,2 with their decision to «go underground», they practically disappeared from the political 
radar, making room for more imaginative and fanciful explanations about their political un-
dertakings.  
More reasonable theories argued that the CUP leaders were either still hiding in Constanti-
nople or went to the Caucasus where Enver Pasha proclaimed to the Grand Vizier go, or they 
went to Europe, possibly Germany or Switzerland. But all these theories were embellished 
with fancy details. Whether they were hiding or went into exile, many people continued to 
believe that they were still somehow secretly governing the state of affairs in Ottoman Tur-
key.3 The increasing bizarreness of these rumors is remarkable. The newspaper Tercüman-ı 
Hakikat claimed already few weeks after their disappearance on November 23 that Talat 
Pasha dispatched some German agents to Constantinople disguised as Englishmen and 
Americans making Bolshevik propaganda.4 Also Yeni İstanbul wrote on November 25, some-
thing so bizarre that the irony of history would later prove somewhat to be prophetic: 
There is no doubt that by changing into new forms the [Committee of] Union and Pro-
gress desires to dive into the profundity of the people and embrace their disposition. And 
now they realized that there is no more a possibility for them to emerge as a government. 
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Interpretation: Considerations of Class, Race, and Empire in British Foreign Office Attitudes towards the 
Young Turks, 1908–1918” (PhD thesis, Georgetown University, 1990). 
3 Orhan Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918: Zaferi Nihai'den Tam Teslimiyete (İstanbul: Boyut 
Kitaplar, 2000), 151. 
4 Quoted in Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 158. 
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Therefore, it is certain that these men are after a new plundering plot to give the home-
land a final blow. It is not a distant possibility that they would stage this very vicious 
blow in the name of Bolshevism.5 
Not only furious Constantinople newspapers, but also the Entente intelligence started pro-
duce very similar theories about alleged conspiracies of the CUP leaders. Soon after their 
disappearance the Young Turks were imagined as partners in crime with other notorious 
cabals such as the Bolsheviks and Germans. Curiously, until the summer of 1919, there is no 
information in the Young Turk ego-documents regarding any plea for help to the Bolsheviks, 
and the German support was everything but cabalistic.6 These conspiracy theories and false 
rumors had a great impact on the general perception of the Young Turk activities after No-
vember 1918—long before they even settled—by muddying the waters for contemporary 
observers.  
*** 
For a long time Enver Pasha remained missing. From late November 1918 to the summer of 
1919, none of Enver’s letters survived. Yet, we have some letters addressed to him by his 
colleagues in Berlin, answering his now lost letters.7 In his disappearance rumors about Enver 
continued to surface in different newspapers. The London Times reported as «a fact» that 
Enver had arrived in Berlin in late November: 
According to a Berlin telegram, the Independent Socialist paper, Freiheit, states it to be 
a fact that Enver Pasha and his friends have fled to Germany and are now in Berlin. This 
has caused much excitement, regret being expressed that Enver, who caused the death of 
hundreds of thousands of innocent Armenians, should be under the protection of new 
free Germany.8 
Meanwhile the Italian Embassy in London reported about the news that Enver and Talat left 
Ottoman Turkey and urged the British officials 
 
5 Quoted in Koloğlu, Aydınlarımızın Bunalım Yılı 1918, 158.  
6 One major exception is Hüsamettin (Ertürk) Bey’s memoir that claims that the rapproachement to the 
Bolsheviks was premediated before they left Constantinople, but I believe he adds some retrospective insights 
to thicken his recollections. Hüsamettin Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, ed. Samih N. Tansu (İstanbul: Sebil 
Yayınevi, 1996), 166.  
7 There is some indication that Enver Pasha had also some contact to fellow CUP men in Constantinople. 
Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu, 2 vols., ed. Zeki Arıkan (İstanbul: 
Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), II, 584.  
8 The Times, “Enver Pasha in Berlin,” November 25, 1918. Later it was reported that Enver’s arrival in Berlin 
was uncertain, The Times, “Enver and Talaat,” December 11, 1918. 
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to trace both of them, and by any means to prevent them, especially Enver Pasha, from 
reaching Northern Africa on the pretext of serving there the cause of Islam. Such an 
eventuality would in fact constitute a threat not only for Libia [sic] but also for Egypt, 
Algeria and Tunisia.9  
Enver Pasha was already imagined as commanding insurgencies in Muslim lands. His path 
was discursively predetermined. The Foreign Office’s answer made no secret about the shared 
imperial anxieties about Enver leading an Islamic insurgency in North Africa: «His Majesty’s 
Government fully realise the danger which would ensue if Enver Pasha should succeed in 
landing in North Africa and will do everything in their power to prevent such an eventual-
ity.»10 Even wilder theories on Enver’s whereabouts would see the light of day in international 
newspapers. Friend or foe, everybody was following the news coverage of Enver allegedly 
being in Caucasus, Kurdistan or Turkestan.11 
In January 1919, for instance, there were rumors that Enver and Talat were among the «pan-
Islamic Turkish officers» who joined the resistance of Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuni (also known 
as Raisuli) in Spanish Morocco.12 Raisuni was a local warlord, who had been involved in an 
uprising against the colonial regime since the World War I. After the war the Spanish High 
Commissioner Dámaso Berenguer started a counterinsurgency campaign against Raisuni.13 
The Italian Embassy in London sent a note to the Foreign Office stating that Italian news-
papers reported that «Enver and Talaat Pashas intend to try, with the help of disguises and 
false passports, to reach Spanish Morocco and to obtain help from and protection from Rai-
suli». The same note continued that «the Italian Consul-General at Tunis states that the 
Residency have received news that Enver Pasha has sent a message from Germany to Tunis 
announcing his early arrival in Tripoli with the object of placing himself at the head of the 
 
9 Italian Embassy in London, note to Foreign Office, November 23, 1918, FO 371/3411, 304. 
10 Foreign Office, letter to Italian Ambassador (London), December 3, 1918, FO 371/3411, 307. 
11 These rumors about Enver’s alleged whereabouts is best summarized in Emir Shakib Arslan, letter (Berne) 
to Enver Pasha (Berlin), December 11, 1919, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., İttihadçı’nın Sandığı: İttihat ve Terakki 
Liderlerinin Özel Arşivlerindeki Yayınlanmamış Belgeler ile Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemlerinde Ermeni 
Gayrimenkulleri Konusunda Alınmış Bazı Kararlar (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013), 472. See also: 
Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu 
Kütüphanesi, 2005), 76.  
12 Directorate of Military Intelligence, letter to Undersecretary of State for Foreign Office, January 24, 1919, 
FO 371/4141, 14537. 
13 Jonathan Wyrtzen, Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2015), 51–52; David S. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 61–62 
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rebels.»14 In response to these rumors, Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner 
in Constantinople, preferred to believe that the misperceptions were caused by deceptive 
measures of the CUP: 
there is possibility of Enver and Talaat being at Constantinople and considers the various 
reports which are being spread abroad of their being in Berlin and other places, are merely 
part of their plan to draw attention from Constantinople.15  
The belief in deception is a common trope in conspiracy theories to assume that «plots, 
schemes and conspiracies imply some kind of agency which is preventing [the conspiracy 
theorists] from discovering the truth, from connecting events and causes in a correct man-
ner.»16 Another report proudly announced: «We are aware of any amount of oriental decep-
tion and intriguing».17 
In the spring of 1919, the British had more and more conflicting intelligence on Enver Pa-
sha’s whereabouts, reaching from a hospital in Berlin and then Constance at the German-
Swiss border over Caucasus to Turkestan and Afghanistan.18 Besides his whereabouts, what 
he was up to also troubled British officials. There were rumors that from his alleged hiding 
place in Constance, Enver was not only «able to communicate freely with [his] friends in 
Switzerland», but he was also «in close touch with Egyptian extremists and probably [was 
helping] them to communicate with their friends in Germany and possibly even with Turkey 
and Egypt.»19 Further intelligence reports claimed that Enver left Constance and traveled to 
Berlin in mid-April.20 There is no indication or what so ever in the private papers and mem-
oires of the Young Turks that Enver was in these places in the spring of 1919 and all signs 
indicate that he was still somewhere in South Russia. Nevertheless, Talat Pasha mentioned 
the problem of the rumors in the press:  
 
14 Italian Embassy in London, note to Foreign Office, January 9, 1919, FO 371/4141, 7921. 
15 Directorate of Military Intelligence, letter to Undersecretary of State for Foreign Office, January 24, 1919, 
FO 371/4141, 14537. 
16 Martin Parker, “Human Science as Conspiracy Theory,” in The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and the 
Human Sciences, ed. Jane Parish and Martin Parker, 191–207 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 194. 
17 Turks in Switzerland: Intelligence Report on their Activities, July 8, 1919, FO 371/4142, 99746, 150. 
18 Masayuki Yamauchi, ed., The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 
(Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991), 11–12. 
19 Sir H. Rumbold, cipher (Berne) to Foreign Office, April 3, 1919, FO 371/4141, 53322. 
20 Under Secretary of State of Foreign Office, letter to Viceroy, May 17, 1919, FO 371/4142, 15. 
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Now since we hear continuing rumors that you are present in the Caucasus, in Baku, in 
Azerbaijan, and from the publication of Dutch newspapers even that Baku was con-
quered by you, we thought that we wouldn’t receive a news or letter from you for a long 
time.21  
The exact date when Enver Pasha arrived at Berlin is not clear from the primary sources.22 
For long scholars believed that Enver was in Berlin, beginning as late 1918 or early 1919.23 
Thanks to letters from Talat Pasha’s private papers, which Murat Bardakçı published in 
2009, we know that Enver was still not in Berlin as late as July 1919.24  
In May 1919, the Viceroy of India believed that Enver was leading the Afghan forces in 
Kandahar.25 Also the German Ambassador in Berne had no idea where Enver was roving 
around and reported: «I hear from Turkish circles that Enver Pasha is actually in safety in 
Afghanistan.»26 Despite all the distant places Enver’s ghost was sighted, most theories con-
cluded that he was in the Caucasus. According to rumors the British Intelligence heard, Enver 
was leading the National Defense Organization (Milli Müdafaa Cemiyeti) in Ottoman Tur-
key from Azerbaijan: 
At its best the National Defence Organization is credited with being in close touch with 
AZERBAIDJAN, while Enver Pasha directs the movement from NAJHITCHEVAN 
[sic] near Urmia on the Persian frontier. 
Pan-Islamic, Bolshevist, Pan-Turkish and all disgruntled forces are looked for help and 
all are being toyed with.27  
Azerbaijan was the most commonly assumed hiding place of Enver Pasha in early summer 
1919. The commander of the Eastern Front, Kazım Karabekir Pasha, reported to Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha: «According to news received it is rumored [söylenmekte olup] that the forces, 
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approaching the Arpa River on behalf of the Bolsheviks, is commanded by Enver Pasha 
[…].»28 
Every now and then, the rumors got out of hand and many British officials seemed to get 
tired of conflicting intelligence reports on the CUP leaders. The British Military Attaché in 
Rome reported to Director of Military Intelligence: «There is a rumour that Enver Pasha is 
in the neighborhood of Venice in disguise—but I have no reason for believing this to be 
anything but a ‹canard›.»29 In August 1919, also General Malleson at Meshed came to the 
conclusion «as a result of very complete and widespread enquiries, that Enver is not now, and 
never has been, east of Caspian within the last two years».30 Nevertheless, the conspiracy 
theories and false rumors continued to reappear in the same fashion. As late as September 
1919, the British press was speculating on Enver’s disappearance from Constantinople.31 In 
December 1919, Enver was even crowned in some newspapers as the King of Kurdistan.32 
*** 
While Enver Pasha was missing and believed to be leading Muslim insurgencies from Mo-
rocco to Afghanistan, there were indeed revolts and revolutions slowly but surely emerging 
in the vast Muslim geography. In Morocco, for instance, the revolts had already started which 
would develop into the Rif War by 1920. The denial of the Egyptian Delegation (Wafd) 
Party under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul by the peace conference in Paris generated in 
Egypt a massive social movement. The ensuing arrest and deportation of the Egyptian dele-
gation to Malta by British officials on March 8, 1919, caused mass demonstrations in Cairo 
and later in other cities, followed by labor strikes and large-scale peasant and tribal uprisings 
in the hinterlands in 1919.33 Following the assassination of the Afghan Emir Habibullah in 
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ATAZB, kutu no. 17, gömlek no. 7.  
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February 1919, the new Emir Amanullah Khan attacked British India to legitimize his rule, 
starting the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Meanwhile, mutinies and revolts were already plagu-
ing the British India after the Amritsar massacre in April 13, 1919.34 Especially after the 
Greek invasion of Smyrna in May 1919, the Anatolian resistance movement became more 
and more a security problem for the Allied administration.35 In an alarming memorandum, 
Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen from the British delegation at the Peace Conference wrote:  
With Egypt in revolt, Afghanistan proclaiming a jihad, trouble brewing in Mesopotamia, 
the not at all unlikely prospect of an Indian mutiny and general upheaval such as will 
eclipse all previous efforts to throw off the British yoke in India, and an almost certain 
prospect of an Arab-Jew conflict in Palestine—on top of all this, we are deliberately in-
citing Mohammedans all over the world to unite against the Christian, which is the Brit-
ish Empire, and do not let us deceive ourselves we are unable to meet it.36  
Cautionary voices as such were, however, mostly ignored, whereas more flamboyant expla-
nations gained currency. Therefore, the CUP was filling an important gap in making sense 
of these uprisings from India to North Africa. Due to its political ambiguity, the CUP was 
everything and nothing at the same time. Its pragmatic and eclectic use of allegedly conflict-
ing policies and ideologies hindered the explicit and definite political categorization of the 
CUP. Therefore the CUP was now after the end of the war able to «embrace pan-Islamic, 
Egyptian Nationalist, possibly Bolshevic, and even Indian Nationalist activity.»37 The CUP 
was not regarded as a political organization with pragmatic policies in cooperation with for-
eign counterparts and strategic partners, but rather as a mysterious political phantom capable 
of changing disguises and infiltrating and manipulating diverse political spheres regardless of 
«natural» boundaries. David Fromkin writes:  
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When the uprisings in the Middle East after the war occurred, it was natural for British 
officials to explain that they formed part of a sinister design woven by the long-time 
conspirators. Bolshevism and international finance, pan-Arabs and pan-Turks, Islam and 
Russia were pictured by British Intelligence as agents of international Jewry and Prussian 
Germany, the managing partners of the great conspiracy.38 
A number of reports have been recently been received, from a variety of sources, wrote 
Vice-Admiral A. Calthrope from the British High Command at Constantinople to the Brit-
ish Embassy in Switzerland, which leads me to believe that there has been an increased ac-
tivity among Egyptian Nationalists, Committee of Union and Progress Turks, and Indian 
Nationalists, in Switzerland.39 On Calthrope’s initiative, Hugh Whittall, a British intelli-
gence agent, was assigned to Switzerland in May 1919 to gather intelligence on «Turco-
Egyptian intrigues». Whittall prepared an extensive report, which was divided into different 
sections under fancy titles such as «The Revolt of Islam», «Switzerland the Centre of Moslem 
Intrigues», «The League of Eastern Revolutionists and the Young Turks», «Lenin’s Hand in 
the Game», and «The Socialist Camouflage». The impact of this report on the manifestation 
of the conspiracy theory about the Young Turk activities in the eyes of the British officialdom 
cannot be understated. The report was the first full theorization of a conspiracy theory that 
was collectively in the making among the members of the British diplomatic and intelligence 
community and CUP’s public opponents in Constantinople and Europe.40 Former British 
Ambassador to Constantinople Louis Mallet stated that Whittall’s report «entirely confirms 
the stray pieces of information which we have been receiving for some time past and it is 
borne out by what has actually happened and is happening today: in Egypt, Kurdistan, Af-
ghanistan and in Constantinople itself».41 
Like any conspiracy theory, Whittall’s report urged for attention. It was «unwise to take the 
conspiracy other than somewhat seriously», he warned his readers about the gravity of the 
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situation. To undermine the report’s claims, Whittall tried to credit his sources and his in-
telligence methodology. Due to his former secret intelligence work in Switzerland during the 
war years, Whittall got in touch with «several EASTERN ‹conspirators›», whom he consid-
ered «former friends». He assured that he «had a large number of Eastern and Western agents 
in [his] service», and therefore «can speak fairly authoritatively on this subject».42 In the final 
sentence of the report, Whittall stated that the importance of continuing intelligence gather-
ing and added that «this can best be done by men who know the East and its languages and 
have personal acquaintance with some of the ‹conspirators› themselves.»43 The job required 
what Priya Satia, a cultural historian of the British Empire, calls an «intuitive intelligence 
epistemology», which only few imperialist Orientalists like Hugh Whittall believed to have 
possessed in deciphering «Oriental intrigues».44 Political Scientist Robert Jervis similarly be-
lieves that «[a]ll too often, intelligence and critics rely on intuitive ways of thinking and rhe-
torical forms of exposition.»45 To be sure, although cultural prejudices and imperialist anxi-
eties were dominating Whittall’s verdict on the events in his intelligence reports, there was 
something undeniably typical for the scientific thinking of the «age of anxiety». In his com-
parison between conspiracy theories and the logic and method of human sciences, Martin 
Parker writes: 
The role of the seemingly ubiquitous conspiracy theorist is to connect things which were 
previously unconnected—to posit causes, motives, plans and plots. Importantly, the 
grammar of these theories is not insane speculation—or a romantic poetic wildness—but 
a form of detective work which uses the tools of the hypothetico-deductive method. Pho-
tographs, documents, eye witness accounts and so on are used to demonstrate that a 
particular explanation successfully draws together a series of events and causes.46  
The content and language of the report is so straightforwardly unapologetic about imperialist 
and colonialist schemes as well as Orientalist and culturalist prejudices that it is worth a de-
tailed look. The summary of the report concluded: 
A. The Eastern enemies of Great Britain have united with the avowed object of over-
throwing British rule in the East. 
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B. They can rely upon the support of Germany and of the Russian Bolsheviks, whose 
interests coincide with their own. 
C. They have great hopes of gaining the ENTENTE SOCIALISTS also of their cause. 
D. The Centre of the movement is in SWITZERLAND; and will remain in 
SWITZERLAND, where communication with the GERMANS, the RUSSIAN 
BOLSHEVIKS and the ENTENTE SOCIALISTS is assured and no serious inter-
ference on the part of the SWISS Authorities is to be feared. 
E. The movement will attain its full development only AFTER the conclusion of peace, 
when demobilization and the abrogation of present restrictions on traffic and corre-
spondence will increase the chances of success.47  
The wording of this report is particularly fruitful in demonstrating the «paranoid style» 
within the British intelligence community.48 Even beyond the intelligence community, this 
report seems to have played an important role in shaping similar conspiracy theories in the 
British and international press. A slightly updated version of Whittall’s report appeared in 
the Daily Chronicle from July 2, 1919, dispatched by the special correspondent in Geneva. 
This article has so many word-by-word similarities to Whittall’s secret report that it must be 
an official leak to the press.49 One day later also the New York Times published the very same 
news received by «special cable» from Geneva. The leaked news announced: 
Under the name of the Oriental League has recently been established at Berne a central 
organization uniting all the various secret societies of Moslem and Hindu nationalists in 
Europe which have hitherto acted independently. The aim of the new association is to 
prepare for joint revolutionary action in Asia and Africa after the definite conclusion of 
peace.  
Reliable information enables me to give a full account of this vast conspiracy, the effect 
of which may already be traced in recent events in Egypt, India, and Afghanistan. […]  
The League is, of course, of German origin. […] Thus the Oriental League is in reality 
the reincarnation of Wilhemstrasse’s Oriental Department.  
The exiled Young Turk leaders, Talaat, Enver, and Djemal, have likewise an active part 
in the organization of the league, and continue to exert a decisive influence over its ac-
tivities. It is to Enver Pasha’s talent for intrigue that the union between Moslems and 
Hindus, the most striking and dangerous feature of the movement, is chiefly due.  
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[…] Besides enjoying the support of the Germans, the league is also in close touch with 
Lenin […].50 
When compared with German official documents and private letters of the CUP leaders—
sources originating from the alleged lion’s den—the fallacies of Whittall’s conspiracy theory 
becomes clear. For instance, a contemporary German report titled «Relations between Islamic 
Movement, Bolshevism, and Socialism», prepared by Herbert Diel from the Auswärtiges Amt, 
is worth a comparison.51 Diel’s report addressed these issues: 
In the press of foremost Entente powers, the prognoses [on Islamic movements] are a 
matter of continuous and increasingly disturbing interpretations. In a similarly growing 
magnitude, the influence of Bolshevism is depicted now either as the causative or the 
promoting force. Truth and fiction are hard to unravel and entangled in this net[work] 
of news.52  
While Diel denied such schemes, Whittall’s report claimed that Germany «still appears to 
have a control over this revolutionary Moslem organisation» and found «new and powerful 
allies» in Bolshevik Russia. Whittall came to the conclusion that «there is some close relation-
ship existing between Germany, the Russian Soviet Republic and the Anti-British agitators 
of the East». Nevertheless, Whittall saw structural obstacles in the realization of this «plot», 
because the «present restrictions on international correspondence and traffic» hindered free-
dom of movement and communication for transnational politics. «Thus, peace in EUROPE 
might be anything but rest in the EAST» he dramatically concluded and warned that «in fact, 
it may give a fresh impetus to seditious activity and insurrectionary movements against 
BRITISH and FRENCH rule.»53  
Whittall explained in several clichés and sensationalistic jargon, why Switzerland was the 
«hotbed of MOSLEM agitation». First, Swiss officials were traditionally «inclined to 
IGNORE THE POLITICAL INTRIGUES OF FOREIGNERS». Second, «some of the 
most influential statesmen» of Switzerland were «little better than GERMAN AGENTS» and 
thus ready to protect «MOSLEM conspirators». Lastly, Switzerland was logistically «the back-
 
50 The New York Times, “Germans Inspire New Plot in East,” July 3, 1919. 
51 Herbert Diel was an Orientalist and diplomat with working-experience in Morocco and Constantinople. 
Between 1918 and 1919 he was at the German Embassy in Berne. For more information see: Maria Keipert 
and Peter Grupp, Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1871–1945, 5 vols., ed. 
Deutschland (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000–2014), I, 425–426. 
52 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and 
Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 1.  
53 Hugh Whittall, The Nearer East and the British Empire, June 5, 1919, FO 371/4142, 90575, 67–68. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
127 
door to GERMANY» and «the outpost of RUSSIAN BOLSHEVISM».54 In addition, it was 
«the favourite meeting-place of Socialists of all nuances, who are also open to be influenced 
in favor of MOSLEM ‹independence›.»55   
Whittall somehow surmised that there was a so-called «League of Eastern Revolutionists and 
the Young Turks», later called «Oriental league» in the press leaks, organized in several re-
gional or national departments and were ambitiously publishing propaganda pamphlets and 
journals as well as coordinating the activity of field agents in different lands: 
Perhaps the most significant circumstance about the present activity of the Eastern revo-
lutionists in Switzerland is that the INDIAN, EGYPTIAN, TURKISH, PERSIAN, etc. 
nationalists, who used to act independently are now tending to combine together and 
join forces.56  
Intelligence assessment was reproducing «its own strongly held beliefs» based on assumed 
ideas about the human nature as well as culture and behavior of adversaries.57 Therefore, a 
political union among Muslim, Hindu, and other Eastern nationalists was regarded as ab-
normal. The assumption that Oriental races had different and incompatible characteristics is 
based on Orientalist prejudices that underline the (philological, cultural, and racial) differ-
ences between Semites, Indo-Persians, and Turkic-Tatars as well as sectarian distinctions be-
tween Sunnites, Shiites, and Hindus. Middle East historian Nabeel Audeh argues that in 
British officialdom «the racially-specific component of Oriental political movements is com-
monly regarded as more significant than the ideological messages these movements espouse.» 
This means that the «ostensible differences» of race and sect were «considered much more 
meaningful than the underlying ontological similarities they share» as anticolonial national-
isms.58 The racial-sectarian compartmentalization of Asian and African people was not only 
a cornerstone of Orientalist curriculum, but also a pragmatic imperative of colonialism: di-
vide et impera. «Our aim must be to divide and to conciliate, and to rule», as a staff member 
of the British High Commission in Constantinople unapologetically proposed as a measure 
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against pan-Islamism, «because we do not want Moslems to rally as a whole round the fun-
damental but at present half-forgotten principle that Moslems should not be ruled by non-
Moslems.»59 
There was also no such thing called «League of Eastern revolutionaries» or «Oriental League» 
in early summer 1919. The only thing that remotely resembles an Oriental League, was per-
haps the Orient Club (Orient-Klub e.V.; in Turkish: Şark Kulübü; in Arabic: al-Nadi al-
Sharqi) at the corner of Kalckreuthstraße 2 and Motzstraße in Berlin. Talat Pasha initiated 
in Berlin the foundation of an «Oriental house» (originally Şark Yurdu), where different 
members of the Eastern communities can have a shared forum. But due to rumors in Con-
stantinople newspapers that Talat was opening a coffee shop in Berlin, Talat soon lost interest 
in this project. The Orient Club was later founded at the apartment of the young student 
and former Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa agent Muhammed Ali al-Hammi.60 Emir Shakib Arslan was 
elected president while Abdel Aziz Shawish served as his deputy. The Orient Club had the 
purpose of assisting and educating Eastern students as well as making propaganda by publi-
cations and other means.61 These men organized also protest events in Berlin together with 
Dr. Ernst Jäckh and other German Orientalists.62 Nevertheless, all sources indicate that the 
Orient Club was not founded before 1920.63 Once again the intelligence was to be proven 
awkwardly prophetic, in its actual imprecision. One year later after Whittall’s report, another 
British Intelligence report still claimed:  
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After the Armistice we saw from reports emanating from Geneva, Rome, and London, 
the development of Unionist activities working in Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Rus-
sia. These same Germans and Turks who had been working together during the war 
again came to notice in association, and as early as February 1919 it became evident that 
the Unionist chiefs were actively preparing a Pan-Islamic movement in connection with 
Bolshevism and with the assistance of the very efficient, so far unsuccessful, German or-
ganisation which had been co-operating for five years against British prestige in the 
East.64 
In Whittall’s report, the slightest possibility of an autonomous agency of Eastern revolution-
aries in finding common terms for cooperation was explained away by making it «principally 
GERMANY’s work.» Behind the League of Eastern revolutionaries, British intelligence saw 
the machinations of Germany’s infamous war-time center for pan-Islamic propaganda, the 
Intelligence Bureau for the East (Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient).65 The usual suspects, such 
as Orientalist diplomats Otto Günther von Wesendonk and Max von Oppenheim, were still 
imagined as the masterminds behind the scenes. Oppenheim’s role was exaggerated—his 
name barely pops out in the German documents in the aftermath of war. Yet, Wesendonk 
was in fact assigned to the German Embassy in Berne and he was also named in the press 
leaks to Daily Chronicle and New York Times as being the «leading spirit» of the «Oriental 
League», which was nothing but «Made in Germany».66 As we will see, Wesendonk’s role was 
not as obvious as it was claimed. 
According to Whittall’s report, Wesendonk met with Halil Halid Bey in Montreux, in con-
nection with the Socialist International Congress held in Berne in February 1919, where they 
also had contacts with Young Turks discussing «the all-Moslem combinations».67 Halil Halid 
Bey, born in Ankara in 1869, was a former Cambridge University lecturer and Vice-Consul 
in London, who later became an anti-British public intellectual associated with the pan-Is-
lamist propaganda activities of the Ottoman Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and the German Intelligence 
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Bureau for the East.68 In fact, a German agent, possibly even Wesendonk himself, was in 
contact with Halil Halid in Switzerland in late May. Halil Halid told to his German confi-
dant that after reading all the news from the Entente newspapers that the CUP was cooper-
ating with the Bolsheviks, he too started to find this idea more and more appealing. Never-
theless, Halil Halid was rather skeptical: he held the fugitive CUP leaders for traitors for 
escaping; he dismissed the resistance movement in Anatolia as mere Muslim banditry in 
Greek and Armenian populated areas; he accused the Dagestanis for being corrupted by the 
British against Russia and Turkey;69 he believed that the Persians were submissive to the 
British imperialism and thus unreliable; and he was also critical about the Egyptian activists 
in Switzerland, declaring Abdel Aziz Shawish as «incompetent» (unfähig) and speaking «des-
picably» (verächtlich) about Shamsi, and did not even knew about the publication of Mu-
hammad Farid’s ambitious Bulletin du Parti National Egyptien.70 Although Whittall knew 
Halil Halid had contact to the Germans, he did not have insights into their conversations.  
Whittall also reported on the propaganda activities of Egyptian nationalists in Switzerland, 
including Abdel Aziz Shawish, Shamsi, Muhammad Farid, and the others, who were alleg-
edly also connected to Berlin networks.71 Nonetheless, Whittall made clear that he only knew 
Turkish and thus had limited access to the Egyptian community only through other «spe-
cialists».72 According to the above mentioned German report in late May 1919, the British 
Government was deeply concerned about the propaganda activities of exiled Egyptians oper-
ating from Switzerland, because they believed that these men were behind the uprising in 
Egypt. Due to the pressure from the British, the Swiss Federal Council is said to have urged 
Egyptian activists in Berne and Zurich, including Abdel Aziz Shawish to caution.73 Some 
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dubious Egyptians, possibly British agents as Wesendonk assumed, were sent to him to re-
quest German support for Egyptian propaganda, but he rejected. The Egyptian propaganda 
was dismissed by Wesendonk as «foolish squabbling» (törichten Zänkereien).74 Also in Diel’s 
report it was said:  
In explaining the completely unanticipated Egyptian uprising, the involvement of Young 
Turk and Bolshevist emissaries—which were deliberately equated with each other—was 
again and again held by the English and especially English-inspired neutral parties re-
sponsible for the events. There was no lack of fantastic finery in this regard: accordingly, 
it was said that Dschemal Pasha was personally leading the ‹operations› of the rebels.75  
Whittall continued to report on the activities of Mahmut Muhtar (Katırcıoğlu) Pasha, the 
former Ottoman commander and ambassador in Berlin, who left Lausanne to Munich to 
allegedly meet Enver, Talat, and Cemal and immediately started «organizing a Turkish Na-
tionalist Movement» after his return.76 Though Whittall mentions some disputes among the 
Swiss Turkish community, he is not able to pinpoint the orientation of the «Ligue Otto-
mane», which was in opposition to the CUP leaders.77 According to a conversation Wes-
endonk had with Mahmut Muhtar (Katırcıoğlu) Pasha in February, he learnt that the British 
believed that the CUP leaders were leading the Anatolian resistance from their exile and that 
this movement was allegedly supported by Germany:  
The Entente claims to have reliable proofs showing that this movement [in Anatolia] is 
put together by Young Turk leaders like Enver, Talaat, Dschemal and their friends hiding 
in Germany and receiving instructions from the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin. With them 
they are in constant secret connection through people like Professor Jaeckh as it is pre-
cisely known to the Allied governments.78 
Mahmut Muhtar advised Wesendonk that Germany should publicly denounce and disown 
its relation to «Enver’s clique and its German following (Prof. Jaeckh, etc.)», in order to avoid 
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a breach of diplomatic relations with Ottoman Turkey and further pressures from England.79 
As Mahmut Muhtar’s advice to Wesendonk shows, it was now already common wisdom that 
Germany was supporting, if not leading outright, the Young Turk’s pan-Islamist campaign. 
Meanwhile British Intelligence followed the same logic: «Whatever the title of Young Turk 
organisation in Switzerland may be does not matter. Reports show that it is run by the Turk-
ish leaders in Germany with German help and that it hopes to continue working upon the 
Moslems of India as well as upon Moslems elsewhere.»80    
Whittall reported that a meeting of the «Ligue Ottomane» took place in Lausanne and an-
other one few days later in Geneva, where «[m]eans were also discussed to prevent the Greek 
occupation of Smyrna».81 A telegraph, which the «Ligue Ottomane» sent to Edwin Samuel 
Montagu, the State Secretary for India, was enclosed to the report, which was calling for «the 
combination of all Moslems (as also Hindus) against the rule of the British over their respec-
tive countries.»82 Whittall was unable to differentiate different Young Turk fractions that 
were opposing the CUP, but also opposing the Allied occupation of Ottoman Turkey and 
other Muslim lands.83 Another report noted: 
The title Pan-Islam is a misnomer in the case of the new League I mentioned, which was 
being formed by Rifaat Pacha, Hilmi Pacha, etc. From subsequent enquiries and conver-
sations I am under the impression that only those peoples who were of the original Turk-
ish Empire at its zenith can be included with certainty, i.e. Turkey, Turkestan [sic], Mes-
opotamia, Arabia, and the whole of North Africa. If INDIA is included in the organisa-
tion, it is not through the Swiss branch as far as can be ascertained at present.84  
The Ottoman League in Switzerland, however, dissolved after the French Embassy started to 
propagate that Enver and Talat had secretly infiltrated the league through the membership 
of Emir Shakib Arslan.85 Another person, who is listed in Whittall’s report as belonging to 
the «Ligue Ottomane», the publisher of the newspaper İkdam, Ahmet Cevdet (Oran) Bey, 
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was living in European exile due to CUP’s pressures since the Counterrevolution of 1909.86 
In the meantime, Ahmet Cevdet had a conversation with a Turkish informant of Auswärtiges 
Amt. He said that he was under pressure to send his telegraphed column to the İkdam from 
an anglophile position.87 Ahmet Cevdet also told that 
he learned from official English sources that the English commissioner in Constantinople 
acquired secret documents regarding organization of a great pan-Islamistic movement in 
all Mohammedan countries. The revelations found in these documents affected England 
to mitigate its attitude towards Turkey and to win over certain Turkish elements by var-
ious promises.88   
German Intelligence tapped Giacomo Agnese, Head of the Colonial Department at the Ital-
ian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying: 
I receive from English sources intelligence that the members of the Committee of ‹Union 
and Progress›, who are still in Germany (and are moving towards Switzerland and Italy?), 
are in the possession of several million Turkish pounds, which are meant to be spent to 
set up the uprising of the Mohammedans who are currently subjects of the Entente gov-
ernments. Headquarters for this movement are established in Switzerland, Greece, Spain, 
and in Russia. The main branch is said to be in Switzerland. The goal of the organization 
is to prove by all means that the butchering of the Armenians by the Turks was a matter 
of self-defense. This news has been confirmed also from other sources.89 
These rumors were all originating from British Intelligence itself. The tautology is that au-
thenticity of these British Intelligence reports was based on being originating from the British 
Intelligence. Conspiracy theories «are entirely self-confirming belief systems», Martin Parker 
noted.90 It was not uncommon that the British Intelligence was rediscovering and reproduc-
ing the same rumors and conspiracy theories that they themselves or their political profiteers 
had unleashed earlier elsewhere. A discourse of a menace was collectively in the making, 
which would later affect the intersubjectivity of the actors, once this discourse became more 
and more perceived as a reality. Those who were seeing ghosts were those who already be-
lieved in ghosts. David Fromkin put it more beautifully:  
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In fact there was an outside force linked to every one of the outbreaks of violence in the 
Middle East, but it was the one force whose presence remained invisible to British offi-
cialdom. It was Britain herself. […] The shadows that accompanied the British rulers 
wherever they went in the Middle East were in fact their own.91 
*** 
Regarding the actual role of the CUP leaders, Whittall explained that the «Emissaries» of the 
CUP in Switzerland were receiving instructions by «the ‹chiefs› in Berlin» and Azmi Bey was 
responsible for correspondence. Although specifics of his intelligence cannot be disproven, 
the CUP leaders in Berlin had indeed started organizing themselves politically. In a letter 
Talat Pasha wrote to Enver Pasha, the right way to proceed was described as follows: 
I think that it is necessary to choose a headquarters for us depending on what form the 
peace will take. And then we struggle on behalf of the Muslim and Turkic world by 
reviving the old [Committee of] Union and Progress organization and [removing] the 
existing disputes and uniting the political networks in these circles and by convening 
annually congresses and carrying out their decisions.92 
Contrary to Whittall’s assumptions of remote control over insurgencies in Egypt, Anatolia, 
Afghanistan, and India, Talat Pasha was primarily concerned about propaganda. Sometime 
in the spring of 1919, Talat travelled together with Nesim Mazelyah to a conference of the 
Socialist International in Amsterdam where he had a meeting there with the Secretary Gen-
eral of the conference, Belgian socialist Camille Huysmans.93 «I explained the Armenian 
Question as best as I could» (Ermeni mes’elesini dilim döndüğü kadar anlattım), Talat wrote 
later in a letter. Talat also told Huysmans about the history of Great Power interventions in 
the Ottoman Empire, gaining the impression to have convinced him. Huysmans advised the 
Young Turks to engage in more serious propaganda activities, because no one knew their side 
of the story. Huysmans said: «no one gives breast to a child that does not cry.»94  
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This meeting with Huysmans is marked as the beginning of their propaganda activities. After 
that Talat Pasha started writing his memoirs. Meanwhile, Cavid Bey, who found refuge in 
Berne, tried to represent Turkey in the Congress of the Socialist International in Berne, but 
was denied access.95 In his place, Talat asked the Georgian representative and former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Akaki Chkhenkeli to defend the Turkish cause against the Armenian ac-
cusations.96 A press bureau in The Hague was opened under the leadership of Nureddin 
Feruh, who was the former secretary of the Liberal Party (Ahrar Fırkası) and the Chief Clerk 
at the Ottoman Embassy in the Netherlands. The Hague bureau was allegedly very successful 
in getting their telegraphs published in news outlets such as Reuters and Het Vaderland.97 
Asım Süreyya [İloğlu], the secretary of the Turkish News Bureau in The Hague, wrote that 
they were working together with several Dutch press and telegraph agencies and were also in 
touch with German and French newspapers.98 In fact, the British Intelligence reported that 
Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, Dr. Nazım, and Azmi Bey had arrived in Scheveningen near The Hague 
in late June 1919. According to the British, they founded a «Bureau for Information for 
TURKEY». Once again, the Young Turks were under suspicion to be «supplied with funds 
from GERMANY» and for conducting «Espionage and Propaganda work on behalf of 
GERMANY» in order «to create trouble in TURKEY».99 Later in early 1920, Talat rented a 
two-room flat at the Uhlandstraße 194 near his own apartment in Berlin which served as a 
press bureau.100 Under the editorship of Arif Cemil (Denker) French, English, and German 
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newspapers were read and reports were prepared to be sent to other press bureaus abroad.101 
The Berlin bureau was intended to be in liaison with the nationalist cultural networks of the 
Turkish Hearth Society (Türk Ocağı Cemiyeti).102 These other associated Turkish press bu-
reaus were located in Rome, The Hague, and Lausanne.103 However, these press bureaus seem 
to be more or less local and autonomous initiatives by an ideologically heterogeneous network 
of Young Turks of different color (and some other Muslim nationalist intellectuals) loosely 
united under the flag of opposing the post-war settlement.104  
The relation between the Auswärtiges Amt and the fugitive CUP leaders in Berlin was such a 
common wisdom that again and again letters and messages for Talat Pasha were delivered at 
Wilhelmstraße. Sending these letters through the Ottoman Embassy was not an option, be-
cause it was closed down and embassy officials were not trusted with some of these mes-
sages.105 For instance, Zeki Abdi, an intelligence agent sent by Talat for a secret mission to 
Geneva during the war undercover as Greek Anastas Papadopulos, was now penniless and 
trying to contact Talat at the German Consulate in Geneva.106 The Auswärtiges Amt re-
sponded that they did not know the post address of Talat in Berlin.107 This was an official 
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lie, of course. Nonetheless, the letters continued to come and seem to be forwarded to Ta-
lat.108  
According to the rumors Whittall heard from the Turkish community in Switzerland, Enver 
Pasha «had dispatched a number of officers to Afghanistan via Persia in order to create trouble 
on the Indian frontier.»109 Even the previous assassination of the Afghan Emir Habibullah 
Khan on February 20, 1919, was explained as a «C.U.P. plot».110 In addition, Whittall re-
ported that Cemal Pasha went to Moscow «to discuss with the Bolshevik leaders and arrange-
ments were made to foment insurrections in India and Afghanistan.» If Whittall’s intelligence 
report would have been dated for 1920 or 1921, most of his claims would have been more 
or less accurate. But in May and June 1919, these were mere fantasies—even more the fan-
tasies of conspiracy theorists than that of conspiracy practitioners.  
Certain «statements» by leading Muslim activists in Switzerland led Whittall to the assump-
tion that «recent events in India, Egypt and perhaps Afghanistan, are not totally unconnected 
with ‹Islamic› activities in Switzerland.» Necmettin Molla (Kocataş) was quoted in the report, 
saying: 
The Young Turks are preparing well organized revolts in Anatolia and the armies of oc-
cupation will not be able to suppress them, they will work together with Moslems in 
other countries, all directed by the ‹Pan Islamic Committee› in Switzerland, which is 
establishing branch sections in the Caucasus, Turkestan, Afghanistan, etc. Later on, Al-
geria and Morocco, etc. will be brought into line.111 
It was perhaps Necmettin Molla’s wishful-thinking or a bluff to claim the existence of such 
an organization. It was nothing but a hoax. A certain Ali Bey Dhulfiqar, the «Secretary of the 
Egyptian revolutionary party» and «one of the chiefs in the press department of the Turkish 
Legation in Berne» was quoted in similar fashion to make the point that national movements 
were now in a union: 
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The Egyptians are firmly resolved to liberate themselves no matter what measures the 
British take to prevent them. The Moslem world is about to be awakened: a union has 
been effected between the various Moslem nationalities and all have decided not to cease 
their activities until the liberation of Islam has been accomplished.112  
To be sure, the British Intelligence did not need to fabricate these voices of discontent and 
calls for mobilization. In 1919, a social movement of anticolonial Muslim transnationalism 
was emerging simultaneously at multiple settings and voiced by multiple actors. But there 
was mostly an intellectual unity and collaboration in public claim-making among these 
movements. These activities neither constituted a conspiratorial union nor a coordinated in-
surgency to «bring about a downfall of the British Moslem Empire [sic!]».113 The connecting 
force between distant events was contingency, rather than conspiracy. Ottoman-Egyptian 
Fuad Salim Bey wrote in a letter to Enver Pasha: 
Either way, while all these programs [on the partition of the Ottoman Empire] are still 
ambiguous [mübhem], the English Government was forced to reconsider [its policies]. 
On the one hand, revolts and unrest which are taking place in religious places in India 
are either meant to induce autonomy or as a reaction to the injustice the Ottoman Gov-
ernment has been subjected to. On the other hand, the great revolution in Egypt that 
started in March 8 and continues to this day is influenced by the desire to claim inde-
pendence as well as a reaction to the catastrophes brought upon the chair of the Cali-
phate. I see the continuation of these revolts and especially their spread to other places in 
the East as the only possible means for salvation to save our state.114   
While ideas were getting formed and connections between distant events were seen more and 
more as an opportunity structure, these revolts were actually far away from being coordinated 
by secret conspirators in Switzerland or Germany. Although the compass of the British In-
telligence was showing more or less towards the right direction that there was a somewhat 
unified message behind these events, intelligence officers like Whittall were too eager in their 
interpretations to see the work of secret cabals behind it all. The reaction to the Indian activist 
Sheikh Mushir Hosain Kidwai’s book, The Sword against Islam,115 summarizes the official 
British perception of these connections: 
it is the gospel of the latest form of C.U.P. Bolshevism directed against the British Empire 
more especially in India and Egypt. It shows more clearly than everything I have seen yet 
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how this movement is connected up with every form of revolutionary activism through-
out the world: C.U.P., Bolshevism, Indian and Egyptian nationalism, anti-Zionism, Sinn 
Fein, the extreme Labour Party, Japanese Asiaticism, [and] Persian democracy.116 
Pan-Islamism became such a threat in the summer of 1919 that the British officialdom 
started to see the only countermeasure in supporting local ethno-nationalisms based on the 
Orientalist assumption of a dichotomy between nationalism and Islam.117 Thus, Muslim na-
tionalism was declared undesired. «What ever they may have been once», Arthur Hirtzel ar-
gued, «Moslems are now as little of a nation as the Jews are, and it is retrograde policy that 
would treat them as though they were.» His logic went on to proclaim that «Panislamism is 
undoubtedly a danger—a potential danger», but as he explained, «[t]he antidote is national-
ism.» Hirtzel believed, like many others, that «the nationalist movement if properly guided 
& controlled will tend against Panislamism […].»118 Herbert Young believed that «the en-
couragement of the Arab movement would have been the surest way of weakening political 
Pan-Islamism in Syria and Mesopotamia.»119 On the other side, Middle Eastern intellectuals 
followed another logic: «Be nationalist because it is the only way to save Islam.... Be loyal to 
Islam because it is the only way to save our national inheritance.»120  
Certain individuals occupied central places in the construction of these elaborate scenarios. 
Dr. Parvus was perhaps the most notorious man in the conspiracy theories of the World 
War I era. Dr. Parvus, was, of course, not missing in Whittall’s report either: «One of the 
more notorious intermediaries between Eastern Nationalists in Switzerland and the Russian 
Bolsheviks is the German agent, Parvus […].»121 Israel Lazarevich Gelfand (or Helphand), or 
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more commonly known as Alexander Lvovich Parvus, was the central figure in the German-
Bolshevik themed conspiracy theories in the World War I era.122 Parvus had played an im-
portant role in the German involvement in exfiltrating Lenin to Russia in 1917, which even-
tually triggered the Russian Revolution. The German involvement through Parvus in the 
Russian Revolution was made public in late 1918 in a pamphlet called The German-Bolshevik 
Conspiracy, where the author claimed that «the Bolsheviks were Germany’s paid agents.»123 
All this infected the official and public opinion with the bizarre idea that the Bolsheviks were 
actually part of a German-Jewish conspiracy against the British Empire, in which Parvus was 
the international man of mystery that connected the worlds apart.124 In addition, Parvus was 
also known to be connected to the Young Turk regime from his former years in Constanti-
nople, where he successfully acted as an influential public intellectual on economics, war, and 
revolution. Nonetheless, his personal relation to the exiled CUP leaders was not on record, 
which accordingly left much room for speculations.125 Hugh Whittall in his intelligence re-
port claimed that it was nobody but Parvus, who «facilitates the frequent journeys of the 
Moslem emissaries and the transportation of funds to Switzerland». Parvus’ so-called secre-
tary Coppete allegedly told Whittall that «C.U.P. is still strongly organized in Turkey and 
that a revolution was being secretly prepared which would, to say the least, CAUSE 
ANXIETY TO THE ALLIED FORCES OF OCCUPATION.»126 Peculiarly, Talat Pasha 
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wrote in letter to Enver Pasha in late May 1919 that he was planning to dispatch Arif Cemil 
(Denker) to Berne to work with a certain Coppete (Kopet) to open a press bureau there and 
added: «Of course, in this undertaking we remain unseen.»127 Cavid Bey speaks of a Socialist 
Copette with whom he was in touch in Switzerland.128 But this is unfortunately a cold trace, 
since Arif Cemil remained in Berlin and Cavid does not mention Copette anywhere else. The 
only other occasion, where Parvus has been brought in connection with the fugitive CUP 
leaders in Berlin was in a dubious propaganda pamphlet in 1920. The author addressed the 
social-democrat Chancellor Scheidemann a rhetorical question: «Did perhaps your friend Dr. 
Halphand [sic], better known under the name of ‹Parvus›, persuade you to grant asylum to 
these people [fugitive CUP leaders] in Germany?»129 Also Gregor Alexinsky, an ex-member 
of the Duma, suggested in 1923 in an article titled «Bolshevism and Turks» that it was Parvus, 
who was at the center of German-Bolshevik-CUP relations, but he did not offer any concrete 
evidence to back his claim either.130 No matter how tempting it is to imagine Parvus in de-
vious relationship with the fugitive CUP leaders in Berlin in scheming a German-Turkish-
Bolshevik plot, the evidence is rather speculative, if not untrustworthy. Regardless of whether 
Parvus was actually involved, the fact that his name pops out in these reports and pamphlets 
is rather the manifestation of conspiracy theories in collective processes of political sense-
making. David Fromkin writes:  
While in the clear light of history this conspiracy theory seems absurd to the point of 
lunacy, it was believed either in whole or in part by large numbers of otherwise sane, 
well-balanced, and reasonably well-informed British officials. Moreover, it could be sup-
ported by one actual piece of evidence: the career of Alexander Helphand. Helphand was 
a Jew who conspired to help Germany and to destroy the Russian Empire. He was closely 
associated the Young Turk regime in Constantinople. He did play a significant role in 
selecting Lenin and sending him into Russia to foment a Bolshevik revolt with a view to 
helping Germany win the war. He did continue to weave his conspiratorial webs after 
the war. He was what Wingate and Clayton believed a Jew to be: rich, subvertive, and 
pro-German. [Emphases in original.]131 
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While their alleged connection to the Bolsheviks was already common in the conspiracy the-
ories, it was still a very vague idea for the CUP leadership to cooperate with Bolsheviks in 
late spring 1919. There is, however indication, that it was Enver Pasha, who now an eyewit-
ness of the Russian Civil War and perhaps saw the cooperation of Crimean Tatars with the 
Red Army, proposed this idea in his (now lost) letters. Talat Pasha suggested to discuss «the 
Bolsheviks, et cetera matters» (Bolşeviği, vesaire mes’elesini) rather face-to-face, implying this 
was a topic brought up previously by Enver.132 Former Ottoman Ambassador in Berne and 
one of the leaders of the exiled Egyptian leaders Fuad Salim Bey complained also in his re-
sponse to Enver about the other CUP leaders for not taking any steps towards Russia—again 
implying that Enver brought up this topic: 
Talat Pasha is said to be hiding in Berlin and Cemal in Munich. Considering the great 
field of operation [saha-i faaliyet] such as Russia standing in front of them, it is a matter 
of great astonishment for the true patriots [erbab-ı hamiyetçe] that they and their friends 
remain lazy. If they believe that they can come out and play a role once the circumstances 
are clear, then they are certainly mistaken.133   
More than the obvious factual incorrectness, there was a constant temporal disconnectedness 
between the CUP’s alleged conspiracy and the conspiracy theories about their undertakings. 
The Blochian simultaneity of the non-simultaneous (Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen) was 
never as detached as in the time frame between their disappearance in November 1918 and 
their reappearance in Berlin in the summer of 1919. In a time of early and modest political 
activism, such as lobbying, networking, petitioning, and publishing, the interpretations in 
intelligence reports were remarkably more far-reaching and revolutionary—especially, con-
sidering the fact that Enver Pasha, was actually absent and missing in action. The intelligence 
reports rather described the future (or desired) outcomes of politics, than their current situ-
ation. This was not due to prophetic analyses, but these assessments soon became formative 
in building social structures and affecting political agents.  
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***  
Contrary to received wisdom, many German officials were quite critical about the activities 
of the Young Turks in Germany and on continuing former policies in Middle Eastern affairs. 
No one, but Adolf Müller, the German Ambassador in Berne, advised the Auswärtiges Amt 
not to support the activities of Talat Pasha in Switzerland or elsewhere:  
First of all, it appears questionable to me, whether we should still encourage the Comité 
way, which stuck in pan-Turanian beliefs proved to be shortsighted especially in policies 
towards foreign peoples [Fremdvölkerpolitik]. Besides, it is abhorrent to the right of asy-
lum that is granted to Talaat Pasha in Germany to spur him for political actions. Regard-
ing Switzerland as the terrain of the intended propaganda, enough-good and less-good 
things are taking place already.134 
Adolf Müller also advised the Auswärtiges Amt not to assign Wesendonk for further duties, 
who has been «compromised due to Orient propaganda» by the «continuous attacks of the 
Entente press».135 Wesendonk in his internal statement denied the accusations, which were 
«of course entirely plucked out of the air» (natürlich völlig aus der Luft gegegriffen). Contrary 
to Whittall’s accusations, Wesendonk championed political discretion in Eastern affairs: «In 
this critical time, Germany shall not incur even the gleam of ambiguity. Nothing shall take 
place in Switzerland which would cause misinterpretations. But in Berlin events occurred 
that are a matter of suspicion to the Entente.» Wesendonk refers to the meeting of the «Op-
pressed People» in Hotel Adlon in April 1919 with Irish nationalist George Chatterton-Hill, 
Indian nationalist Dr. Chempakaraman Pillai, American reactionist Colonel Edwin Emer-
son, and Egyptian nationalist Dr. Mansur Rifat holding lectures.136 Talat Pasha and his 
friends most certainly had relations to this meeting of the oppressed nations as Talat’s assis-
tant Arif Cemil (Denker) was one of the lecturers.137 Whittall also criticized that Mahendra 
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Pratap, long compromised from the Hentig-Niedermayer mission to Afghanistan, went re-
cently to Moscow in company of other Indian activists, sending wrong signals regarding Ger-
many’s role.138 These were problematic «remnants of military espionage» (Überbleibsel des 
militärischen Agentenwesens) from the war-years and Entente’s interpretation was accordingly 
based on their war-time experience with counter-espionage against Germany’s pan-Islamist 
policies. Wesendonk concluded: «Of course, the Entente, which is familiar with the war-time 
affairs, believes that I am in connection with the processes in Germany. If you want to have 
peace, then the meetings such as the one in Adlon cannot take place publicly and the [Jour-
nal] ‹Neue Orient› must quit its Bolshevik tendency.» Even though blunt propaganda was to 
be omitted, yet Wesendonk cautioned not to completely abandon and neglect Germany’s 
good relations to Asian countries. Wesendonk advised to carefully wait and utilize the con-
nections in the East.139 Caution did not mean a policy change for imperialist Orientalists like 
Wesendonk. The Orient was still a space of resources. Nonetheless, Adolf Müller from the 
German Embassy in Berne, again, urged the Auswärtiges Amt to be careful with men like 
Wesendonk, «[b]ecause it is assumed in many ways that he [Wesendonk] is still active in 
Switzerland for ministerial assignments, the steps taken by him might give rise to misinter-
pretations, which do not necessarily represent our interests and perhaps needs to be rather 
avoided.»140  
To come back to Herbert Diel’s above mentioned report to contrast it to Whittall’s report, 
he saw three strategies behind «the careful tracing and also frequent inventing of connections 
between ‹Panislamism› and ‹Bolshevism›». First, this connection served as a measure to «deny 
the genuine emergence of unrest out of the state of mind and declaration of will by the sub-
jected people». Instead the uprisings are depicted as a «mechanical contagion» of Bolshevik 
propaganda activities. The conclusion was that «the imminent threat of Islam» would directly 
disappear, as soon as Bolshevism is defeated. This strategy was supported by propagating the 
notion that «Bolshevist theories and Islamic social order» are «completely incongruent in 
their nature». The second strategy behind the «Bolshevist labeling of all liberation movements 
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in the Orient» according to Diel was to «nip the rising sympathies to these struggles [in neu-
tral countries and in America] in the bud [im Keime ersticken]».141 Diel describes the circula-
tion of news in Entente and Entente-friendly newspapers in Europe as originating from anti-
Bolshevik socialist circles in French-speaking Switzerland, finding their way by further 
«make-up» and «embellishments» to the editorial boards in Paris and London. Finally, these 
news were published in «their classic and worldly-wise wording» in Times and Temps.142 Diel 
comes to the sober conclusion: 
The evidence that the mandatory powers have an interest in spreading the belief that 
there is a Bolshevik infection of their Oriental people does not entitle one in any way to 
believe that every connection is invented. It is rather worthwhile to pick out the grains 
of truth that, as already hinted at, are hidden in the husks of the false evidence. In one 
point the enacted concerns displayed by the Entente are actually real and correct, despite 
all the fantasy in the particular details: that there is a logical connection between inci-
dences that are spatially disparate, such as in Egypt and in India. The concept of a Bol-
shevik origin is merely a very transparent veil, with which the controlling powers of the 
Entente attempt to enshroud the eyes of the ‹profanum vulgus› from their own realization 
that there is an awakening sense of solidarity in the Islamic Orient.143 
Diel rightly notes that the Entente will argue against the potential of an «all-Muslim com-
munity spirit» by pointing to the failed jihad of 1914.144 But now in the aftermath of World 
War I the situation changed radically: 
Then the collapse of the Central Powers happened and along with it the demasking of 
the Entente’s aims in the Orient. The secret treaties came to light out of the darkness of 
archives, not to be torn apart, but rather elevated to become laws. Their individual par-
agraphs have been ‹matched› to meet the Wilsonian formula without changing the con-
tent, but only by interchanging the headline ‹share of the loot› into ‹mandate›.145 
Diel pointed out that there were broken promises of reform, autonomy, and independence 
from Morocco to India.  
In short, there is no Islamic country in the coalition of the ‹victors› whose disappointment 
about the consequences of their loyalty is less bitter than the despair of Turkey in face of 
the unmercifulness of its ‹punishment›. […] The commonalities of these experiences 
wrap a new strong bound around the whole Orient. Thus, the sentiments blur into an 
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aligned grievance, which rises among the Mohammedanian populated territories from 
Indian to Atlantic Ocean. It has a completely different momentous than the single flashes 
of open uproar, in which they scatteredly cringe for the time being. The underground 
fire of this grievance is hardening the consciousness of a community of fate and the ne-
cessity of an association to overcome their present-day fate.146  
Despite its wishful-thinking in the potential of these movements, Diel correctly described 
these events as independent social movements transnationally connected in the framing of 
their political cause as a struggle against the global hegemony of Western colonialism and 
imperialism. Italian Orientalist Leone Caetani also pointed out a similar trend in a lecture he 
delivered in Rome on May 28, 1919: 
The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental civilization to its foundations. The en-
tire Oriental world from China to the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hid-
den fire of anti-European hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers, discon-
tent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia, and Libya, are all differ-
ent manifestations of the same deep sentiment and have as their object the rebellion of 
the Oriental world against European civilization. 
The principal reason for this ferment is the report spread throughout the world that the 
Entente wishes to suppress the Ottoman Empire, dividing its territory among the powers 
and ceding Palestine to the Jews. This report has deeply disturbed Mussulmans, who see 
in these projects a grave threat to their most sacred religious sentiments. England, the 
greatest Mussulman power in the World, and also the other countries which will even-
tually be commissioned to administer the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, must take 
into account these sentiments if they wish to avoid serious complications.147 
In sum, it was the spread of colonial rule despite the promise of self-determination and the 
disintegration and perceived defamation of the Ottoman Empire that gave these distant and 
detached incidents from Morocco to Afghanistan a common framing. In this regard, the 
Bolshevik connection was more imagined than real. As Diel argued: «The direct exertion of 
influence by the Bolshevists in the processes in the Orient is for sure ‹hic et ubique› vanish-
ingly low in relation to the ghost sightings of the Entente press and their alarm calls.»148  
Compared with Whittall’s conspiracy theories, Diel offered a rather sociological explanation 
for the relationship between Islamic and socialist movements. According to him, the «con-
spicuous analogy» between socialist theory and the emancipation demands of the Muslim 
people lies in the class society of states in the League of Nations, where all Muslim nations 
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are denounced as «mandate states» (Mündelstaaten), i.e. «proletariat of the states» (Staaten-
proletariat). Diel offered a remarkably postcolonial perspective, when he said: «The hegem-
ony of the imperialistic system in a way discredits as a rule the Islamic character of a state as 
a disqualification for its acceptance among the upper classes of states—which is reserved to 
the European civilization.»149 Elsewhere in his memorandum Diel made the observation: 
«The religious fanaticism that is ascribed to Islam obtains its main food from the pretension 
of the superiority of occidental ‹civilizers›, who until today have a delight in draping them-
selves in crusader cloaks.»150 Diel believed that this understanding was adopted by certain 
Muslim intellectuals and were now being publicly expressed in international forums.151 In 
addition, the «organization of Islamic movements» successfully adopted the contentious rep-
ertoire of mass demonstrations and strikes as it was being demonstrated in Egypt.152 Diel 
believed that very soon an «Islamic International» will be founded after the socialist model 
that would join the «struggle against the capitalist-imperialist dominance».153 As much as 
Diel romanticized these social movements of Muslim nations, it was completely against the 
grain of contemporary cultural interpretations that saw Islam, nationalism, and socialism 
irreconcilable. The impact of this tradition is still present in the scholarship.154 
To be sure, it is perhaps questionable, how representative Diel’s observations were for Ger-
man imperialism and Orientalism in 1919.155 He was, nevertheless, as representative as Whit-
tall was to British imperialism and Orientalism. Regarding Germany’s role in all these affairs, 
 
149 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and 
Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 11.  
150 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and 
Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 15. 
151 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and 
Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 12. 
152 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and 
Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 13. 
153 Herbert Diel, memorandum (Berne) on the relations between the Islamic movement, Bolshevism, and 
Socialism, June 6, 1919, PA-AA, R 14553, 17. 
154 Hans-Lukas Kieser, for instance, is still inclined to be suspicious of any connection between Turkism, 
Islam, and socialism, and follows the received wisdom: «Türkisten waren von ihrem völkischen Glauben her 
schlechte Vertreter des Islams und hatten von ihrem rechtsmodernistischen Weltbild her nichts gemeinsam 
mit internationalem Sozialismus.» Kieser, Vorkämpfer der “Neuen Türkei” 93. 
155 For German Orientalism see: Sabine Mangold, Eine “weltbürgerliche Wissenschaft”: Die deutsche 
Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004); Ursula Wokoeck, German 
Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Islam from 1800 to 1945 (London: Routledge, 2009); Suzanne 
L. Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion Race and Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
148 
Diel had one last advice, namely to abandon the «power politics of the old style» (Machtpolitik 
alten Stils) and to adopt a «comprehensive policy of ideas» (grossangelegte Ideenpolitik).156 Ger-
mans were in the post-Versailles trauma everything but adventurous and daring, although 
deeply resentful.  
In the end, the British officialdom possessed mostly reliable intelligence. Their interpretation 
was, however, very much speculative, to say the least. Patterns and tropes of conspiracy the-
ories led the way in making sense out of the complexity of transnational politics and this 
trend would reach its climax in the summer of 1920 as it will be discussed in later chapters. 
The British Intelligence assessments were no better off than the sensationalist news coverage 
of Entente press. The paranoid thing was shared mentality of the imperial officialdom. When 
The Times announced that allegedly a delegation from Anatolia had arrived at Berlin in order 
to conduct secret negotiations with the German Government, the German representative in 
London reported to Berlin: «In this context, the English newspapers strive to persuade the 
public with all kinds of allegedly dangerous machinations of the Turks in order to justify the 
English policies in the Middle East.»157 But also through purposeful public leaks to newspa-
pers and to informants, the British Intelligence was also constitutive in the making of a con-
spiracy that went beyond theory, altered perceptions and behaviors. Count Carlo Sforza re-
members, how «an Intelligence Service composed of specialist English officers who, little by 
little, were taking over all political control» of the political discourse at the Constantinople 
Headquarters.158 These intelligence reports and their press leaks made the Islamic-Bolshevik 
alliance a possibility in public imaginations—for good or bad. On the other hand, the impe-
rial paranoias of the British officialdom in 1919 were also somewhat prophetic, as they proph-
esized and exaggerated tendencies and alignments, which were to be realized or attempted 
not much different than the way as they were envisioned in past intelligence assessments. 
These prophetic misjudgments perhaps helped the British Empire to be few steps ahead of 
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their adversaries. Indeed, soon later Talat and Enver looked for ways to approach the Bolshe-
viks and found a league of Eastern revolutionaries. 
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5. «You all Need to Get Organized!»: 
Transnational Relations with 
Bolsheviks, Entente, Arabs, and Kemalists 
While the CUP leaders has been imagined in conspiracy theories as plotting grand schemes 
involving Bolshevik-sponsored armies and pan-Islamic insurgencies on behalf of Germany, 
the CUP leaders slowly started to crawl out of their hide-outs and engaged more and more 
in politics in the summer of 1919. «I see hope for the future where the sun rises», Talat wrote 
to Cemal Pasha on December 21, 1919. «It is necessary to work there with all our existence 
and to grow stronger», as Talat believed.1 The same day, Talat also wrote another letter to 
Cavid Bey, where he said: «I set my hopes from now on entirely on the place where the sun 
rises. With all my existence I will work for that region. And I seriously foster great hopes.»2 
Since the sun rises in the East, both the Muslim East and the Russian East were now politi-
cally related to each other in their horizon of expectations. One of the contacts of the exiled 
CUP leaders in Berlin, Wipert von Blücher from the Auswärtiges Amt, wrote in his memoir: 
By no means, they were willing to accept the defeat [in World War I] as something de-
finitive. Instead they immediately began to search for new combinations. Outlawed in 
homeland, persecuted by the Entente powers, they had to turn their eyes towards the 
East.3 
Whereas diplomats and delegates were discussing and deciding the future of distant lands in 
the peace conferences of Paris and San Remo, the CUP leaders participated at unofficial 
meetings in Berlin and Switzerland. Secret letters were exchanged by couriers between Berlin, 
Ankara, Damascus, and Moscow that manifested the engagement of the fugitive CUP leaders 
in transnational relations. 
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The ambivalence of transnational contentious politics is important to be considered. In the 
absence of the legalism and formalism of international diplomacy, transnational politics con-
stituted ambiguous interactions, which tend to be marginalized or criminalized by diplomatic 
histories. A friendly handshake at a secret meeting in a café houses or some promises spoken 
behind the closed doors of a private apartment or few cordial words in a letter from some-
where important like Moscow, Syria or Anatolia was enough to imagine that political alli-
ances were in the making—both by conspirators and conspiracy theorists. By the same token, 
when at these secret meetings or in these private letters such threats were expressed to organize 
insurgencies and conspire with other states, this again was imagined as serious contentions. 
The clandestineness of the revolutionary non-state actor, its transnational networks, and its 
potentially subversive capabilities fueled both the anxieties of state actors as well as the am-
bitions of revolutionary non-state actors to read more into such transnational contentious 
politics. Thus, the already existing rumor-based conspiracy theories of CUP activities were 
enhanced by the evidence of very real transnational interactions that the CUP leaders were 
part of. Furthermore, direct dialog of Entente agents with the CUP leaders delivered the 
confirmation of existing fears. In the meantime, the increase of transnational relations with 
numerous political actors gave a boost to the imagination and ambition of the CUP leaders 
in pursuing their usurpation plans.  
The ambivalence of transnational contentious politics also blurred the cohesion of a group 
of transnational actors in the eyes of distant observers. For instance, there were some serious 
disputes between Talat’s and Enver’s factions. But these differences were consciously con-
cealed to the outside. In the midst of negotiations with a number Entente states, Enver wrote 
in a private letter to Cemal: «And for now I think it is better not to show that we are working 
independently from Talat in order to look stronger from outside.»4 The cohesion between 
Kemalists and Unionists was similarly a matter of speculation and deterrence. «The Com-
mittee’s strength is the strength of these two ideas», as one British memorandum concluded. 
«These ideas cannot be controlled by the physical power of the Allies nor can the Allies 
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physically control the Committee. All the members and its organization are not known. Its 
ramifications are wide.»5  
The fugitive CUP leaders were engaged in transnational relations with state actors such as 
Soviet Russia as well as with Entente states of Britain, France, and Italy as these will be dis-
cussed below. The relationship of the Young Turk refugees to German officials deserves a 
more detailed discussion as this will be covered in other chapters. The CUP leaders also 
maintained transnational relations with other non-state actors, such as Arab, Turkic, and 
Muslim activists from different lands, as well as with quasi-state actors from the Middle East, 
such as the provisional government of Prince Faysal in Syria and the (soon to be announced) 
Ankara Government of the National Forces under Mustafa Kemal Pasha.6  
In reading dialectic processes of sense-making in transnational contentious politics, once 
again perceptions and misperceptions as well as promises and deterrence were entangled with 
each other. Thus, ideas and ideologies come into play in understanding the strategies and 
agendas behind these transnational relations. The CUP leaders were considered as trespassing 
the given political and ideological boundaries. Why would Muslim nationalists seek an alli-
ance with Bolshevik communists? Why would Young Turks reach out to Entente states? Why 
were supposedly hostile Arab nationalists and Turkish nationalists collaborating with each 
other? Why were Kemalists and Unionists supporting each other, although they were rivals? 
Not only the state-centric ontology of international relations, but also the epistemologies of 
intellectual histories has been responsible for misconceptions and misinterpretations.    
*** 
Karl Radek, formerly known as Karol Sobelsohn, was born to a Polish-Jewish family in Aus-
tria-Hungary in 1885. Since his student days, he had been an influential figure in the Polish 
and German Social Democratic movements. During the war, he became a confidante of 
Lenin in Switzerland and had accompanied him in the «sealed train» to St. Petersburg. From 
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the beginning of the Russian Revolution onwards, Radek belonged to the inner circle of 
leading Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia. He was generally in charge of foreign and press affairs. 
He had been a Soviet delegate at Brest-Litovsk negotiations, where he had met Talat Pasha 
for the first time. As connoisseur of German affairs, he has been a close observant of the 
November Revolution in Germany. In the last weeks of 1918, Radek decided to attend the 
«Reich Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils» in Berlin with a Soviet delegation. At 
the border, the German border patrols denied the Soviet delegation permission to enter Ger-
many. Since he was a Germanophile Polish Jew, Radek and his three comrades disguised 
themselves as Austrian POWs on their way home from captivity in Russia. Without any 
trouble the group crossed the border, but still missed the already dissolved congress in Berlin.7 
Nonetheless, on December 30, 1918, Radek participated at the founding congress of the 
Spartacist League, where he held a lecture on «The Russian and German Revolutions and 
World Politics».8  
When the clashes between the Spartacists and police began in January, the Berlin police and 
its Freikorps vigilantes started a witch-hunt against Spartacist leaders with brutal results. Spar-
tacist leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were tortured and executed on January 
15, 1919.9 Radek immediately went hiding, because there was also a similar arrest warrant 
against him, accusing him of sedition and conspiracy. After several weeks of hiding, Radek 
was arrested and imprisoned in the Moabit prison on February 12, 1919, for the accusation 
of being a Soviet agent provocateur for the Spartacist uprising.10 In return, the Soviet Republic 
of Ukraine declared him ambassador in Berlin, hoping that diplomatic immunity might help 
him get released from prison.11 As a Bolshevik, Radek was considered a transnational con-
spirator. As a Soviet diplomat he might have enjoyed the privileges of international diplo-
macy. But in the eyes of German officials, Soviet Russia was still a revolutionary quasi-state 
and Radek its seditious agent. To make sure that no harm was done to Radek, the Soviets 
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took prominent German residents in Russia hostage until Radek’s release.12 German officials 
considered Radek to be the «most skillful and influential agitator» of the Bolsheviks and his 
release and extradition was feared, although the evidence against him was admittedly scarce 
and speculative.13 After several months under harsh conditions of solitary confinement, on 
July 1, 1919, Radek voluntarily revoked his nominal diplomatic status and was granted with 
larger quarters with many privileges.14 Radek’s loyal comrade Karl Moor, a German-Swiss 
communist with far-reaching connections in Berlin, arranged several political guests of dif-
ferent color for meetings in Radek’s new quartiers.15 In Radek’s words: «Within a day my cell 
had become a political salon».16  
Sometime in the summer of 1919 Enver Pasha also arrived at a prominent political salon in 
Neubabelsberg, near Berlin. From May to July 1919, Enver was able to send some letters 
from his hiding place, presumably in Crimea, to the addresses of his old pal Hans Humann 
and his sister Maria Sarre (married to the Director of the Museum of Islamic Art, Professor 
Friedrich Sarre) in Berlin.17 Hans Humann and Maria Sarre were the children of Carl Hu-
mann, who was a German engineer and archaeologist, who had discovered the Pergamon 
temple. Thus, Hans and Maria had spent their childhood in the colony of German expats in 
the Ottoman Empire. The Humanns/Sarres and Enver became family friends as Enver was 
Military Attaché in Berlin from 1909-1911. Enver’s letters from these years to Humann’s 
sister Marie Sarre are an important source of his intellectual development and a matter of 
gossips about a romantic affair.18 As a proud German imperialist and expert on the Ottoman 
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Empire, Hans Humann served as the Naval Attaché to the Ottoman Empire and played a 
key role in Ottoman-German relations during World War I.19 Although Enver’s letter to 
Maria Sarre and Hans Humann are missing, Hans Humann asked General von Seeckt as 
Enver’s «good-old mentor» to give him some advice in his current «loneliness».20 Regarding 
Enver’s political position, Humann commented:  
In his current involuntary buen retiro he hears probably only Turkish or Bolshevik voices. 
They both are partly superficial, partly not independent from an unintended tendency. 
He will have this bias as a statesman or at least obtain it.21 
Once arrived at Berlin, Enver, first stayed at Sanatorium Sinn together with Talat Pasha, but 
soon found shelter in the Villa Sarre in Neubabelsberg, which belonged to his befriended 
couple Maria and Friedrich Sarre.22 The Villa Sarre was a popular meeting place of Oriental-
ists, militarists, imperialists, and many other public figures in Berlin.23 A contemporary 
wrote: 
At the home of the Humanns many policies have been made, especially regarding Tur-
key. I can remember that the old privy councilor [Maria Sarre’s father Carl Humann] 
was a great connoisseur of the state of affairs in the Orient and that diplomats were in 
and out his home. And now, at the [house of] family Sarre the old relations are continued 
and political strings are woven.24  
The son of Maria and Friedrich, Hans Sarre, wrote in his memoir, how Enver Pasha was 
hiding in a guest room in the loft of his childhood home. Although the children soon learned, 
what was going on, Enver’s presence was kept as a secret. His food was brought to his room 
and Enver seldom left his quarters. Whenever he came across the children in the corridor, 
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Enver used to mask his face playfully with his hands.25 It was only a matter of time that the 
political salons of Radek and Sarre/Humann would be connected with each other.  
With Enver’s arrival in Berlin in the summer of 1919, the CUP leaders, Enver and Talat, 
met again for the first time since November 1918 as they went separate ways in Crimea. 
Meanwhile the National Struggle in Anatolia had already started and they were keenly ob-
serving and absorbing all the news they could about Ottoman Turkey from newspapers and 
recent visitors. Although it is not necessarily known, how their thought process came to em-
brace the idea of a «Turkish-Russian entente», but as soon as Talat and Enver reunited in 
early August 1919, they decided to visit Karl Radek at his Moabit prison.26 Talat Pasha was, 
first, to visit Karl Radek.27 Later Radek acknowledged Talat’s significant role in this critical 
moment:  
And to be fair to Talaat Pasha, it must be noted that he understood the significance of 
Soviet power at the moment of its greatest impending danger. In September 1919, during 
the Denikian advance Talaat entered negotiations with the Soviet representatives abroad 
and propagated the idea of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement.28  
Enver and Talat continued to visit Radek until he was deported from Germany in January 
1920. Radek wrote in his prison memoir:  
Two of my first guests were the former Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha, the Head of the Young 
Turk Government, and his War Minister Enver Pasha, the hero of the defence of Tripoli. 
After the rout of Turkey, they lived semi-illegally in Berlin—the Entente was demanding 
their extradition—and they were planning how to conduct the further defence of Tur-
key.29  
Regarding the impression Enver and Talat gave, Radek noted: 
I knew Talaat from the time of Brest-Litovsk. There I had seen him at the victors’ table. 
Here in the Berlin prison, a broken man, he recalled that he was the son of a telegraphist 
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and himself a former telegraphist, […]. […] We discussed the Armenian question many 
times. Talaat did not defend his policy, but pointed out that, surrounded as they were 
on all sides by the Entente which used the Armenians as an element of internal disrup-
tion, they were compelled to resort to the most brutal measures. I must say that Talaat 
struck me as a man with great innate intelligence and will power; he spoke a mixture of 
broken German and French. Enver Pasha, expressing himself freely in French and Ger-
man, nervous by temperament, gave the impression of an unstable man who had com-
pletely lost his balance and was fighting for his personal position than for his country.30 
In their conversations with Radek, the CUP leaders «kept saying that the Moslem East could 
free itself from slavery only with the support of the popular masses and an alliance with Soviet 
Russia.» Both Talat and Enver were compelled to underline that «there were no essential 
divergences between them» and Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who has been publicly disassociating 
himself from the CUP—allegedly only as a deception. As Radek remembers, Enver and Talat 
were claiming that «they were organizing help for him abroad». The CUP leaders believed 
that Turkey in its current situation was depended on auxiliary resources from abroad, espe-
cially from the Muslim and Turkic peoples. Talat was convinced that the Soviets had given 
up their plans to conquer and centralize former Tsarist territories and were at this moment 
of civil war ready to grant autonomy and independence to Russian nationalities, including 
the Muslim republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. These opportunity spaces of Muslim 
Russia were long imagined by the Young Turk leadership as a potential resource for Ottoman 
Turkey’s rescue. To mobilize these resources in Muslim Russia, they needed the blessing and 
support of the Bolshevik government.  
Radek was convinced that these men could be an asset for Soviet interests and advised them 
to go to Moscow and talk these matters with Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders.31 Together 
with Radek they decided upon a provisory «Turkish-Russian agreement» (Türk-Rus İtilafı).32 
A telegraph from Moscow gave a preliminary approval to this agreement.33 This agreement 
is a matter of discussion when comes to the relation between Islam, nationalism, and social-
ism in writing the intellectual history of this liminal period. The agreement with Radek was 
summarized by Enver Pasha in a letter to Cemal Pasha in six points:  
1- Redemption of the Muslim nations,  
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2- Cooperation with the socialists, since it is my goal to collectively struggle against 
Europe’s imperialist capitalism.  
3- Acceptance of principles of socialism in the liberated countries on the condition to 
respect the traditions and nature of internal affairs.  
4- Utilization of any means of force including revolution for the liberation of Islam. 
5- Cooperation with non-Muslim captive nations in this regard. 
6- Tolerance of cultural improvement of all the elements [i.e. non-Muslims] living 
within Islamicate societies.34 
In Enver’s six points there is a clear boundary set to the adoption of socialist principles. These 
presumed boundaries are marked by the premise of protecting and respecting «the traditions 
and nature of internal affairs» (idare-i dahiliyesinde esasat ve bünyeye tevafuk ettirmek şartı ile). 
When one newspaper announced that Talat Pasha was in touch with Radek in Berlin, but 
only to achieve his own goals and to «use Bolshevism as a weapon», Talat is said to have been 
very sad about this. In their agreement with Radek, they had openly acknowledged each 
other’s respective political differences and granted each party with political autonomy.35 
Thus, a certain cultural incompatibility between Islam and socialism was seen in the conduct 
state of affairs, but this mismatch did not necessarily mean a rejection of socialism per se. To 
the contrary, certain socialist ideas and terminology was consciously adopted by the CUP 
leaders.36 The interpretation of British Intelligence was, again, rather exaggerated:  
The most important development in Anatolia to-day is undoubtedly the movement to-
wards Bolshevism. […] The Unionist wing, however, […] insists that it is useless to hope 
for the slightest assistance from the Bolsheviks unless Bolshevism is adopted with all its 
consequences; and they maintain that the tenets of Islam are capable of complete recon-
ciliation with Bolshevik doctrines. […] It [the Unionist wing] is in constant communi-
cation with Talaat, who is the principal protagonist of Islamic Bolshevism in Europe and 
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who is making every effort to obtain control of the nationalist movement, with the assis-
tance of the Russians and Germans.37  
In the imagination of British Intelligence, the CUP was already inseparable from the Bolshe-
viks. Therefore, it was very common to conclude that «[t]he ostensible bolshevik, pan-islamic 
and nationalist propaganda are all apparently organized and controlled in the near East by 
Turks.»38 In the perception of the British officials, the CUP and Bolsheviks merged to a single 
political body in the aftermath of World War I. As one British official concluded «there is or 
ever has been any dividing line between the CUP and bolshevism», because, he argued, «[t]he 
force behind all these movements is the same.»39 In the same breath, Pan-Islam and Bolshe-
vism were equally grouped together. «Bolshevism and Islam were both giant secret societies 
in the British official mind», as Priya Satia explains, «their members following party decrees 
and clerical fatwas, respectively.»40 For instance, T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) was even talking 
about a «wahabi-like Moslem edition of Bolshevism».41 
On the other hand, others saw mere realpolitik behind the union of Islam and Bolshevism. 
Islam and Bolshevism were commonly imagined as contradictory beliefs. Thus, their union 
was considered to be based on an intrigue. «No principles, for example, are more fundamen-
tally incompatible than those of Bolshevism and Islam», as one political officer on the staff 
of the British Naval Commander-in-Chief concluded in a report on the effects of Bolshevism. 
He argued that «no two systems have less in common.» This incompatibility, as it was stated, 
did not hinder the Bolsheviks to «use any instrument and any device» in order to «delude 
Moslems» that «Great Britain is the enemy of Islam».42 In addition, the «rise of the nationalist 
movement and the resurrection of the Committee of Union and Progress has provided valu-
able allies or, more correctly tools.» Others granted the CUP more agency, but also saw an 
alliance with Bolshevism in instrumental terms. «The Moslem respects power above all else», 
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as another British official claimed. If Turkey desires to achieve to assure its «hegemony in 
Islam», he believed that «she will use [Islam] for the iconoclastic purposes of the Committee 
of Union and Progress and Bolsheviks.»43  
The power of realpolitik cannot be denied in CUP-Bolshevik relations.44 Hans Humann, 
who paraphrased the information he got from Enver Pasha, draw a rather pragmatic picture 
of the Islamic-Bolshevik rapprochement: «Lenin makes favorable offers; goes without social 
or Bolshevist movement and contents himself with active anti-English policy dressed as pan-
Islamism according to the motto of right of self-determination of the peoples.»45 A British 
official, who had interviewed Enver in Berlin, reported a similar version of the events—per-
haps revealing Enver’s opinion: 
In dealing with ENVER and his supporters the Bolshevic policy has been extremely 
clever. The Bolshevists have given everything and asked practically nothing in return. 
They do not wish to establish Bolshevism in Turkey and do not even ask the Turkish 
leaders to say they approve of Bolshevist methods in Russia. All they have asked is that 
ENVER should work for Pan-Islamism directed principally against England. In return 
for this they have supplied money and equipment for the Turkish troops in Caucasia and 
Turkestan.46 
One of the German friends of the CUP leaders in Berlin wrote: 
T. [a.k.a. Talat] considers the flirtation with Bolshevism without a risk. It constitutes a 
significant threat against the Entente and T. [a.k.a. Talat] thinks that Turkey is practi-
cally seen absolutely not a field for Bolshevism. Therefore, the experiment is without any 
risk. It can be turned off whenever desired.47 
Legation Council Hey from the Auswärtiges Amt, who accompanied Karl Radek’s deporta-
tion to Russia via Poland in January 1920, came to a similar conclusion after several conver-
sations with Radek:  
Regarding the anti-English propaganda in these regions [the Bolsheviks] expect much 
from Enver Pasha. Radek had detailed conversations with him and also with Talaat Pa-
sha, who are united by the common enemy. The cooperation is relieved by the fact that 
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even the Bolsheviks hold it for impossible to establish Soviet Governments in Central 
Asia.48  
To be sure, there was no ideological conversion to socialism. But it would be a mistake to 
dismiss the Young Turk interest in Soviet Russia as a bogus maneuver. The Young Turks’ 
approach to Soviet Russia and Bolshevism was to a certain degree based on a sincere curiosity 
and fascination for revolutionary politics. As self-acclaimed revolutionaries, they acknowl-
edged the power of the revolutionary moment coming from the epicenter of Soviet Russia. 
Young Turks knew very well that global revolutions offered opportunity structures, where 
new alliances could be merged across boundaries and new ideas could be adapted to local 
exigencies and repertoires.49  
«The task did not differ markedly from one which the C.U.P. had itself undertaken before», 
as Masayuki Yamauchi correctly noted, which was «the spread of anti-imperialist and partic-
ularly anti-British propaganda, conveyed in Muslim phraseology, throughout Anatolia, Iraq, 
Iran, Afghanistan, India and Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan.»50 In their intellec-
tual approach to socialism and Bolshevism, the CUP leaders cherry-picked those ideas that 
were common to their existing ideological repertoire and similar to their own political mind-
set. Bolshevik-inspired anti-imperialism, for instance, offered a seamless translation to Mus-
lim anticolonialism. The idea of revolutionary politics similarly corresponded to their komita-
dji repertoire, and was, thus, adopted and admired. The Young Turks were also no strangers 
to populist rhetoric and social mobilization tactics of mass politics. The Marxist class-struggle 
and proletariat ethos corresponded to their nationalist self-victimization discourse as op-
pressed people in face of foreign and infidel economic exploitation. Communist internation-
alism was seen as a federative framework for Muslim transnationalism. All in all, coming to 
terms with the Bolsheviks did not meant a serious policy shift or intellectual rupture for the 
CUP leaders, but rather the continuation and transformation of their existing experiences.  
After the Young Turk leaders decided with Karl Radek upon the principles of their coopera-
tion in the Moabit prison in Berlin, it was then necessary to go to Moscow to seal the deal 
with the Bolshevik leaders. Enver Pasha dreamt of arriving at Moscow in the official company 
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of Karl Radek. Being Radek’s fellow traveler would certify his political mission in Moscow. 
Enver’s wish did not come true, as we will see later. Nonetheless, the CUP leaders, both Talat 
and Enver, seem to have been very much occupied in cooperating with Karl Radek in Berlin. 
For instance, in a letter from November 7, 1919, Enver wrote to Cemal that he has been 
busy, dealing with Radek’s release.51 Talat wrote the following in a letter to Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha, probably not without exaggerating his own role: 
I am in touch with the Bolshevik leaders here [in Berlin]. I met several times with Radek 
who was imprisoned until recently. And we agreed to cooperate within the principles I 
described above to be approved by Lenin. I worked a lot with the Germans and achieved 
Radek’s release and his transportation to Moscow by airplane. And I arranged his travel 
documents under another name. For this reason, Radek and the Bolsheviks here are 
gratefully indebted to us. Because Radek is the specialist on eastern affairs within the 
Bolshevik government, he assures that our agreement will be accepted by the central 
committee.52 
How far Talat Pasha is telling the truth here is doubtful. He probably wanted to impress 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Except for these few bold claims in their private letters, there is no 
evidence in archival documents that Talat or Enver had anything to do with Radek’s release.53  
Nonetheless, regarding the rapprochement with the Bolsheviks or anyone else, Mustafa Ke-
mal made clear that no one but he was the king of the castle. «In any kind of approach or 
alliance with the foreigners», Mustafa Kemal declared in his correspondence with Talat, «last 
word and last decision must be communicated with here.» «For instance,» he said and defined 
it more precisely, «the arrangement with Radek which is to be approved by Lenin must be 
approved and examined by me as well.»54  
*** 
While the British Intelligence saw the CUP leaders engaged in anti-British conspiracies eve-
rywhere possible, ironically both Talat and Enver were trying to come to term with British 
decision-makers. These were mostly efforts to clear their own name of war-crimes, but also 
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partly sincere efforts to do something against the situation in Ottoman Turkey. Talat Pasha 
reached the conclusion that he first needed to convince the prime victor of the war, the British 
Government, that he was not responsible for the Armenian massacres. Therefore, Talat wrote 
a letter to Lloyd George where he introduced himself as a «man who does not occupy any 
official and political positions». Yet, his status as a non-state actor was not helping and the 
Armenian Question was certainly making doors slammed at his face. Talat wrote George that 
the British needed the Turks in their current conflict with Soviet Russia. He never received 
an answer. Meanwhile, Enver Pasha, as he was still hiding somewhere in South Russia, wrote 
a letter to Winston Churchill, urging him to intervene Lloyd George’s foreign affairs. But 
not without warning him about the «deep fire of Islam», if Britain would not come to terms 
with Ottoman Turkey.55 Talat considered Churchill to be «a little charlatan» (biraz şarlatan). 
In these attempts to get in touch with senior British politicians, they knowingly risked to get 
«caught by entrapment» (yakalatmak için tuzak). Enver would not receive an answer from 
Churchill either.56  
When Talat Pasha realized that Lloyd George would not answer his letter, he decided to write 
a letter to his «ancien ami» Aubrey Herbert, whom he knew prior to the war and treasured 
as a trustworthy and Turcophile (Türkiye muhibbi) British official—more on Aubrey Herbert 
later in Chapter 10. In his letter to Herbert in September 1919, Talat had claimed again that 
«he was not responsible for the Armenian massacres, that he could prove it, and that he was 
anxious to do so.» To settle the strife with the British, he wished to have a talk with Herbert 
in a neutral country. One British government official, whom Herbert asked for advice on 
how to response, was not happy at all hearing about the identity of Herbert’s pen pal.57 «What 
did you want to bring me into this for?, he stood up and moaned. Couldn’t you have left 
me out? It’s illegal to correspond with the enemy.»58 As a result, Herbert politely answered 
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to Talat that a meeting would not help him clear his reputation in these days.59 As a fugitive 
political actor, there were structural barriers between him and the decision-makers in Lon-
don.  
In August 1919, Major Ivor Hedley, a member of the British Military Mission in Berlin, 
approached Maria Sarre at her villa in Neubabelsberg, claiming to be interested in her fam-
ily’s collection of archaeological artefacts. Major Hedley’s real intention was, however, to 
meet the fugitive CUP leaders, whom Maria Sarre was rumored to maintain good relations. 
Somehow, Hedley and Sarre reached an understanding and Talat Pasha was first to meet 
Major Hedley, soon followed by Enver Pasha. Major Hedley referred in his reports to Maria 
Sarre as «the lady through whom I used to communicate with ENVER» or «the Fair Lady, 
who is always in close touch with ENVER’S movements».60 It was even rumored in circles 
close to the Young Turks in Berlin that Major Hedley promised to bring the CUP back into 
office with Talat Pasha as the Grand Vizier, if they would offer their help in finding a settle-
ment in increasingly troubling Ottoman Turkey.61 How far Major Hedley really went in 
beguiling Talat is not certain. However, British documents tell a different story, namely, that 
it was Talat, who «practically offered his services» to establish «a united Turkey […] in the 
Turkish-speaking territories of Europe and Asia». Talat’s offer implied putting the grand 
schemes of saving the Muslim world from colonization aside and instead settling on securing 
Ottoman Turkey on behalf of the CUP. Despite these mutual overtures, Major Hedley seem 
to have handled on his own, because the British Government  
considered that it would be highly improper for them to enter into any kind of negotia-
tions with this man whose surrender is about to be demanded under the Treaty of Peace 
and who is personally responsible not only for the policy leading up to the entry of Tur-
key into the war but also for some of the worst cruelties and atrocities perpetrated by the 
Turks during its continuance.62  
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Nothing came out from the first talks with Major Hedley. In early October 1919 after com-
ing to an arrangement with Radek, Talat Pasha travelled to Switzerland, visiting Cavid Bey, 
and Enver took the airplane to Moscow.63 «Both the Italians and French wants to establish 
good relations with those Young Turks whom they consider to possess the government in 
the future», Talat Pasha explained to Mustafa Kemal Pasha in his letter, implying that the 
Unionists and Kemalists were considered to be the future powerholders. Both Italy and 
France were ready to «give us the best possible assistance», he assured, «however, under the 
condition not to bring them in a difficult position with the English.» The Italians were more 
forthcoming than the French, Talat noted. «I am at all times in touch with the Italian Foreign 
Minister Count Sforza and thus with the Italian government», Talat bragged to Mustafa 
Kemal.64 In return, Mustafa Kemal made clear that he too had «personal friendship» to Count 
Sforza.65 In Switzerland, Talat and Cavid got in contact with French officials. Cavid as a 
liberal-minded finance expert was strictly against a serious cooperation with Soviet Russia 
and hoped to find an alternative partner in post-war France. Meanwhile, France and Britain 
were experiencing more and more troubles with each other at the Paris Conference. «If it 
comes to an agreement with the French», Cavid noted in his diary, «we explained that we 
would abandon all the other efforts and until then we would not start dialogue with the 
Bolsheviks». Furthermore, they explained to the French officials, as Cavid wrote, «what kind 
of benefits we could arrange for the French in the Caucasus and Arabia.» 66 However, Talat 
made sure in correspondence with Mustafa Kemal that in these talks they were only prear-
ranging future negotiations with legitimate representatives from Anatolia.67  
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On January 6, 1920, Enver Pasha had a secret meeting with Major Hedley at Knauseestraße 
17 in Grunewald. This was in midst of Enver’s various unsuccessful flight attempts to Mos-
cow.68 Enver explained the reason why Turkey and Britain had to come to terms to Major 
Hedley with the Turkish proverb: «To be good friends one must have quarreled well». Turkey 
had quarreled enough, so that Enver «had to look to his late enemies to find a real friend for 
Turkey».69 This was also the same masculine logic behind the CUP leaders’ more or less 
known overtures to Soviet Russia. Later in their propaganda journal, Liwa-el-Islam, they ar-
gued in similar terms that 
Tsarist Russia was an enemy of the Ottoman Sultanate. Nevertheless, it showed his ani-
mosity openly. […] All of this is evidence enough to show us that the Russians were brave 
and honest enemies and the English are fraudulent and perfidious enemies.70 
But for Enver Pasha, sitting on the negotiation desk in front of a British agent in February 
1920, «[i]t was, therefore, to England» to be Turkey’s friend, as Hedley paraphrased, because 
the British Empire was «the strongest nation in the world.» Enver made clear that only the 
CUP was capable of establishing «an independent Turkey closely and secretly associated with 
Great Britain». Compared to Talat Pasha, who was ready to settle for Ottoman Turkey, En-
ver was more willing to act as a global player. To Major Hedley, Enver promised to solve 
their «difficulties and dangers in Egypt and other Mahommedan countries further East». Re-
lying on the power of the rumors and conspiracy theories about him, Enver, warned that «[i]t 
will not be possible to convert them to be entirely anti-Bolshevik», because, as he bragged, 
«the thing has gone too far already». In reality, the fugitive CUP leaders had not achieved 
much yet, besides some conversations with Radek and publishing some propaganda pam-
phlets and telegrams in European metropoles. Nevertheless, Enver self-confidently assured 
that «it will be possible, to a large extent to remove, the Anti-English feeling.»71 «What I 
understand from the ongoing dialogue is», Talat concluded about Hedley’s interest in talking 
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to Enver, «that they seem to be terribly afraid of the Bolsheviks.» This was the only reason 
why Major Hedley approached the CUP leaders in the first place, Talat believed. «These 
blokes are pragmatic», Talat noted, but also admitted that «there is a chance that these might 
be empty promises.» But it was worthwhile to gamble with. «Let’s see what will happen», he 
said.72 
Cavid Bey learned about this meeting in a telephone conversation with Berlin but remained 
rather suspicious. «The chief of the British Mission there approached him [Enver]», he noted 
in his diary, «allegedly [gûya] to establish an offensive and defensive alliance.»73 On January 
20, Cavid received a letter from Talat Pasha, which said, that their British contact person 
went to London and to Paris, spoke with Churchill, Lloyd George, Montagu, and Curzon, 
and came back to Berlin again.74 The review of Hedley’s report by British decision-makers 
was mixed, but more negative than positive. While it was stated that for Enver «is wanted for 
Atrocities; that we must know before going any further exactly what he can and will do to 
help», investigations were ordered to assess, «what he is doing against us & whether his in-
fluence would be of any value if he took our side».75 Most of the reactions were, however, 
more critical about negotiating with criminals and enemies, so that Hedley was ordered not 
to promise anything. 
After Hedley’s return, the Young Turk leaders figured out that the British were putting breaks 
on the negotiations. Therefore, as Talat explained, for now they «did not cut any connection 
with the other side», meaning the Bolsheviks.76 Enver, however, seem to have insisted on 
coming to terms with the British, unless more trouble was to be awaited in British India, as 
he warned Hedley. Regarding his relation to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Enver claimed boldly to 
the British—playing on their fears—that Mustafa Kemal «was willing […] to take his orders 
from Enver if necessary, thus though appearing to be still enemies, they would in reality be 
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working for the same ends for their country».77 This was, as it will be discussed below, an 
outright bluff. In a letter to Cemal Pasha, Enver paraphrased the outcome of negotiations, as 
Hedley saying:  
As you see we [i.e. the British] leave İstanbul to you. Those places, where the Turks are 
in majority will become independent and Turkish. We recognize the independence of 
the Caucasian Republics. We will help them by any means necessary. and regarding the 
independence of Turkestan we will not object. In addition, we will not enter any secret 
engagement. As you see, in return my government disregards to work with you and all 
parties are free in their conduct. You are free to act for or against whom you want […].78  
Regarding the indifference of the British answer, Enver said: «I consider everything in this 
way, even by our intrigues [dolabımızla bile olsa], a benefit for our country.» This would 
enable Enver to work more freely in Turkestan, as he believed. «Honestly, I would be lying», 
he confessed, «if I say, I am not happy about being freed in this matter.»79 
A potential intensification of their overtures to the Entente states was considered an option 
in case of a negative outcome of Enver’s visit to the so-called «desired place» (mahal-i mak-
sud), the code word for Moscow. «It is not possible to give the state leader [Salarüddevle]80 a 
positive answer», as Talat explained Cavid, «not before going there [Moscow] and meeting 
with the necessary people».81  
On February 23, 1920, Major Hedley was contacted by Mr. Robbins, the British Commer-
cial Commissioner in Berlin that an informant desired to meet him. Arrived at Mr. Robbins’ 
office, Hedley found the man whom he described as «a German-Russian, a supporter of the 
Deutsche Militar Partei [sic], and in need of Money.» From this man they received the fol-
lowing information: 
ENVER PASHA and DJEMAL PASHA, accompanied by a courier from VICTOR 
KOPP to the Soviet Government, were due to leave Berlin this morning by aeroplane 
from the Johannisthal Aerodrome; they will reach Konigsberg to-night, stay overnight in 
that town and fly on to-morrow morning to WITEBSK. From there they will go on to 
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MOSCOW where ENVER and DJEMAL will consult with the Government, get their 
final instructions and travel on to South Russia en route for Afghanistan.82  
If this information was true, Hedley knew, Enver and Cemal could be arrested in Königsberg. 
Hedley called Maria Sarre to check the information. He learned that Enver indeed left Berlin 
that morning. Maria Sarre said she could, however, arrange a meeting with Talat Pasha, but 
he was also out-of-town for few days. Talat was in Munich and rushed back to Berlin, when 
he heard from Maria Sarre that Major Hedley had contacted her.83 Meanwhile, however, 
Enver’s plane had a crash landing soon after their departure. Next day on February 24, 
Hedley met with Enver, where Enver again declared that he would rather work with the 
British than with the Bolsheviks. Hedley asked Enver, «if, in consequence of this, he intended 
to modify his anti-English campaign throughout Islam or continue the very wide active prop-
aganda that he meditated». Enver answered boldly «that he was so far embroiled in the cam-
paign since that refusal that it would now be very difficult to break it off.» This was, of course, 
a bluff. Enver knew, at least from the flamboyant news coverage about his alleged adventures, 
that he possessed an elusive power rooted in the enemy’s (and his own) constant overestima-
tion of his potential influence. After the last refusal of negotiations, as Enver bluffed to 
Hedley, «he had immediately set his machinery in motion and himself intended to take an 
active part in the East.» As soon as the airplane was repaired, as Enver explained, he would 
fly to Moscow «to work with the Soviet Government simply and solely with a view to stirring 
up insurrections, small and large, against England throughout her Mussulman possessions.» 
In detail Enver continued to reveal his plans to Hedley. Since it was «obviously impossible» 
to fight «England in the East» in a conventional war with «a large Mussulman army», Enver 
rather preferred an unconventional campaign that would «cause sufficient trouble» to make 
England reconsider its economic overreach in trying to maintain military control in the 
East.84  
The next day, Enver asked Major Hedley to call him on the telephone. There was courier, 
ready to be dispatched to Constantinople that evening, so Enver wanted to talk over some 
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issues with Hedley, before sending orders to Ottoman Turkey. Hedley noted that Enver was 
«still extremely anxious to work with England rather than with Bolshevic Russia.» Enver even 
postponed his flight to Moscow. Again posing as the champion of the Muslim world, when 
Enver talked about «Turkey’s favour», his demands went far beyond Ottoman Turkey and 
combined a vast geography reaching from Egypt to Afghanistan and Turkestan. Enver be-
lieved that many points that were previously discussed in January seem to have already been 
settled. Turkey appeared to be able to keep most of its European and Asiatic possessions; 
«independence for Caucasia and Turkestan» seemed in Enver’s vision «to be certain»; Eng-
land had «recognised the independence of Afghanistan»; and was «prepared to grant inde-
pendence to Northern Egypt». In addition, Enver demanded independence in Egypt (includ-
ing Sudan) and the right of self-determination throughout Ottoman Arab lands as well as 
the settlement of the Smyrna and Thrace questions. If the British would agree to work with 
him, Enver offered to break all on-going relations with the Bolsheviks and proceed to Con-
stantinople—«of course incognito»—«in order to talk with the leaders there». From there he 
would travel to the Caucasus and Turkestan and work for their independence. More im-
portantly, however, Enver made clear that «his presence would be essential if the feeling to-
wards England is to be entirely changed.»85 This was said in Hedley’s report to London.  
Enver has a remarkably different recollection of the negotiations with Major Hedley. In a 
letter, he told the same story, but his own demands were rather reformulated as Hedley’s 
offers: 
The above mentioned told that the English ministers had regretted greatly that they 
abandoned the first negotiations. Yet, the opinions of their ministers [changed] and the 
English are now free to pursue independent policies from the French. Secondly, the Eng-
lish abandoned their former policies and decided to work together with those nationalists 
who represented the majorities. In this connection, he told that they would leave İstanbul 
for us and that those soldiers temporarily staying at the straits would leave in two years. 
They would recognize the independence of the Caucasus republics. In addition to İzmir, 
all territories of Syria and Iraq will remain with us, although the decision about Iraq is 
not absolutely definite. Consequently, in return he [Enver] should abandon working 
against the English and leave any propaganda against them aside. And he said that they 
would give independence to the northern part of Egypt.86 
 
85 Major Ivor Hedley, report (Berlin) on a telephone conversation with Enver Pasha, February 25, 1920, FO, 
371/5211, 1311, 39–40. 
86 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cemal Pasha (Munich), February 26, 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, 
İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 37.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
171 
We don’t know, who tells the truth here. We know definitely that Enver was deceiving 
Hedley about many things. He could barely process, what was going on. Isn’t it awkward?» 
(Garip değil mi?), he asked Cemal Pasha.87 But perhaps, Hedley was also lying to Enver about 
potential British overtures in order make Enver reveal more and more details about his po-
litical plans and delay his rapprochement with the Bolsheviks. Hedley’s official reports barely 
mentions, what he was offering as a bargain to keep the CUP leaders away from further anti-
British intrigues. Hedley was more or less negotiating without governmental authority. After 
hearing reports about Major Hedley’s continued conversations with Enver, Lord Curzon or-
dered to abandon «any such intercourse with a criminal whose surrender has been demanded 
from Germany».88 «I don’t support them in any question of doing things behind Lord Kil-
marnock’s back», the Director of Military Intelligence noted, implying that Hedley was act-
ing on his own in Berlin.89  
These negotiations with the British also leaked to the press—perhaps on purpose, in order to 
damage Enver’s relation to the Bolsheviks. On March 7, Cavid Bey wrote in his diary, that 
while Enver was having secret talks with the British in Berlin, The Times was reporting that 
«Enver was in Berlin and scheming intrigues with the Entente states by making offers». The 
negotiations with the British, as Cavid believed, were «without a doubt» an «entrapment» to 
spy on them, but, as Cavid complained, Enver «didn’t understand it».90 The article in The 
Times announced the news, which was said to be confirmed «from a wholly independent 
source», that Enver, currently in Berlin, was «credited with the desire to enter into relations 
with the Entente Chargés d’Affaires.» The article reassured that «[t]here is no indication, 
however, of a reciprocal desire on the Entente side», indicating that the leak to the press 
possibly came from British officials. After claiming that Enver the «Turkish Napoleon» has 
allegedly fallen from grace in Weimar Germany, the final verdict was yet: «That he is still 
intriguing, however, admits of no doubt.».91  
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While these talks took place, most British officials dismissed the negotiations with war-crim-
inals in the likes of Enver and Talat as a matter of principle. W. S. Edmonds from the Foreign 
Office believed, for instance that «[t]he CUP and the Bolshevists will work together, whatever 
Enver may say, and if we made terms with Enver, we should only give him more prestige to 
use against us».92 But still for many other British officials Enver somehow always possessed 
an elusive power that he was too dangerous and scheming to be simply let off the leash. After 
hearing the rumors that Enver was seen in Afghanistan, in February 1920, Montagu said that 
this was yet «another fruit of the decision we took to have nothing to do with this man».93  
During the London Conference in February 1920, the partition of Constantinople was so-
lidified. The Ottoman Parliament, however, did not accept terms of occupation and pub-
lished the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) on February 17, 1920, which practically legitimized 
the Anatolian resistance movement. This move resulted in the Entente decision to intensify 
the exiting occupation. The Ottoman Parliament was resolved on March 14, 1920. The mil-
itary occupation of Constantinople and the Straits was realized on March 16, 1921.94 All this 
had a tremendous impact on the perception of the Young Turks regarding the good will of 
the British Empire. Enver was quoted in newspapers as threatening the British with holy war: 
Not I alone, but hundreds of thousands of Mohammedans will sacrifice their lives to lead 
the Muslims in a holy war, if Constantinople and Dardanelles should be robbed from 
the Turks. Turkey would ally with Moscow, and woe betide the British Dominions when 
the sleeping peoples of Asia will be awakened.95 
The negotiations with the British had a brief aftermath in June 1920. A Polish informant of 
the British Military Mission in Berlin stated that due to their concerns about Soviet Russia 
becoming Russian nationalist, Talat Pasha and Cavid Bey were once again «anxious to enter 
into some sort of understanding with Great Britain.»96 The Foreign Office was, however, 
more curious, whether the Polish informant «was a real Pole by race», because «a certain 
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number of Moslem Poles were associated with the C.U.P.» 97 Ideas of racial intrigue contin-
ued to surface, when it came to understanding the CUP. The memorandum of the Polish 
informant claimed that there was a «Young Turk Government now in Berlin».98 The minutes 
on the dossier summarized the proposal as follows: «The leitmotif of these Young-Turk pro-
posals would thus seem to be that Great Britain, as a remedy for the present disagreeable 
situation, should discard her intriguing French and Italian Allies, abandon Greeks, Poles 
etc., and champion Young Turkey as the kernel of Islamism by modifying in her favour the 
terms of San Remo.»99 Lord Curzon made, again, clear that «no intercourse should be held 
with these refugees.»100  
*** 
Meanwhile, the British Intelligence suspected that an alliance was in the making between 
Arab insurgents in Syria and Iraq and Turkish nationalist forces in Anatolia. To be sure, the 
prevailing Orientalist presumptions in the British intelligence and diplomatic community 
imagined Turks and Arabs as racial enemies. Therefore, a potential alliance of Arabs and 
Turks was considered as abnormal and only the result of Oriental intrigues and despotism, 
if not atavistic Muslim fanaticism.101 The propagation of a discourse of Turkish-Arab ani-
mosity was one of the cornerstones of the British war-time agenda in the Middle East. On 
March 22, 1920, Winston Churchill unapologetically made clear at the House of Commons: 
«There are the Arabs who have been disturbed by the [French] occupation of Syria, and who 
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are inclined now, for the first time, in many ways to make common cause with the Turkish 
Nationalists, thus uniting two forces by whose division our policy has hitherto prospered.»102 
What Churchill and many others did now know was that the Arab insurgents of the Arab 
Revolt of 1916, whom the British Intelligence had propagated as an anti-Turkish awakening 
of Arab nationalists, had mostly an ambiguous, if not even favorable, relation to the Ottoman 
Empire and to their Ottoman-Turkish compatriots. Nuri al-Said, who left the Ottoman 
Army to join the Arab nationalist secret society of al-Ahd (the Covenant) and became one of 
the commanders of the Arab Revolt and later Prime Minister of Iraq, wrote once: «None of 
us thought of separation from the Ottoman Empire. Our thinking was directed toward ob-
taining a local Arab administration, the recognition of Arabic as an official language, and 
Turkish-Arab association in the administration of the general policy of the state […].»103 
Indeed, the same Nuri al-Said gave a secret letter to a befriended Turkish officer, during the 
Armistice negotiations between the British-Arab forces and the 7. Ottoman Army on No-
vember 3, 1918. The secret letter was addressed to Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha and 
proposed a Muslim federation of Turks and Arabs against Allied plans. The acting com-
mander of Ottoman delegation in Qatma, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha, however, dismissed the 
letter as a British intrigue.104 What Ali Fuat Pasha did not know, was that at the same time, 
Grand Vizier İzzet Pasha was envisioning and proposing a solution to the Allies that was very 
similar to Nuri al-Said’s proposal, an Ottoman imperial federation of Turks and Arabs.105 
With the vast majority of Moslems Arab nationalism and Islamism are synonymous terms, 
as one British political officer in Damascus rightly concluded. It will, however, inevitably 
lead to a rapprochement with the Turks and with Mustafa Kemal.106 
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During the war, the British had made conflicting promises to the French, Zionists, and Sharif 
Husayn.107 Behind the Sykes-Picot agreement there was, what diplomatic historian Alan 
Sharp calls, a «deliberately ambiguous approach». «[W]hat we mean by» Arab independence, 
as Viscount Alfred Milner explained, «it is that Arabia while being independent herself should 
be kept out of the sphere of European political intrigue and within the British sphere of 
influence: in other words that her independent native rulers should have no foreign treaties 
except with us.»108 Contrary to the plans of British Intelligence officers at the Arab Bureau 
in Cairo or the British decision-makers in London, the situation was more complex. An 
American intelligence officer who made inquiries in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria in late 1917 
and throughout 1918, reported: The great masses of people in the Near East are illiterate 
and fanatical Moslem, whose only desire is to be free from the domination and rule of the 
Christian nations of the West.109  
Soon after the armistice, resistance to colonial or foreign forces emerged in Greater Syria 
(Bilad al-Sham) and Mesopotamia, which were actually areas considered by the Entente as 
liberated from the Turkish yoke. In Iraq large-scale uprisings against the British administra-
tion occurred as early as May 1919 among the Kurdish tribes. Syria was soon to rebel under 
the rule of the leaders of the Arab Revolt of 1916, nominally Prince Faysal and de facto the 
Young Arab Society (al-Fatat). The British forces left Syria for the French (to whom the 
territories had been secretly promised) in the autumn of 1919, which gave rise to broad scale 
uprisings in urban and rural areas in Syria. This did not only undermine the right of self-
determination of Syrians, but France was also considered by the Muslim Arabs as an historical 
ally of Christian minorities of Syria and Lebanon. These Middle Eastern uprisings against 
foreign-infidel rule reached a new height in the year 1920, as Syrian resistance against the 
French occupation forces came to a disastrous climax at the Battle of Maysalun on July 24, 
1920. Meanwhile in neighboring Iraq, British occupation forces were busy struggling from 
summer to autumn of 1920 against the Great Iraqi Revolt, which could only be stopped by 
 
107 James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2011), 31. 
108 Quoted in Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking after the First World War, 1919–1923, 
2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 188. 
109 William Yale, memorandum on Great Britain, France and the Near East, December 16, 1918, quoted in 
Isaiah Friedman, British Pan-Arab Policy, 1915–1922: A Critical Appraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 144. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
176 
major air strikes. All these uprisings in Syria and Iraq were very similar to the resistance 
movement in Anatolia and there seem to be some connections between the movements, 
which bedeviled the Entente administration.110  
One year before the climax of events of summer 1920, in August 1919, the British acquired 
a secret treaty between Mustafa Kemal and Faysal, signed by intermediaries on June 16, 1919, 
in Aleppo.111 The British officials immediately assumed that it was a forgery. They had ac-
quired the document by Boghos Nubar Pasha of the Armenian National Delegation in 
Paris.112 Previously, the French officials in Constantinople had acquired the same document 
from another Armenian, Dr. Topjian, for one hundred and fifty Turkish liras.113 An alliance 
between Mustafa Kemal and Faysal was surely a major threat to the future of Armenian Ci-
licia, which was under French occupation. This explains perhaps why the Armenians had an 
interest in spreading the news.114 The treaty’s first clause proclaimed: 
In order to put an end to the regrettable discord which is observed in the Islam World 
the Turkish and Arabic races which have material, moral and religious bonds between 
them are in duty bound to help each other towards perfect agreement in matters of reli-
gion and country.115  
The treaty went on and «adopted the declaration of a Holy War for the safety of the Country 
and of Religion» and invited to this Holy War «Mesopotamia, the Yemen, the Hedjaz, Me-
dina, Syria, Tripoli of Barbary, Benghazi, Algeria, India, Morocco and Tunis and will see 
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that their participation is assured.» Other more outrageous sources such as Ibn Saud claimed, 
for instance, that the Sharifian forces in the Hijaz, Syria, and Iraq, Turkish nationalists in 
Anatolia, the Egyptian Nationalist Party, and the Egyptian Wafd (Delegation) Party were 
allegedly waging a jihad against the British forces.116 Another report from Damascus said: 
This movement may not take the form of a definite Jehad, although given favourable con-
ditions this is by no means impossible, and will certainly be attempted […].117 
In the collective imagining of the British officials the alleged treaty between Mustafa Kemal 
and Faysal was integrated into the existing template of conspiracy theories and the usual 
suspects were added to the bunch. Thus, few months later Mustafa Kemal «was represented 
as commanding a new national army associated with Enver Pasha, Feisul, the Soviet etc.»118 
There was, of course, no mention of Enver and Soviets in the treaty, or whatsoever. «At the 
same time I do not believe that such a treaty exists», a British Intelligence officer in Cairo 
concluded and continued, «though C.U.P. would no doubt like to conclude it».119 Although 
this was an accurate estimation on the general ambitions of the CUP to unite the struggles, 
it also marked the paranoid style in intelligence assessment. Another report said that Faysal 
was attempting to play the role of a Near-Eastern Napoleon […] in cooperation with the 
dark forces radiating from Constantinople and Konia is challenging Europe—constantly 
[evoking] the specter of Pan-Islamism, Bolshevism and similar phenomena.»120  
Despite rumors and allegations that the treaty was a forgery, it made sense in the historical 
context.121 Therefore, the treaty was a matter of serious concern. A handwritten note by a 
British official, possibly Curzon himself, on the copy of the treaty said: 
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Even if this treaty is a forgery, which is more likely, as Faisal would not be such a fool as 
to sign anything of the kind, it would I think, be a mistake for us to under-estimate the 
risk of his taking some such action. What line are the Allies to take it as an immediate 
result of Treaty with Turkey, the Moslems of the Middle East combine on religious 
grounds to drive out the infidel invader?122  
These fears were then materialized in December 1919 and January 1920. During the Arab 
raid on British troops in Dayr al-Zor (today in Syria) in December 11, 1919, and the follow-
ing Turkish campaign against French troops in Cilicia in January 20, 1920, there were many 
contacts between Turkish and Arab insurgents. Not without reason, the British documents 
indicate that these two attacks were connected.123 «Lloyd George’s proposal to partition Tur-
key», a Turkish military intelligence note from February 1920 concluded, «will result in the 
revolt of the Muslim world and in the future the danger of a union of Turks with Bolsheviks 
and Arabs.»124 The opportunity structures were visible to friends and foes alike. Shakib 
Arslan, assuming that Enver was already in Russia in December 1919, said that it would be 
the best for the Muslim world to work with Soviet Russia after Ottoman catastrophe.125  
Arnold Wilson was more close to the truth, when he assumed that the alleged treaty was 
«accurate in substance, even though formal treaty may not exist».126 It was no secret that 
Mustafa Kemal and Faysal were trying to establish an official and lasting cooperation between 
the Arab and Turkish nationalists.127 Faysal was known for his interest and admiration for 
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the Kemalist movement in Ottoman Turkey.128 In early 1920, a secret Arab delegation was 
sent to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. An emissary from the General Syrian Congress, Said Haidar, 
a founding member of the Young Arab Society (al-Fatat), belonged to this secret delegation. 
In an interview Said Haidar told years later that in Constantinople they met with represent-
atives of Mustafa Kemal who was by-then already in Anatolia. They agreed on a four-point 
agreement on fighting the colonial occupation. The fourth and last point of the agreement 
said:  
(4) In the event of the successful outcome of their efforts against the West, the Arabs and 
the Turks will live side by side in two independent states but their relations will be nearly 
on the same line as the relations of Austria and Hungary in the pre-War Austro-Hungar-
ian Empire. This relationship will be governed by a Treaty to last for fifty years.129  
In the Turkish military archives, there is five-point manuscript of a different but similar 
Turkish-Arab agreement, implying that at least such negotiations took place.130 However, 
these negotiations were aborted by Faysal in June 1920.131 Faysal would soon regret his with-
drawal, when he was defeated by the French in the Battle of Maysalun, July 24, 1920.132  
In this period of Turkish-Arab rapprochement with rumors of alleged treaties and indications 
of secret connections, the CUP leaders were, of course, not missing in the bunch—both in 
conspiracy theories and in real-life conspiracies. In May 1919, intelligence reports came in 
about Young Turk and Arab nationalists meetings, where an Islamic Revolt was prepared 
with the support of Germany and Russian Bolsheviks.133 According to British Intelligence, 
«a very important meeting» was held around November 15, 1919, in Montreux, then another 
one in December in St. Moritz, between Talat Pasha representing the CUP and Turkish 
nationalists, the Ottoman-Egyptian Fuad Salim and an emissary of Faysal on behalf of the 
Arab nationalists.134 Other sources corroborate the existence of some kind of meetings in 
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Switzerland. Talat was indeed in Switzerland from October 23 until November 19, 1919.135 
It seems to be the talk of the town by then that Talat was in Switzerland, as Tribune de Genève 
reported that Talat arrived in Switzerland with a fake passport and was trying to establish the 
new Young Turk headquarter in Zurich.136 Talat was back in Switzerland as late as December 
24 and stayed there until mid-January 1920.137 In addition, German archival sources as well 
document a meeting of Young Turk leaders in St. Moritz in January 1920.138 During these 
meetings, the British Intelligence reports that a preliminary alliance was formed by the exiled 
CUP leaders, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and Arab nationalists representing Faysal. According to 
British Intelligence it was Emir Shakib Arslan, trusted by both the Young Turks and Faysal, 
who was chosen to go to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviets.139 Shakib Arslan was indeed 
contacted by emissaries of Faysal who desired to travel to Ottoman Turkey and meet with 
Mustafa Kemal and Rauf (Orbay). The Syrians were in great need for arms and ammunition. 
The emissary told Arslan that they were even ready to look for support from Soviet Russia. 
Arslan who did not even knew where Enver was in December 1919, asked how to proceed.140 
The British archival sources document that Arslan declared in a letter to Maxim Litvinov, 
the leading Soviet diplomat in Europe, that «all [Arab] hatred against the Turk had been 
dispelled and all that was now wanted was mutual trust and combination in support of the 
common cause.»141  
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Aziz Ali al-Misri visited Talat Pasha in Berlin in December 1919. Aziz Ali was of an Egyptian 
of Circassian origin and belonged to the CUP’s circle of military officers in the Balkans. He 
had served with Enver and Mustafa Kemal in Tripoli. In Tripoli Aziz Ali got in a dispute 
with Enver. Although Enver threatened him with death penalty, Aziz Ali was allowed to leave 
for exile thanks to Cemal Pasha’s intervention.142 Exiled to Egypt, Aziz Ali became one of the 
leaders of the Arab nationalist movement as the founder of the secret society al-Ahd (the 
Covenant). During World War I, Aziz Ali served as one of the military leaders of the Arab 
Revolt.143 As he told to Talat, Aziz Ali al-Misri believed due to malgovernance of the Entente, 
it was now possible for the Arabs in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to form a «federal government» 
with the Turks.144 Talat believed that they could profit from men like al-Misri and even 
attached a message from Aziz Ali even to his letter to Mustafa Kemal.145  
«Connections and agreements are said to be existing down to Arabia», as Hans Humann 
heard from Enver Pasha. He continued: «Likewise Mesopotamia is said to have joined the 
movement.»146 The British Intelligence knew already better: Enver Pasha throughout De-
cember 1919, was actively engaged in making supreme efforts to bring about an alliance 
between the C.U.P. Nationalists, Pan-Arabs, and Pan-Islamists […].147 In the letters, En-
ver’s involvement in Arab affairs is rather missing, while Talat was more proactive and vocal. 
«The Arabs have been totally disillusioned after the armistice», Talat told Mustafa Kemal. 
«Someone from the entourage of Amir Faysal said in a conversation with someone from us 
in Switzerland», as Talat updated Mustafa Kemal about his activities abroad, «the Arab Youth 
would forget about the past and would rather favor to unite with the Turks like old Germany 
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or Austria-Hungary and cooperate to hinder the occupation by the Allies.» Talat believed 
that «[i]t might be a great advantage, if the Arabs in the course of the negotiations for the 
peace conditions show that they wish to unite with the Turks and propagate legitimately this 
cause, so that the power of the Caliphate continues and survives in that area.»148 One policy 
option which Talat proposed to Mustafa Kemal was: «To create an organization, which 
would make a Turkish-Arab union possible by capitalizing the current desperation of the 
Arabs, and which would generally create a trend within the Islamic world for our benefit.»149 
Mustafa Kemal in his answer to Talat acknowledged connections, but was rather distrustful: 
For a long time, relations have been established with Syrians and Iraqis and joint actions 
are set against the English and French.  
Decisions have been taken with legitimate Arab delegates that came to us in order to 
proceed as a united operation under more serious principles. The formula that we pro-
posed to the Arabs from the beginning on is this:  
To unite in form of a confederation, once each nation has established independence. 
Arabs delightfully accepted this principle.  
Even Emir Faysal’s trustees have approached us to unite under this principle. The 
thought and the possibility that Faysal might be following a secret policy on behalf of the 
French makes us proceed cautiously. Nonetheless, the actions taken regarding a cooper-
ation with the Arabs started with the settlement of the other fractions.150 
Mustafa Kemal supported the idea of Arab nationalist movements, but was rather distrustful 
towards monarchical ambitions of Faysal.151 Although the British Intelligence overestimated 
the existing connections, there were indeed on-going relations between Arab and Turkish 
nationalists. But again, misinformation was ever-present. A British report told that Palestin-
ian activist Sheikh Abdel Qader al-Muzaffar went to Anatolia in mid-March 1920 and met 
also with Enver Pasha in order to establish an alliance with the Turks.152 In an intelligence 
report in April 1920, Enver was identified as the force behind Turkish-Arab rapprochement 
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under Bolshevik support.153 The fugitive CUP leaders were once again in the midst of trans-
national relations, although their movement was still certainly limited. 
*** 
With rise of the Anatolian resistance movement, a new kind of political actor emerged in 
Ottoman Turkey, which was soon labeled by the Entente as the Kemalists, i.e. followers of 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, or sometimes simply as «Nationalists» in upper case. The true nature 
of this movement caused a general confusion in the perceptions of its contemporaries. What 
was the difference—if any—between the Kemalists and Unionists? Were they the one and 
the same? Or, were they rivals? If they were different movements, what was the relationship 
between them? If these two parties were collaborating, who was subordinated to whom? If 
they were rivals, on what terms were they in conflict? These are complex questions, and there 
is still not one answer.  
This political ambiguity posed a major challenge for distant observers trying to make sense 
of the nature of political affairs in Ottoman Turkey. «I beg to express the opinion that the 
whole movement originates with Enver Pasha», Captain Perring stationed at Samsun re-
ported to British Headquarters in Constantinople, and continued by arguing that Enver’s 
«presence in the Caucasus there can be very little doubt of, and his appearance at the head of 
the present organization is openly talked of.»154 His superior officer, Admiral Richard Webb 
had doubts, however. «I do not agree with his opinion» that «the movement [is] originating 
with Enver», he said, because «other reports rather go to show that Mustafa Kemal has no 
dealings with him whatever.»155 This confusion was not singular and continued to reoccur in 
political observations from the time. Mostly based on the information they received from the 
Sublime Porte and other anti-CUP circles, many reports claimed that «MUSTAFA KEMAL 
is in constant communication with ENVER.»156 Also French Intelligence officers were having 
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trouble in understanding relation between Enver and Mustafa Kemal by making misin-
formed analogies between them. If both men were associated with the CUP, and because 
Enver was a notorious Germanophile and more recently rumored to be a Bolshevik, then, as 
it was accordingly assumed by French Intelligence, Mustafa Kemal was similarly working for 
the CUP with the support of Germans and Bolsheviks.157  
In October 1919, the Constantinople newspaper started to spread the news that Enver Pasha, 
who was allegedly commanding the Nationalist Forces in the Caucasus will soon assume the 
leadership of the Anatolian Nationalist Forces.158 The commanders of the Nationalist Forces 
(Kuva-yı Milliye) were complaining about the propaganda that associated them with the Un-
ionists. Colonel (Galatalı) Şevket, reported from Constantinople: «The issue, which the op-
positionals here most strongly advocate is, convincing everybody that the nationalist move-
ment is a Unionist movement and that Talat and Enver will soon come into power.» Şevket 
urged to find ways to replace the directors of press and telegraph agencies with politically 
reliable individuals.159 Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied personally to Colonel Şevket and made 
clear: «In any given occasion, we did not restrain to deny that we have anything to do with 
Unionism [İttihatçılıkla].»160 Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself publicly distanced himself from 
the CUP and its leaders like Enver. In an interview to the United States Radio Press, he 
stated: «It is untrue that we are working with Enver Pasha. We believe his policies injured 
Turkey. We do not know his whereabouts. It is rumoured that he is with the Russian Bol-
shevists.»161 
Kazım Karabekir Pasha reported that the news of Enver entering Anatolia is «anything but a 
lie» (katiyen yalandır). He even doubted that Enver was in the Caucasus. Karabekir believed 
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that there was «propaganda about the national movement being a mandate of the Union-
ists».162 Kazım Karabekir reported that there were rumors that some groups belonging to the 
Nationalist Forces had crossed the Caucasus border and were involved in fights with Arme-
nians and that Mustafa Kemal was in contact with Enver in Azerbaijan. These news «were 
not true at all» Karabekir complained. «I don’t even believe that Enver is in Azerbaijan», he 
wrote, because «[t]he French representative in Trabzon told the local commander that he was 
in Turkestan»! All these false rumors were «nothing but fuss» (yaygaradan başka bir şey olma-
dığının) to damage the nationalist movement.163 According to intelligence mostly based on 
hearsay statements in so-called «Nationalist circles», in February 1920 Enver was still believed 
to be in Azerbaijan and exercising influence on the nationalist movement.164 The association 
and subordination of Mustafa Kemal to Enver and the CUP was a conscious instrument by 
the Constantinople regime and anti-CUP politicians to delegitimize the nationalist resistance 
movement. 
Nonetheless, in retrospect, one can identify a certain Unionist Factor—to use the title of Erik 
J. Zürcher’s seminal book—that the CUP took «the first steps to organize a national re-
sistance movement […] by establishing an underground network».165 Even more, the CUP’s 
«spirit»—if not always physical and personnel presence—was unmistakably observable within 
the resources, repertoire, and mindset of the Kemalist movement. There were also some con-
temporary voices within the British officialdom that delivered similar explanations of the 
relationship between the Kemalists and Unionists:  
But Mustapha Kemal had set himself up against the Central Government, having inher-
ited the adherents, the organisation, and, I feared, also the spirit of the Committee [of Union 
and Progress, my emphasis], and it looked as if he hoped to establish himself somewhere 
in the interior where he was intangible, and whence, he could direct all the proceedings 
of the regularly constituted Government, who would dance to his tune.166 
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Also Admiral Richard Webb, who doubted that Mustafa Kemal was subordinated to or as-
sociated with Enver, saw behind the Anatolian movement a certain CUP-like motivations: 
Whether the organizers of the national movement can properly be called Committee men 
or not is a question of labels. They may differ from the Committee to some extent in 
personality. Indeed, they are just now at pains to advertise their past differences with, 
and present horror of, people like Enver and Talaat. They may differ in minor points of 
sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their fundamental character is, how-
ever, the same. They want Turkey for Turks. They want no foreign interference or for-
eign protection. Ottoman Christians are their cattle and they want to do with their own 
that they will. They want to fight Europe, and, above all, England, with the weapons of 
pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. They aspire to sign, not the death warrant of the 
Empire, but a lease of new life. 167 
At the end, to answer the initial question, I shall argue that by their nature Kemalists and 
Unionists were the same but different; they were simultaneously allies and rivals; while being 
separate, they were actually inseparable from each other. 
To be sure, the CUP leaders in Berlin had only limited correspondence with the resistance 
movement in 1919 and 1920. Although the CUP’s underground branches in Constantinople 
and in Anatolia has been actively following the blueprints for post-armistice resistance, they 
were more or less autonomous cells working without a hierarchical organization structure. 
The fugitive CUP leaders in Berlin were not at the top of a direct chain of command that 
controlled the CUP networks on ground. Due to the restrictions of communication between 
Germany and Ottoman Turkey, a remote control of the movement was practically impossi-
ble. The information they received from their fellow Committee men, such as Kara Vasıf 
from the Karakol (Sentinel) Society in Constantinople, did not give them a realistic picture 
of the situation, either. For instance, Enver proudly announced:  
I received a letter from Kara Vasıf in İstanbul. He reports that they [the Unionists] con-
trol ninety-five percent of the state of affairs. But all their hopes are connected to pan-
Islamism and Turanianism movements. They need airplanes and so forth. They want me 
to command the Turkistan and Caucasus operations personally. They report that they 
have Syria and Iraq under their control. The news are not bad.168 
This was mere wishful-thinking, if not an outright lie. Despite the limits of communication, 
it is undeniable that from late 1919 on both the expatriate CUP leaders and their Karakol 
networks in Ottoman Turkey were set on the same track leading towards Soviet Russia. In 
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autumn 1919, Baha Sait (Bey),169 one of the founding members of the Karakol, went to the 
Caucasus to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. On behalf of the National Forces, as he claimed 
to represent, Baha Sait signed a treaty with the Bolsheviks on January 11, 1920.170 The later 
Soviet Ambassador Upmal-Angorski would even compare the Karakol with many praises to 
the Italian Carbonieri.171 The bravado and the lack of controllability of the Karakol was, how-
ever, considered as a breach of authority by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Kazım Karabekir Pa-
sha. Despite their own efforts to come in contact with the Bolsheviks, Baha Sait’s treaty was 
not ratified by the leadership in Anatolia, which led Mustafa Kemal’s break with the Karakol 
networks. Baha Sait, Dr. Fuat Sabit (Ağacık), and other «Leftist Unionists»—as they are 
called by later historians—founded the (crypto-Unionist) Turkish Communist Party (Türk 
Komünist Fırkası) in April 1920 in Baku.172 In Trabzon, one of the CUP strongholds in 
Anatolia, French Intelligence reported that the crowds were shouting Long live Lenin, Ta-
laat, and Enver in May 1920.173 Disconnection and deliberate deterrence was causing disin-
formation.  
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The relative disconnectedness of CUP networks between Berlin and Anatolia, however, did 
not hinder the fugitive CUP leaders to claim that they were directing the national resistance 
from abroad. Most of the knowledge they had about the situation in Ottoman Turkey was, 
however, based on common news coverage in European newspapers. The fugitive leaders in 
Berlin could only occasionally receive some letters from Constantinople and Anatolia. Recent 
arrivals from Constantinople delivered private letters to the CUP leaders and brought Otto-
man newspapers with them. Not unlike other Western observers, the CUP leaders learned 
the rise of Mustafa Kemal, or the «Blond Pasha» in the vernacular language of their letters, 
from Western newspapers.  
The knowledge Mustafa Kemal Pasha and other leaders of the National Forces had about the 
fugitive CUP leaders was also based on rumors and news originating from the international 
and Constantinople press with respective misconceptions. An article in the Alemdar by Reşad 
Halis, the former Ambassador in Berne and one of the signatories of the Sèvres Treaty, 
claimed that CUP leaders were controlling the state of affairs in Ottoman Turkey with the 
support of their German friends.174 In an article in the Açık Söz, it was reported, by referring 
to Débat and The Times, that the Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs established a «Mid-
dle East Committee» (Şark-ı Vusta Heyeti) for the «redemption of the Muslim World», which 
was represented by Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. The newspaper suspected that the Germans 
were behind the organization with Talat Pasha pulling the strings from a Berlin committee.175 
The Turkish military intelligence was receiving more and more conflicting news about the 
alleged movements of Young Turks from late 1919 to the summer of 1920. The military 
officials noted and translated, for instance a Times article that announced on November 11, 
1919, that a Turkish-Afghan-Bolshevik alliance was signed.176  
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Among all these rumors, one was particularly notorious, suggesting that Enver Pasha was 
returning to Anatolia with a Soviet-sponsored Muslim army, the so-called Green Army (Yeşil 
Ordu)—as green being the symbolic color of Islam. Italian administration in Antalya were 
spreading rumors in January 1920, as Turkish military intelligence reported, that flyers were 
dropped from an airplane on Constantinople that proclaimed that Enver was returning to 
Ottoman Turkey with «seven army corps» under his command.177 Official responses cor-
rected that «the mentioned issue is not true.» It was believed to be a deception by Italian 
officials «in order to understand our anticipations» (hassasiyetimizi anlamak için), and urged 
to react «cautiously and discreetly» to such news. This kind of news and rumors continued 
to catch the attention of officials in Anatolia. In May 1920, newspapers in Batum, which 
were regularly used by Turkish military intelligence, announced that Enver was appointed 
by the Soviet Government as the Chief of Staff in Moscow and that Mustafa Kemal Pasha 
had reached an agreement with the Bolsheviks.178 A news in The Times reported from Con-
stantinople in May 1920 that: «In the Caucasus, Enver Pasha’s so-called Green Army is in 
reality composed of units of the Bolshevik red Army, and is quite ready to advance with him 
into Asia Minor, or wherever he may lead it; but more […] out of mercenary motives than 
from political consideration.»179 The official newspaper of the Kemalist movement, Ha-
kimiyet-i Milliye, reported often on the activities of the Green Army of Russian Muslims, 
fighting its way through Caucasus to Baghdad and through Turkestan to India, mostly quot-
ing English or French newspapers.180  
The idea that a Green Army was coming to Anatolia’s rescue was initially a combination of 
paranoid Entente rumors, Unionist and Bolshevik propaganda, confusions with the Peasants’ 
Green Movement in Russia,181 and the collective memories of the Ottoman campaign of the 
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Islamic Army of the Caucasus in 1918 with its green flag.182 Once these Green Army rumors 
were captured in the prose of official intelligence reports, they became perceived as a reality 
of their own.183 Unintendedly, it was the Eastern Command of Kazım Karabekir Pasha that 
gave the Green Army legends currency and credibility by transmitting them to various com-
mand outposts in Anatolia.184 This discursive power of the Green Army was so strong in the 
spring of 1920 that the Ankara regime utilized it and started to build its own Green Army. 
When Kazım Karabekir sent a unit of irregular cavalry to suppress the Anzavur uprising, he 
gave the unit «a quite powerful name» (pekala kuvvetli bir isim), namely the Green Army. As 
Karabekir explained, the reputation of the Caucasian Green Army was already well-known 
and «the effect [of the color green] on our nation was tremendous», thus it helped to «ag-
grandize it in reputation» (manen büyütmek).185 Finally, in early summer 1920, the Kemalists 
decided to fully capitalize the Green Army and found officially the Green Army Society (Yeşil 
Ordu Cemiyeti).186 The discursive power of rumors was once again defining and provoking 
behaviors and affecting the intersubjectivity. Ironically, both the Green Army and its parlia-
mentary faction People’s Group (Halk Zümresi) would eventually become Unionist strong-
holds in Ankara.187   
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The idea to get in touch with Mustafa Kemal became urgent after their negotiations with 
Karl Radek, where they bluffed about working together with Mustafa Kemal and supporting 
him from abroad. The first attempt to get in touch was made in December 1919 by Talat 
Pasha, probably because he had a better relation with him compared to Enver. Asım Süreyya 
[İloğlu], a young student in Europe, was chosen as the courier.188 After a long journey via 
Switzerland, Italy and Greece, Asım Bey delivered the letter two months later to Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha in Ankara.189 In the letter Talat explained the future he envisioned: 
The Turkey, which will be restrained by the Peace, will not be able to set boundaries to 
Europe’s plans. Therefore, it is necessary to search for this strength abroad and build 
auxiliary forces. I think this can be found in two great domains and by building a strong 
organization. One of this force lies in the vast Turkic world, the other in the Islamic 
world.190  
Talat saw these struggles abroad rather suited for Enver, because 
I consider Enver as an important asset, who can work in the Islamic World, not only 
because of his influence and fame there, but also because of his determination and firm-
ness. Besides, under the current situation his return to the homeland is impossible.191  
The CUP leaders made an important division of labor in two categories, the struggle inside 
(dahilde) and the struggle outside (hariçte) Ottoman Turkey. Talat proposed that the relation 
between the organization must be kept secret because of the stigma of the CUP leaders as 
war criminals: 
There should be no open relation to those assets abroad [hariçte]. It is required to estab-
lish a Sublime Court for the prosecution of those responsible of war. This is completely 
a different matter. On the one hand, this direction must be pursued. On the other hand, 
there can be occasionally a connection to me only through the medium of men sent to 
me. […] 
All this organization can be subordinated now or later to the person of Mustafa Kemal 
or a bureau he appoints. Since I will provide the liaison center of the organization abroad 
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[harici], you can be assured of a serious and neat execution and obedience befitting a 
soldier.192  
Contrary to their claims that Mustafa Kemal was following their orders, they were voluntarily 
subordinating their struggle to Mustafa Kemal. In doing so, Talat hoped to guarantee that 
he was the liaison person for the organization abroad, while Mustafa Kemal led the move-
ment in Ottoman Turkey and Enver the operations in the Caucasus and Turkestan.  
In his answer to Talat, Mustafa Kemal gave a detailed report on the progress made by the 
Anatolian and Rumelian Societies of Defense of Rights in the last year. This not only was to 
undermine the sovereignty of his movement, but also a signal of confidence to Talat. Regard-
ing the question of the struggle beyond «Turkish and Kurdish national borders», Mustafa 
Kemal reported on the relations to Arabs in Syria and Iraq, as described above, and came to 
the topic of Caucasus. Mustafa Kemal noted that he had assigned Enver’s uncle Halil Pasha 
to Azerbaijan and Enver’s brother Nuri Pasha to Northern Caucasus, where they both gained 
experience from the end of World War I.193 «For now, communication and connection to 
both of them continues», Mustafa Kemal explained to Talat and continued: «Halil Pasha is 
leading an Azerbaijani force in Zangezur [today Syunik in Armenia] and combating the Ar-
menians, while Nuri Pasha is commanding the Northern Caucasus forces. We gradually pro-
vide them with officers.» The assignment given to them was to establish Azerbaijani and 
Circassian independence in the Caucasus with good relations to Georgia. Due to false rumors 
circling in the press, Mustafa Kemal still believed that Enver was in Turkestan. Mustafa Ke-
mal ordered Halil Pasha to establish communication with Enver in Turkestan. «Both in the 
Caucasus and in Turkestan», as Mustafa Kemal ordered to Halil and Nuri, «the operations 
and activities that will be materialized are to be directed towards the interests of Turkey.»194 
 
192 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), December 22, 1919, in Yalçın and 
Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 206–7.  
193 Halil Pasha met with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Sivas in September 1919. Halil Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den 
Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütülmare Kahramanı Halil Paşa’nın Anıları, ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum 
Saati Yayınları, 2007), 227–28. See also: Richard G. Hovannisian, “Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis 
of the Soviet-Turkish Entente,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 4, no. 2 (1973): 140. 
194 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), February 29, 1920, in Yalçın and 
Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 212. As evidence for the close colaboration between 
Mustafa Kemal and Halil see: Halil Pasha, report (Nakchivan) to the 15th Army Corps, March 22, 1920, 
ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 867, gömlek no. 39; Halil Pasha, report on the state of affairs in Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Armenia, August 3, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 614, gömlek no. 22; Kazım Karabekir, 
summary of Halil Pasha’s report on Armenian movements in Zangezur to the General Staff, August 17, 1920, 
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Perhaps these orders given to Halil or Nuri were somehow transmitted to Enver in Berlin. 
Even before Mustafa Kemal’s cited letter to Talat was written, Hans Humann wrote, «[En-
ver] received a letter recently from Mustafa Kemal.» «He seems to be very happy», as Humann 
observed, «about how things turned out.»195 Perhaps Enver was lying or there are other letters 
that are lost today. Nonetheless, in their initial correspondence there was a mutual under-
standing between the fugitive Unionists and the Kemalists in Anatolia in early 1920. Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha explained his vision to Talat Pasha as follows: 
As you can understand from the formula I used in the alliance with the Arabs and the 
instructions I gave to our friends in the Caucasus, what I have in mind is that we should 
provoke the various Muslim masses against those enemies of Turkey for them to obtain 
independence. By this means, their autonomous employment can lighten the burden of 
the pressure put on Turkey and can produce maximum advantage for its material and 
moral strength. And then in the future we can unite with those Muslim masses that safe-
guarded their independence in a confederation. So far, the work that was invested man-
ifests a result that seems to be gratifying.196 
Meanwhile, the British had good intelligence on Mustafa Kemal’s approach to Bolshevism. 
«Mustapha-Kemal’s entourage state», as British Headquarters in Constantinople reported to 
War Office, «that they want to join Bolshevists in the event of Turks receiving hard peace 
terms, Bolshevism being preferred to loss of independence.»197 Indeed, Mustafa Kemal Pasha 
wrote to Talat Pasha:  
Therefore, instead of the inauspicious risk of our homeland getting disintegrated and 
seeing our nation under the English yoke, it is considered to find the means for redemp-
tion in effectively implementing Bolshevik principles. In that case, despite the difficulties 
regarding its execution, based on the strength we possess today, it might be required to 
engage with that issue as well.198 
«Your efforts in Europe since one year are a matter of gratitude», Mustafa Kemal congratu-
lated Talat and said: «The continuation of these efforts in the same way will give more ben-
eficial results».199 Nonetheless, Mustafa Kemal also made clear that he was the sole decision-
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Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 213.  
197 British General Headquarters, letter (Constantinople) to War Office (London), February 18, 1920, in 
Şimşir, British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol.1, 377–78.  
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maker and even though Talat was allowed to manage the networks abroad, he was subordi-
nated to his command. Mustafa Kemal Pasha finished his letter with the following arrange-
ment: «For now, I see it as required that you correspond only with me and only through the 
medium of Asım Bey. Because if you correspond through other means and with other per-
sons, it leaks out… As a matter of fact, it did…».200 Talat did not even informed Enver about 
these letters, where Talat made himself the center of communication with Ankara.201 The 
correspondence between Mustafa Kemal and Talat remained, however, not a secret within 
the leadership of the nationalist movement. A letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Ankara protested: «In what occasion and according to which commission’s decision, a courier 
was sent to Enver and Talat Pashas.»202  
Although the Kemalist movement was somehow associated with the CUP, being labeled as 
Unionists was considered a terrible stigma. «By this, we would be labeled as Unionists», Mus-
tafa Kemal Pasha explained to Talat, «as our all initiative in the homeland has been seen as 
such. Thus, we would give our enemies a weapon and chance to diminish our strength.»203 
Retrospective knowledge of consequent events that opened the chasm between the Kemalists 
and Unionists blurs the understanding of these two letters. Talat’s correspondence with Mus-
tafa Kemal was a matter of mutual misunderstanding, as the former CUP publicist Hüseyin 
Cahit (Yalçın) believed after publishing the letters in 1945.204 On the other hand, Kemalist 
historiography is rather inclined to read a clear rejection of the CUP and its policies in Mus-
tafa Kemal’s answer to Talat’s alleged bid for dual-leadership.205 Nonetheless, archival docu-
ments show that Talat (and Enver) continued to send secret couriers to Anatolia, as one of 
them Artillery Lieutenant Salim Bey, who had brought letters from Talat and Enver from 
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Germany was taken into custody by the officials in Antalya only to be permitted to travel to 
Ankara.206 
To be sure, Mustafa Kemal’s horizon of expectations was less clear in early 1920. There is a 
turn in Mustafa Kemal’s policies sometime in 1921 and he would later rhetorically frame it 
as if he had always thought and acted by secularist and republican means, the so-called «na-
tional secret» (milli sır).207 Thus, he was still exploring and exploiting all potential options 
and strategies inside and outside Turkey and his letter is a special manifestation that repub-
licanism, secularism, and nationalist isolationism were not yet foundations of his policies. 
Yet, Talat Pasha was perhaps also inclined to read into the letter an official approval of col-
laboration between Unionists abroad with Kemalists at home. At his prosecution in 1926, 
Dr. Nazım told the authorities that Talat was working in Berlin «in the name of Muslim 
revolutions against the enemies of our homeland». Talat’s activities abroad were sanctioned 
in «a letter from Ankara», as Dr. Nazım explained, but under the premise «not to intervene 
into Anatolian affairs».208 To courier who came from Constantinople, Talat said: You all 
need to get organized! You should work inside [the homeland] and we from abroad and stir 
up the Muslim world. Soon the English Empire will fall into pieces!209
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6. Destination Rapallo? 
Young Turks, Soviet Russia, and Post-Versailles Germany  
While the peace settlement in the Middle East yet proved to be a far cry, the peace in Europe 
was settled on June 27, 1919.1 The peace treaty was, however, a bitter pill to swallow for 
Germany. After deadlocked negotiations, the German Government signed under protest the 
somewhat Carthaginian peace with the Entente at the Versailles Palace.2 Alone the place of 
the peace treaty was a symbolic blow. In 1871, after the devastating Prussian victory over 
France the German Kaiserreich was proclaimed provocatively at the very same Versailles Pal-
ace. Now 38 years later at the same palace, the German cataclysm was manifested. The Treaty 
of Versailles not only established the German guilt as fact for in the outbreak of World War 
I, but it also demanded serious territorial concessions, excessive reparations, and radical cur-
tailment of war-related industry and commerce.3 The Entente powers knew perfectly well 
that Germany was barely capable to pay the reparations and survive the burden of peace 
conditions.4 Cultivated by imperialism, militarism, and nationalism, brutalized by trench 
warfare, ashamed by defeat, enraged by surrender, impoverished by war-economy, and radi-
calized by revolution, most of the Germans regarded the harsh and dishonorable conditions 
of Treaty of Versailles as the climax of resentments and bitterness. Especially the ancien ré-
gime, i.e. the Prussian-styled imperialists and militarists from Kiel to Munich, were joined by 
the völkisch-oriented masses of nationalists, irredentists, and revanchists in their collective 
resentment. German socialists and Spartacists similarly despised the Versailles conditions 
typical for Western imperialism and capitalism. Except for few liberals and pacifists, the Ger-
man political spectrum from right to left agreed that Versailles had to be overcome somehow. 
 
1 For the peace settlement in the Middle East see: Paul C Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the 
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2 Hans-Christof Kraus, Versailles und die Folgen: Aussenpolitik zwischen Revisionismus und Verständigung 1919–
1933 (Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 2013), 27. 
3 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2002), 
157–203; Kraus, Versailles und die Folgen, 27–31. 
4 Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918–1932 (Oxford: 
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Karl Radek’s political salon was established in the midst of these days, where Enver Pasha 
and Talat Pasha were one of his first visitors. Such guests of Radek’s Moabit salon uniquely 
illustrates the political complexity of post-Versailles Germany. Radek’s contact man to the 
outside world, Karl Moor, had far reaching contacts to Berlin’s diverse elites, ranging from 
socialists to militarists, and used his contacts to bring these different minds to Radek.5 Moor 
was so influential in Berlin that at the German Ministry of Defense, «where all doors opened 
before him», he used to arrange forged passports for those people who desired to meet Radek 
off-the-record.6 Now as the German Revolution was brutally suppressed and the peace 
proved to be worse than ever expected, Soviet Russia came to be seen as an opportunity space 
to subvert the Versailles settlement. One of the visitors of Radek in the Moabit prison, M. 
Philips Price, remembers 
I had the impression that Radek had succeeded in finding some elements in influential 
circles in Prussia, either of the Left or Right, who were prepared to use him against the 
Entente Powers who were at that time in process of forcing the Versailles Treaty on Ger-
many. That probably accounted for the astounding scene that I witnessed in Moabit 
prison. Later I heard that Radek had become friendly with certain officers of the 
Reichswehr, and quite possibly this was the beginning of the move that led later to 
Reichswehr units getting training in Russia to escape from Entente control.7 
There is a certain overestimation of the reach of Radek’s hand from his political salon into 
the state of affairs between Berlin and Moscow. Especially Radek’s relation (via Moor’s ar-
rangements) to German militarists is subjected to a great deal of speculations.8 Nonetheless, 
Radek’s political salon was something extraordinary, a crystal ball to envision possible futures 
for post-Versailles Germany, where many dared a look inside.  
One of the most important visitors of Radek’s political salon happened to be Walther Rathe-
nau, President of the General Electricity Company (Allgemeine-Electricitäts-Gesellschaft, 
AEG) and later German Foreign Minister. Like many others frustrated by the economic bur-
den of peace settlement, Rathenau was interested in building economic and trade relations 
 
5 Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, “Deutschland zwischen Ost und West: Karl Moor und die deutsch-russischen 
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8 Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), 85–
86; Schurer, “Karl Moor,” 150. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
198 
between post-Versailles Germany and Soviet Russia.9 Although commercial and industrial 
cooperation was welcome, for Radek it was clear that «Soviet Russia is not looking for a 
German alliance against the Entente».10 The cooperation had to take place on grounds of 
material needs and rational choices.11 One successful result of these talks between Radek and 
Rathenau and others was the Treaty of Rapallo signed in 1922.12 The Rapallo Treaty was an 
official rapprochement between Weimar Germany under now Foreign Minister Rathenau 
and Soviet Russia that enabled commercial and industrial as well as secret military coopera-
tion that would avoid the restrictions of Versailles.13  
Ever since, the Rapallo Treaty was seen as an «unholy alliance».14 A so-called «Rapallo myth» 
emerged in imaginations that demonized every Russian-German interaction as a «secret and 
potentially dangerous collaboration».15 For this reason, the Rapallo Treaty had also a strong 
effect in reading the precedent interactions following a certain teleology leading to the «sui-
cidal alliance».16 This Rapallo teleology implies that there was a collective intention and 
agency in post-Versailles Germany in early 1919 that pushed for cooperation with Soviet 
Russia. The process was, however, rather unlinear and complex.  
The teleology of Rapallo might also be a problem in reading too much into Enver Pasha’s 
role in the Soviet-German rapprochement. It is common to find Enver as the deus ex machina 
in explaining the initial and continued approach of German military, especially his old men-
tor and the new Chief of Staff General Hans von Seeckt, towards a cooperation with Soviet 
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Russia. Ayşe-Azade Rorlich once summarized the state of research as: «If Enver is to be cred-
ited with any role in this, it is certainly within the context of those indirect levels of commu-
nications which paved the way for Russo-German rapprochement.»17 This notion is mostly 
based on Radek himself, who wrote in his Moabit memoir that 
Enver, having fled after the rout through Soviet Russia illegally to Germany, was the first 
to bring home to the German militarists that Soviet Russia was a new and growing world 
force with which they would have to count, if they in fact meant to struggle against the 
Entente.18  
Before the Rapallo teleology, conspiracy theories were already paved the way for a German-
Soviet-Turkish alliance. For instance, the British representative in the Caucasus had received 
intelligence from Denikin that German agents were in contact with Kemalists and Bolshe-
viks.19  
After several meetings and reaching a preliminary agreement with Karl Radek, the CUP lead-
ers decided to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss their plans with the Soviet leadership. 
While Enver, who had only recently returned from South Russia, was eager to go back and 
visit Moscow, Talat Pasha decided to send Bahaeddin Şakir Bey as his representative.20 This 
chapter will show how the attempts of the CUP leaders to travel from Berlin to Moscow is 
uniquely illustrative in understanding the ways in which the military-industrial complex in 
post-Versailles Germany approached Soviet Russia in late 1919 and early 1920.  
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I use the concept of military-industrial complex in the context of post-Versailles Germany to 
describe a dynamic and informal network of elites of different established institutions within 
state and society, such as military and industry etc., which are collectively profiteering and 
racketeering from fortunes of war and accordingly manipulate the state of affairs.21 As the 
«complex» in the name suggests, the concept implies neither uniform agency nor tangible 
and static structures. Both Enver Pasha through his friendship to the family Humann/Sarre 
and to General Hans von Seeckt, and Karl Radek, through the social contacts of Karl Moor, 
had access to important nodes in the military-industrial complex of post-Versailles Germany.  
Enver Pasha’s role in connecting the German military-industrial complex with Soviet Russia 
was certainly an extraordinary (and extraterritorial) factor that was not easily replaceable in 
that specific context. To be sure, besides Enver there were also plenty of other and even far 
more influential agents and structures that were involved in the making of this rapproche-
ment that resulted in the Rapallo Treaty of 1922, Rathenau being the most obvious example. 
Enver was perhaps only the most flamboyant and conspicuous agent in the lot. Yet, as I will 
argue, the unanticipated contingencies of and the disorder caused by his transnational polit-
ical activism between Berlin and Moscow—rather than his intended actions—had a more 
lasting impact on the intensification of Soviet-German affairs. Somewhat like Inspector 
Jacques Clouseau of the Pink Panther series, if I may caricature, who successfully cracked 
difficult criminal cases by the unintended fortunes of chaos and ineptness, Enver’s story from 
Berlin to Moscow was similarly chaotic and had many unanticipated consequences in the 
complex process that led to Rapallo Treaty of 1922.    
*** 
«Emin is still here», Naval Lieutenant Commander Hans Humann wrote on August 14, 
1919, in a letter to General Otto von Lossow, implying that Enver Pasha had arrived in 
Berlin. 22 Humann was also in contact with other fugitive CUP leaders such as Talat Pasha, 
Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, and Dr. Nazım, and he admits to have found their political ideas more 
 
21 The term has been popularized after President Dwight D. Eisenhower used it in his farewell address on 
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instance: Charles Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
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and more inspiring.23 «More importantly», Humann continued, «in 5 days he [Enver] flies 
to Moscow with Radek who is released from prison».24 Two days later, on August 16, 1919, 
Radek was, in fact, released from the Moabit prison, but was held under military detention 
until his extradition in due course.25 Radek’s extradition (and also Enver’s travel plans) were, 
however, accursed by geopolitics: East Prussia and the Baltic region were under Allied occu-
pation, thus an arrest by the Entente was feared; the Polish-Soviet War made travelling by 
land dangerous, especially for the Polish Bolshevik leader Radek with whom Enver desired 
to travel with; the peace conditions forbade any kind of commercial or other kind of inter-
action between Germany and Soviet Russia. Therefore, the land route via Poland and the 
Baltics was literally unsurpassable—at least for notorious men like Radek and Enver. The 
CUP leaders, who were already impatient about their come-back to high-politics by a devious 
route via Moscow, were eager to push for alternative routes, and soon came up with the idea 
to fly to Moscow.26  
While the plans were in the making for the flight to Moscow, Hans Humann wrote a letter 
to General Hans von Seeckt on September 19, 1919, that elaborated on the possibility of a 
land route via the Baltic region.27 In this letter Humann mentions a common friend from 
Constantinople—again—by the name of Said Emin Efendi, a so-called «confident and em-
issary of Enver Pasha», who desires to travel incognito to Moscow for political reasons. This 
Said Emin Efendi was, of course, no one else but Enver himself. Peculiarly, Enver was already 
aware about the wrong rumors about his whereabouts and hoped to utilize these rumors as 
deception. Humann explained:  
He insists with great tenacity on absolute incognito. The reason is not his desire for per-
sonal security, but the deliberation that this serves the military-political interests of Tur-
key to deceive the English about his current place. The English believe him to be in 
 
23 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), 24. August 24, 1919, BayH StA, 
Abt. IV, HS 3158.  
24 Hans Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), August 14, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 
3158.  
25 Karl Radek, radiogram (Berlin) to People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Moscow), August 16, 1919, 
PA-AA, R 2043. See also: Schüddekopf, “Karl Radek in Berlin,” 97 
26 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, ed. Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Doğu 
Kütüphanesi, 2005), 77.  
27 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), September 19, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87. The 
content and context of this letter is confused and misunderstood in Arthur L. Smith, “The German General 
Staff and Russia, 1919–1926,” Soviet Studies 8, no. 2 (1956): 127; Vourkoutiotis, Making Common Cause.  
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Anatolia and directed their measures accordingly. This condition seems to be advanta-
geous and desirable to him.28 
Humann’s plan was to send Enver Pasha through East Prussia and Baltic states to Russia. 
Humann was hoping for the assistance of German military officials, still stationed in the 
region, who had established contact with the Red Army front. Therefore, he needed a rec-
ommendation letter or maybe even support from General von Seeckt who had been the chief 
of staff of the Northern Battalions with connections to the troops in the Baltics. On October 
1, 1919, Seeckt was appointed as the chief of the newly founded Truppenamt (Troop Office), 
a camouflage organization for the German General Staff, which was formally forbidden by 
the Treaty of Versailles. Humann suggested that Enver should contact General Rüdiger von 
der Goltz who was at that time stationed in Joniškis in Northern Lithuania. There, Enver 
would pass the border with Goltz’s assistance or on his own. General von der Goltz was in 
the Baltic region since early 1919, first as military governor and later as commander of the 
Freikorps, where he has been aggressively fighting the Latvian Soviet Government.29  
In the same letter, Humann declared that he was appointed as the new Director of Naval 
Intelligence Bureau, which was soon to be united with the Army Intelligence to a joint Mil-
itary Intelligence Bureau. Intelligence work, as Humann writes, was his «old expertise» (altes 
Arbeitsgebiet).30 Humann’s role in the initial German-Soviet rapprochement in 1919, espe-
cially in his position as the Chief of the Naval Intelligence Bureau in arranging Enver Pasha’s 
flight to Moscow, needs attention.   
Regarding Enver Pasha’s travel arrangements, General von Seeckt was only remotely associ-
ated in the beginning. As Humann requested General von Seeckt’s help, Seeckt was, accord-
ing to his diary, on leave and not in Berlin, but a reference letter for General von der Goltz 
was still somehow prepared.31 There is no source that indicates that Enver had any contact 
 
28 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), September 19, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87, 51.  
29 John Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 17; 
Jobst Knigge, Kontinuität deutscher Kriegsziele im Baltikum: Deutsche Baltikum-Politik 1918/19 und das 
Kontinuitätsproblem (Hamburg: Kovač, 2003), 59–63. 
30 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), September 19, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87, 52.  
31 According to his diary entries von Seeckt was on leave in Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Nauhem from 
September 01 until October 10, 1919, BA-MA, N247/18, 18–19. For General von Seeckt’s letter to General 
von der Goltz see: Adolf von Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau (Potsdam: Rütten & Loening Verlag, 1942), 30; 
Hans Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann: Erinnerungen des Bagdadfliegers Hans Hesse, ed. Christa Siegling and 
Holger Steinle (München: Hampp, 2002), 122. 
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to General von Seeckt until late October 1919. This contradicts the common wisdom that 
General von Seeckt was the man pulling the strings in Enver’s flight to Moscow in 1919.32 
Nevertheless, it is for certain that General von Seeckt became later on the most important 
German ally of Enver in Berlin. That being said, Seeckt was indeed one of the first militarists 
to consider the idea of a Russian-German cooperation—even before Enver’s arrival to Berlin. 
General von Seeckt’s man in the Baltics, Fritz Tschunke stated years later to Seeckt’s biog-
rapher that 
the establishment of connections between Germany and Russia was conducted through 
military hands, [emphasis in original] and through the foresight and initiative of General 
v. Seeckt. What his motives were at that time is difficult to discover today.  
As we led the Grenzschutz forward through the Baltic in 1919, I was commissioned to 
show the French, American, and English military commissions there that we were doing 
the business of the Entente and were raising a wall between us and Russia … General v. 
Seeckt’s oft expressed opinion at that time was that those of us who favored Ostpolitik 
would be able—naturally refusing to accept the Bolshevistic theories—to establish a 
broad basis for an area of contact with the Soviet Union 33 
There are also rumors that General von Seeckt had a secret meeting with Karl Radek, though 
this remains as a speculation.34 Anyhow, General von Seeckt belonged to military milieu that 
increasingly favored a Soviet-German rapprochement as a strategic maneuver against the Ver-
sailles settlement.  
Buying an airplane was apparently not difficult, because the German military aviation was in 
the process of getting disarmed.35 Indeed, according to the peace conditions, it was forbidden 
for the German military staff to be in the possession of an air force. The problem with finding 
an airplane was that it had to be done so secretly, that not even the German Government was 
 
32 For long scholars believed that it was General von Seeckt and Cavalry Captain Köstring made these first 
flight arrangements in 1919, but they played a role only after 1920. This confusion ist reproduced in the 
literature: Rorlich, “Fellow Travellers,” 290; Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923 
(London: Macmillan, 1961), 247; Francis Ludwig Carsten, Reichswehr und Politik: 1918–1933 (Köln: Verlag 
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964), 80; Masayuki Yamauchi, ed., The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver 
Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and 
Africa, 1991), 16; Vourkoutiotis, Making Common Cause, 40–44. 
33 Major Fritz Tschunke, letter to General Friedrich von Rabenau, quoted in Smith, “The German General 
Staff and Russia, 1919–1926,” 126–27. 
34 From Seeckt’s staff, Ernst Köstring (later German Military Attaché in Moscow), belonged to Radek’s 
visitors. In an interview he gave to Svenska Dagbladet, September 5, 1949, Köstring claimed that Seeckt and 
Radek had a secret meeting, but later denied it. General von Seeckt and Radek met for the first time in 
February 10, 1922. Carr, “Radek’s ‘Poltical Salon’ in Berlin 1919,” 413, note 4; Schüddekopf, “Karl Radek in 
Berlin,” 90; Hans Meier-Welcker, Seeckt (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1967), 322–23 
35 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 55–56.  
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allowed to find out, since the pressure of the Allies was too much on Germany.36 Also the 
Auswärtiges Amt, as Humann discovered at a meeting with Otto Göppert, had objections on 
sending Radek together with Enver to Moscow, because the German Government might get 
compromised. While Humann got cold-shouldered by the Auswärtiges Amt, he thought 
highly of the Social Democrat Minister of Defense Gustav Noske, implying that he was will-
ing to cooperate. «Working with Noske is very pleasant», Humann explained, because, he 
«comprehends extremely easy, and has not only very much courage, but also the responsibil-
ity and determination typical for the rage de perfection of German craftsmanship.»37 The 
German official assistance to Enver’s travel plans to Moscow was limited and never a fully 
official governmental policy, but it reached up to the upper floors of Berlin. Yet, it remained 
as a confidential and semi-official conspiracy of a group of high-ranking state officials. 
Hans Humann himself met Radek in mid-October. Humann talked with Radek about pos-
sibilities to work out an oil deal between Soviet Russia and Turkey in order to weaken Britain, 
implying that Soviet Russia was increasingly an eligible partner for the German ancien ré-
gime.38 Hans Humann’s plans to transport Enver to Moscow was also a family matter. Behind 
the scenes, his sister Maria Sarre took the matters into her hand. Later she would admit that 
«she had been virtually the initiator of the enterprise.»39 As for the pilot, Lieutenant Hans 
Hesse,40 famous as the «Baghdad aviator» (Bagdadflieger) for flying from Berlin to Baghdad, 
was friends with the Sarres since his childhood.41 One day Maria Sarre asked him, if he would 
accept to fly Enver Pasha to Moscow. After speaking with Enver at the Sanatorium Sinn, 
Hesse travelled to his hometown Dessau to the Junkers-Werke, one of Germany’s leading 
 
36 Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, 56.  
37 Hans Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), August 14, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 
3158.  
38 Hans Humann, letter to Chief of the Admirality Adolf von Trotha, October 10, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, 
HS 3158. 
39 Major Seitz, letter (Berlin) to Professor Hugo Junkers (Dessau), December 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 
0612.T01.  
40 Hans Hesse first published his memoir of the Moscow flight in the local newspaper Deister- und 
Weserzeitung in 1934. Adolf von Hatzfeld inoffically novelized the recollections of Lieutenant Hans Hesse in 
Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau. Later Hesse’s daughter published his full memoir in Hesse, Kusch Adam der 
Vogelmann. Since both editions are rare to find, I cited both of them, but quoted only Hesse’s own wording.  
41 Major Seitz, letter (Berlin) to Professor Hugo Junkers (Dessau), December 13, 1919, ADM, JW, 
0612.T01.  
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aviation companies, where he had good connections to its founder and director.42 Hesse told 
to Professor Hugo Junkers: 
Herr Professor, I want to talk about a curious matter with you. It is an adventurous 
matter, but it delivers an opportunity for Junkers-Werke to create a potential market that 
is due to the Entente settlement otherwise not given. I can fly with an airplane as the first 
German to approach Lenin and Trotsky. It is a political flight that one must keep silence 
about. German and Russian authorities are informed about the flight and approve it. I 
want to buy sufficient war machines, but I want to make another offer to you. Provide 
me with your newest all-metal airplane so that I can make propaganda for your company 
and sell your airplanes abroad.43 
For Professor Junkers, this idea was not new. He himself has been hatching similar plans so 
that he accepted Hesse’s offer. Since the German aviation industry was hit hard by the Ver-
sailles conditions, the Junkers-Werke had interest in deploying the production to newly open-
ing market in Soviet Russia. Already in May 1919, Professor Junkers was approached by Herr 
Maier-Haller from the Ural-Caucasian Society (Ural-Kaukasische Gesellschaft) from St. Pe-
tersburg. As an expert on Russian affairs Maier-Haller informed Professor Junkers about pro-
duction possibilities in Russia. «In order to thwart the English plans», Prof. Junkers asked, 
«what political possibilities will result regarding the airplane issue—manufacturing and com-
mercial routes.»44 Maier-Haller had also information that the German Government intends 
to start commercial relations with Russia, but they were over-cautious not to attract any at-
tention from the Entente. Nonetheless, the times of free-trade relations was over, for good 
or bad, thus, the future of German-Russian commercial relations had to be of a different 
nature, he said.45 Hesse’s offer was dropped in the midst of these on-going debates within the 
Junkers-Werke. On September 30, the management of the Junkers-Werke send a telegram to 
Professor Junkers: 
Lieutenant Hesse has opportunity to fly with six-person airplane on a political mission 
to Russia, backed by German and Soviet Governments. [He] proposes urgently to utilize 
this with Maier-Haller as our representative. Departure is due at the very latest on Satur-
day. [We] recommend unanimously to execute the flight. Cable decision urgently.46 
 
42 Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 12–15; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 117. 
43 Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 117–18.  
44 Minutes of Prof. Junkers’ meeting (Dessau) with Maier-Haller from St. Petersburg, May 24, 1919, ADM, 
JW, 0618.T01.M01., nobib.  
45 Maier-Haller, letter (Ulm) to Herr Früh, July 18, 1919, ADM, JW, 0618.T01. 
46 Semalüreusamie [short for Seitz, Mader, Lürken, Reuter, Sachsenberg und Mierzynski], telegram (Deassau) 
to Professor Hugo Junkers (Bayrischzell), September 30, 1919, ADM, JW, 0612.T01. See also the pioneering 
study by Angelika Hofmann, “Der Moskau-Flug der F 13 ‘Annelise’,” accessed March 29, 2016, 
http://www.junkers.de/kalenderblatt/8-oktober-1919-der-moskauflug-der-f-13-annelise.  
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Hans Hesse had meanwhile also contacted Meier-Haller. Hesse could not reveal the real in-
tention of the mission to Russia, as Meier-Haller reported to Dessau, but he still made a good 
impression. «Regarding the matter of Lieut. Hesse», Meier-Haller concluded, «I can only say 
that after all what this gentleman was kind enough to bring forth to me, the case is rooted to 
the soil [die Sache Grund und Boden hat].» Maier-Haller assured that, if Hesse achieves to 
reach Moscow, he would be able to sell the patent of the airplane there and even that of other 
machines.47 Maier-Haller’s recommendation for Hesse’s mission convinced the Junkers man-
agers.48  
For the pilot Hesse, the Junkers-Werke applied for a certification register (Zulassungsbeschei-
nigung) at the Reich Department for Aviation (Reichsluftamt).49 Hans Humann arranged this 
official flight permit, prepared by an official called Lieutenant Walter Lange from the Zen-
tralstelle Grenzschutz Ost of the German Ministry of Defense. This was a flight permit for five 
passengers, including the pilot Lieutenant Hans Hesse, granting them protection and assis-
tance in airports on their route. As Humann had already communicated with General von 
Seeckt in his letter, the flight permission explained that Lieutenant Hesse was instructed to 
deliver an important letter to General von der Goltz.50 All parties were required to commit 
to outmost secrecy until shortly before the flight.51 But still enough people were initiated. 
Apparently, Walter Rathenau arranged additional papers with the help of Karl Radek.52 On 
October 4, the Minister of Defense Gustave Noske called Minister of Foreign Affairs Her-
mann Müller on telephone. Noske informed Müller «that there is an opportunity to transport 
Karl Radek to Russia, because a Turkish delegation would proceed by airplane to Russia.» 
 
47 Maier-Haller, letter (Berlin) to Major Seitz, October 1, 1919, ADM, JW, 0618.T01.  
48 Major Seitz, minutes (Dessau) of telephone conversation with Maier-Haller, October 1, 1919, ADM, JW, 
0618.T01.  
49 Junkers-Werke Head Office, letter to Junkers-Flugzeugwerk A.G. (Dessau), October 2, 1919, ADM, JW, 
0612.T01.  
50 Walter Lange, certification for Lieutenant Hesse as pilot of "Anneliesen" for 5 passangers, October 2, 1919, 
BA-MA, N247/87. 
51 A document slightly mistranslated in Murat Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 183, 
says: «N[ote]. No one is informed about this matter. Neither [Viktor] Kopp, v. Henri, Döberitz [air field?] 
and so forth. / I ask Herr Colonel not to speak with these mentioned person, before the execution of this 
enterprise is seriously approached.» («Anm. [Anmerkung] / Über die Angelegenheit ist niemand unterrichtet. 
Weder [Viktor] Kopp, v. Henri [?], Döberitz [air field] dergl. / Ich bitte Herrn Oberst bevor nicht ernstlich 
an die Ausführung dieses Unternehmens herangegangen wird mit keiner der genannten Personen darüber zu 
sprechen.») 
52 Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 118. 
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Noske added that «Radek had heard about this and is supposedly content with this transport 
route.» But Müller insisted that until the release of the German hostages this was not an 
option. He said that once the hostages were set free, Radek could fly with any airplane he 
wants.53 The Auswärtiges Amt under Minister Müller stayed out of the operation.54 Thus, 
Radek’s return was delayed—but not Enver’s.  
The Junkers bureau in Berlin contacted the Lieutenant Lange and the latter underlined «that 
the flight of Lieutenant Hesse is not a military affair, but very well supported and promoted 
by the military.» Lieutenant Lange explained that the whole operation was based on the con-
sent of Admiralty and Ministry of Defense and Lieutenant-Commander of the Navy Hans 
Humann as the Director of Naval Intelligence was named by Lange as the responsible per-
son.55  
The airplane chosen by the Junkers-Werke for the flight to Moscow was one of the prototypes 
of the model F 13 named Annelise (or sometimes also wrongly called Anneliese in the docu-
ments).56 The F 13 was a very special model. It was in metallic silver and looked with its six-
passenger cabin like a «new and interesting construction» in contemporary eyes.57 It was the 
first all-metal commercial aircraft in the world. The model’s first flight took place on June 
25, 1919, with the other prototype Herta.58 The chosen prototype, Annelise, had recently 
broken the world record in high-altitude flight on September 13, 1919.59  
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According to logbook of the airplane, it was originally arranged that the pilot Hesse would 
fly on October 2 from Dessau to Berlin, but then it was delayed for October 8.60 On October 
10, 1919, the crew met for the first time at the Johannisthal Air Field near Berlin. The occu-
pants of the flight were Hans Hesse as the pilot, Paul Maruszyk as the mechanic, and Abra-
ham Frankl as the engineer and interpreter from Junkers-Werke. The special guests arrived by 
car were Enver Pasha and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir.61 Among the crew, only Hesse knew their 
true identity and purpose of their trip, but the others probably figured it out sooner or later. 
Although Hesse had previously given strict directives, the two Turkish passengers had too 
many baggage. They each had two travel bags and additionally each a handbag. Because they 
were planning to stay in Moscow in the coming winter, they had their winter clothes in the 
bags.62 Meanwhile, the Junkers-Werke officials took several photos of the airplane for promo-
tion purposes.63 Interestingly enough, Junkers-Werke also insisted that Hesse’s special passen-
gers were to pay the fuel costs and other expenses.64 
On October 10, the plane took-off from Berlin flying across the Polish Corridor. It was 
probably the first time that Enver and Bahaeddin were flying. Bahaeddin Şakir was the only 
one on board too corpulent to fasten seat belts, which would soon become a matter of con-
cern.65 On route they had two very dangerous forced landings due to technical malfunctions, 
one near Czersk and the other in Dirschau (Tczew) in Poland.66 The propeller was broken 
in the first crash and had to be changed as well as a new cooler was requested to be sent to 
Königsberg. They had already lost three days, as they had barely left the German borders 
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behind. The Annalise landed in Königsberg (Kaliningrad) on October 13.67 From Königs-
berg, pilot Hesse wrote letter to Professor Junkers, in which he explained the malfunctions 
and the troubles they survived. Hesse came to the bitter conclusion that the Annelise «is not 
yet fit for long-distant flights.»68  
Nevertheless, the Annelise left Königsberg on October 15 and landed on the same day in 
Shavli (Šiauliai) in Lithuania. There, they were welcomed by anti-Bolshevik troops and had 
their meals there.69 Shavli was occupied by the anti-Bolshevik West Russian Volunteer Army 
in September-October 1919, which was infiltrated by and acting on behalf of the German 
Freikorps.70 The recommendation letter they received had fulfilled its purpose after General 
von der Goltz gave orders to his troops on the telephone to help the flight crew.71 Later on 
that afternoon the Annelise left Shavli to the fiercely fought over city of Dvinsk (formerly 
known as Dünaburg, today Daugavpils in Latvia), where they believed that the Red Army 
troops had control over the area around the airfield according to the German General Staff 
maps they were given in Berlin.72 Radek and the Soviet emissaries in Berlin had informed 
Moscow about the arrival of the special delegation from Berlin. The airplane only needed to 
cross the Russian front line.73 
During the flight, however, the Annelise had to make an emergency landing on a field due to 
an approaching snow storm and the looming nightfall.74 From the local peasants astonished 
by the airplane, they discovered that they landed near Abeli (Obeliai, today in Latvia), which 
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was under Lithuanian authority, around 200 km northwest of Kovno (Kaunas in Lithuania) 
and only 100 km away from the next Russian front line at Dvinsk.75  
The Baltic States were in a brutal process of state-formation. The Lithuanians were known 
to be against the Russians and Bolsheviks were persecuted in the region. After their landing, 
they met a German veterinarian by the name of Dr. Nye, living in a nearby house. Dr. Nye 
invited the visitors from Germany to his home to stay overnight. Town guards were assigned 
to watch the airplane over the night so that they were already the talk of the town. At that 
night they were woken up by an officer from the Lithuanian counterintelligence police 
(Kontr-Razvedka).76 The officer accused them of being Bolshevik agents. Hesse’s prognosis 
that a snow storm was approaching had proven to be a misjudgment, making the reason for 
their landing in Abeli even more suspicious. Nonetheless, the police officers remained 
friendly and were rather interested in Enver’s camera. Anyhow, the Lithuanian secret police 
had any reason to be suspicious because, as the officer in charge boldly explained to the de-
tained flight crew, they had intelligence on a Bolshevik airplane that was scheduled to land 
three days earlier. This was an alarmingly accurate intelligence, if one considers the three-day 
delay which they had due to the technical issues on route. Apparently, there was an infor-
mation leak in the Berlin networks.77  
The next day, October 16, 1919, the pilot and the mechanic with Lithuanian officers on 
board flew to Kaunas where the plane was confiscated. Kaunas was under Allied control since 
the summer 1919.78 Shortly after they landed a British commission inspected the airplane. 
Their reaction after seeing the brand new airplane was: «Damned Germans», as pilot Hesse 
proudly remembers.79 Enver Pasha, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, and Abraham Frankl were brought 
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to Kaunas by train, where they were interrogated after their arrival.80 The crew was, however, 
not imprisoned, but held under detention in a Hotel in Kaunas.81 
*** 
The official cover story of Enver Pasha and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was that they were delegates 
of the Ottoman Red Crescent (Hilal-i Ahmer) on a mission to conduct inspections on the 
situation and extradition of former Ottoman POWs in Russia.82 The Auswärtiges Amt had 
diplomatic passports of the Ottoman Red Crescent under its possession, with which Talat 
Pasha had already traveled to different European destinations.83 Talat wrote in a letter to 
Cavid Bey: 
My first thought has been to issue a passport for you here and to send it to you. I already 
heard that your brother was here. Yesterday I asked Ziya [former Deputy of Smyrna] for 
his photographs. Today we met in Berlin. I got the photographs. But he told me that 
your brother doesn’t look like you. Now I will get the passport and send it to you through 
Vitalis Efendi. I will write your first name and your father’s name in the passport. The 
passport will be diplomatic and I will get it issued for a Red Crescent delegate. If it arrives 
before the démarche it can be of use. Otherwise you can use it for travels.84  
Meanwhile, the question of Ottoman POWs was a topic in Russian-German dialogue on the 
exchange of prisoners, thus not an unreasonable cover.85 Nevertheless, the Red Crescent was 
also a matter of suspicion as well, because it was often compromised as a cover for Teşkilat-ı 
Mahsusa and other clandestine CUP activities.86 An incident in the spring of 1919, when two 
Turkish lady delegates of the Red Crescent arrived in Switzerland with a check for Banque 
Fédérale over four million francs for the support of the Turkish communities (embassy offi-
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cials, students, and patients) in Europe, it had caused many rumors in intelligence and dip-
lomatic reports. These funds were supposed to be meant for «adherents of C.U.P.», as one 
British report declared, to be «used for propaganda and conspiracies against England in con-
nection with Egyptian Nationalist Committee.»87 Nevertheless, the Red Crescent mission by 
the two ladies proved to be no cover for clandestine activities.88  
According to the report of the British official in Kaunas, one of the two passengers of the 
Annelise was a Chemist by the name of Dr. Dimitri Nicola, alias Sayd Emin, an Ottoman 
Christian of Bulgarian descent, and the other one was called Dr. Muhammed Ali Sami, a 
doctor of medicine from Constantinople.89 There is some confusion in the literature on who 
is who. Azade-Ayşe Rorlich argues that Muhammed Ali Sami was Enver Pasha, since Ali was 
indeed Enver’s code name in his secret correspondence.90 Murat Bardakçı, who edited the 
private papers of Enver, published a permission letter to visit Karl Radek for a Dr. Mehmed 
Ali (living in Lehrterstraße 3), issued on November 21, 1919, implying that Enver was un-
dercover as Dr. Mehmed Ali.91 Nevertheless, I choose to follow other sources that imply that 
it was the other way around.  
There is reason to believe that Enver was the Bulgarian chemist and Bahaeddin Şakir there-
fore Dr. Mehmed. To begin with, Hans Hesse tells that «Enver Pasha traveled as Bulgarian 
pharmacist Ali from Sofia and claimed to be the assistant of Professor Mehmed, alias Bah 
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Eddin».92 During the interrogation, Muhammed Ali claimed to be the head of the mission 
but the interrogating Lithuanians reported that they suspected that Said Emin was the actual 
leader. Said Emin was talking about curious things, such as that the German Government 
asked him to «make arrangements for the return of some German hostages in exchange for 
Radek.»93 This observation corresponds with pilot Hesse’s recollection that it was rather Ba-
haeddin Şakir, who was the charismatic one among them and acting as the leader, while 
Enver, hiding behind dark glasses, acted as being «only a poor pharmacist» (Ich bin nur armer 
Apotheker).94 Shakib Arslan also heard that Bahaeddin Şakir was undercover as a doctor of 
medicine and Enver his assistant on their way to Moscow.95 It is convincing that Bahaeddin 
Şakir would act as a physician and not Enver, since Bahaeddin himself was a Professor of 
Forensic Medicine at the University of Constantinople. Halil Pasha heard from Enver that 
he was undercover as a pharmacist from Monastir (Bitola).96 Enver’s wife Naciye Sultan tells 
that Enver spoke very good Bulgarian and acted as a Bulgarian during his captivity with 
Bahaeddin Şakir.97 Last but not least, in the above quoted letters of Humann to Seeckt and 
Lossow, Humann was using the same code name, Said Emin or Emin, for Enver.98 Despite 
suspicion that these Red Crescent men were somehow suspicious, the British mission had no 
idea, who had just fell into their hands. 
Meanwhile, the news that the flight crew was arrested in Lithuania had reached Berlin. But 
Lieutenant Lange from the Ministry of Defense believed that the arrest of the flight crew 
would not catch the attention of the Entente officials in Kaunas, «because the enterprise is 
posed as a purely private matter.»99 However, he was mistaken. The British officials quickly 
 
92 Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 19; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 118.  
93 R. B. Ward, Report of Landing of a German Aeroplane (Kovno) to Chief of the British Military Mission 
General Malcolm (Berlin), October 22, 1919, in, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 45.  
94 Hatzfeld, Flug nach Moskau, 18, 63; Hesse, Kusch Adam der Vogelmann, 118, 133.  
95 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 77.  
96 Halil Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütülmare Kahramanı Halil Paşa’nın Anıları, 
ed. Taylan Sorgun (İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2007), 263. 
97 Naciye Sultan, Acı Zamanlar: Enver Paşa'nin Eşi Naciye Sultan'nın Hatıraları, ed. Orhan G. Aşiroğlu 
(İstanbul: Burak Yayınevi, 1992), 58. Bahaeddin Şakir was the son of Bulgarian refugees, but I don’t know 
whether he could speak Bulgarian. Erik J. Zürcher, “Renewal and Silence: Post-War Unionist and Kemalist 
Rhetoric on the Armenian Genocide,” in The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman 
Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey, 195–207 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 197.  
98 Hans Humann, letter (Neubabelsberg) to Seeckt (Berlin), September 19, 1919, BA-MA, N247/87; Hans 
Humann, letter (Berlin) to Otto von Lossow (Munich), August 14, 1919, BayH StA, Abt. IV, HS 3158. 
99 Minutes (Dessau) on telephone conversation with Lieutenant Lange (Berlin), October 24, 1919, ADM, 
JW, 0612.T01. «da das Unternehmen als rein private Angelegenheit dargestellt ist.» 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
214 
understood the true purpose of the mission. According to the report of the Assistant British 
Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces, the Allied forces found two suspicious letters on 
Fränkl, the interpreter of the crew. These suspicious letters were from a Junkers employee, by 
the name of Depp (or elsewhere Doep), addressed to his father in St. Petersburg. The report 
concluded that   
These letters go to prove that Hesse had two tasks to perform in flying the aeroplane to 
Moscow, viz., (1) to start trade relations with the Soviet Government; and (2) to take a 
person from Germany, who, he states, is like his father to come to Moscow, so that he 
could arrange for Krasin, a well-known Bolshevik Commissar, to make the acquaintance 
of either Hesse or this important personage, but here the text is not quite clear.100 
The Junkers managers, who commissioned the flight, did not know anything about these 
letters Fränkel was carrying and Hesse claims to have hidden or destroyed other evidence.101 
Hesse insisted that they were on a commercial mission to Russia and their papers were suffi-
cient. The report wrote: 
According to Hesse, he was commissioned by his firm to fly this aeroplane to Moscow in 
order to make inquiries as to the possibility of selling the Patent and establishing a factory 
in Russia for the manufacture of aeroplanes of this kind. I enclose a copy of a document 
he had with him in connexion with this. Apart from this and the fact that he is the 
aeroplane pilot, he says he knows nothing about the other passengers whom he was told 
to take in ordinary course of his duties.102 
The suspicion that there was a person of importance on board in a mission to meet high-
ranking Bolsheviks in Moscow troubled the Entente officials, while Lithuanians were rather 
concerned that they were Bolshevik agents against Lithuania. The Lithuanian counterintelli-
gence suspected even Fränkel to be Karl Radek for a while.103 A further evidence that was 
highly suspicious was the German General Staff issued map of the region, which the Allied 
forces found hidden in the airplane. This map was updated on September 1, 1919, and 
 
100 R. B. Ward, Report of Landing of a German Aeroplane (Kovno) to Chief of the British Military Mission 
General Malcolm (Berlin), October 22, 1919, in, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 45.  
101 Major Seitz, report (Berlin) on recent developments regarding the airplane Annelise, December 30, 1919, 
ADM, JW, 0612.T01. 
102 R. B. Ward, Report of Landing of a German Aeroplane (Kovno) to Chief of the British Military Mission 
General Malcolm (Berlin), October 22, 1919, in, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, II, 45.  
103 Abraham Fränkel, report on the Berlin-Moscow flight with the Annelise (Dessau), March 28, 1920, ADM, 
JW, 0612.T01. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
215 
showed the strategic positions of anti-Soviet and Soviet troops in the Baltics.104 In the pres-
ence of all these conspiratorial evidence, the British authorities in Lithuania advocated to 
hold the flight crew under detention until further instructions from London or Paris fol-
lowed.105 In sum, the British officials had reached a quite accurate assessment over the inci-
dent.    
(1) In view of the blockade it is not permitted for an aeroplane to proceed into Russia 
without some form of pass;  
(2) The journey was avowedly undertaken to commence trade between Germany and 
Russia, which is not permitted at present;  
(3) The map discovered in the aeroplane gives one to suppose that some form of spying 
was intended;  
(4) The passengers have insufficient and unsatisfactory papers to enable them to under-
take a peculiar journey of this kind at such time.106  
The Assistant British Commissioner sent a copy of his report to the Foreign Office and to 
the Paris Peace Conference. The mentioned telegraph was from Colonel Rovan Robinson, 
British Military Representative at Kaunas, including Ward’s above-mentioned report. The 
telegram was sent two days after the landing, on October 17 and was received at the Paris 
Conference on October 21.107 At the Paris Conference, during a meeting of the Supreme 
Council of the Head of Delegations on October 22, nearly a week after the arrestment, the 
message was read out.108  
Sir Eyre Crowe said that he wished to bring to the attention of the Council a telegram 
which had just been received, according to which a German aeroplane had made a forced 
landing in the neighbourhood of Kovno [Kaunas]. The aeroplane carried two German 
civilian pilots and three passengers, one of whom was Russian and the other two Turkish; 
this aeroplane was travelling from Berlin to Moscow and was being held until further 
orders. 109 
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However, the conference attendees did not grasp the potential gravity of this telegraph and 
soon the telegraph drowned among the other agenda items. Many British Generals forwarded 
the report among each other, all advocating the confiscation of the plane and the imprison-
ment of its crew and holding the German Government to account. But before the Allied 
decision-makers in London and Paris could take any measures, it was already too late.110  
*** 
The story of how Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir escaped the Lithuanian captivity is a spectacular 
episode, resembling adventure movies. Yet, it still shows how far the German officials were 
ready to go in order to protect Enver Pasha from the Allies.111 For some reason, the Lithua-
nian authorities assigned a very lax surveillance to the flight crew. Their guards simply es-
corted them in the city from coffee houses to theaters.112 Once during their daily visit to the 
local tavern with the guards, Hesse could disappear briefly with the excuse of going to the 
restroom. Across the street there was the offices of German official delegation, where they 
were so far denied contact by the Lithuanian authorities. Hesse informed the German offi-
cials on duty about the situation without revealing the secrets of the mission.113 On another 
occasion, Hesse could easily manipulate the Annelise during an inspection of the airplane, 
where he was asked to accompany Lithuanian officials. After that the Lithuanians could not 
fly the airplane.114 After Hesse had informed the German mission about their captivity, they 
were finally granted permission to meet the Chief Representative of Germany, where Major 
Fritz Tschunke, a protégé of General von Seeckt, and other German officials immediately 
recognized Enver.115 Soon rumors started to spread across the city that one of the Turks was 
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a person of interest. This resulted in the measure that the Entente commission took photo-
graphs of the flight crew and sent these to Paris peace conference for further investigation.116 
It was now only a matter of time that Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir were to be identified as 
fugitive war-criminals.   
Hesse immediately started making plans for the rescue of the two Turks. He had previously 
established contact to a German pilot, Lieutenant Harry Rother, working for the Lithuanian 
military and bribed him to fly the two Turks to safety. For this they decided to highjack a 
Lithuanian airplane in a nearby airfield.117 Meanwhile Tschunke contacted General von 
Seeckt about Enver Pasha’s captivity.118 Naciye Sultan tells that the German officers sat in 
front of the window of Enver’s room and pretended to be drunk, revealing the details of the 
escape plan in their German drinking songs.119  
The date was October 28, 1919.120 Following their instructions, Enver Pasha and Dr. Ba-
haeddin Şakir walked together with their guard to the hayfields of Niemen (Neman, near the 
same named river) not far away from their hotel. 121 Arrived at the fields, Enver and Ba-
haeddin Şakir started to do a small picnic and offered their guard a bottle of cognac and 
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chocolate. Bahaeddin had put few drops of morphine from his medicine case on the choco-
late. The guard got soon drunk and dizzy.122 Meanwhile, pilot Rother hijacked the Lithua-
nian airplane and took off from the nearby airport in Alexota (Aleksotas, near Kaunas). Once 
appeared over the rooftops of Kaunas, the airplane faked an emergency landing, flying in 
circles, and landed on the hayfields of Niemen near the picnic venue.123  
Pretending to be curious what was going on, Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir raced to the air-
plane. Their intoxicated guard was weaving behind them.124 Other people were also attracted 
by the emergency landing and watching what was going on. Suddenly the pilot of the airplane 
pointed his gun at the guard and the two CUP leaders jumped on board. The engines started 
and the airplane took off. The drunk guard helplessly watched them fly away.125  
As for the rest of the crew, first the mechanic Paul Maruszyk and later pilot Hans Hesse were 
released after several weeks of imprisonment and were able to return to Germany. The inter-
preter Abraham Fränkl was, however, not as lucky. Since he was a Russian citizen, the Ger-
man officials could not do much for his release.126 After six months in a shabby Lithuanian 
prison, Abraham Fränkel wrote in his report after his arrival in Dessau: 
All in all, the escape was very well planned, but the same plan could have also included 
all of us. […] Unfortunately, this opportunity was not appreciated. I believe that the 
German Mission wanted first and foremost to bring the two Turks into safety and there-
fore disregarded everything else. On the very same day, as one might have anticipated, 
we were quite ungently conducted under escort: Lieutenant Hesse to the police head-
quarters, Maruczyk and myself to the prison.127  
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The Annelise remained in Lithuania, despite several attempts by the Junkers-Werke and the 
Auswärtiges Amt requesting its extradition. The Annelise was soon repaired and served the 
Lithuanian military until August 22, 1923, when it crashed and was wrecked.128 
The airplane that rescued Enver Pasha and Bahaeddin Şakir landed in Tilsit, near Königsberg 
(today Sovetsk, near Kaliningrad). Lieutenant Tschunke, who claims to have been on the 
airplane with Enver and Bahaeddin Şakir, writes that General von Seeckt personally came to 
welcome Enver.129 Although Enver was under Lithuanian detention for barely two weeks, 
from October 15 to November 28, in an article he wrote anonymously in 1921, Enver stated 
that he was in prison for two months in Kaunas.130 This article was meant as a response to 
another article published in the Hakimiyet-i Milliye, the official mouthpiece of the Kemalist 
Government in Ankara, which charged heavily on Enver.131 This is certainly the reason, why 
Enver lied about being imprisoned for two months in Kaunas. He probably wished to dram-
atize his own suffering and struggle in face of Kemalist accusations. 
Soon after Enver Pasha and Bahaeddin Şakir fled, the French military commission identified 
the photographs.132 The Allies had taken their photographs during the interrogations and 
sent them to London and Paris to identify them. Remarkably, the Young Turk community 
in Berlin saw these news in the newspapers and mentioned it all in their memoirs.133 They 
were fascinated by the fact of being part of a political mystery, in which they outsmarted the 
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Entente. Naciye Sultan tells that the Allies had mistaken Enver for Cemal Pasha, because 
Enver had a beard by then, just like Cemal used to have in his day.134 In fact, The Times of 
November 29, 1919, reported from Constantinople: 
In certain Turkish circles [Constantinople] the two Turkish passengers captured with 
three Germans in an aeroplane which descended at Kovno have been identified with 
Talaat and Djemal Pashas, and the German passenger with Lieutenant von Geisner, a 
friend of Talaat. A local Entente newspaper, while giving the information under reserve, 
adds that the reports is current here that Talaat and Djemal, fearing that the German 
Republic would hand them over to the Entente Powers had recently decided to escape 
and join Enver in Turkestan or Transcaucasia via Soviet Russia.135 
It was remarkable that Enver was not even considered to be in the Baltics, since it was com-
mon knowledge that he was already in Turkestan or Transcaucasia. The German military 
overheard from British radiograms reporting the same news: 
According to a message from Kaunas, Cemal Pasha and Kemal Pasha [sic] were on board 
of the airplane that was shot down near Kaunas, who fearing their extradition to the 
Entente wanted to escape to Soviet Russia with the help of the German Republic in order 
to get to Enver Pasha in Turkestan.136  
In Constantinople, meanwhile, Enver’s brother Kamil was taking care of Enver’s wife and 
children. Naciye Sultan was sick since her last childbirth in last July. Regardless the medical 
report that she should go to Europe for treatment, she was denied departure by the Allied 
administration. The reason was, again, the belief that Enver was plotting schemes against 
Britain in Turkestan: 
The real reason, why the English don’t want to let us go is the news about my brother 
[Enver] that are generally heard here. Most important one, as it is read in the newspaper 
Times, claims that he has been crowned by a five hundred men Muslim Congress in 
Tashkent. He is said to be building a vast organization. It is said that only this organiza-
tion could destroy the English.137  
Strangely enough, in January 1920, the British Foreign Office was apparently neither in-
formed about the prisoners’ identity, nor about their escape from captivity in Lithuania. A 
letter sent to the Director of Military Intelligence asked what actually came out of the inves-
tigations. The inquiry was never replied.138 While a British official from Switzerland told 
London that «[i]t is further alleged that Enver Pasha proceeded from Central Asia to Berlin 
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by aeroplane, and he was obliged to descend at Kowno where he was seen by some of British 
Military authorities but not recognized.»139 Another message commented that this infor-
mation was «incorrect, for photographs of the two Turks who were forced to descend at 
Kovno some months ago in an aeroplane which was proceeding from Berlin to Russia have 
been seen at this Dept. and were not those of any prominent persons.»140 The bureaucratic 
chaos of intelligence assessment was unable to figure out what was going on. But rumors had 
already a life of their own, as Consul James Morgan curiously asked whether the rumors were 
true which he heard in Aleppo in March 1921: 
Enver Pasha was in Tashkent, and that when flying there, dressed as a German officer, 
he came down in Roumania and was taken prisoner. He was handed over to the British 
authorities, who were unaware of his identity and released him a month or two later.141  
*** 
The episode had a bureaucratic and diplomatic aftermath in Germany as well, which again 
reveals the network that was behind this daring enterprise. August Euler, the Under Secretary 
of Department of Aviation and Motorized Transportation (Reichsamt für Luft- und 
Kraftfahrwesen) and a pioneer in German aviation, was an ambitious bureaucrat and a keen 
advocate of civil aviation. Contrary to the German militarists, Euler saw an opportunity for 
the development of the German civil aviation in the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. 
Therefore, he took his job very seriously and was not willing to tolerate legal violations by 
government offices. In February 1920, for instance, he wrote a warning letter to all German 
aviation companies—likely including Junkers. In this letter he complained about the increas-
ing illegal cross-country flights supported by German private companies.142 Euler went even 
further and wrote a very similar warning letter to the General Staff and to other state depart-
ments in March 1920. In that letter he complained about the increasing support of German 
ministries for illegal flights abroad.143 Other archival documents from Euler’s bureau show 
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that Enver’s flight was not a single case—German state departments had a general interest in 
East Europe and Russia, politically as well as commercially.  
The reason for Euler’s admonitions was the Annelise case. On January 6, 1920, Euler sent an 
inquiry letter to the Minister of Defense, Gustav Noske.144 In his inquiry, Euler asked for 
information on an illegal flight piloted by Lieutenant Hesse, where a brand-new Junkers air-
plane was confiscated by the authorities in Lithuania. Before the Minister received the letter, 
an internal inquiry at the Ministry of Defense started. First, Lieutenant Lange, who had pre-
pared the papers for the flight permit was asked to give a statement.145 In his defense, Lange 
wrote that he issued the papers according to a personal order from the Chief of the Intelli-
gence Bureau, Naval Lieutenant Commander Hans Humann. Lange also wrote that Hu-
mann was acting in accordance with General von Seeckt and called it a «highly political» 
matter. Therefore, the internal inquiry was forwarded to General von Seeckt, who, however, 
forwarded it with no further comments to Humann.146 Humann answered: 
To issue at hand I respectfully report hereinafter: 
1./ It is about the flight of two Turkish statesmen to Russia. 
2./ Herr General v. Seeckt did not arrange anything in this instance. He was, as I recall, 
in vacation by then. The statements of Lieutenant Lange regarding this must be a matter 
of confusion.  
3./ I had informed the Minister of Defense [Gustav Noske] and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs [Hermann Müller] by then about the plan. A meeting took place between the two 
mentioned ministers and myself. The Minister of Foreign Affairs gave me the assignment 
for one of the Turkish statesmen. –Considering the political and other circumstances 
utmost secrecy was required.  
4:/ To support the operation I took responsibility for the issued papers by the Zegrost 
[Central Office of Border Protection East, Zentralstelle Grenzschutz Ost] (Lieut. Lange).  
5./ I am willing to report verbally and in private to Under Secretary of the Department 
of Aviation and Motorized Transportation in this regard, but request only a reassurance 
of official secrecy, because these were not my private affairs, but rather political pro-
cesses.147 
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A handwritten manuscript of a letter signed by the Minister of Defense Noske, found in the 
German Military Archives, attests Humann’s statements. Noske admits that he was informed 
on the nature of the flight.148  
The Auswärtiges Amt was everything but amused about the diplomatic aftermath of the whole 
incident. «The Auswärtiges Amt will absolutely not undertake anything regarding the issue 
of Airplane Annelise», as Lieutenant Lange informed Junkers-Werke on the telephone, «be-
cause they were not at all informed by Captain Humann about this plan.»149 To the question 
of the British official in Berlin, Lord Kilmarnock reported that the German Foreign Minister 
said that  
it was scarcely likely in the present state of relations between Germany and Soviet Russia 
that the German Government would lend itself to such a traffic. He professed complete 
ignorance of Enver’s presence in Germany, but said he would ask his Department 
whether anything was known on the subject. He promised also to draw the attention of 
the Minister of Defence to the reports in question with a view to preventing any such 
activity by aeroplane as was suggested.150  
On the other hand, General von Seeckt had, as I argued above, played no part in Enver’s 
flight in October, but only because he was out-of-office. Nonetheless, Seeckt believed in the 
idea of reaching out to Soviet Russia to overcome Versailles restrictions. Seeckt wrote in Jan-
uary 4, 1920: «Only through a firm confederation with greater Russia will Germany have 
any chance of regaining its position as a world power.»151 Seeckt would support from there 
on Enver’s attempts to connect with Moscow. Nevertheless, claims found in Entente press 
regarding a German-Russian-Turkish plan in the East were still mere paranoid fantasies.152 
Most importantly, Noske had full knowledge and had authorized the whole operation. 
Noske’s relation with the Young Turk leaders reached far behind. He had personally con-
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tact—at least once—with Talat Pasha as early as in June 1919, where they had a meal to-
gether.153 Hans Humann was the person, at the end, who connected the nodes within gov-
ernment offices and within the military. Outside the state structures, it was his sister Maria 
Sarre, who micromanaged the initiation of this plan by assigning Hesse, who had contacts to 
Junkers. From his captivity in Kovno, Hans Hesse wrote his first letter to Germany not to 
Junkers-Werke or Lieutenant Lange, but to Maria Sarre, implying that she was a major player 
behind the scenes. Maria Sarre made no secret about her role either.154 Nevertheless, the 
Junkers-Werke also continued to follow their plans to move production to Russia and 
achieved this in 1922 with help of the German military.155  
At the end, this story of «Enver’s odyssey», as Ayşe-Azade Rorlich rightly argues, «offered 
vivid testimony to the commitment of the Germans in helping Enver as a link with Mos-
cow.»156 The argument, however, needs to be differentiated, because the commitment of the 
military-industrial complex in post-Versailles Germany was neither unitary nor resolute. It is 
in the complex, where one needs to dig in, to understand the processes that arranged the 
flight and rescue of Enver Pasha in the autumn of 1919. The diplomatic and bureaucratic 
aftermath of the confiscation of the Annelise, proved that not all German officials would 
support such enterprises, but a certain milieu in the post-Versailles Germany did. 
There was a shared milieu of the CUP leaders with the German imperialists and militarists, 
which became more obvious during the Kapp Putsch. On March 13, 1920, the Kapp Putsch 
took place in Berlin. This was one of the major reactionary outbursts that followed Versailles. 
It was a right-wing military coup d’état against the status quo of Weimar Republic after the 
November Revolution and the Versailles Treaty. A large-scale general strike was called by the 
trade unions to protest the coup, which eventually forced Wolfgang Kapp and other putschist 
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to give up.157 Some of the friends and guardians of the CUP leaders were, of course, not 
missing in the Kapp Putsch. General Rüdiger von der Goltz, who had been the spearhead of 
the Freikorps in the Baltics, was responsible for the defense of Berlin during the putsch. Gen-
eral von Seeckt, though ideologically not far away from the putschists, but not involved due 
to his already high position as the chief of Truppenamt, had, nevertheless, ordered his troops 
not to shoot the putschists. General von Seeckt was though too powerful to put away with 
and remained in power. This was not the same for Hans Humann, who was the chief of 
Naval Intelligence. Humann was an open supporter of the coup and was later removed from 
his desk.158 Yet, the military-industrial complex offered him other options soon. Humann 
was appointed by the industrial mogul Hugo Stinnes as the publisher of his newly acquired 
the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a conservative-nationalist newspaper.159  
Ernst Troelsch, a theologian and philosopher, noted that the leader of the putsch, Wolfgang 
Kapp, was asked by a French journalist right after the putsch, who would be in his cabinet. 
Kapp answered honestly that he did not think it through that far, but will come up with a 
cabinet in due course. In criticizing Kapp, Troelsch made reference to Talat Pasha who he 
saw as «the experienced master of revolutions». Talat had commented that «it is completely 
a childish prank» to start a revolution «without having a cabinet in the bag»—by that he, of 
course, did not differentiate between revolution and coup d’état.160 After the putsch, Enver 
Pasha found shelter in the same room Wolfgang Kapp had stayed at the home of Hanna von 
Wangenheim, the wife of the former ambassador to Ottoman Empire. There in Kapp’s room, 
Harry Kessler noted sarcastically in his diary after a dinner at Frau Wangenheim’s home in 
Berlin, Enver «conspired with his Bolshevists».161  
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«You remember that about the time of the Kapp outbreak», the Foreign Office wrote to Lord 
Curzon, who was currently at the San Remo Conference, «it was suggested here that repre-
sentations should be made to German Government to cease harbouring these persons», re-
ferring to the fugitive CUP leaders.162 By then Humann had already taken precautions. «Just 
in case, I arranged their accommodation as good as possible», he wrote to Lossow.163 «Reliable 
informant tells me», Lord Kilmarnock reported from Berlin, «that the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs are well aware of Enver’s activities. He characterizes Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs statement to me […] to the effect that he knew nothing of the matter as a deliberate 
lie.»164 «I am told by same source», he wrote in another telegram, «that question of activities 
of Enver and other anti-British plotters was raised in German Cabinet». After long discus-
sions, as Lord Kilmarnock reported, «Chancellor utterly denied that he had any knowledge 
of such activities», but an arrest warrant for Enver «seems not to have been accepted.»165 The 
Foreign Office asked Lord Kilmarnock to «give privately a hint to Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that rumours of the activities of Enver and other anti-British plotters have reached our 
ears».166 
At the end, it is, nonetheless, important not to overestimate the investment of the military-
industrial complex in Enver Pasha and his friends. In a private conversation Talat Pasha had 
with a British informant in December 1920, he described «his relations with the German 
Foreign Office [as] indirect and that there is dislike and suspicion on both sides.»167  
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7. Soldiers of Misfortune: 
Young Turks in Moscow 1920 
«A report reaches me that Enver Pasha is now in Berlin, having arrived here about a week ago 
[my emphasis]», as The Times announced in early March 1920, assuming Enver has already 
been in Russia long before.1 Enver’s movements continued to be a matter of public and offi-
cial interest. Enver was imagined as being constantly mobile, frequently travelling between 
Germany, Russia, Central Asia, Caucasus, and Turkey. For instance, the Foreign Office re-
ceived the news in January 1920 that «Enver Pasha was recently in Berlin, that he was in close 
negotiation with present German Government for the purpose of creating further difficulties 
for Great Britain, and that he has left again probably for Asia Minor [my emphases].»2 Swiss 
Intelligence assumed that Enver is currently in the Caucasus or Turkestan, where he had 
organized Bolshevik bands that are ready to intervene in Anatolia.3 In reality, the CUP lead-
ers were once again lagging behind their own reputation. 
Since Enver Pasha and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir’s first flight attempt to reach Moscow in October 
1919 ended with an arrestment in Lithuania which they had escaped thanks to a daring rescue 
operation, the Young Turk leaders were more or less stuck in Berlin from November 1919 
until April 1920. This was, however, not for the lack of trying. Numerous flight attempts 
were hindered due to complications and contingencies of cross-border mobility in post-war 
Eastern Europe—not to forget the technical troubles of air travel in those days. After surviv-
ing several crash landings that smashed a couple of airplanes, most Young Turk leaders gave 
up the idea of flying for good—but not Enver. After a final solo flight attempt Enver ended 
up in captivity in Latvia. While Enver was in prison in Latvia for a couple of months, he was 
considered to be missing in action for his friends and family. Only in May 1920, Cemal 
Pasha and his friends were first to successfully travel to Moscow—undercover in a convoy of 
Russian POWs. Later in mid-August 1920, Enver, who was released from his captivity, could 
finally reach the Soviet capital thanks to the help of his friends from the German General 
Staff and Bolshevik emissaries in Berlin. At the end, it took nearly a year after the initial talk 
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with Karl Radek that Enver could set a foot in Moscow. The delay, however, had high cost 
for the CUP leaders. They missed certain opportunities structures, as the state of affairs in 
Moscow and elsewhere had continued to move on without them.  
Their struggles and troubles to reach Moscow from October 1919 to August 1920 showcases 
not only their growing—but not necessarily more effective—entanglement with German 
militarist and Russian Bolshevik circles in Berlin, but also the structural complications of 
transnational mobility and contingencies of travel by air across East European regions of war 
and revolution. 
The plan that a Young Turk delegation should secretly travel from Berlin to Moscow con-
tinued to occupy German-Russian relations in Berlin. The main reason was that Karl Radek, 
who was still awaiting his extradition, could fly secretly with Enver Pasha and his friends 
avoiding the Polish land route. Therefore, the exiled CUP leaders were still in touch with 
Karl Radek in Berlin. In many ways, the Soviet mission in Berlin was cooperating with the 
CUP leaders. The Soviets purchased two airplanes for the planned flight.4 Radek was, for 
instance, personally helping them to get new papers issued.5 In late November 1919, 
Radek—still under detention—was moved to a flat of Eugen Freiherr von Reibnitz in Berlin. 
Eugen von Reibnitz was an old friend of General Ludendorff, and himself a «National-Bol-
shevist». He was also a relative of Baron Ago von Maltzan from the Auswärtiges Amt.6 Ago 
von Maltzan was the Commissioner for Eastern Affairs and had been working for Radek’s 
release for quite some time.7 Both these men were no strangers to the CUP leaders in Berlin. 
General Erich Ludendorff is rumored to have been in touch with the Young Turk leaders in 
Berlin, although there is no solid evidence.8 Ago von Maltzan, on the other hand, was closely 
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in touch with these men either personally or through intermediaries.9 Nonetheless, one can 
observe the same network of German officials around both Karl Radek and the exiled CUP 
leaders in Berlin.  
In early December, 1919, Enver Pasha’s plans to travel together with Radek to Moscow were 
getting once again more concrete.10 Before the departure they arranged some test flights to 
assure that the airplane could fly long distances.11 Meanwhile, the Chief of Police was, how-
ever, rather impatient to get Radek out of the city.12 The flight was scheduled for mid-De-
cember.13 Radek decided, however, not to fly with Enver.14 He had heard of a conspiracy of 
Polish officials against his flight. Polish secret service wanted to bribe the pilot to land in 
Poland to arrest Radek.15 Nonetheless, Enver was permitted to keep the airplane and fly to 
Moscow with it.16 Everything was set on December 21, and the crew was only waiting for 
the weather conditions to improve.17 The plan was to travel on December 31, 1919, in hope 
that the New Year’s celebrations would distract from their flight.18 But ten minutes after their 
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take-off, the airplane crashed into a nearby garden. The plane was wrecked to pieces, but no 
one was seriously hurt.19  
For the next flight, they arranged a new plane, but this time a smaller and lighter one.20 
During one of these test flights they crashed the plane again.21 At the end of January, 1920, 
Enver was once again planning his next flight.22 This time, there was a bureaucratic compli-
cation concerning Enver’s plane which, again, delayed his departure on February 8.23 On 
Monday, February 23, 1920, Enver finally took off, but the plane had again an emergency 
landing without anyone getting hurt.24 The next flight was scheduled for March 10, 1920, 
after Cemal Pasha had arrived in Berlin.25 This time the flight was canceled due to troubles 
which occurred right after the take-off.26 For two days, they tried to take off, and after an 
hour of flight they crashed and wrecked the airplane.27 Bahaeddin Şakir noted, «hopelessly 
we are now forced to stay in Berlin.».28 Their frustration was understandable. From October 
to April they had five flight attempts. Except for the first flight with the Annelise in October, 
they had not left the German borders once. They had countless emergency landings and had 
already wrecked several airplanes. 
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The continuing problems that were hindering their arrival at Moscow was increasingly be-
coming a burden to their political enterprise. When Cemal Pasha told Cavid Bey in late 
February that he decided to accompany Enver Pasha on his next flight attempt to Moscow, 
Cavid urged them to hurry, because «there was no time to lose during the current state of 
politics».29 «Our friend E. [a.k.a. Enver] is still in Berlin», Hans Humann wrote on the same 
day and complained that «[i]t is a great pity considering the situation in the Near East and 
Russian Orient that none of these matadors is there.» 30 «Enver declared to a friend about two 
months ago», Lord Kilmarnock reported to London from Berlin, «that all the mines would 
be laid by June and it would be possible to fire fuse in September.»31 Indeed, the Young 
Turk leaders were missing the action. The unrest in the Middle East had started to accumu-
late. After his arrival in Moscow, their new comrade Karl Radek was appointed as the new 
Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, which was definitely 
a promising opportunity for future collaborations with the Bolsheviks.32 Everything was fall-
ing into place, and only they were lagging behind. But once in Moscow, they believed, they 
would catch up and land on top.  
These numerous airplane purchases and flight attempts could not remain unnoticed either. 
On March 6, The Times reported that Cemal Pasha came to Berlin to fly together with Enver 
to Soviet Russia. The newspaper reported also about an earlier «unsuccessful aerial attempt», 
implying an intelligence leak from the British military mission in Berlin.33 After stating that 
there was «a frequent traffic of airplanes between Germany and Russia», Mehmed Zeki Bey, 
a critical observer of the CUP leaders in Berlin, claimed in his propaganda pamphlet that the 
Young Turks even purchased an airplane fabric in Germany and that they were planning to 
ship the military equipment they bought in Germany to Tripoli and Tunisia.34 A French 
intelligence report from May 29, 1920, made the same claim that the Young Turks bought 
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an airplane fabric in Germany and had already transported airplanes to the Caucasus and 
Turkey via Russia.35 Once again the rumors found in intelligence reports and contemporary 
publications shared—if not the same informants—the same template in imagining Young 
Turk movements. 
Meanwhile, in Constantinople there were rumors made in circular by the underground 
branches of the CUP alleging that Enver Pasha is now in India marching on Bombay. 
Given Enver’s reputation and inflation of similar allegations in the press, the Reuter’s news 
agency commented: This news is believed by many Turks.36 Swiss authorities reported 
that Enver was in Berlin, in March 1920, and that he was in contact there with the extreme 
socialist and Lenin’s friend Moor. It was assumed that the Young Turks are apparently 
making common cause with the Bolsheviki in Moscow. Enver assumed the false name of 
Enim [sic, Emin] Bey.37  
The next airplane they arranged had only one seat behind the pilot, so it was up to Enver to 
fly alone. His flight was scheduled for Monday, March 29.38 In a letter, dated April 7, Dr. 
Bahaeddin Şakir wrote: «Ali Bey [a.k.a. Enver Pasha] is gone. But so far we could not receive 
any news yet on whether he arrived at the desired place [i.e. Moscow].».39 For a long time no 
one would hear anything from Enver. While Enver was practically missing, false news about 
his whereabouts continued to muddy the waters. For instance, Talat had heard from Hans 
Humann that the British believed that Enver had arrived in Moscow.40 Turkish Intelligence 
reported that newspapers in Tiflis (Tbilisi) were writing that Enver was in Moscow.41 In early 
June, The Times reported that Enver came back to Berlin from Moscow to negotiate with the 
German military and left again for Moscow.42 Enver had not reached Moscow. 
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Most false news and rumors claimed that Enver’s specter was seen in the Caucasus or in 
Turkestan. The Tripolitanian newspaper Rakib of May 4, 1920, reported that Enver together 
with his uncle Halil and brother Nuri were leading a Bolshevik-sponsored army in the Cau-
casus. The newspaper was only with the claim: Political circles of all descriptions are much 
occupied with Enver Pasha..43 From Yemen, «a sample of rumours» arrived at London that 
«Anwar [sic] Pasha has returned from Afghanistan with a large quantity of gold, and has been 
sent a part of it to Mustafa Kemal in order to strengthen his armies».44 The British press 
claimed that Enver was in Baku with «a mixed Russo-Tatar force, approximately 50.000 
strong».45 «The fall of Baku on April 28 is a signal for us that you are there», Kamil wrote in 
wishful-thinking in a letter from Rome to his brother’s address in Berlin.46 At a meeting the 
Society of Oriental Languages in Frankfurt, Captain Philipp Rühl, who had previously served 
as a translator in the staff of Enver and now a lecturer for Turcology at the University of 
Frankfurt, gave a lecture on Enver Pasha’s career. The Frankfurter Zeitung reported on this 
lecture, where the so-called «champion of pan-Islamic ideas» Enver’s «name has been men-
tioned once again in the last time in connection with the events in Central Asia and the 
organization of the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia.» Reporting on the same 
lecture, the Mittagsblatt supposed that Enver, the so-called «hero of Islam», was in the Cau-
casus.47 In early July, Cavid Bey stated in an interview that he supposed that Enver was in 
Turkestan.48 It is once again amazing how friends and foes alike shared the same imaginary 
trajectories about Enver’s whereabouts. Anyway, Enver could only so much as to wish to be 
in Moscow, Caucasus, or Turkestan in his current situation. 
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*** 
«My informant states that Djemal is here now», Lord Kilmarnock reported from Berlin on 
April 22.49 After all the airplane accidents they suffered one after another, both Dr. Ba-
haeddin Şakir and Cemal Pasha gave up the idea of flying to Moscow. Soon Bahaeddin Şakir 
came up with the idea that they could travel to Russia with the hundreds of Russian prisoners 
of war.50 In the spring of 1920, negotiations between Soviet Russia and Germany were taking 
place in order to settle the question of POWs. Because Poland did permit the transit of Rus-
sian POWs over painfully defended Polish territory, the Russian war prisoners were to be 
transported to Stettin (Szczecin, today in Poland). Once arrived there, they were to be 
boarded on vessels and to be shipped to Reval (Tallinn, Estonia) and from there they could 
travel by train to St. Petersburg and beyond. This mass migration of former POWs delivered 
an opportunity for the CUP leaders to travel to Moscow without getting any attention by an 
extravagant flight attempt or suspicious Red Crescent passports.  
The Bolshevik delegation under Viktor Kopp in Berlin provided fake papers identifying the 
CUP leaders as POWs. On this journey, Cemal Pasha and the former police chief Bedri Bey 
as Cemal’s aid-de-camp were accompanying Bahaeddin Şakir.51 Cemal and others were 
dressed up as shabby Russian war prisoners and left with the convoy of other prisoners from 
Stettin to St. Petersburg.52 Kilmarnock’s source in the German secret police, Baron Eckhard-
stein, had suspected that something was going on, but was ill-informed. He reported that  
Djemal Pasha and two other Turks are leaving probably to-night for Stockholm whence 
they intend to proceed via Finland and Estonia to Moscow. They will be met by Enver 
on the Russo-Esthonian frontier and travel to Azerbaijan where meeting is to take place 
with dignataries [sic], officials and religious leaders of Mohammedan world including 
many Sheiks. They will take with them many boxes and sacks latter to be filled at Mos-
cow with forged English bank notes chiefly of fifty pounds denomination. These to be 
used for buying gold from Sheiks. Whole plan is being forged with Kopp and many 
influential Germans are [involved] though German Government are kept in ignorance.53  
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From the German secret police, they also received the cover names of the three men disguised 
as Russian Azerbaijanis: Cemal being «Dadshemirof», the other two, respectively «Kemiroff» 
and «Kaplanoff». Following this information, the Danish authorities were asked to detain 
these men.54 The intelligence was accurate, Cemal’s cover name was Taştimurov from 
Baku.55 Together with five hundred Russian POWs, Cemal, Bahaeddin, and Bedri left Stet-
tin on May 18, and arrived in Narva at Estonian-Russian border on May 23. From there on 
they travelled by train to St. Petersburg. They arrived at Moscow on May 27 at eleven o’clock 
in mid-day.56 The three men were travelling luxuriously with eight bags, which they could 
barely carry themselves, thus hired a porter. They left Bedri by the bags at the station and the 
other two went to the Commissary of Foreign Affairs, which they found with the help of a 
former Russian General they met earlier in the train.57 One can only imagine, what a scene 
it was, when Cemal in his shabby disguise tried to convince the ministerial officials that he 
was the former Ottoman Minister of Navy Cemal Pasha, requesting an appointment with 
Chicherin.58 Cemal unable to meet with Chicherin that day, but he managed to be received 
by Karl Radek, by then the Secretary General of the Communist International.59  
Cemal Pasha was, however, not the first Turkish delegation arriving at Moscow. Halil Pasha 
had arrived at Moscow briefly before him. Cemal soon met with Halil Pasha and Dr. Fuat 
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Sabit (Ağacık).60 The latter was sent in order investigate the Bolshevism, who ended up be-
coming a (pseudo) communist. Previously, Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat had escaped from 
the Bekirağa Prison on August 9, 1919.61 By coincidence, Enver Pasha’s brother Nuri Pasha 
escaped from his prison camp in Batum on the very same night, and this led conspiracy 
theories. «It would be naïve to assume that their escape at the same night […] is a coinci-
dence», Kazım Karabekir Pasha cautioned. For Kazım Karabekir it was clear—as late as at 
the moment of writing his memoir—that these two prison breaks were both planned and 
coordinated by the British Intelligence. According to Karabekir’s conspiracy theory, the Brit-
ish freed these men from prison because they ended up in need of support from Tashnag 
Armenians, Menshevik Georgians, and Musavvat Azeris to build a bulwark in the Caucasus 
between Turkey and Russia. Karabekir suspected that these men were assisted to break from 
prison by British agents in order fuel the existing chaos in the Caucasus.62 This was, of course, 
nonsense. Soon after his escape, Halil united with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Sivas. Both Halil 
and Nuri were personally assigned by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to work in the Caucasus in order 
to prepare the war against the Armenian Republic.63 With Halil and Nuri making trouble in 
the Caucasus, The Times supposed that it is reasonable to suppose that Enver is not far off.64 
In June 1920, Halil Pasha had arrived at Moscow as a special emissary of Government of 
Asia Minor. In his first meeting with Soviet officials Halil Pasha underlined that both Ana-
tolia and Russia were fighting against the same enemy. The British were supporting Denikin 
and the Tashnags to protect their interest in the Caucasus and Asia in general.65 Halil Pasha 
played an important role in organizing the first arms delivery from Russia to Anatolia.66 
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Chicherin promised Halil Pasha to give support to the Anatolian national movement and the 
Afghan national movement.67 In a letter to Lenin, Chicherin said:  
It would be better not to fall into allure of grand perspectives and throw ourselves into 
adventures that exceed our limits. Nonetheless I must note that the rapprochement with 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly might help our policies flourish in the East.68  
This was the situation before Cemal Pasha’s arrival. In short, we are guests in the full sense 
of the word, Cemal wrote to Talat Pasha. Both Halil and Cemal as well as their entourage 
were lodged in the Sugar King’s Palace, which was right across the Kremlin at Sofiskaya 
Naberezhnay 14. The building is today rather known as the former British Embassy. The 
Palace has its name from Pavel Haritonenko, a wealthy Ukrainian sugar merchant, who com-
missioned its construction as a family mansion in 1891. After Harientko’s widow abandoned 
the mansion during the Russian Revolution, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs 
occupied the palace as a residence for state guests. As state guests, Cemal and Halil had Lith-
uanian servant and they were getting three meals a day as well as a cigarette pack. We eat 
and drink superbly, noted Cemal. Karl Radek was taking good care of them.69  
Not everybody in Moscow was pleased about the arrival of the Young Turk Pashas. The 
Turkish communist leader Mustafa Subhi criticized the arrival of the CUP leaders to Moscow 
in his Moscow-based Turkish newspaper. Mustafa Subhi noted that Mustafa Kemal had re-
nounced any association with the CUP. This means that it is not correct to speak of any 
political or diplomatic status that can attach rebellious Turkey to Soviet Russia.70 Also the 
Russian-Turkic community soon got alienated by some of the opinions and mannerisms of 
CUP leaders. Cemal, Halil, and others met with Zeki Velidi (Togan), the Chairman of the 
Bashkir Revolutionary Committee and former chairman of the briefly independent Bashkor-
tostan.71 When Zeki Velidi, already heartbroken with Soviet promises, told them that he was 
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secretly planning to go to Central Asia to work against the Soviets, Cemal protested: «please 
do not do that; let us all of us join in and become one with the Soviets, and induct all of 
Turkistan in uprising into the army we are going to form.» During the feasts they gave for 
the Young Turk guests at the Mansion of the Representatives of Bashkortostan, which was 
formerly the residence of a Russian rich man with a large collection of wines and liquors, the 
Young Turk leaders made themselves unpopular in the eyes of their Russian-Turkic hosts, as 
they could not control their liquor and were unpleasant drunks. Even more they proved to 
be ignorant of the state of affairs in Turkic Russia. Cemal Pasha could barely understand the 
Turkic dialects and he was arrogant on top.72 Cemal himself was rather annoyed by the be-
havior of fellow committee man Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, who was acting as a propagandist of 
the [Committee of] Union and Progress in the company others and with his extreme na-
tionalist principle (müfrit bir milliyetperestlik prensibi) he was stirring up the Tatars against 
the Bolsheviks. Cemal requested that Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir should rather return to Berlin.73  
One week after their arrival, Cemal Pasha met with the director of the Eastern Branch of the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs.74 According to the proposal Cemal made to the Bolsheviks, 
Halil Pasha was to lead the Iranian revolutionary movement, Cemal himself would lead the 
Afghan and Indian revolutionary movements, and Enver Pasha, once arrived in Moscow, 
would command these movements from the Moscow headquarters. While the fugitive CUP 
leaders would manage these insurgencies abroad, Mustafa Kemal Pasha would lead the move-
ment in Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt from Ankara.75 In talks with Radek, Chicherin, and 
Karahan, Cemal could convince them to support his expedition to Afghanistan.76  
To the bitter disappointment of Cemal Pasha, he soon learned that he had no more the 
backing of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The understanding which Mustafa Kemal and Talat had 
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reached in early 1920 that the fugitive CUP leaders were allowed to manage the struggle 
abroad was unilaterally revoked by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. It cannot be permitted, Mustafa 
Kemal wrote to Kazım Karabekir, that Enver Pasha and his fellows autonomously and indi-
vidually intervene into the affairs of homeland and the nation.77 The fact that Enver was 
actually still missing in action did not matter, as he was omnipresent in rumors and news. 
The Ankara Government soon released an official decree that Talat, Cemal, Enver Pashas 
has no authority to engage in any political enterprise in the name of the Grand National 
Assembly and they have no communication or association with us.78 Karabekir considered 
this decision by the cabinet to be too heavy (fazla ağır gördük) and supposed that it would 
have a bad effect (fena bir tesir-i has edeceğini) on the Soviet Government. Karabekir re-
quested not to submit this decree to Chicherin.79 But Mustafa Kemal had already made up 
his mind.  
When Cemal Pasha heard from this decree, he politely protested that this decree contradicted 
the sole purpose of his journey. Because Talat Pasha had told him in Berlin: In order to 
provide assistance to Turkey from abroad we are entitled to engage in all kinds political en-
terprise. This goes so far as the last word and the right of command and decision belongs to 
the Grand National Assembly. He assured that he had not entered into any negotiations so 
far and that would continue to follow Mustafa Kemal’s instructions.80 As the Kemalist dele-
gation closed its door on Cemal’s face, he immediately channeled his activities towards work-
ing for the Indian revolution.81  
Cemal Pasha could, nevertheless, convince the Soviet Government that to send him with a 
delegation to Kabul. It was long no secret that Cemal had long before coming to Russia to 
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personal goal of working in Afghanistan in his mind.82 I am leaving tomorrow that is Mon-
day, 12 July [1]920, for Tashkent, Cemal reported to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.83 Arrived at 
Tashkent, Cemal got soon frustrated, because of being stuck there. He became good friends 
with Mikhail Frunze, the notorious Red Army Commander of the Eastern Front, who gave 
Cemal a Circassian saber as a present.84 Together with 14 Turkish officers, 9 Turkish soldiers, 
and 9 Turkic soldiers from Tashkent as well as the Indian Maulana Barkatullah85 they trav-
eled to Kabul. Cemal was fortunate enough that his personal project to work in Afghanistan 
against British India coincided with Comintern’s campaign to establish an Indian exile gov-
ernment in Kabul and a military-revolutionary training camp in Tashkent.86 Cemal requested 
an unofficial delegation of teachers and professors from the «Ottoman-Turkish Revolution-
ary Government» (Osmanlı-Türk Hükumet-i İnkılabiyesi) to be sent to Afghanistan.87 Cemal 
Pasha’s plan was work for the Indian revolution (Hindistan ihlilali) in Kabul, as he wrote to 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha before leaving for Kabul.88  
Cemal Pasha gave Enver Pasha also an extensive report on the recent developments in Tur-
kestan and Afghanistan. Cemal saw Oriental despotism, in his words the mindset of our 
Oriental sultans (Bizim şark padişahlarının ahval-i ruhiyesi), as well as Islamic fundamental-
ism, namely the captivity of an Islamic emirate in the hands of a bunch of ignorant and 
naïve people called the ulema (ulema denilen bir sürü cahil ve safiye insanların elinde bir 
emaret-i islamın esareti) was the cause of the backwardness of the region from Bukhara to 
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Afghanistan. Cemal Pasha himself believed that the reactionary Emirate of Bukhara consti-
tuted a barrier for the modernization of Turkestan. In a public gathering in Tashkent, as one 
contemporary Turkestani nationalist remembers, Cemal declared that the Emir of Bukhara 
should abdicate for the sake of the people.89 While the former Emir of Afghanistan Habibul-
lah was similarly considered as an incompetent Oriental sultan, Cemal’s intelligence on the 
new Emir of Afghanistan Amanullah framed him rather as a reformer and an enemy of Brit-
ain. After the Fergana Government was suppressed by the Red Army, its Jadidist leaders went 
to the mountains and started a guerilla warfare against the Bolsheviks. However, as the young 
Jadidist leadership died out, Islamic fundamentalist took over the leadership and started to 
terrorize the local Muslim population.90 Behind the devastating social and cultural decay in 
Turkestan, Cemal saw a secret force. Who is the instigator behind these poor rebellious 
people of Fergana?, Cemal asked rhetorically. Would you know that it is again our notori-
ous English! These well-known clever fellows are behind half of all the blood and fire in the 
world.91  
In Turkestan Cemal Pasha witnessed that the local Soviet officials, contrary to the cordial 
Soviet-Afghan relations in Moscow, were not very fond of the neighboring Afghan Govern-
ment, because the latter was accused of supporting the Emir of Bukhara and engaging in anti-
Soviet propaganda throughout Turkestan.92Cemal Pasha, why would you go to Kabul, what 
would you do there?, asked a senior Soviet official in Tashkent dismissively, Afghanistan is 
entirely a lost cause for us. Only recently, the Afghan Government and British India had 
reassumed negotiations first time after the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919. Soviet officials in 
Turkestan assumed that bold promises were made to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud 
Khan Tarzi. Afghanistan was, indeed, looking for British support to liberate Bukhara and 
Khive, but the first round of talks went actually nowhere.93 In the world of rumors, all this 
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looked a little different. According to rumors, Cemal heard in Tashkent, a secret agreement 
was concluded after the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs made a visit to British India. It 
was decided to establish a Great Afghanistan in Central Asia as a bufferzone between British 
India and Soviet Russia. It was rumored that the Caliphate would also be offered to the 
Afghan Emir, only if the Afghan Emir would conclude an anti-Russian agreement.94 Even-
tually, we can regard the Afghanistan-England alliance as a fait accompli, supposed the So-
viet official pessimistically. Therefore, it is totally in vain and possibly even harmful, if you 
would proceed to Kabul, he said to Cemal. Because the Afghans might capture and hand 
in you the English.95  
While Cemal Pasha was on his way to Kabul, on August 28, 1920, the Red Army in con-
junction with the leaders of the Young Bukhara movement took over the Emirate of Bukhara. 
The Emir Alim Khan fled and went to exile in Afghanistan.96 As you see, I arrived at Kabul 
right in these times, as Cemal recapitulated a year later.97 The Sovietization of Turkestan, 
despite its obvious brutality, would, nevertheless, help Cemal to have a fresh start in Kabul. 
The news of Cemal Pasha coming to Kabul travelled fast, as The Times announced: Jemal 
Pasha […] is now on his way to Kabul via Tashkent at the instance of the Soviet Government. 
There is reason to believe, however, that Jemal is more concerned with the Pan-Islamic move-
ment than with Bolshevism.98 In face of alleged British overtures to the Afghan Govern-
ment, Cemal explained his plans as follows:  
I want to reach Afghanistan as soon as possible, in order to thoroughly explain the Afghan 
Emir what murderous consequence such considerations would have. And I want to incite 
and persuade him to animosity against the English, which is the sole solution for the 
political salvation of the East. By this, I want to prepare a road and a gateway for the 
Indian revolutionaries at the border of India. Let’s see who will succeed.99 
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*** 
When Cavid Bey received the news that Cemal Pasha and the others had arrived in Moscow, 
but Enver never reached Moscow, he was concerned.100 What Cavid was not told was, how-
ever, that Enver had already reappeared in Berlin after a long and difficult journey. After 
leaving Germany, Enver’s plane made a forced landing in the Polish Corridor in Danzig 
(Gdańsk) due to an engine trouble. There, Enver and his pilot Lieutenant Eberhart Gruda101 
could only by chance avoid an arrestment by the Allied troops. Somehow the responsible 
British officials at the airfield did not devote their highest attention to Enver’s airplane so 
that the two men could proceed without further complications. On April 5, they had a fur-
ther stop at Königsberg (Kaliningrad), where they repaired the malfunction they had during 
their flight.102 As it seems the engine trouble was not sufficiently solved. On the flight to the 
Lithuanian-Russian border, they had to make another emergency landing in Latvia. There 
Enver and his pilot were imprisoned in Riga and later in Volmar (Valmiera).103 
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The situation in the Baltic region was still precarious, when Enver found himself in a Latvian 
prison. This time, he was not as lucky as he had been in Lithuania six months ago. Latvia 
had suffered immensely by both Red and White terrors since its independence in November 
18, 1918. There are nearly no sources on Enver Pasha’s time in Latvia—except for memoirs. 
In the retelling of his friends, the story of Enver’s captivity has been told in different versions. 
While in one version Enver was either disguised as a German communist by the name of 
Malessa, in the other he acted as a Polish-German, while others claim that he was imperson-
ating a Jewish German communist by the name of Heinrich Altmann. Yet, others claim that 
he was disguised as a Russian with papers prepared by the Bolshevik mission in Berlin.104 
One important source for Enver’s prison time is his collection of drawings from his prison 
days, recently published by Murat Bardakçı.105 As Bardakçı states, his drawings are signed 
with different names, including Malessa, Altmann, Ali, and even Enver, implying that 
Malessa and Altmann were both the one and same cover. The drawings and their handwritten 
titles and descriptions indicate that Enver was imprisoned mostly with Bolsheviks and com-
munists.  
Whether he had German or Russian papers, or perhaps both, is not clear. Either way, it was 
a hard time in Latvia both for Germans and Russians. Latvian nationalists had been fighting 
both against the Soviet Russians and local communists as well as against the local German 
land-owners. The Baltic Germans traditionally possessed most of the wealth in Latvia. In 
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1920, the Baltic Germans were strongly discriminated and disliked by their Latvian compat-
riots.106 The events of 1919, especially the Allied intervention had strengthened the Baltic 
nationalisms.107 General von Seeckt wrote in a memorandum that the Entente forces in the 
Baltics rather preferred the expansion of Bolshevism than the continuance of German settle-
ment in the Baltic region.108 Indeed, the general atmosphere was in favor of the Allied inter-
ests and therefore considerably against Germany and Germans.109 But Russian Bolsheviks 
and Latvian communists were no better off than Germans. Latvian Bolsheviks had set up a 
Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic in December 1918 by pushing the government of inde-
pendent Latvia to German-controlled territories. Only in May 1919 the Soviet Republic of 
Latvia was dissolved, but Latvian Bolsheviks still posed a threat to the Latvian nationalists in 
the second half of 1919 and first half of 1920.110  
In Arif Cemil’s retelling of Enver’s story, everyday life in the prison is described as unbearable 
and poorish.111 When Arif Cemil’s memoir was first published in a Constantinople newspa-
per in 1922, his sympathetic account on Enver’s captivity aroused a controversy. Falih Rıfkı 
(Atay) criticized Arif Cemil for audaciously dramatizing Enver Pasha’s fate. Falih Rıfkı argued 
that the Anatolian people had not even the boiled beans to eat, which Enver apparently had 
with dislike every day in prison. «Enver Pasha, who played Napoleon for thirteen years», as 
Falih Rıfkı ridiculed, was now « rather seen after the Armistice somewhat in the role of Arsèn 
Lupin», the fictional Gentleman burglar, having adventurous travels from one country to 
another.112  
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With his drawings Enver Pasha could make some money in the prison. This made him pop-
ular among the prisoners and wardens so that he even draw portraits of the prison director.113 
Somehow Enver was also in touch with a Monsieur Walter from the Danish Embassy in Riga 
and Monsieur Heinberg, the deputy consul at the Danish Consulate in Volmar.114 Eventu-
ally, Enver benefited from a prisoner exchange between Germany and Latvia and returned to 
Germany, implying that he had probably German papers.115 The conflict between Germany 
and Latvia was normalized on July 5, 1920.116 According to a dedication note on the collec-
tion of his prison drawings Enver gave his wife as a present, signed on July 28, he was im-
prisoned from April 10 until July 6, 1920.117  
When Enver Pasha arrived in Germany in mid-July 1920, his wife and children had now 
arrived from Constantinople.118 His wife Naciye Sultan’s journey from Constantinople to 
Berlin is another manifestation of state control over transnational mobility. For being Enver’s 
wife, Naciye Sultan received a harsh treatment from the Allied forces. First, she was kicked 
out of her villa at Kuruçeşme, which was given to the French General Louis Franchet d’Es-
pèrey as a residence.119 When asked to leave for Europe, this was denied. The Allies were 
holding her as a quasi-hostage in Constantinople—measures Enver considered to be child-
ish.120 Naciye Sultan had been seriously sick since the birth of her second daughter, but was 
not permitted to leave for Europe for treatment.121 Thus, Naciye Sultan, a Princess of the 
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House of Osman, had to secretly escape the imperial capital. Naciye Sultan left Constanti-
nople in disguise of the nanny of the famous Italian architect Dinari and his family. Arrived 
in Germany via Rome, she checked in at the sanatorium of Dr. Carl Franz von Dapper-
Saalfels in Bad Kissingen. After arriving in Berlin, Enver went directly to the sanatorium.122 
It was the first time that he saw his second daughter Türkan, who at that time was already 
11 months old. The family reunited after more than one and a half years and spent one or 
two weeks together at the sanatorium. When Naciye Sultan’s health was soon restored, they 
settled in Berlin where Nazım Bey (Enver’s sister’s husband, not be mistaken with Dr. 
Nazım) rented a house in Grunewald.123 Despite the long-awaited family reunion, Enver 
could not settle down. He stayed about two weeks in Germany.124 «Naciye, why would you 
cry at all?», Enver would write to his depressed and sick wife on his way to Moscow. «Think 
that I am leaving to work for a great Muslim mission, for the humanity, for the Turkic world 
[Türklük], he cheered her up, but for me even more holy, I am leaving to work for you, so 
do not grieve.»125 
Duty was calling. Enver had still not reached Moscow, while others were already there. Before 
he left again, he had a meeting with Emir Shakib Arslan who arrived Munich to talk on 
matters regarding the Arab world.126 Since a Kemalist delegation was supposed to be in Mos-
cow, Enver wished to represent the Arabs and other Muslims in Moscow. There was collec-
tive effort in hiding the embarrassing fact that Enver had never reached Moscow so far, while 
in public rumors he was constantly being sighted in Moscow and beyond. Enver’s return was 
kept secret even from trusted CUP colleagues, like Cavid Bey.127 After being confronted by 
Cavid, who heard of Enver’s return from other sources, Talat explained that 
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The Ali [a.k.a. Enver] issue is indeed a secret. However, not a secret from you. After 
going through months of escapades and adventures and being exposed to great dangers, 
ten days ago he suddenly showed up. [side note: top secret] Last night he went off in the 
company of Hayreti, Secretary Ziya Bey, Dr. Ahmed Fuad the Egyptian. If you allow, I 
won’t give any details here. In ten days, he will arrive at the desired place [mahalli mak-
suda, i.e. Moscow]. I will report to you on the details. […] Depending on the situation 
he finds there at his arrival, I will travel also by the same route and come back again.128   
«As if the Ali [a.k.a. Enver] issue is a secret!!», Cavid noted angered in his diary. «I wrote a 
letter to Talat», he noted two days later. «I made fun of Berlin’s mystery», Cavid continued 
and told Talat that «those things considered secret are already on everyone’s lips.»129 
*** 
Since the Bolshevik advance in Poland, the Russian front line once again bordered to East 
Prussia in summer 1920. Therefore, travel by land seemed to be a better plan.130 Once again 
Enver Pasha needed the assistance of the German authorities. His old pal Naval Lieutenant 
Commander Hans Humann was no more the Chief of the Military Intelligence. Therefore, 
Enver contacted General von Seeckt. For this assignment, General von Seeckt had one man 
for the job, Cavalry Captain Ernst Köstring. Seeckt usually appointed Köstring to «special 
assignments», as Köstring later told.131 «In the war, I received my orders from him», remem-
bers Köstring and these orders were rather «small, but exhaustive». As a disciplined Prussian 
officer, Köstring did not bother Seeckt with questions about «why and what consequences 
these special assignments had.132 Köstring got his instructions for this mission first from Gen-
eral von Seeckt’s aid-de-camp, Captain Herbert Fischer.133 The assignment was to deliver 
Enver through the Allied occupied East Prussia to the Soviet controlled Lithuanian border. 
Once arrived there, Enver had to be smuggled over the border and handed over to the Red 
Army officials, awaiting him. If caught by the British officials, as Fischer briefed Köstring, it 
would cause a «political spectacle and humiliation» (politischen Mordsspektakel und Blamage). 
When Köstring later discussed his overcautious plans with Seeckt over tea at Seeckt’s home. 
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«Hit the road, you will somehow figure it out», General von Seeckt laughed, while playing 
with his dog.134  
In his machine-typed original version of his memoirs, Köstring first wrote that it was an 
initiative of the Auswärtiges Amt to bring Enver to Russia, but crossed it out and wrote in the 
margin that it was von Seeckt’s initiative instead.135 Further below in the manuscript, he 
wrote a note that the Auswärtiges Amt and the German Government embraced this idea. In 
the publication of his memoirs, there is no mention of these governmental bodies.136 It was, 
again, rather the work of a few than an official policy. In the minds of these few German 
collaborators, this mission served also national interests. The potential benefits of Enver re-
connecting the «Russian wire» was obvious.137 The ambitions of Enver’s German friends went 
but perhaps even beyond the enhancement of a German-Russian rapprochement. Köstring 
was told that «Enver was a beacon for the Mohammedanian-Turanian people.» From Enver’s 
collaborations with Moscow, Köstring believed that Enver’s friends in Berlin «anticipated 
ramifications for the Mohammedan population of India and thus trouble for England.»138 
Negotiations between Germany and Soviet Russia had started in supporting the anti-Entente 
struggle in the East even prior to Enver’s arrival in Moscow. Military material was planned 
to be transported from Germany via the ports of Trabzon or St. Petersburg.139  
On August 4, 1920, Enver Pasha and his entourage, Hayreti Bey, Ziya Bey, and Dr. Ahmed 
Fuad Efendi, in the company of Captain Köstring and a Bolshevik emissary by the name of 
Leo left Berlin by train to Stettin.140 From Stettin they travelled with the ferry Odin to the 
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port of Pillau (today Baltiysk) near Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Köstring was appalled by En-
ver’s attempt to send an open radiogram from the ferry to Berlin with the message that «the 
route is perfectly hazard-free».141 While Enver stayed with Köstring at the officer’s guest 
house in Königsberg, the others stayed at a hotel. It was still unsure how to cross the border. 
While Enver, Köstring, and Leo had papers, others still needed passports to cross the border. 
«Again, difficulties appear on the journey», Enver complained in another letter to his wife. 
«Those arrangements planned in Berlin always become complicated. Let’s see what will hap-
pen?...»142 Contingencies of transnational mobility was plagued with complications. They 
stayed for few more days in Königsberg, spending their days with sightseeing in the city, 
doing shopping or visiting the zoo.143 Köstring made some inquires at the border meanwhile. 
On the morning of August 9, Köstring, Enver, and Leo left and headed to Johannisburg 
(today Pisz in Poland). From Königsberg (Kaliningrad) they travelled to Lyck (today Ełk in 
Poland) by train. In Lyck they had to wait two hours for the next connection train. Somehow, 
they caught the attention of British troops at the station. Enver improvised immediately and 
started to draw a portrait of Köstring in his sketchbook, distracting the British officials. 
Köstring tells that Enver somehow was in possession of a press card of the New York Times 
as a cover for his journey. Later in Johannisburg, they even shared the only hotel in town 
with British officers and sat together with them during the meals without raising any suspi-
cion.144 Arrived at Kolno, Enver—again, by ignoring all the security measures—asked 
Köstring to drop by a letter he wrote to his wife at the local post office, which was even 
enveloped in a couverte with the Ottoman coat of arms on it. Köstring, of course, did not 
do it. There, they also met with the others from Enver’s entourage, who had travelled with 
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fake German passports and were collected by car.145 There was, however, a problem with the 
passports. Dr. Ahmed Fuad was an Egyptian and protested, «since I don’t look like a German 
at all, I can’t travel with this passport.» Hayreti and Ziya crossed the border first and figured 
out that the border patrols were only looking at the visa.146 In the night of August 12, they 
crossed the Russian border and Köstring escorted Enver and his entourage to the Russian 
troops that resembled in the eyes of the Prussian officer nothing but a «terrible bunch of 
thieves». Enver and his friends waved to Köstring, while he left them behind in Russia.147 
After that Köstring returned to Germany.148 From Russia, Enver sent further messages to 
Lieutenant Tschunke and Lieutenant Fischer from General Seeckt’s staff, Ago von Maltzan 
from the Auswärtiges Amt, and last but not least to Hans Humann—drawing the network of 
his relations in Berlin.149 On August 12, the Red Army officials took Enver and his fellow 
travelers to Grodno (Hrodna in Belarus) by car.150 From there they travelled in a sleeping car 
via Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow.151 From a letter he wrote to Talat after crossing the 
Russian border, he told that his journey had been «very easy and comfortable».152 «Anyway, 
praise Allah, he arrived at last», was Talat’s reaction.153 
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*** 
Enver and his friends arrived at Moscow on August 15, at 11 o’clock.154 They first went to 
the former German Embassy. From there, the Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs accom-
modated them at the Sugar King’s Palace across the Kremlin, where also Mustafa Kemal’s 
delegation was hosted.155 «Thus we are for now the guests of the government, Enver wrote 
to his wife. Therefore, he explained, we don’t need money. Yet they give us money. But we 
don’t ask for much.»156 Enver was back on the diplomatic parquette—so he believed.  
Sooner than later Enver Pasha understood that diplomacy in Soviet Moscow was something 
else and the warm welcome he hoped for remained shallow. «After all, said Muhittin (Bir-
gen), there was a whole lot of large and small Enver Pashas from all over the world in Mos-
cow at that time.»157 Moscow was the Mecca of revolutionaries in 1920. There was, however, 
some legitimate suspicion whether Enver was a true believer. The status of the so-called «Ali 
Bey Mission» in Moscow was, in fact, a matter of ambivalence. The distinguished guests 
believed that theirs was a diplomatic mission, and were waiting for a formal reception, re-
members M. N. Roy who was also guest at the Sugar King’s Palace. Roy observed that Enver 
and his friends avoided publicity for that they had not received a formal reception.158 In due 
course, Enver was received by Soviet leaders such as Karahan, Chicherin, and Bukharin, but 
Lenin would continue to ignored him.159 British Intelligence claims that Enver was received 
by LENIN and was invited to a sitting of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, specially 
summoned to meet, was only far from the truth.160 
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In order to elevate his status on the diplomatic parquet, Enver Pasha searched for fields in 
which he could present himself as a valuable asset to the Soviet Government. One of these 
fields was in the Soviet-Kemalist negotiations. In his fist letter to Mustafa Kemal, Enver wrote 
that he came to Moscow with the purpose to realize an organization in the Muslim regions 
and to work for the redemption of our homeland.161 Enver soon got in contact with delega-
tion of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s diplomatic delegation. These were trying to arrange an offen-
sive and defensive pact as well as military and financial aid. Me and my friends are for now 
working to help them without being involved to the delegation, Enver told to Cemal, not 
without bragging, of course. And I believe that my influence was beneficial to their treat-
ment. Because the deal will now be completed in few days, although the delegation hasn’t 
achieved anything in the last one and a half months.162 Later when Enver defended his in-
volvement into the initial Kemalist-Soviet talks, he told that the Ankara’s head diplomat 
Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) feared that Bolsheviks would demand Turkey to become com-
munist and, hence, hesitated to push for talks. Enver used his contacts to Karl Radek and 
arranged the initial meetings. Once he even participated at a meeting between Chicherin and 
the Kemalist delegation, as he later claimed, only to demonstrate his solidarity with the An-
atolian movement. To Mustafa Kemal, Enver stressed that he never officially acted on behalf 
of the Ankara Government. As a symbol of his diplomatic restraint, Enver did not want be 
on the same photograph as the Ankara delegates to avoid further misconceptions, although 
the Soviet officials insisted —apparently still confused about their distinction.163 
Enver Pasha’s plan to help the Anatolian struggle was to establish a Red Army cavalry unit 
consisting of Russian Muslims, possibly from Dagestan and the Caucasus, and dispatch them 
to Anatolia in the spring of 1921.164 The first reactions to Enver’s plans by senior Kemalist 
officials was surprisingly positive. Kazım Karabekir Pasha even encouraged Enver Pasha to 
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no. 570, gömlek no. 51; TİTE, kutu no. 327, gömlek no. 1. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın 
Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 176–78; Bardakçı, Enver, 539–42. 
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delay his expedition to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and India in order to establish an Azeri bat-
talion that could come to the help of Anatolia.165 It was necessary to give Enver and his friends 
a program that would allow them to work for the benefit of our homeland in abroad, only 
if they don’t forget about us while following their own convictions.166 
Another area, where Enver Pasha believed to offer invaluable assets, was his connection to 
the German military through General von Seeckt. Enver needed military material for Turkey 
and Afghanistan etc., but Soviet Russia was similarly in need for military material. Thus, 
Enver was working with the German military officials in Moscow and Berlin to organize a 
way for arms delivery. Under the code name Heinrich Altmann, Enver was able to send 
regularly letters to Berlin via German diplomatic courier.167 In letters addressed to General 
von Seeckt, he gave not only reports on the state of affairs, but also asked for possibilities of 
receiving from Germany radio transmitters and telegraph machines for both Turkey and Af-
ghanistan. In Turkey, there was a great need for cartridges as well as machines to fill car-
tridges, Enver explained. There was also a lack of technical personnel. With General von 
Seeckt’s help, Enver hoped to transfer these from Germany via Russia to Turkey.168 Enver 
also asked his brother to collect intelligence from Seeckt’s aid-de-camp Lieutenant Fischer 
on Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian armies for the sake of the «general operation» (harekat-
ı ummumiye), since intelligence could be an important asset for Enver in establishing working 
relation between Berlin and Moscow before the planned uprising in the Muslim lands in the 
spring of 1921.169 Enver had put himself as communication channel to General von Seeckt. 
However, as noticed Chicherin, regarding the purchase of military equipment from Ger-
many, we already started […] talking, but Enver claims that the approval of the government 
 
165 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to Enver Pasha (Baku), September 7, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu 
no. 570, gömlek no. 50. For the same letter see also TTK, EP 01-70. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist 
Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 167–68. 
166 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to Mustafa Kemal (Ankara), September 21, 1920, in Karabekir, 
İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 25.  
167 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), August 25, 1920, BA-MA, N247/195, 4; Enver Pasha, 
letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan, August 26, 1920, in Bardakçı, Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim, 44; Kamil Bey, 
letter (Grunewald) to Enver Pasha (Baku), September 7, 1920, TTK, EP 01-83, in Yamauchi, The Green 
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compromised. Kamil Bey, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), April 14, 1921, TTK, EP 03-74, in 
Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 206. 
168 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), August 25, 1920, BA-MA, N247/195, 4. 
169 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 23, 1920, in Bardakçı, Naciyem, Ruhum, 
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means nothing if Seeckt does not give his consent. […] Enver waits for his response.170 In 
return for the pre-1914 borders for Germany, Enver promised to Chicherin that General von 
Seeckt would arrange arms delivery for Russia and support inciting an insurgency in Poland. 
Chicherin commented to Lenin: It seems to us like a diplomatic lie.171 Enver was hoping 
to find allies among Trotsky’s clique. After talks with Trotsky, Lenin wrote a letter to 
Chicherin: 
Comrade Chicherin. As you see the things work out. Speed up the Enver Question (be-
cause Trotsky is leaving tomorrow): We will find the general who promised everything to 
Enver (through Trotsky I talked to him); as long as we get arms, cloaks, and boots. 
If it doesn’t work out, to hell with Enver.172 
On August 25, Enver apparently had a meeting with E. M. Sklianski, deputy of Trotsky. In 
a letter to General von Seeckt the next day, Enver told:  
There is party here which has real power. Trotsky belongs to this party as well and he is 
in favor of a rapprochement with Germany. Sklianski said that their party is willing to 
recognize the former German border of 1914. They see only one way out of this world 
chaos and that is collaboration with Germany and Turkey. In order to strengthen their 
party and to win over the whole Soviet Government, would it be possible to supply un-
official help, such as by intelligence on the Polish Army or, if possible, by selling or smug-
gling arms.173  
But after the setbacks against Poland in late September 1920, Trotsky was dropped. Enver 
Pasha complained that «politicians are by their nature cowards…».174 Later in September, 
Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’s long-time agent in Turkestan, had arrived at Ber-
lin. In Germany, on behalf of Enver he made inquiries with German officials and friends 
about buying arms for the Anatolian resistance movement. They gave the answer that the 
official government will not dare to undertake anything, he reported to Enver. Although it 
is possible to supply some secretly, there is no possibility to deliver them, thus, they advised 
 
170 Chicherin, letter to Lenin, August 8, 1920, quoted in Sergej A. Gorlow, “Geheimsache Moskau-Berlin: 
Die militärpolitische Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Sowjetunion und dem Deutschen Reich 1920–1933,” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 44, no. 1 (1996): 134–35.  
171 Chicherin, letter to Lenin, August 16, 1920, quoted in Avagyan, “Kemalistler, İttihatçılar ve Bolşevikler I,” 
20. 
172 Emphases in orginal as underlining. Lenin, secret message to Chicherin (Moscow), [before August 20, 
1920], in Rem Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri: Yeni Belgeler, (1920–1922) (İstanbul: Kaynak 
Yayınları, 2000), trans. by Arif Acaloğlu, 35–36.  
173 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Seeckt (Berlin), August 26, 1920, BA-MA, N247/195, 6.  
174 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Erzurum), September 28, 1920, in Karabekir, 
İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 46. 
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to supply it to Turkey from elsewhere abroad like Italy.175 Enver himself went back to Ger-
many in October 1920 in order to organize the arms delivery for Turkey. In Berlin Enver 
met with Hans Humann and with Professor Friedrich Sarre as well as some military officers 
at the Villa Sarre. The informant of the Auswärtiges Amt, Paul Weitz recommended not to 
raise the subject in the cabinet and not to have any direct or indirect connection with 
Enver, because the Allied officials were already aware of Enver’s presence in Berlin. If possi-
ble, Enver should be hindered in delivering arms from Germany.176 Enver’s plan was to or-
ganize the transport of arms and uniforms to Anatolia via Russia and Baku. For this he was 
making inquiries about Allied controls of ships in the Baltic Sea.177 As reaction, German 
authorities decided the expulsion of Enver from Germany.178  
Meanwhile, Enver was able contact several German arms dealers and get some offers. After 
Berlin, Enver made visits to Rome and Budapest for further inquiries.179 In a letter to Mos-
cow, he told that he could purchase 50,000 rifles, 200,000,000 ammunition, 500 machine 
guns to be transported via Italy. To begin with, he wanted to purchase 200 machine guns, 
1000 rifles, and 7,000,000 ammunition. More money was needed to purchase more, as he 
explained. From Russia he could purchase uniforms and boots.180 Karahan sent a Soviet em-
issary to Berlin in order to manage Enver’s arms deals in Germany and Italy.181 Enver con-
tinued to work for delivery of the arms previously acquired in Germany to Anatolia.182 Enver 
Pasha later explained in a letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha that the Russians promised to deliver 
more arms to Turkey, if he would also manage to deliver arms to Russia from Germany. But 
 
175 Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), September 30, 1920, TTK, EP 02-69.  
176 Stockhammer, report on Enver Pasha’s activities in Berlin, October 22, 1920, ZMO, NGH, 07-03, 59.  
177 Stockhammer, report on Enver Pasha’s disappearance from Berlin, November 18, 1920, ZMO, NGH, 07-
03, 59. 
178 See: Paul Weitz, letter to Auswärtiges Amt, January 16, 1921, ZMO, NGH 037-03, 56. There were 
already rumors in December 1920, that Enver Pasha declared persona non grata by the German Government, 
since he was considered to be too «dangerous». See: Kazım Karabekir Pasha, letter (Erzurum) to the General 
Staff (Ankara), December 12, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 617, gömlek no. 81.  
179 Bardakçı, Enver, 211. 
180 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Halil Pasha [?] (Moscow), October 24, 1920, TKK, EP 01-63. For an 
undated list of military material which the Ankara Government asked to acquire from Italy, see: TTK, EP 03-
24. 
181 Halil Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), January 16, 1921, TTK, EP 02-32.  
182 Ali Fuat Pasha, cipher (Moscow) to the Grand National Assembly (Ankara), March 1, 1921, TİTE, kutu 
no. 326, gömlek no. 7. This cipher could, however, not be dechiphered by the Grand National Assembly. 
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then, the armistice between Poland and Russia was signed, which made Russian needs obso-
lete.183  
The development of events had moved faster than Enver. In a declaration Enver Pasha gave 
at Baku in September 1920, he stressed that his arrival in Russia (and also in Caucasus) was 
delayed, first, by sea storms in the Black Sea in the autumn and winter of 1918 and, second, 
by «the bars of the prisons of Kovno and Riga and the forced landing of airplanes» from the 
summer of 1919 to the summer of 1920.184 In similar terms, Arif Cemil believes that the 
one-year delayed arrival at Moscow had a damaging effect on CUP’s plans. In October 1919, 
when Enver first flew to Moscow, Soviet Russia was indeed not in a confident situation be-
cause of the Russian Civil War. In the course of the last year, the Bolsheviks had settled many 
fronts in the civil war, and even advanced into Caucasus and practically bordered to Turkey 
and Iran once again.185  
 
183 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), July 16, 1921, TTK, EP 03-27, in Yalçın 
and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 92.  
184 Quoted as in Riddell, To See the Dawn, 140. For the original see: Enver Pasha, manuscript of the speech 
submitted to the Baku Congress, [ca. August – September 1920], TTK, EP 01-77, in Yamauchi, The Green 
Crescent under the Red Star, 319.  
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8. Ambiguities of a Bolshevik Jihad: 
Bolshevism, Islam, and Enver Pasha at the Baku Congress 1920 
On June 18, Karl Radek declared at an executive meeting of the Communist International (in short 
Comintern) that it was not enough to «send salutation and congratulation telegraphs» to those 
movements in the East revolting against «world imperialism». Instead, Moscow needed to be the 
«center of incitement».1 The first policy move in this regard was to convene a conference. Both the 
Comintern and Soviet leaders took concrete steps to do and made preparations to convene the First 
Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku, more commonly referred as the Baku Congress.2 After 
some delays, the Baku Congress was scheduled for September 1 to 8, 1920. Historians have already 
pointed out with good reason the significance of the Baku Congress in studying the complexities 
of the national and colonial questions during the eventful years of the Russian Civil War.3  
 
1 Quoted in Yavuz Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi: Türkiye Komünistlerinin Rusya’da 
Teşkilatlanması, (1918–1921) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997), 133. 
2 The congress idea was on the agenda of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on June 18, 
1920, where it was decided to convene the Baku Congress. Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa 
Suphi, 132. The Soviet Government also supported the idea. On June 29, 1920, the People’s Council of 
Commissioners made the decision following Lenin’s initiative to convey an Eastern congress. Cosroe Chaqueri, “The 
Baku Congress,” Central Asian Survey 2, no. 2 (1983): 90. Ahmet Zeki Velidi (Togan) claims that it was his idea to 
assemble a Muslim congress. Zeki Velidi, a leading political figure in Russian Central Asia and former president of 
the Republic of Bashkortostan, was then in 1919 working with Radek in Moscow. After some discussions on where 
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and Cultural Struggles of Turkistan and other Muslim Eastern Turks, Translated by H. B. Paksoy (North Charleston: 
CreateSpace, 2012), 263. See also: Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British 
Imperialism, 1918–1923 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 99. 
3 The most influential work on Baku Congress is still Stephen White, “Communism and the East: The Baku 
Congress, 1920,” Slavic Review 33, no. 3 (1974): 492–514. See also G. Z. Sorkin, Pervyi s''ezd Narodov Vostoka 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1961); Gotthard Jaeschke, “Die Ankara-Türkei auf dem Kongress von Baku 1920,” Die Welt des 
Islams 7, no. 1 (1961): 185–86; Chaqueri, “The Baku Congress,” 89–107; Edith Ybert-Chabrier, Le premier congrès 
des peuples de l'Orient (Bakou, 1–8 Septembre 1920) (Paris: EHESS, 1984); Edith Ybert-Chabrier, “Les délégués au 
Premier Congrès des Peuples d’Orient, Bakou (1er-8 Septembre 1920),” Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 26, 
no. 1 (1985): 21–42; Nermin Menemencioğlu, “Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, September 1920,” in XI. 
Türk Tarih Kongresi: Ankara, 5–9 Eylül 1990. Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, vol. 6, 6 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Yayınları, 1994), 2223–33; Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, 4 vols. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1971–1996), IV, 166–177; Solmaz Rustamova-Towhidi, “The First Congress of the Peoples of 
the East: Aims, Tasks, Results,” in Centre and Periphery: The History of the Comintern in the Light of New Documents, 
ed. Mikhail Narinsky and Jürgen Rojahn (Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1996), 74–80; 
Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 130–206; Pezhmann Dailami, “The First Congress 
of Peoples of the East and the Iranian Soviet Republic of Gilan, 1920–21,” in Reformers and Revolutionaries in 
Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 85–117; 
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(London: Gingko Library Press, 2015), 273–93.  
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The turn towards the East was a matter of strategy for the Bolshevik regime. Facing the disappoint-
ment of the failed revolutions in Europe, the Bolshevik revolution seemed to have come at a dead 
end in the West. The route to Paris and London is through the cities of Afghanistan, the Punjab 
and Bengal, as Trotsky had proclaimed in a memorandum in August 1919.4 Although Red Army’s 
situation in Poland seemed more favorable after the Kiev offensive was checked in May 1920, vic-
tory was still far from sight. Nonetheless, most of European Russia was recovered from the Whites. 
When Baku was conquered by the Red Army in April 28, 1920, Soviet Russia’s gates to the Middle 
East via Turkey and Iran were (re-) opened. Baku was chosen as the venue for the Eastern Congress 
due to its logistical and geopolitical centrality.5 Kazım Karabekir Pasha, the Commander of the 
Eastern Front, appreciated the increasing importance of Baku as the «center of Muslim and Slav 
politics».6 «We propose Baku for the congress venue, not Moscow», Radek declared. «Because it is 
easier for us to go to Baku than for Eastern delegates to come to Moscow. Besides, Baku is the 
actual center of the East.»7  
With the rise of Baku to center stage, the former Great Game between Russia and Britain over Asia 
had reemerged in the aftermath of World War I. In the East, after the fall of Baku new geopolitical 
developments were now finally accessible for the Bolshevik regime which directly threatened British 
interests in the Middle East. With the help of the Soviets, for instance, Mirza Kuchik Khan’s Jangali 
Movement in Northwestern Iran had founded the Soviet Republic of Gilan in May 1920. Kuchik 
Khan himself was no communist rather a Muslim nationalist revolutionary, who found in Soviet 
Russia and in the former Baku-based Communist (Edalat) Party of Iran valuable assets, and vice 
versa.8 The Kemalist movement in Ottoman Turkey was also a Muslim nationalist revolutionary 
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Muslims and Communists: An Introduction,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 25, no. 1 (2009): 
7. For the history of Azerbaijan in this period see: Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The 
Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
6 Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 
15.  
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movement, conducting a people’s war against the common Western enemy. Although the Anato-
lian movement was a far cry from communist revolution, numerous local and regional forms of 
Soviet-style constitutional councils (şura) and congress-like governmental bodies (kongre or ku-
rultay) had demonstrated a bottom-up democratic spirit that resulted in the foundation of the 
Grand National Assembly in Ankara in April 23, 1920.9 All this won some considerate sympathies 
among the Bolsheviks.10 These anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements in immediate proximity 
of Caucasus seemed to offer sympathetic auxiliary forces to Soviet Russia in return for financial and 
agitational support.  
«Pan-Islamism was a revolutionary force and, as such, should be welcomed and supported as an ally 
of the proletarian world revolution.»11 This motto had increasingly become a commonplace notion 
in Moscow, as Indian communist leader M. N. Roy remembers distastefully. By then, the first 
delegation of Indian Muslims had arrived at Moscow in March 1919 and others soon followed.12 
As a convinced communist and connoisseur of Eastern affairs, Roy himself strongly disagreed with 
utilizing Muslim nationalism. He feared that a nationalist revolution in the East might come to 
terms with imperialism at the expense of the proletariat. Roy also questioned the sincerity of the 
Comintern leaders in convening a conference, since in his eyes this was anything but mere agitation. 
Many others, however, regarded the Baku Congress as a welcome wind of change in Moscow, one 
that was could possibly change the wind in the West as well.  
The ideological framework for the Baku Congress was manifested by Bolshevik leader Vladimir 
Lenin at the Second Comintern Congress. The Congress first took place in St. Petersburg in July 
19, 1920, and continued in Moscow from Jul 23 to August 7.13 For the Comintern Congress, 
Lenin prepared his preliminary draft of his «Theses on the National and Colonial Questions».14 
 
9 Bülent Tanör, Türkiye’de Kongre İktidarları, 1918–1920, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009). 
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struggle with international imperialism.» Admiral de Robeck, telegram (Constantinople) to Foreign Office (London), 
June 12, 1920, FO 371/5178, 6346, 88. The Paris-based Bolshevik mouthpiece La Cause Commune published a 
letter from Chicherin to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The letter proposed independence to Turkey and the states of Arabia 
and Syria and so forth. La Cause Commune, “Tchicherine et Mustapha-Kemal pacha”, June 26, 1920. See also: 
FO.371.5178, 7384, 94. 
11 Manabendra Nath Roy, Memoirs (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964), 390. 
12 K. H. Ansari, “Pan-Islam and the Making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialists,” Modern Asian Studies 20, no. 3 
(1986): 517–20. 
13 Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 127. 
14 For the final draft of these theses see: Vladimir I. Lenin, “Theses on the National and Colonial Questions: Adopted 
by the Second Congress of the Communist International (July 28, 1920),” in To See the Dawn: Baku 1920 – First 
Congress of the Peoples of the East, ed. John Riddell (New York: Pathfinder, 1993), 300–307; John Riddell, ed., 
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Previously Lenin had called for the right of national self-determination which had appealed to 
many.15 Now in 1920, he proposed to support revolutionary movements in the colonial world 
regardless of their stance towards communist ideals.16 The main objection came from M. N. Roy, 
who in private meetings convinced Lenin that his approach was rather naïve and theoretical. Based 
on Roy’s «supplementary thesis», Lenin made some terminological adjustments. The initial term 
«bourgeois-democratic» was replaced with «national-revolutionary».17 Objections of Zeki Velidi 
(Togan) from Bashkortostan was, however, rejected by Lenin, for Lenin himself did not have faith 
in the revolutionary potential of the Eastern proletariat—at least not in strict Marxist terms.18 In 
article six of the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, adopted by the Second Congress 
of the Comintern, this idea was manifested as follows: 
Consequently, we cannot limit ourselves at this time merely to recognizing or proclaiming the 
friendship of the toilers of various nations. Rather we must pursue a policy of implementing the 
closest possible alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia. 
The forms of this alliance will be determined by the level of development of the Communist 
movement within the proletariat of each country or of the revolutionary liberation movement 
in the backward countries and among the backward nationalities.19  
Regarding the adoption of the new Eastern policy, the Bolshevik Orientalist M. N. Pavlovich an-
nounced the general euphoria in the Comintern as follows: «All Communists—Russian, French, 
Italian, and so on—have now become Asians and are resolved to help every revolutionary move-
ment in the East and in Africa.»20 The main motto of the Second Congress of the Comintern and 
of the following Baku Congress was reformulated as: «Workers of the world and oppressed peoples, 
unite!» «Of course, the modification is wrong from the standpoint of the Communist Manifesto», 
Lenin frankly admitted the opportunism behind this revision, «but then the Communist Manifesto 
was written under entirely different conditions. From the point of view of present-day politics, 
 
Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress of the Communist 
International, 1920, 2 vols. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991), 283–90.  
15 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
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however, the change is correct.»21 Rather than unchanged ideologies, political contingencies and 
necessities were defining the Bolshevik turn to East. It was a multi-facetted and complex policy 
with many contradictory and conflicting aspects both for Comintern and Soviet polices.22  
The call for the Baku Congress especially addressed «the enslaved popular masses of Persia, Arme-
nia, and Turkey». Accordingly the Russian Muslims and also geopolitically distant Eastern nations 
were not the primary target audience of the congress, but were invited to join as well.23 During the 
planning nearly 3,280 delegates were invited.24 In the end, around 2,000 showed up.25 Contrary 
to the expectations of the organizers, the majority of the delegates were Russian Muslims from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.26 It was not easy to communicate the invitation and enable the travel 
of the delegates in Entente controlled territories.27 Zinoviev later regretted that there were only very 
few delegates from India and China.28  
Less surprising was the fact that most of the delegates were not members of a communist party, and 
were in many cases even members of a petty-bourgeois movement.29 The demands on delegates 
were set by the Comintern to be as inclusivist as possible. Zinoviev recalled that «it was decided to 
invite to the Congress, not only Communists, but also representatives of national revolutionary 
organisations, and non-aligned personalities of anti-imperialist tendency from Eastern coun-
tries».30  
The announcement of the Baku Congress first reached Cemal Pasha’s ears who wrote a letter to 
Talat Pasha and urged him to send experienced activists such as Arif Cemil Bey to the Baku Con-
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gress in order to demonstrate what kind of personalities are assembled among the Turkish revolu-
tionaries (Türk ihtilalcierinin ne gibi şahsiyetlerden terekküp ettiğini).31 «I think that the Baku Con-
ference is extremely important», Cemal wrote to Mustafa Kemal in a letter from Moscow. Cemal 
believed that the Baku Congress offered a special opportunity for Turkey: «If you would send some 
of the most distinguished and convincing orators of Turkey and some of our most brilliant friends 
to this conference, then it will be possible for Turks to take hold of the leadership position in the 
Eastern World.»32 Mustafa Kemal, however, had mixed feelings about the Baku Congress, because 
the Ankara Government was not officially invited by Comintern officials. During a parliamentary 
debate, Mustafa Kemal Pasha declared:  
Lately, they are conveying an international congress at Baku. Official and unofficial requests 
reached us that invite us to send delegates there. These invitations are directly addressed to our 
people. […]  
[…] We, too, go to congresses. We go everywhere and attend everything. But only we do it. The 
nation goes [to congresses], that is to say the [Grand National] Assembly goes, which is com-
posed of the delegates of the nation […].33 
Thus, the Ankara Government was not officially represented at the Baku Congress, but sent 
İbrahim Tali (Öngören) stationed at Moscow in an observer mission to Baku in addition to several 
local delegates from Anatolia.34 These Turkish delegates to the Baku Congress were carefully se-
lected by the Ankara Government and their local branches.35 They received strict instructions not 
to be persuaded by communist promises, since the situation in Turkey did not share the same 
problems as in industrialized countries. They were also cautioned not to give any promises regard-
ing Turkey’s position and policies.36 The Kemalist-Bolshevik rapprochement was not be rushed, 
when it came to ideologies. 
 
31 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Talat Pasha (Berlin), July 5, 1920, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Osman Selim 
Kocahanoğlu, eds., İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan Tarihi Mektuplar (İstanbul: Temel 
Yayınları, 2002), 247–50. 
32 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), June 11, 1920, in Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Moskova 
Hatıraları: Milli Mücadele ve Bolşevik Rusya, ed. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 47.  
33 Mustafa Kemal, speech at the Grand National Assembly (Ankara), August 14, 1920, Nimet Arsan, ed., Atatürk’ün 
Söylev ve Demeçleri, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Ankara: Türk İnkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayımları, 1981), I, 102. See also: Aslan, 
Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa Suphi, 144; Emel Akal, İştirakiyuncular, Komünistler ve Paşa 
Hazretleri: Moskova-Ankara-Londra Üçgeninde (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 200.  
34 Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 14. 
35 ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 910, gömlek no. 64. See also: Aslan, Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’nın Kuruluşu ve Mustafa 
Suphi, 143–51. 
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The contradiction of Soviet support for nationalist forces in Turkey, Iran, India, and China was a 
disputed issue. «Don’t paint Nationalism red», Lenin is said to have cautioned his Comintern col-
leagues subsequently.37 Making sense of this new national and colonial policy was running the risk 
of making no sense at all, thus it was necessary to justify it again and again. In his opening speech 
of the Baku Congress, Grigory Zinoviev defended this policy as follows:  
And so I say that we patiently support groups that are not yet with us and even against us on 
some questions. For example, in Turkey, comrades, you know that the Soviet government sup-
ports Kemal. We do not forget for one moment that the movement headed by Kemal is not a 
Communist movement. […] It is not out of some mercenary calculation that we support na-
tional movements like those in Turkey, Persia, India, and China. Rather we support them be-
cause a conscious worker will tell himself that the Turks who today do not yet understand where 
all their interests lie will understand this tomorrow. We must support this Turk and help him, 
and wait for a real people’s revolution to arise in Turkey, when veneration for sultans and other 
obsolete notions will vanish from his mind.38 
Whereas Mustafa Kemal Pasha possessed some sort of legitimacy as a leader of a national movement 
in September 1920, it was more a complex and complicated affair for the Bolshevik regime to make 
sense for themselves and for others, why Enver Pasha was present at the Baku Congress. Regarding 
Enver’s participation at the Baku Congress, Louise Bryant wrote, for instance: 
The Communists understood perfectly well that Enver Pasha was not at the Oriental Conference 
as a sudden and sincere convert to Internationalism, and he knew that they knew. Both Zinoviev 
and Enver were actors taking the lead rôles in a significant historical pageant. The results are 
really all that matter, since the motives will soon be forgotten.39 
It is these forgotten motives we will explore throughout this chapter. In their struggle against im-
perial powers, the Bolshevik regime was hoping to utilize the anticolonial Muslim nationalist move-
ments and the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movements, the latter, including Enver Pasha, were 
hoping to utilize the resources of the Bolshevik regime in turn. «The Transcaucasus is adrift in 
rumors», as Robert Scotland-Liddell, a British reporter from Russia once put it beautifully. «They 
blow about in the air like the mountain winds.»40 Conflicting and concurring perceptions and 
agendas as well as distant rumors were in a contentious interaction to make sense of the Baku 
Congress.  
 
37 Quoted in Roy, Memoirs, 395.  
38 Riddell, To See the Dawn, 82, 84; Pervyy s’ezd narodov vostoka, 41–45. See also: Küçük Talat Bey and Nail Bey, 
report (Erzurum) on the Baku Congress to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, October 20, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal 
Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 40. 
39 Louise Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, Reprint (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973), 157–58. 
40 Quoted in Michael G. Smith, “Anatomy of a Rumour: Murder Scandal, the Musavat Party and Narratives of the 
Russian Revolution in Baku, 1917–20,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 2 (2001): 211. 
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*** 
Since Enver Pasha was mostly ignored by the Soviet leadership after his arrival in Moscow, he set 
out to find more interested audience. During the two weeks he was in Moscow, Enver surrounded 
himself mostly with dignitaries of Moscow’s Muslim community, ranging from the Mufti of Kazan 
to the Afghan Ambassador, enjoying a warm welcome by the Muslim community in Moscow. 
Many receptions were given in his honor. On August 25, the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice (eid al-
adha), «[w]e performed our feast prayers yesterday morning at one of the two mosques here, which 
was closer to us», Enver wrote to his wife. «The affection, which the people showed, was truly 
marvelous», he said.41 Afterwards there was a reception for Enver at the Tatar Theater with 300 or 
400 guests, where Enver held a long speech, which was translated into various languages.42 For 
Enver’s Muslim nationalist romanticism, these events constituted hope for the future: «There were 
representatives from Afghanistan, Khiva, Iran, almost from all of the Eastern-Muslim nations. 
Many speeches were held. It was as I always believed. I was pleased to see that the Islamdom [İslam] 
is striving to get better.»43 The next day there was a play at the Tatar Theater in honor of Enver.44 
Before leaving for the Baku Congress, the company of the Muslim community of Moscow made 
Enver rather optimistic: 
Here [in Moscow] I got in touch with all the Muslim delegations. Either they be communist or 
not, they all support from their heart a military enterprise for the Muslims. From the mufti of 
Kazan to Sultan-Galiev.45 Accordingly, I am sure that great services will be done for the Islamic 
World when the general spirit is as such. 
 
41 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), August 26, 1920, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., Naciyem, 
Ruhum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Naciye Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yazdığı Sürgün Mektupları (İstanbul: 
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44 Hayreti, diary entries, August 17–26, 1920, in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat-Terakki Erkanı, 
258. 
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sent to Turkish communist leader Mustaha Subhi, he requested information among other things on «Committee of 
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ve Mustafa Suphi, 194. Sultan-Galiev’s posthumous popularity is grounded in his conceptualization of Muslim 
national communism, the so-called Sultangalievism. For Sultan-Galiev see: Alexandre A. Bennigsen and Chantal 
Quelquejay, “Der ‘Sultangalievismus’ und die nationalistischen Abweichungen in der Tatarischen Autonomen 
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I am leaving in few days for the Islam conference that will take place in Baku. At this congress 
the decision of the Second Congress of the Third International will be implemented that enables 
assistance to those movements which are considered revolutionary, but not communists. I am 
convinced that good decisions will be made regarding the Muslim movement.46 
Enver was not alone in his optimism. «It is a very important matter that you will be present at the 
Baku Conference», wrote Kazım Karabekir Pasha in a letter to Enver Pasha, «where the fate of the 
Islamic World and all nations of the East will certainly be discussed […].»47 For many Muslim 
nationalists, the Baku Congress had therefore gradually turned into a rising sun in the horizon of 
expectations.  
On August 26, 1920, Enver Pasha traveled from Moscow to the Baku Congress in the same train 
with Comintern leaders Grigory Zinoviev, Karl Radek, Bela Kun and other prominent delegates.48 
The Comintern train travelled through the newly secured, but heavily destroyed and civil war-
struck landscapes of South Russia.49 The train arrived at Baku on the morning of September 1 with 
a great ceremony.50  
Yet, Enver Pasha’s presence at the Baku Congress had a highly ambiguous nature. Enver was trav-
elling to the Baku Congress not as a delegate, but rather as a «special guest» of the Comintern.51 
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This meant that Enver was important enough to participate at the Baku Congress, but perhaps too 
important to let off the leash as an independent delegate. Accordingly, it has been an important 
matter for the Bolshevik leadership to restrict Enver’s activities at Baku. The Comintern leaders 
feared that Enver could cast a shadow on them. Their fears would soon prove to be true.  
When Enver Pasha entered the congress hall during Zinoviev’s opening speech and sat next to the 
Kemalist delegation in one of the front loges, his sudden presence caused a great curiosity and 
excitement among the Muslim delegates.52 One can only imagine how annoying this must have felt 
for Zinoviev that many delegates came to Enver to kiss his hand, while he was still in the middle of 
his long speech.53 Without a doubt, it was a warning about Enver’s political schemes, when Zino-
viev said at his opening speech that «[t]he enormous significance of the revolution that is beginning 
in the East does not consist in requesting the British imperialist gentlemen to take their feet off the 
table, only to then permit the Turkish rich to stretch their feet comfortably on the table.»54  
After Zinoviev’s opening speech, Enver Pasha attempted to read his declaration, but was denied 
permission.55 The official Soviet historian of the Baku Congress, G. Z. Sorkin, noted that «at the 
beginning, the presidency of the Congress permitted Enver to speak to the Congress», but claimed 
that his wish was rejected afterwards due to alleged objections from the crowd.56  
What made Enver Pasha such an uncomfortable guest in the eyes of the Comintern leadership was 
not the objections against him, but rather the fact that Enver enjoyed a remarkable popularity 
 
52 For the reactions of the delegates see: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. 
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among the Muslim delegates.57 Hafız Mehmet Bey reported to Ankara Government «that the kind 
regards and affection showed to Enver Pasha in the streets of Baku and at the congress venue was 
mind-blowing and historically unprecedented [muhayyir-ül ukul ve tarihen na-mesbuk].»58 The 
young and ambitious Turkish delegate Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir) has a similar recollection of En-
ver’s public appeal:  
[Enver] Pasha’s fame in the Muslim Orient was like a fairy tale or a legend. According to folk 
belief, he was not a human being from this world. Everywhere he appeared, the sky had to open 
up, the ground had to split up, and great and magnificent things had to occur. He was over 
everything and over everyone.59  
In an interview to a local newspaper, the Turkish delegates from Trabzon Abdülhalim Efendi and 
Ali Kemal Efendi also took note of the amazing fame Enver enjoyed among the Muslim delegates 
in Baku: 
The assembly was opened. The speeches were proceeding. Suddenly at one of the loges Enver 
Pasha appeared. When the Muslims saw Enver, all hell broke loose. Everybody ignored the as-
sembly and encircled him. Some were kissing his forehead; some were caressing his back, some 
were touching his clothes; and some were looking at him amazed. They wanted to imagine him 
to be almost a superhuman creature [fevkal-beşer bir mahluk]. […] He had so much fame in the 
Islamic world that he nearly became a symbol of union and salvation. There is, I believe, no 
Muslim at all who had never heard of him.60  
«The delegates of a number of different nations visited Ali Bey [Enver] today», noted Hayati Bey 
in his diary, «he was much applauded by the people in the streets.»61 A British Intelligence report 
confirms these reports. Enver «exercised great influence over the Moslem delegates from the various 
districts of Central Asia». The report claimed that he was «looked upon by them as heroic figure 
and the representative of Moslem hostility to the Western powers and particularly England.» Fur-
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thermore, the British Intelligence reported, many senior Muslim representatives «insisted on ren-
dering Oriental obeisance to Enver Pasha when presented to him».62 Ankara Government’s diplo-
mat Rıza Nur heard from his colleagues that people were kissing the ground in Baku behind Enver’s 
steps.63 Even Zinoviev himself confessed later in Halle: 
In Baku, the influence of Enver over a large part of the Muslim population is so great that people 
on the streets kiss his hands and feet. Of course, this is regrettable. I will not hide that. But I do 
not want to hear that the whole Muslim population is totally different compared to us. This is 
what we must understand. We must be able to respond to and remove such local difficulties 
which the working class in the Orient always comes across.64 
Despite the obvious distrustfulness of the Comintern leaders, Enver Pasha did not hesitate to in-
dulge in self-promoting schemes either. For instance, he galloped on a near-by hill during the mil-
itary parade and saluted the crowds on his reared horse, hoping to steal the show. This intervention 
by Enver strongly displeased the Comintern leadership and they suspended Enver from the con-
gress.65 Fantasy or legend though not implausible, Lev Nussimbaum wrote under his assumed name 
Essad Bey that Enver had made visits to the mosques of the city, holding speeches and reciting the 
Koran, very much to the arousing suspicion among his Cheka surveillance.66 Enver also used his 
coming to Baku to get in touch with old friends and to extend his political network. He tried to 
reach out to his uncle Halil Pasha in Nakhichevan. Enver invited Halil to Baku, but they could not 
meet.67 Nevertheless, Enver’s home had become a meeting center for numerous delegates who 
sought his audience.68  
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All this attention had made the Comintern leadership uneasy. Although Enver was not allowed to 
hold a speech, his declaration was eventually accepted to be read out to the delegates.69 Later during 
the Labor Conference in Halle, Zinoviev had to explain the presence of Enver Pasha at the Baku 
Congress against the criticism of his European comrades:   
I have to say that comrade Crispien really has taken in with this Enver Pasha business. Such 
outrageous flimflam has been written on the question of nationalities. But it is not only in Ger-
many that people are talking of this spectre Enver, but in Switzerland too. I just received a letter 
from the Swiss comrade Rose Bloch, in which she asks: Well comrade, tell me, is Enver really 
your ally? Tell me, is the terrible Enver Pasha your ally? And I have a pamphlet from Frankfurt, 
signed by Gütler and Kohl, which cries that Enver Pasha, the executioner of the Armenian peo-
ple, is admitted into the Third International, but Ledebour the old revolutionary fighter is re-
fused admittance. 
Allow me to tell you how things really stand (Heckles. Unrest) Enver Pasha was present at the 
Baku congress, he was not a delegate. He requested that we give him the opportunity to issue a 
statement. […] So, we did not allow him to speak, indeed this was at my instigation as president 
of the congress. Then he asked us to read out a statement. We agreed to do that. […] 
So that is what the Enver Pasha story looks like. (Unrest) Enver Pasha was not a delegate, and 
there was even a resolution against him. Of course, Enver Pasha was the leading butcher of the 
Armenians, and we also told him that to his face.70 
The stigma of war-criminal surely haunted Enver to a certain degree at the Baku Congress, but this 
was limited to certain groups such as European and Armenian delegates.71 But there was some 
opposition to him among the Muslim delegates as well. Some Turkish communists did protest his 
participation for he should rather be prosecuted at a people’s court as an imperialist war-monger.72 
Underground networks of Azerbaijani nationalists of the defeated Musavvat Party, on the other 
hand, were rumored to have planned the assassination of their former hero Enver Pasha, because 
of his collaboration with the Bolshevik enemy.73 The Bolshevik leadership of Azerbaijan under 
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Neriman Nerimanov tried to undermine Enver’s presence in Baku as well.74 Also Celaleddin Kork-
masov, a Dagestani delegate, criticized the «intrigues of the Turkish imperialists» in Northern Cau-
casus and expressed disappointment about Enver’s presence at the Baku Congress.75 But for most 
of the Muslim delegates, his dark past probably did not really matter or remained unknown.76 Even 
less noticeable was the speech delivered by Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, the master-criminal behind the 
Armenian Genocide.77 The summary of his speech renders it as an apologia for Ottoman Empire’s 
war-time policies.78 Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was even elected to the nonparty faction at the Council 
for Action and Propaganda.79  
Enver Pasha’s declaration was read out on the fourth session, on September 4, 1920.80 Mehmed 
Emin, a Turkish communist delegate, who read out the Turkish original text of Enver’s declaration, 
presented it dismissingly and disapprovingly. Thus, a confusion among the Muslim delegates arose, 
as Şevket Süreyya remembers. Many delegates were not sure whether to cheer or not. Hurrahs and 
boos mixed with each other in the congress hall.81 The news of his declaration, as it was circulated 
in Ottoman Turkey, however, received mostly positive reactions. Strangely enough, Comintern 
and communist publications published Enver’s declaration and contributed to its circulation.82 En-
ver’s name was enough to give the British sleepless nights. Therefore, in Bolshevik propaganda 
outlets his presence at Baku was neither denied nor neglected.  
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In his declaration, Enver Pasha expressed his solidarity with the Bolshevik Revolution and the 
achievements of the Comintern. According to his self-given title, Enver claimed to represent the 
Union of the Revolutionary Organizations of Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia and India. It 
is convenient to assume that this Union was specially designed for the occasion of the Baku Con-
gress to represent the absent Muslim nations.83 On the one hand, Enver argued that the Young 
Turk regime was not motivated «by any sense of imperialism under any circumstances» (hiçbir 
zaman emperyalizm hissi değildi). To the contrary, as Enver claimed, the Ottoman Empire was 
nothing but the victim of the clash between British or German imperialisms. On the other hand, 
Enver made efforts to underline the Young Turk regime’s anti-imperialist motivations in defending 
Tripoli for the Tripolitanians and Azerbaijan for the Azeris against imperialist and colonialist pow-
ers. All in all, Enver was explicitly polite and praiseful in addressing the Comintern and the leaders 
of the Bolshevik revolution. There were several pseudo-socialist references to Anatolian peasants 
and laborers in his manuscript showing that he already adopted the Comintern topics and terms. 
At the end of his declaration, he called for a further cooperation with the Comintern for the anti-
imperialist and anticolonial struggle in the East.84   
Masayuki Yamauchi was first to compare the Ottoman-Turkish hand-written manuscript of Enver 
Pasha’s declaration stored at the archives of the Turkish Historical Society with the Russian steno-
graphic record officially published by the Comintern. The result showed that Enver’s Muslim na-
tionalist phraseology and expressions in the original manuscript such as «army of mujahideen» 
(mücahidler ordusu), «the sacredness of the people» (halkın mukaddesatına), and «victory by the 
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grace of Allah» (Hak’tan muvafakiyetler), etc., was changed in favor of Bolshevik terminology or 
completely omitted in the Russian publication.85 
A resolution was immediately adopted by the congress in reaction to Enver’s declaration. Despite 
solidarity with «all Turkish fighters in combat against world imperialism», the third clause said: 
The Congress finds it necessary to act with special caution toward the leaders of the movement 
[i.e. Unionists] who in the past led the interests of one of the imperialist groups, thereby sub-
jecting the toiling masses of Turkey to twofold ruin in the interests of a small group of rich men 
and high-ranking officers. The congress proposes to these leaders that they prove in deeds that 
they are now ready to serve the toiling people and make amends for their false steps in the past.86  
This clause demonstrates Comintern’s strategy about exploiting Enver Pasha for the mobilization 
of anticolonial Muslim nationalism. Although he was to be utilized and kept close, collaboration 
in revolutionary politics with Enver was to be justified, if not publicly downplayed. Enver did not 
attend any of the congress sessions thereafter.87 Enver wrote later in a letter to Mustafa Kemal, «[…] 
if I had ever worked to obtain a personal benefit from the Bolsheviks, […] I had not come under 
the senseless attack of some the people in Baku for I declared the world the truth and my purpose.»88 
Zinoviev later said before the St. Petersburg Soviet:  
The former Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish armed forces during the Imperialist war took 
part in the Congress. He declared himself to be a sincere partisan of the Communist Interna-
tional. But we have warned the partisan of the Congress to be prudent in their relations with 
apostates of this sort. Enver Pasha and men of his like cannot be sincere. Seeing no solution for 
their country, which dismembered by Western bourgeoisie, they come to us for protection. This 
reaffirms the strength and importance of the Congress.89 
 
85 It is, however, not clear whether the text was changed for the reading or for the publication. Yamauchi, The Green 
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89 Petrogradskaya Pravda, September 18, 1920, quoted in Chaqueri, “The Baku Congress,” 94. 
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Zinoviev and the Comintern leaders discovered that even as a fallen hero of pan-Islamism and as a 
fugitive war-criminal, Enver Pasha was still too strong be left alone in Baku.90 On the one hand the 
Bolsheviks distrusted Enver’s schemes and publicly disassociated themselves from his past crimes. 
On the other hand, the Bolsheviks’ general skepticism over the potential of spread of communism 
in the East made Enver a more practical asset in anti-imperialist struggle than some Eastern com-
munists.91 In a secret meeting with a British representative in February 1921, Talat Pasha frankly 
admitted that 
An alliance with the Bolshevists was purely a matter of expediency. You might say it was a dou-
ble-edged sword, but its edge, as far as the enemy of Turkey were concerned, was sharp, and its 
dangerous edge to Turkey was very blunt. The Turk and the Bolshevik had nothing in common 
but a temporary alliance, a convenience from the point of view of Russia that answered a need 
from the point of view of Turkey. […] Enver was at the moment in Moscow […] not through 
any liking of Bolshevism. Enver […] was colourless, as far as policy was concerned. He was doing 
the best in his power for his country.92 
At the last evening of the Baku Congress on September 8, Şevket Süreyya was introduced to Enver 
Pasha at his poorly furnished quarters in Baku. There was also Küçük Talat (Muşkara) Bey. Later, 
Azmi Bey and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir Bey joined them as well as they came from with groceries in 
their hands. A Turkish POW was cooking a meal at one corner of the room. At that night, Enver 
and his friends were uncertain, whether Zinoviev would even take them with in his Comintern 
train back to Moscow. As Şevket Süreyya left, there was still no news from Zinoviev.93 «According 
to information from a good Caucasian source», as The Times informs, «Enver Pasha has left Baku 
for Moscow in an armoured train in the company of Zinovieff.»94  
*** 
The Baku Congress was a uniquely transnational event of Orientalism. On the one hand, Eastern 
delegates expressed self-Orientalizing notions of pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Asianism. 
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On the other hand, the Baku Congress aroused also sentiments of Orientalism in the sense of the 
postcolonial theory of Edward Said.95 One might see Orientalist (imperialist) intentions and dis-
courses on behalf of its Bolshevik conveners that haunted the Baku Congress from the onset. The 
Baku Congress was a complex social event that was perceived differently in the eyes of its diverse 
witnesses and in the imagination of its distant observers. The Baku Congress did not make imme-
diately sense for it was a very ambiguous event. The significance of the Baku Congress remained 
contested thereafter as well. Some considered it a fiasco or a farce, but for others it remained a lost 
and forgotten moment for anticolonial movements of the East.  
One should not forget that despite the political opening towards nationalist-revolutionary move-
ments of the East, the Baku Congress was foremost a Soviet event. Before the sessions started, the 
communist faction had a meeting with more than 400 members. At this meeting a proposal was 
prepared for the statute and executive committee of the Congress, which was put for ratification at 
the first session.96 Thus, it was assured from the beginning that the Baku Congress was—to put it 
in Zinoviev’s words—the «complement, the second part, the second half» of the Second Comintern 
Congress.97 Though the autonomy of the Comintern from the influence of the Soviet Government 
was given to a certain degree in 1920, it was never fully independent from Soviet state of affairs 
either.98 As the British Baku delegate H. G. Wells concluded, the Bolshevik motivation behind the 
Baku Congress was presumably not much more «than a vague idea of hitting back at the British 
Government through Mesopotamia and India, because it has been hitting them through Kolchak, 
Deniken, Wrangel, and the Poles». In Wells’ critical eyes, the Baku Congress was only «a counter-
offensive almost as clumsy and stupid as the offensives it would counter.»99 Even critics such as M. 
N. Roy accepted the strategic gains: «It might not yield any lasting results, but why forgo the fun 
of a picturesque show which was sure to give the then British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, some 
sleepless nights.»100 In fact, Trotsky wrote at the eve of the Baku Congress to Chicherin that «a 
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potential Soviet revolution in the East is now advantageous for us chiefly as a major item of diplo-
matic barter with England.»101 Most Comintern leaders had certainly an honest interest in the 
Eastern Revolution beyond Soviet strategic interests.102 The delegates holding speeches were stress-
ing the revolutionary potential of the East for the struggle against imperialism.103 For many Com-
intern enthusiasts, the World Revolution was more than a lip service. However, they seemed to be 
rather ignorant, if not arrogant, in dealing with the East. One must give Wells credit, when he 
wrote: «I did my best to find out […] what they thought they were doing in the Baku Conference. 
And frankly I do not think they know.»104  
The Baku Congress was convened with typical Soviet-style parades and Internationalist ceremonies. 
The topics under discussion also reveal a certain Euro-centric understanding of communism. For 
instance, one of the major issues was why the Third (Communist) International was superior to 
the Second (Socialist) International. To entertain the delegates, the anthem «International» was 
playing repeatedly by an orchestra during ovations. On September 3, 1920, there were no sessions 
out of respect to Friday prayers, but a military parade of the Red Army took place.105 In this military 
parade there was also a Red Turkish regiment consisting of former Ottoman POWs carrying a 
Turkish flag.106 A huge statue of Karl Marx was unveiled by Comintern leaders in the city center 
with a great ceremony.107 One of the propaganda highlights was a public performance at which the 
effigies of Lloyd George, Alexandre Millerand, and Woodrow Wilson were show-trialed and set on 
fire.108 At the end of the congress sessions, there was a ceremony for 26 Baku commissars, executed 
previously by the British in Baku.109 At the end of the congress, a Council of Action and Propa-
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ganda was elected with the duty to administrate the propaganda and agitation by publishing jour-
nals and pamphlets after the end of the congress. Furthermore, a University of the Peoples of the 
East was also to be founded in Moscow.110 The Council published a propaganda journal called 
Narody Vostokak (and Şark İli in Turkish). Many articles as well as guidelines were prepared for 
further correspondence, propaganda, and organization.111 As a communist and Soviet event, how-
ever, the Baku Congress was not necessarily convincing. The Comintern leaders practically did not 
really know how to deal with the situation in Baku. The targeted crowd was mostly uneducated 
and uninterested in debates on class-struggle as well as presumably unimpressed by the outlandish 
Internationalist ceremonies. Major Arif Bey, who was sent by Kazım Karabekir Pasha to the Baku 
Congress, concluded: «The Congress principally serves the purpose of propaganda.»112  
The hope to mobilize the anticolonial Muslim nationalist feelings proved to be double-edged sword 
for the Bolshevik regime. Although the Baku Congress was directed against the rest of the world as 
an asset to Soviet foreign affairs, the over-proportionate representation of Russian Muslim delegates 
and the impact of Enver Pasha on them tied the Baku Congress unintendedly with the Soviet 
domestic affairs in the Caucasus and Turkestan. One of its most important delegates, the leader of 
the nonparty fraction Narbutabekov from Tashkent, for instance, harshly criticized «the local au-
thorities, whose policy is alienating the working masses from the Soviet government.» He called 
upon the communist leaders to pull back their «colonizers who are now working behind the mask 
of communism!» Narbutabekov did not even hesitate to say that only when «that is done, I am 
sure, not a single Muslim will venture to raise his hand against Soviet power.»113 Major Arif Bey 
came to the conclusion that the promise for autonomy in Turkestan and Dagestan has proven to 
be disappointing, because «its execution is a trouble» (tatbikatı bir aksidir).114 The representative of 
the Ankara Government İbrahim Tali (Öngören) also expressed the inconsistencies of the Bolshevik 
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agenda in his report to the Ankara Government: «My mind doesn’t grasp the Bolsheviks’ depiction 
and perspective of a world federation. What I heard from Khiva and Turkestan and what I saw in 
Azerbaijan has opened my eyes to this mentality.»115 Although Comintern leaders would go strides 
to deny it, Soviet «internal» imperialism and colonialism was on the rise in its Central Asian fron-
tiers.116 
Despite the Soviet spectacles, the Baku Congress was at the same time a remarkably pan-Oriental 
event. Without exception, all eyewitnesses underline its unique exotic atmosphere. The British sci-
ence fiction author H. G. Wells, who attended the Baku Congress during his research trip to Russia, 
remembers with a touch of cynicism «a quite wonderful accumulation of white, black, brown, and 
yellow people, Asiatic costumes and astonishing weapons.»117 «The auditorium was extremely pic-
turesque», as the French delegate Alfred Rosmer similarly noted. «All the Eastern costumes gathered 
together made an astonishingly rich and colourful picture», Rosmer wrote in his memoir.118 Turk-
ish delegate Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir) also depicted how Baku resembled «the colorful view of one 
of the great cities of Asia in medieval times». «Arabs, Indians, Iranians, Afghans, Mongols, Uzbeks, 
Kirghiz, […] Kurds, and people from many more tribes and nations» were present, according to 
Şevket Süreyya, all dressed in their traditional costumes. «They all had sabers, daggers, pistols, and 
knives on their shoulders and belts», he wrote and mentioned their numerous and distinct head 
wears.119 One Turkish delegate from Trabzon told in an interview: «What a great and an astonish-
ing gathering it was. There were people in various images and costumes. Endless nations.»120 
This exotic pan-Oriental scenery was partly responsible as to why many commentators derided the 
Baku Congress as a serious gathering.121 «I cannot take this Baku Conference very seriously», wrote 
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H. G. Wells, a view that has for long determined the ridiculed legacy of the Baku Congress. «It was 
an excursion, a pageant, a Beano», he explained and concluded that «[a]s a meeting of Asiatic pro-
letarians it was preposterous.»122 Not without a reason, the pan-Oriental atmosphere of two thou-
sands of Muslim delegates mixed with Marxist phraseology and Soviet public ceremonies were per-
ceived as a confusing and artificial scenery.  
To be sure, there was a good portion of Orientalism in Comintern’s approach to the «backward 
nationalities»—to quote the Bolshevik nomenclature of the time. The Bolshevik Orientalism some-
what differed from imperialist and colonial Orientalism of the time, since it was openly anticolonial 
and gave the Eastern delegates a platform to voice their demands. Yet, it was still culturally Euro-
centric and politically hegemonic in its over-all approach to the «Orient» and «Orientals».123 As an 
anticolonial intellectual M. N. Roy believed that «the idea [of the Baku Congress] was exotic and 
appealed to the curiosity of the western delegates to the Second World Congress».124 Therefore, 
Roy mocked the Baku Congress as «Zinoviev’s Circus». «I refused to join the picturesque cavalcade 
to the gates of the mysterious Orient», Roy wrote in his memoir.125 American journalist John Reed, 
who died shortly after the Baku Congress, was strongly disappointed by Zinoviev’s and Radek’s 
insincerity and cynical rhetoric in dealing with the Eastern nationalities.126  
Despite the Bolshevik overtures to Orientalist clichés and hegemonic ambitions, tropes of Orien-
talism were clearly stronger on the part of the critics of the Baku Congress. Despite his alleged 
insincerity, Zinoviev ended up defending the Baku Congress against the Orientalism of his Euro-
pean comrades in Halle. Zinoviev made painstaking efforts to counter Rudolf Hilferding’s criticism 
of «mullahs of Chiva, whom the demagogues, the Bolsheviks, were trying to draw into the Com-
munist international.»127 British Intelligence even ridiculed the intellectual competence of the del-
egates. «The majority of the delegates seem to have been illiterate», as one report concluded, «and 
to have taken far more interest in each other’s weapons and in selling the produce, which they had 
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brought with them from their native countries, than in the proceedings of the Conference.»128 One 
Comintern functionary Elena D. Stasova was annoyed about the Muslim delegates, «a variety of 
khans and beks, who decided to utilize their journey to Baku to attend to various commercial 
matters—the selling of carpets, leatherwork and so forth.»129 Also Şevket Süreyya dismissively re-
calls in his memoir—from the retrospective of Kemalist Orientalism—that  
the first sessions of the congress passed by with parades, screams, roars and cheers. The swords 
were drawn out without ceasing. Besides these, a few program meetings took place, but since it 
was necessary to listen to the speeches there, rather than drawing out the sword and yelling, these 
didn’t get the attention of the honorable delegates.130  
«In view of the fact that the Soviet gave free meals to the delegates at the expense of the Baku 
population», as The Times mocked the event, «the following Russian mot seems to be a good sum-
ming-up of this sorry farce:—The Eastern Communists Congress has simply shown that Orientals 
like pilaff [a rice meal] and that our Communists have not understood the Moslem mentality.»131 
Despite the motives of Orientalism in criticizing the Baku Congress, there was certainly a discon-
nection between Bolshevik intentions for social mobilization and the socio-political motivation of 
the targeted social movement base.  
Although the oft-mentioned Oriental atmosphere casted a shadow on the Bolshevik momentum of 
the Baku Congress, for most of the Eastern delegates the congress probably meant something else. 
Despite his retrospective sarcastic tone, Şevket Süreyya gave credit to the general euphoria and 
solidarity among the Muslim delegates filling the streets of Baku. He remembers, how everybody 
was fraternizing with each other, even though they could not speak or understand each other’s 
language. Everybody was celebrating the so-called «awakening of the East». The end of the long-
lasting oppression of Asia was believed to have arrived. It was felt like a «judgement day», as Şevket 
Süreyya remembers. The sleeping nations of the East were now waking up from their «centuries-
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old sleep» to finally overthrow their oppressors and besiegers.132 Şevket Süreyya summarizes his 
youthful feelings in Baku in a popular poem, «which all the young men of the time knew by heart»:  
I gazed at your silent horizon where delusions sleep, 
O Orient! Haven’t you slept enough for ages? 
Those peaceful domes, still the most soulful shelter, 
Those minarets, still echo a call for destiny… 
A piece of blood is enough to defeat thousand sufferings, 
O Orient! Wake up, enough is enough, O Orient, wake up, it’s enough!133 
The oft-repeated maxim of the Baku Congress was that «[a] new world [was] awakening to the life 
and struggle: the world of the oppressed nationalities.»134 Naciye Hanım, a young lady delegate 
from Ottoman Turkey, was proclaiming that «in order to see the dawn one has to pass through the 
dark night.»135 This metaphor of the «awakening of the East» had a long history at least since the 
Muslim reform movements of the 19th century—from the Young Ottomans over Jamal ad-Din al-
Afghani and the literary Arabic nakhda (awakening) movement to Tatar Jadidist movement. In this 
sense, the modernist-progressive worldviews in the Middle East imagined their encounter with mo-
dernity as an awakening.136 The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 had a further effect in appre-
ciating the geopolitical potential of a modernist awakening by Eastern nations.137 This metaphor 
of the «awakening of the East» was simultaneously supported by the imagination and anxiety of 
European Orientalists. 
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One year after the Baku Congress, at the third conference of the Communist International, Enver 
Pasha was still a «special guest» of the Comintern. The declaration of the Union of Muslim Revo-
lutionary Societies was read out by a so-called Makhul Bey. The declaration was a celebration of 
the global struggle of Muslims since the end of the war:  
It is now almost a year since the Baku Congress of the Eastern Nations. With great pleasure, we 
observe the struggle towards freedom of a people of five-hundred-million Muslims making the 
four-fifth of the people from the Atlantic Ocean over North Africa reaching into the Great Chi-
nese Ocean who are thirsty for freedom.  
Those independence struggles in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Albania, Yemen, 
Syria, Iraq, Iran, and India which has joined the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies and 
the results achieved so far are rapidly encouraging our hopes. […] 
Like we said last year, the war between the imperialists which started in 1914 still continues. 
These monsters whose rapacity cannot be satisfied will long quarrel over the body of oppressed 
nations they knocked down.  
Let us continue to prepare for the world revolution so that when the time is ripe let us all free 
ourselves by working together as hand in glove. Time is working for our benefit. Let us not sleep, 
but move with courage. Definitely, the last triumph will be ours. Because we are the oppressed, 
we are the rightful.138 
*** 
«Bolshevism and Islam can no more mix than oil and water», The Times propagated boldly on the 
occasion the Baku Congress but claimed that «Enver is no Moslem.»139 Of course, Enver could not 
disagree more with the latter assumption, although the former was a matter of dispute. Indeed, in 
the year 1920 discussions on Islam and Bolshevism was passionately discussed in the Muslim 
world.140 A British Intelligence report on pan-Islamism and Bolshevism said: Both the Turks and 
other [Arab] nationalists put forward hostility to Britain as common ground on which to unite 
with the Bolsheviks.141 The Bolshevik leaders made no secret about their utilitarian approach to 
pan-Islamism, even when speaking to Enver Pasha. Enver told Mustafa Kemal: 
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On the way [to the Baku Congress], I talked to Zinoviev and his friends. They think that there 
is no fertile soil for communism in the East and believe that by working along communist prin-
ciples in the East would turn the public against us [i.e. the Muslim nationalist revolutionaries]. 
Therefore, they explained that they see the solution in relying on the principle of pan-Islamism 
[ittihad-ı İslam] in sponsoring and encouraging all revolutionary movements directed against the 
English and capitalism.142 
The relation between socialism and Islam has always been considered suspicious in Orientalist im-
aginations. The Baku Congress was, therefore, in the eyes of many observers the «heyday» of this 
«unholy alliance».143 The reason for this perception was one particular aspect of the Baku Congress. 
Zinoviev finished his long speech at the first session of the congress with the following appeal to 
Eastern delegates: 
Comrades! Brothers! The time has come when you can set about organizing a true people's holy 
war against the robbers and oppressors. The Communist International turns today to the peoples 
of the East and says to them Brothers, we summon you to a holy war, above all against British 
Imperialism!  
Loud applauses followed Zinoviev’s call for holy war. Delegates stood up and cried «Hurrah!», while 
holding up their weapons. Zinoviev was unable to continue for some time. The collective voice of 
the delegates, according to minutes of the congress, cried: «We swear it!» 144 
The Bolshevik call for holy war was, of course, the most obscure moment of marriage of socialism 
and Islam. The Marxist motto that religion is «the opium of the people» bedeviled the jihad of 
Baku 1920 from the beginning on.145 This call for jihad was not a slip of the tongue by Zinoviev. 
It was programmatic. Radek and many others repeated the call for holy war in their speeches. In 
the Manifesto of Peoples of the East, which was accepted by the Baku Congress, «holy war» was 
one of the signal words, which was frequently repeated. The final declaration of the Baku Congress 
called: «May the holy war of the peoples of the East and of the toilers of the entire world against 
imperialist Britain burn with unquenchable fire!»146  
Why would the Bolsheviks call for a holy war? Common wisdom—then and now—shows that the 
«Great Jihad» (cihad-ı ekber) of 1914 declared on the eve of World War I had failed to impress its 
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adversaries.147 The German and Ottoman call for a global pan-Islamist uprising and large-scale 
mutinies of Muslim soldiers against Ottoman Empire’s enemies proved to be nothing but hot air.148 
Nevertheless, the jihad of 1914 had not been a total failure from another perspective. Despite the 
large number of deserters, the Ottomans demonstrated a much-respected determination and a ter-
rifying zeal and violence in fighting the infidel enemies.149 The use of Muslim nationalist and 
jihadist terminology was more effective for Ottoman war mobilization, counterinsurgency, ethnic-
religious cleansing, and homefront propaganda than for stirring Muslim uprisings abroad.150  
The picture differed severely in 1920. The defamation of the Ottoman Empire and the unapolo-
getic parcellation of Muslim territories by the Entente powers had caused mass protests and mass 
uprisings in the Muslim world. In the summer of 1920, major Muslim uprisings were simultane-
ously taking place in Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia. Although post-Ottoman nation-
alist historiographies were all too eager to frame these uprisings as «national awakenings», calls for 
jihad were very common in the Middle Eastern uprisings of 1919-1920. Arguing against grain of 
nationalist narratives, Michael Provence demonstrated that «rebel participants […] did not view 
the post-Ottoman revolts as separate movements of national liberation but rather as locally condi-
tioned elements of a single, undifferentiated struggle.» The insurgents shared, according to Pro-
vence, a «common Ottoman genealogy of armed struggle, nationalism, and patriotism».151 The 
sense of religious identity is far stronger than that of national identity, as one American intelligence 
report from Syria had pointed out in late 1918 and continued: The so-called Arab Movement is 
essentially and fundamentally a religious, and not a national movement. The conclusion was that 
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Arab nationalism was in reality a form of Moslem nationalism.152 Indeed, Muslim nationalism 
was still the dominant political identity in the aftermath of World War I.153 
Regardless of the mischiefs of the jihad of 1914, the British officials were still haunted by the spec-
ters of jihad and pan-Islamism in 1920. In post-war Syria, where people who had recently escaped 
the conscription of the Ottoman and Faysal governments were now freely participating in the jihad 
against the French occupation.154 During the Iraqi revolt in the summer of 1920, there were calls 
for jihad by Shiite mujtahidin.155 Gertrude Bell wrote from Iraq to her father: «We are now in the 
middle of a full-blown Jihad.»156 Uprisings were taking place at the Afghan-Indian border in 1919-
1920 after the Afghan Emir had declared jihad against British India in Third Anglo-Afghan War.157 
Jihad cries were now heard everywhere from Morocco to Afghanistan. 
Bolsheviks were not deaf to these numerous calls for holy war throughout Muslim lands. A Com-
intern document summarizes the Comintern perception of the Muslim uprisings as follows:  
The devastation and spoliation wrought by the capitalist great Powers for four years aroused 
stormy revolutionary movements in the English colonies … which draw courage and strength 
from the example of the Russian revolution and the existence of Soviet Russia. They are primarily 
of a nationalist and religious character, but they are also bound up with social revolutionary 
struggles. … From the Atlantic to the Himalayas and to China, the Moslems are stirred up and 
restive. However various the forms in which this disturbance among the peoples of Asia and 
Africa is expressed, they are all directed against the capitalist States and are only intensified by 
the competition among these States.158 
 
152 Underlined in the original. William Yale, “An Arab Empire,” December 18, 1918, quoted in Friedman, British 
Pan-Arab Policy, 1915–1922, 145.  
153 Erik J. Zürcher, “The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 137, 
no. 1 (1999): 81–92. See also: Alp Yenen, “The ‘Young Turk Zeitgeist’ in the Middle Eastern Uprisings in the 
Aftermath of World War I,” in War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and 
Feroz Ahmad, 1181–1216 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016), 1191–97. 
154 James L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (California: 
University of California Press, 1999), 3, 111, 113, 116, 133–134. 
155 Amal Vinogradov, “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no. 2 (1972): 136. Shiite calls for jihad were also very instrumental during World 
War I. Werner Ende, “Iraq in World War I: The Turks, the Germans and the Shiʾite Mujtahids’ Call for Jihād,” in 
Proceedings of the ninth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants: Amsterdam, 1st to 7th Septembre 
1978, ed. Rudolph Peters (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 57–71; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Ottoman Jihad or Jihads: The 
Ottoman Shīʿī Jihad, the Successful One,” in Zürcher, Jihad and Islam in World War I, 117–34. 
156 Quoted in Isaiah Friedman, British Miscalculations: The Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918–1925 (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2012), 191. 
157 Leon Bacqueiro Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize 
a Tribal Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), 46–47. 
158 Extracts from the Executive Committee of the Communist International Theses on the Fight against the War 
Danger, March 1922, in Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International, 1919–1943: Volume One, 1919–1922 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 330. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
286 
Zinoviev did not need to seek far in finding ways to mobilize anticolonial Muslim nationalism. 
The Muslim concept of jihad was already an established framing strategy for political and military 
mobilization. The Comintern tried use the Islamic concept of holy war, however, without making 
direct reference to Islam. The word «Islam» was not mentioned literally in the call for holy war at 
the Baku Congress and the Muslim religion was mentioned only on few occasions also in other 
speeches.159 Nevertheless, Zinoviev’s call for a holy war (in Russian: sviashchennaia voina) was 
meant most certainly as an Islamic jihad. It was surely translated into Turkish, Azeri, and Persian 
as jihad, if not by other synonymous variants such as ghazavat or harb-i mukaddes.160  
Although Islam remained somewhat a taboo word, some speakers were going long distances in 
emphasizing that «the Muslim religion is rooted in principles of religious communism».161 Whereas 
Islam was barely mentioned by name, there was a repeating and derogative discourse about pan-
Islamism. «Pan-Islamism, Musavatism, all these trends are not ours», Zinoviev proclaimed: «We 
have a different policy.»162 Already in Lenin’s Theses on National and Colonial Questions, the 
article 11, c) made a similar objection regarding pan-Islamism, rendering it nothing but Turkish 
imperialism:  
It is necessary to struggle against the pan-Islamic and pan-Asian movements and similar currents 
that try to link the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with strength-
ening the power of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobles, large landowners, clergy, 
and so forth.163  
These were no single remarks. As much as the call for jihad was programmatic, the rejection of pan-
Islamism was similarly stressed as a provision. Disclaiming pan-Islamism while calling for holy war 
had ambiguous consequences.164 It simply did not make sense for many Muslim delegates. On the 
one hand, some true communists were displeased. Louise Bryant criticized later that «there was 
hardly anything Socialistic about Zinoviev’s appeal for a holy war.»165 On the other hand, for 
Muslim delegates, the strict rejection of pan-Islamism was alienating, because the «Muslim union» 
(ittihad-ı İslam), the actual term for pan-Islamism, was generally perceived as a desired ideal to 
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many Muslims of different political color. Some Turkish delegates to Baku Congress believed even 
that there was a fanatic Christian movement that tried «to hinder the Bolsheviks from working 
together with the Muslims, because they claim that the revival of the Muslim nations will cause a 
pan-Islamism problem [ittihad-ı İslam meselesi].»166 British Intelligence was proudly reporting the 
news coverage from Tiflis newspapers that «the Congress has been a failure. From the point of view 
of those Muslims, who sincerely expected to further the cause of Islam, it is certainly a failure.»167 
After reading the intelligence report on the Baku Congress, Herbert Young from the Foreign Office 
noted: «It is quite clear from this report that Bolshevism and Pan-Islam are gradually separating 
from incompatibility of temperament.»168 Later it was confirmed by Muslim communists that by 
rejecting Pan-Islam, the Comintern had rather damaged its relation to Muslim masses.169 A report 
prepared by two Unionists from Enver’s entourage in Baku for the Ankara Government had the 
impression that the Eastern delegates were surely disappointed (inkisar-ı hayale uğradıkları şüphe 
edilemez) by the outlandish celebrations and communist-bias of the Congress declarations. Alt-
hough the Soviets did not demand a communist regime in Turkey, the same report concluded that 
«Turkey was in need of developing a Leftist movement», because Turkey’s relation to «the East, 
that is the Turkic and Muslim world», was depended on its good relations with Bolshevism.170  
«The innate contradiction between Pan-Islam and Soviet-style atheist internationalism was con-
stantly pushed into background», because, as Selim Deringil puts it, «both the Soviets and the 
Turkish exiles realized that they needed one another against the common enemy—Britain.»171 En-
ver Pasha knew very well that the Bolshevik approach to Islam was problematic. Enver Pasha wrote 
to Mustafa Kemal Pasha: 
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Nevertheless, at the [Baku] congress I talked to many Muslim delegates, either they be com-
munists or not, from Turkestan, Afghanistan, Kirgizstan, Dagestan, and Caucasus and Chech-
enia. They have demonstrated by their spirit and acclamations that they are allied to Turkey and 
possess an indescribable degree of attachment to the Turks with strong ties. As far as I under-
stood, as a result of a general revival of Islam [İslamda bir intibah-ı umumi], they came to the 
conclusion that any war taking place against Turkey will bring a greater degree of attention to 
them. Some of these ovations out of this position made the communists concerned. For some 
reason, I think that the Russian communist executive committee which considers Turkey as 
aspiring to communist rule, did neither understand that this Muslim union [Müslüman birl-
iğinin] is a force nor that this force cannot be obtained by communism.172 
Despite being aware of the problems in the cooperation between Muslim nationalist revolutionaries 
and Soviet Russia, Enver Pasha told all the Muslim dignitaries in Baku to continue collaborating 
with the Soviet regime.173 Also a newspaper article quoted in a British Intelligence report stated 
that «Moslem delegates, particularly […] those from Turkestan, […] pour out their many wrongs 
into Enver’s ear.» However, the newspaper approved that «Enver Pasha urged the Turkestan dele-
gates to try and forget the evil past even if they only forgot it temporarily.»174 Enver believed that 
Soviet modernization, however difficult it may come, would eventually help the Russian Muslims 
establish independence and foster nationalist ideas.175 Enver wrote even to Mirza Kuchik Khan, 
who was rumored to have abandoned the Soviet cause after witnessing their malgovernance in Gi-
lan, a letter trying to convince him to come to term with the Russians «for the sake of general 
interests».176  
«Let’s see, what Allah will bring upon us. Is there hope for the future?», Enver Pasha asked in 
another private letter after returning from the Baku Congress. «The World War did not end yet. 
No matter what happens, I am sure it will end with the redemption of Islam», he preached once 
again.177 Islam became the main frame of reference in Enver’s political enterprises. When Enver 
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asked Kazım Karabekir to send Turkish officers to Moscow and Baku to work for pan-Islamism, 
for instance, he insisted that they should be pious Muslims, not drinking alcohol.178 In an internal 
note of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies on the results of the Baku Congress, Enver 
made clear that he was rather suspicious of communism, but ready to cooperate with Soviet Russia 
and the Comintern against the British. First, the autonomy of all anti-imperialist struggles in the 
Muslim World must be guaranteed. Second, no «export of communism by the bayonet» was to be 
tolerated in these countries. The third and last principle read: «Since we have the opinion that we 
can mobilize them against our enemies in the Islamic world only by operating as Muslims and only 
then they can move towards progress, no other ways of operation need to be considered.»179  
In negotiating to win over the British, the CUP leaders expressed more openly their concerns about 
Bolshevism. In an interview with a British informant in December 1920, Talat said that he «had 
no fear of Bolshevist propaganda among Mahomedans», because—he explained—it «was doomed 
to failure, being opposed to their mentality and to the Koran.»180 In February 1921, Talat’s words 
were even harsher. «He spoke of the natural antagonism between the principles of Bolshevism and 
Islam», as Talat’s friend Aubrey Herbert remembered, «fire and water were not more different.»181 
*** 
British accounts on the Baku Congress were more eager to trivialize the congress.182 For instance, 
there were many official reports claiming that they «have heard from other sources that the Baku 
Conference was a farce.»183 Nevertheless, the British officials were in the meantime very much con-
cerned about the Baku Congress. For instance, the British occupation forces in Turkey and Persia 
did everything to prevent the arrival of delegates to Baku. They even used deadly force, as in the 
case of some unfortunate Persian delegates.184 British newspapers were reporting that the Baku 
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Congress proposed to unleash a wave of anti-British propaganda material «issued on the question 
of freeing India from British tyranny.»185  
At the center of imperial anxieties was Zinoviev’s call for holy war. Not unlike the overtly vocal 
role the Germans played in the jihad of 1914, once again the «infidel» calls for Muslim jihad were 
broadly perceived as suspicious by distant observers. Especially because the jihad call came this time 
from atheist Bolsheviks—and most of them were of Jewish origin, as some public voices enjoyed 
to underline as an evidence of conspiracy. Once again publicly voicing prejudices of British impe-
rialism,186 The Times reported:  
At this remarkable gathering Apfelbaum, who masquerades as Zinovieff, declared a holy war 
against Imperialism, and 1,800 Turkish, Kurdish, Persian, Arab, and Tartan delegates drew 
their swords as a token of acceptance of Jehad. Apfelbaum is a Jew, like his associate Bela Kun, 
or Cohen, from Budapest, who was also at Baku; and of all the strange things which have hap-
pened in the last few years, none has been stranger than this spectacle of two Jews, one of them 
a convicted pickpocket, summoning the world of Islam to a new Jehad.187  
Since the Russian Revolution in 1917, the international media depicted the Bolsheviks as Jewish 
conspirators—and the British newspapers were no exception to the rule.188 «According to the crazier 
section of the British Press», as H. G. Wells confirmed the tradition of conspiracy thinking, «they 
[i.e. the Bolshevists] are the agents of a mysterious racial plot, a secret society in which Jews, Jesuits, 
Freemasons, and Germans are all jumbled together in the maddest fashion.»189 In early 1920, the 
infamous propaganda pamphlet, The Jewish Peril: Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, was first 
published in English.190 This anti-Semitic forgery has been the main source for conspiracy theories 
of the alleged Jewish plot for world domination ever since.191 In David Fromkin’s words, «the Pro-
tocols explained—among other things—the mysterious revolts against Britain everywhere in the 
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East.»192 The Morning Post was perhaps the most outspokenly anti-Semitic voice in mainstream 
press in Britain, where the Protocols were republished and cited in a series of articles in July to 
August, 1920. The Protocols were presented as an evidence for «the existence of a vast Pan-Oriental 
Conspiracy», where Bolsheviks as agents of International Jewry were «The Cause of World Un-
rest».193 To be sure, the worldwide circulation of the Protocols in 1920 was not the origin of Jewish-
themed conspiracy theories, but unfortunately the outcome of farther-reaching anti-Semitic preju-
dices and discursive traditions of conspiracy ideologies.  
The Jewish element was, of course, not missing in the conspiracy theories about the Young Turks, 
either. Even the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 had been explained by many British experts as a 
pro-German Jewish-Freemason plot against the British interests in the Middle East.194 The assump-
tion was that the «hidden hand» of the so-called «International Jewry» in form of crypto-Jews and 
Freemasons was behind the CUP and the revolution of 1908. This conspiracy theory was based on 
Orientalist as well as anti-Semitist prejudices. The question of Muslim agency was explained (away) 
by the incapability of the «Oriental mind» and the secret power of «Jewish influence». Robert Irwin, 
a British scholar of Orientalism, pointed out that there is an Orientalist tradition to interpret every 
Muslim resistance to the Sunni orthodoxy as «super conspiracies dedicated to atheism, republican-
ism, free love and general mayhem.»195 
Soon after the disappearance of the CUP leaders in November 1918, the conspiracy theories about 
the Young Turks regained currency as we have seen in previous chapters. Once again, the «Jewish 
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influence» was not missing. Sir Eyre Crowe from the Foreign Office claimed that «the heart and 
soul of all revolutionary and terroristic movements have invariably been the Jews, the Bolsheviks 
and the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress», thus identifying the triumvirate of evil.196 
This idea that CUP was a Jewish and Masonic organization continued to color British Intelligence 
analyses. A British Intelligence report claimed that it was the Kemalist «dislike of the Jewish Free-
Masonic elements dominating the Unionists» that was partly responsible for the chasm between 
the two movements.197 One British official went even farther in labeling the usual suspects behind 
the Middle Eastern unrest. According to him, there was a «far more dangerous party, that of Enver 
& Talaat & the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination» which was, «with the Pan-Islamic of-
fensive of Bolshevism throughout the East, primarily directed against Great Britain».198  
All these conspiracy theories played into the British views of the Baku Congress. As late Richard 
H. Ullman, a diplomatic historian of Anglo-Soviet relations, noted, the word «propaganda» became 
in the terminology of the British officialdom «the shorthand term which increasingly came to stand 
for the whole complex of Soviet revolutionary activities against British interests, especially in 
Asia.»199 «The real danger in Middle Asia, as elsewhere», as The Times claimed, was not the Red 
Army, but rather the «Bolshevist propaganda.»200 In Lord Curzon’s words, it was the «Russian 
menace in the East», which threatened the British Empire «incomparably greater than anything 
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else».201 Even when facing the lack of facts and proofs of any Bolshevik propaganda or organization 
in the Middle East, the paranoid style was delivering creative explanations: 
I do not think we can say Bolshevism does not exist because we can certify that no Bolshevist 
organization exists [emphasis in original]. We are looking for something far more elusive and 
intangible than that, viz: tendencies and sympathies on the part of the Turks or any of the peo-
ples of Turkey, which foreshadows a fusion with Bolshevism or may end directly or indirectly, 
morally or materially, in aiding the Bolshevik cause to our detriment.  
[…] There have in fact been a number of incidents relevant to the subject, which, with the 
concomitant evil of Pan-Islamism, seem to fill the near horizon day by day with greater power 
of disturbing the British world.202 
According to a sarcastic report of The Times, at the Baku Congress «Enver Pasha […] assumed the 
mock title of Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevist forces marching on India.» And this army 
was nothing but «Enver’s stage army», merely a device of «Bolshevist propaganda».203 Enver’s lim-
ited agency was first revealed at the Baku Congress for distant and critical observers. To be sure, 
Enver and the CUP still continued to haunt the minds of the British officialdom, but slowly sar-
casm was used to express the increasing disillusionment with Enver’s specter. 
Although Enver Pasha had every reason to be disappointed about the long-desired cooperation with 
the Bolsheviks after the Baku Congress, he was still seeing the glass half-full. On September 7, 
Enver wrote to Kazım Karabekir: «I’m very pleased with the Eastern Congress. It will produce great 
results in the future.»204 «Anyway, I am greatly satisfied with the result of the conference», Enver 
repeated in a following letter.205 Enver had now discovered perhaps for the first time with his own 
eyes that his legendary fame in the Muslim and Turkic world was a political reality and the Bolshe-
vik leaders had also witnessed with fear and despise Enver’s great appeal. It is surely safe to say that 
Enver «suffered» from what political psychologists call a narcistic personality disorder—common 
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to many dictators and charismatic leaders.206 Thus, his fame was certainly one of the reasons why 
he was pleased with Baku Congress. His personal ambitions put aside, Enver saw in Baku, what he 
had been dreaming of for a long time, namely the grand gathering of the anticolonial Muslim 
nationalist movement which he hoped to unite under his aegis. A Turkish informant of the British 
intelligence reported that Enver’s presence was «though undoubtedly useful in that it added im-
portance to the proceedings, was nevertheless a cause of some anxiety to the Bolshevik authori-
ties».207 There is indeed an ambivalence in Enver’s presence at the Baku Congress. Masayuki 
Yamauchi rightly asked, whether the Baku Congress was the «apogee» or the «eclipse» of Enver’s 
relation to the Bolsheviks. «Enver’s participation in the Baku Congress represented the apogee of 
his cooperation with the Bolsheviks», as Yamauchi explained, «but it resulted in the commencement 
of the eclipse.»208 At the Baku Congress, Enver Pasha was, indeed, a political beast—but he was in 
chains in a traveling circus, admired and feared by spectators.
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9. Causes of Unrest in the Middle East: 
Muslim Revolutionary Societies 
between Fiction, Intention, and Action 
While the British Intelligence had long elaborated on an international conspiracy behind the 
Muslim menace, this chapter tries to map out the political organization in question by re-
covering historical facts from fiction. It illustrates the attempts of Enver Pasha and his friends 
to establish the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. As it has been argued so far, up 
until the summer of 1920, the political activities of the CUP leaders lagged behind their 
rumors and reputations. When newspaper and intelligence reports confirmed the presence of 
Enver at the Baku Congress, the rumors and conspiracy theories circling around since No-
vember 1918 finally found their approval, remarkably in a time when the unrest in the Mid-
dle East had reached its climax.  
Major Norbert N. E. Bray, a Special Intelligence Officer working for the India Office in Iraq, 
prepared in three reports the most definitive treatment on the so-called causes of unrest in 
the Middle East.1 Major Bray’s reports in fall of 1920, similarly to Hugh Whittall’s report 
from May 1919 discussed in Chapter 4, were important in pseudo-theorizing the alleged 
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Young Turk intrigues from Germany and Switzerland to the Middle East via Russia. Previ-
ously, Major Bray had made a visit to Damascus and Jeddah in 1917, when he had already 
made up his mind about the brewing dangers of the pan-Islamist movement.2 His fears were 
now approved by the revolts taking place in Palestine, Syria, Anatolia, and Iraq. Despite 
increasingly accurate intelligence, the reports still followed the same conspiracy ideology in 
projecting current events as trajectories of grand conspiracies.  
According to Major Bray’s preliminary report, the Middle Eastern unrest was a concerted 
action directed by secret societies originating from Berlin and Moscow. Since many de-
tached local groups like the Pan-Arabs, the Nationalists, the disgruntled Effendi, the tribes-
man […], and the fanatical priest were now rebelling collectively against the British rule in 
Iraq, but also elsewhere, Bray concluded that there must be an outside influence […] making 
concerted action possible.3 According to Bray’s preliminary report, an Asiatic-Islamic Fed-
eration was established with the purpose to unite and coordinate these diverse movements.4  
In his consecutive report on the causes of unrest», Bray argued again that the internal rev-
olution was organized by secret societies working on one principle but under different 
guises in different spheres. But, of course, as Bray made sure, all this was directed by Mos-
cow. This Bolshevik plot, in Major Bray conspiracy theory-laden words, proceeds to con-
solidate and organize her position thus obtained and from these nuclei to again throw out her 
sinister tentacles which, griping about in every direction, seek to fasten themselves on local 
soil, into which their roots will strike, giving her a fresh grip of organized conspiracy [emphases 
added]. This conspiracy was fostering any local discontent, preaching her doctrinism unset-
tling men’s mind, weakening authority. The verdict was: Russia has taught the Eastern 
world new lessons in statecraft and intrigue. But, of course, not only Russia was behind it 
after all. The Eastern movement is being actively supported by the German Foreign Office 
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by every possible means short of proving military forces, as Bray explained. In support of his 
claims, Bray presented a chronological diary of culmination of the various steps leading 
up to direct control by Moscow. In detail, the reports were surprisingly accurate in many 
aspects, however, the overall interpretation was rather overblown with tropes and vocabulary 
of conspiracy ideology. In short, these steps were summarized as: 
1. Discontent of the various communities of Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia.  
2. The focusing of this discontent into organized societies.  
3. The junction of these societies with each other.  
4. The linking up of these societies irrespective of policy on an Asiatic Islamic basis.  
5. The conversion through the above into Bolshevism. 
Major Bray concluded that it is the very complexity of interests [emphasis in original] that 
weakens the opposition. Therefore, as he proposes, we must remember that our opponent 
is working on a highly organized and single-minded system; we have to oppose an organized 
resistance [emphases added]. In addition to his conclusions, Bray also presented a ridiculous 
chart illustrating German-Bolshevic-Asiatic Intrigue.5 All in all, the CUP leaders were de-
picted in the midst of all these networks. While Enver Pasha was charged with the direction 
of the movement in Caucasus; Cemal Pasha was charged with the direction of the move-
ment in Afghanistan; and Halil Pasha was charged with the direction of the movement in 
Persia. The dander was real and present: The ball has been set rolling.6 
In a summary of Bray’s report, it was listed that a union with Turkish nationalists was 
brought about and active cooperation has been obtained between Syria and Anatolia, in 
which a violent and well organized pan-islamic policy has been instituted both in Syria and 
Angora. As it was explained, this organisation has been traced back to Switzerland and 
Berlin. Controlling influence in the movement is C.U.P., though it has combined pan-
Arab and nationalist elements as well as tribes. […] Great endeavors are being made to unite 
Moscow and Enver Bey with the above.7 Eventually, Major Bray went on in his following 
 
5 This chart is reprinted in M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat 
Movement 1918–1924 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 222. 
6 N. N. E. Bray, Causes of the Unrest in Mesopotamia – Report No. II, September 1920, FO 371/5231, 
7765. 
7 Secretary of State of India to Civil Commissioner (Baghdad), September 23, 1920, WO 106/200, quoted in 
Isaiah Friedman, British Pan-Arab Policy, 1915–1922: A Critical Appraisal (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010), 223. 
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reports in 1921 to forecast the coming of a wave of chaos caused by extreme Muslim nation-
alism: 
The national sentiment in the East created and bolstered by anti-Christian forces has 
grown to be a living reality in the hearts of even the moderate Moslem elements through-
out the East. National independence is being striven to an unreasoned intensity unpar-
alleled in politics. Regardless of cost, impervious to reason, its extremist adherents press 
forward as result, attainment of which, should throw the whole Eastern world into an 
inextricable chaos.8 
If we filter out the imperial prophecy of doom, there was, in fact, a very real and present 
conspiracy lurking beneath connections that Bray’s reports brought about. Although we have 
heard the same story many times before, now by the fall of 1920, the intelligence was more 
accurate than ever before, as real conspiratorial politics were more active and present than 
ever before. To be sure, some of the intelligence sources were partly distorted by the factoid 
or deceptive proclamations of CUP leaders, while they were secretly negotiating with the 
British agents. In a secret interview with a British intelligence officer, for instance, Talat Pasha 
boldly claimed that «Enver’s supporters had been given carte blanche to organize Moslems 
from Turkestan to Asia Minor and incite them to embarrass England everywhere in the 
East.»9 Such claims were half-truth, half lies.  
In assessing the validity of Major Bray’s reports, Middle-East historian A. L. Macfie came to 
the conclusion that while the information collected was for the most part accurate enough, 
the conclusions drawn were dangerously misleading.10 As intelligence historian John Ferris 
concluded, the British fears of a conspiracy were not unreasonable.11 Major Bray was actu-
ally right when he claimed that Talat Pasha had been trying to establish cooperation with the 
Syrian and Iraqi insurgents, Egyptian nationalists and Indian Muslims as well as with Russian 
 
8 N.N, . Bray, memorandum on the present situation in the Middle East, [1921], BL, IO, L.PS 11/194, 
1114, quoted in in Friedman, British Miscalculations, 91.  
9 Interview with Talat Pasha in Berlin, December 2, 1920, FO 371/5173, 15552, 144. 
10 Macfie, “British Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919–21,” 172.  
11 Ferris, “‘The Internationalism of Islam’,” 67. A report which demonstrates how well informed the British 
Intelligence has become on Enver Pasha’s activities in June 1922 see: Intelligence report (Constantinople 
Branch), June 22, 1922, FO 371/7947, 6421, in Bilal N. Şimşir, ed. British Documents on Atatürk (1919–
1938), Vol. 4: October 1921 – October 1922 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1984), 281–87. 
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Bolsheviks.12 All these conversations and connections were tapped by the British Intelligence 
in one way or another.  
Nonetheless, at the time Bray’s reports were circulating by the fall of 1920, the CUP leaders 
had indeed started to organize a more tangible movement that went beyond coffee house 
debates and midnight meetings while playing cards in Berlin. Beneath Bray’s Asiatic-Islamic 
Federation, there was indeed an organization founded by the CUP leaders that called itself 
the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. In the end, the fugitive CUP leaders had 
reached the parquet of high politics once again. Enver Pasha had finally reached Moscow and 
presented himself to the global public at the Baku Congress as a fierce revolutionary. As for 
Cemal Pasha, he was busy in Afghanistan eagerly reforming the armed forces of the Emir at 
the Indian frontier. They finally caught up with the rumors. The perceptive gap between 
conspirators and conspiracy theorists was now getting narrower as more overt action was 
taking place. This time, however, a new gap emerged between their own intentions and ac-
tions as these were laid out in their programs and correspondence.  
*** 
This attempt and this organization, namely the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, 
was stillborn anyways, rather dead long before its birth, was Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s ver-
dict.13 According to the British intelligence, on the other hand, the organization had existed 
long before, even before its actual conception. Europe hosted the creation of various émigré 
Muslim societies, but this was the most ambitious, wrote Martin Kramer, because unlike 
other societies, it was founded to regulate a wide network of other Muslim societies. How-
ever, Kramer also pointed out that it subsequently led little more than a fictitious exist-
ence.14 Thus, we are dealing with an organization that was ambitious and fictitious at 
the same time.  
 
12 N. N. E. Bray, Turco-Bolshevik Activities: Note by Political intelligence Officer Attached to India Office, 
December 10, 1920, IO.L.P&S.18.B360. Cited in Fisher, “Major Norman Bray and Eastern Unrest in the 
British Empire in the Aftermath of World War I,” 51. 
13 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya, 3 vols. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1972), 
III, 556.  
14 Emphases mine. Martin S. Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 71.  
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The conflicting manifestations of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in different 
sources—such as in public and official intelligence reports, in constitutional statutes and 
charters, in propaganda outlets, and in the correspondence and recollection of its members—
illustrate the thin line between ambition and fiction. In this context, we need to differentiate 
between movement and organization as well as between milieu and network to be able to tell 
which is which. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was rather a political move-
ment defined by its cause, namely anticolonial Muslim nationalism, than a full-functioning 
political organization which is a system of sovereignty for sovereignty. To be sure, it was both 
in many ways in ambition, but we need to differentiate here as much as we differentiate 
between the Young Turk movement and the Committee of Union and Progress. On the 
other hand, the cultural and social space of a milieu can provide discourses, structures, and 
resources for a movement/organization and networks qualitatively organize trans-spatial and 
interpersonal relations inside and outside the movement/organization. Not every other actor 
within a shared milieu or network was also inside the same movement/organization, and vice 
versa. Although the social milieus and political networks of the Union of Muslim Revolu-
tionary Societies emerged as early as the spring of 1919 in Berlin, the organization was offi-
cially founded in early fall 1920 in Moscow. 
This is the Union of [Muslim] Revolutionary Societies, founded in 1919, said Zinoviev 
while introducing the organization at the third congress of the Comintern in 1921, implying 
that the movement formally traced its foundational roots back to 1919.15 As Dr. Nazım later 
testified at the Independence Trial, the idea to found a new organization that would unite 
the revolutionary movements in the Muslim lands first came up in Berlin in the spring of 
1919. When Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım returned from Munich to Berlin, they held 
a meeting with Talat Pasha and Dr. Rüsuhi, where they discussed for the first time the idea 
to unite different movements with a single movement.16 The CUP leaders’ experiences with 
the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa made them no stranger to the politics of Muslim transnationalism. If 
we are to trust Hüsamettin Bey’s memoir, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was the precursor of the 
 
15 John Riddell, ed., To the Masses: Proceedings of the Third Congress of the Communist International, 1921 
(Leiden: Brill, 2015), 843.  
16 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, Osmanlı İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 328. 
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later exile organization after being renamed as General Revolutionary Organization of the 
Muslim World (Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilal Teşkilatı).17  
The social milieu of cosmopolitan revanchism of post-war Berlin with its politically active 
Muslim community provided the intellectual forum and accessible interpersonal networks 
for the CUP leaders to establish a transnational social movement of Muslim anticolonial-
ism.18 In Berlin, there was a remarkable community of Muslim activists, who had been for-
merly associated with the German-Ottoman propaganda and intelligence machinery. In ad-
dition, Dr. Nazım tells that there were thousands of Muslim students in Berlin and the CUP 
fugitives established contact to most active ones among these students.19 One can also argue 
that the Orient Club, located at the Kalckreuthstraße 2, served most certainly as a precursor 
organization or as a civil society branch of the later Union of Muslim Revolutionary Socie-
ties.20 The Orient Club was part of the same movement. In this context, Talat Pasha’s activ-
ities in Berlin are accredited in a report by a former insider as the origin of this movement, 
where alliances were made to Turkish and Egyptian political immigrants (Mısır ve Türk 
muhacirin-i siyasisi) and to the League of Oppressed People (Akvam-ı Mazlume Cemiyeti) 
in Rome.21 In explaining the roots of their movement, Enver Pasha gave credit to their time 
in Berlin, too: 
In Berlin, we witnessed the emergence of some local movements against the Entente in 
the general Muslim world. We were thinking about the unification of these Muslim 
 
17 Hüsamettin Ertürk, İki Devrin Perde Arkası, ed. Samih N. Tansu (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1996), 168. 
Another Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa agent Captain Hüseyin Fevzi also draws an organizational continuity from the 
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa to the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. See: Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on 
the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, February 27, 1922, in Mesut Erşan, 
“Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in, Enver Paşa – İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı – Anadolu Arasındaki İlişkilere Dair 
Raporu,” Turkish Studies 4, no. 3 (2009): 959.  
18 Nathanael Kuck, “Anti-Colonialism in a Post-Imperial Environment: The Case of Berlin, 1914–33,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 1 (2014): 134–59. For the Muslim community see also: Bernd 
Bauknecht, “Muslime in Deutschland von 1920 bis 1945,” Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft, no. 9 (2001): 
41–81. 
19 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 329. 
20 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar I: (1908–1925) (İstanbul: Berdan Yayınları, 2000), 109. Also the 
Press Bureau at the Uhlandstraße is said to be origin of the idea of uniting the Muslim movements. Richard 
Euringer, Der Serasker: Envers Ende, Irrfahrt und Kampf eines kühnen Türken (Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1939), 57. 
21 Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, report on the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 
February 27, 1922, in Erşan, “Hüseyin Fevzi Bey’in Raporu,” 959, 963–964. 
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movements that had no organization and were deprived of material assistance. After talk-
ing with friends, it was decided to unite them.22 
Except for the Orient Club, however, no political organization is known to be founded in 
Berlin in this period—at least not according to internal documents of the CUP leaders that 
has survived. On the other hand, French Intelligence from May 1920 claims that a Union 
pour la libértation de l’Islam was founded by Talat Pasha and his friends.23 Other Western 
intelligence reports claim that at the time of their negotiations with Karl Radek in August 
1919, the CUP members founded a new organization that was commissioned by the 
Musselman Section of the Eastern Branch of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Soviet Government.24 The Ottoman archival sources corroborate that a Muslim congress 
has indeed taken place on September 2, 1920, in Berlin—possibly initiated by the Orient 
Club—where Turkish, Arab, Indian, Egyptian, Azeri, Syrian, Tunisian delegates were gath-
ered. The declaration sent to the Sublime Porte in Constantinople said: For every Turk and 
for every Muslim these kinds of [post-war] stipulations are nothing but a murderous conspir-
acy [suikast] and even a declaration of war against the Muslim world. The sixth and last 
point of the declaration called for legal and if necessary armed resistance [hukuki ve gerek 
musellehen mukavemeti] […] with the purpose of defending their freedom [hürriyetlerini 
müdafaa maksadıyla].25 News of similar Muslim congresses organized by the CUP leaders 
were long in circulation in the international press—although there is no further evidence. 
For instance, as Turkish military intelligence reported, a Muslim congress took place in Mu-
nich under the auspice of CUP leaders in early summer 1920.26 In the end, the idea of or-
ganizing so-called Muslim congresses were experiencing a heyday in the aftermath of World 
 
22 Enver Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 26, 1920, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın 
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Terakki Erkanı (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 23. See also: Kramer, Islam Assembled, 70; Paul 
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War I and such congresses were already part of the contentious repertoire of social move-
ments in the Muslim world.27 Rumors of existence of CUP organizations in Berlin were even 
propagated by the Young Turk leaders. «Here in Berlin a semblance of an independent Turk-
ish Government was maintained, Talat Pasha told to a British informant in December 1920. 
«Thus the Emir Chekkib Arslan was Minister of Foreign Affairs.»28 Talat’s claim of an exile 
government rather seems to be a fiction of deterrence than an actual attempt to found an 
exile government. Nonetheless, internal evidence implies that a new political organization 
was being formed that intended to build a federation or confederation of Muslim nationalist 
organizations and represent the collective movement. Talat first mentioned a so-called Mus-
lim Union Society (İttihad-ı İslam Cemiyeti) in July 1920.29  
When Enver Pasha had arrived at Moscow in August 1920, he said that he represented the 
Muslim Revolutionary Organization (İslam Teşkilat-ı İhtilaliyesi) as well as the Muslim 
Revolutionary Society (İslam İhtilal Cemiyeti) in the very same document, implying that the 
movement had not yet formally brought out its organization.30 In addition, I talked to Kara-
han, Chicherin, and Bucharin, Enver reported about his first negotiations in Moscow. 
They say that they would support any revolutionary movement, even if it is not colored 
communist. Above all, they are quite favorable to our Muslim Revolutionary Society 
[Müslüman Cemiyet-i İhtilaliyesi].31 Enver had proposed to open a school for future terror-
ists in Moscow, as Chicherin reported to Lenin.32 The final name of the organization was 
coined only after the Baku Congress, where Enver still claimed to represent the so-called 
Union of the Revolutionary Organizations of Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia, and 
 
27 See: Kramer, Islam Assembled; Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: 
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30 Enver Pasha, memorandum on the cooperation of the Muslim Revolutionary Organization with Soviet 
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India (Cezayir, Tunus, Trablusgarb, Mısır, Arabistan ve Hindistan İhtilal Cemiyetleri İtti-
hadı).33 Meanwhile, Hacı Sami was complaining that those working at home and abroad 
[dahilde ve hariçte] are not only united around a common program and purpose, but do not 
even think about uniting.34 Thus, after returning from Baku, Enver convened the founding 
meeting of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies (İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı) 
on October 15 at Moscow. It was probably a meeting of the few former CUP members in 
Moscow—some of which were not even present. As it was later instructed to the branches in 
Constantinople, the Central Committee consisted of Enver Pasha (chairman), Ziya Bey (sec-
retary), and Dr. İbrahim Tali (treasurer), in addition to the board members Halil Pasha, Hacı 
Sami Kuşçubaşı, and Seyfi Bey.35 In its official policy, the movement subscribed to the anti-
colonial Muslim nationalist movement. The charter of the Union of the Muslim Revolution-
ary Societies said:  
The aim of the Society is to make the Muslims—who are used like slaves, enslaved and 
dominated by the imperialists and capitalists—masters of their own fate under the lead-
ership of Turkey; to ensure their free and independent organization within their national 
culture; and to liberate them from captivity. The aim of the Society is to create the or-
ganization necessary to realize the aforementioned goal, by uplifting and uniting the 
Muslims spiritually and materially.36 
The overt structure of the newly founded organization was a combination between the inter-
nationalism of the Comintern and the committee-system of the CUP. Thus, the concepts 
soviet and committee had merged into each other in their minds. Not unlike an Islamic 
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international, the Union was supposed to represent different associated parties from differ-
ent countries.37 An annual congress was intended to assemble the various national branches.38 
The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies had also taken up certain organizational char-
acteristics of the CUP as a revolutionary secret society. The idea of membership very much 
resembled a komitadji-style clandestine revolutionary organization.39There are no differ-
ences of rank and prestige among members; all are brothers and equal, the statue proclaimed. 
Acceptance as a member was also based on trust networks, since it was required that two 
present members must nominate and give assurances for a new member. Membership also 
did not resemble a regular political party or federation membership, but rather that of secret 
societies: Every person who joins the Society shall be bound to it for the rest of his life, and 
is not permitted to leave it.40 Each member was required to profess an oath as part of their 
initiation:  
I swear to God and give my word of honor that I will fulfill each assignment to the limits 
of my power and give my property and life in order to liberate my oppressed brothers 
from captivity and raise them spiritually and materially and that I will not reveal the 
secrets of the society, I swear.41  
Ziya Bey told me about a secret Muslim Society [bir hafi İslam Cemiyetinden], wrote a 
fellow politician and journalist from Rome to Enver Pasha. Herewith I join in advance this 
society under your leadership. Please sign in my name. […] I would like to work for Turkey 
and Islamdom [İslamiyet] by any means.42 After the establishment of the organization in 
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Moscow, Ziya Bey had gone to Europe to establish further connections between Moscow, 
Berlin and Rome as well as other places in the Middle East. Previously, the Soviet Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs Karahan had urged Ziya Bey to send trusted men to Constantinople, 
Rome, and Berlin in order to stay en contact with different centers.43 Although the internal 
documents required a strict code of membership, other more vivid evidence implies that in-
tentions were not necessarily put in action. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies 
had beyond its members to the Central Committee no individual membership, but only 
member societies, as Dr. Nazım testified. Each associated national-revolutionary society was 
responsible over its own members and recruitment.44  
The policy of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was, however, more military 
than revolutionary in its action plan. Enver Pasha soon revealed to Cemal Pasha that he 
wanted give this revolutionary organization a military color (askeri bir renk).45 The purpose 
of Enver’s journey (maksad-ı seyahat) to Moscow was, as it was put down in a memorandum, 
to organize a general campaign (umumi hareket) in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan that will 
take place against the capitalist governments and especially England in the coming spring 
of 1921. For this campaign, the Muslim countries needed the assistance of Soviet Russia. 
The Soviet Government was asked to support the establishment of this new Muslim revolu-
tionary organization that would coordinate this general campaign. Soviet Government was 
also asked to supply cavalry units consisting of Russian Muslim soldiers and militias. In order 
to administer the propaganda and prepare the military campaign in Turkey, Iran, and Af-
ghanistan Enver proposed to stay in Moscow in the Winter of 1920/1921.46 In a letter to 
General von Seeckt, Enver described his grand strategy as follows: 
I want the operations to concentrate on the Turkish, Persian, and Afghan borders this 
winter [of 1920] in order to keep the position until the spring. Until then one would 
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make preparations, and can proceed in the spring on all fronts in the offensive. On this 
point, I would like to know your opinion.47 
Enver explained the possible outcomes of this strategy by its potential connection with other 
movements. when the operations in Egypt, Indian, and Iraq will also join in, then the posi-
tion of England will eventually become pretty complicated.48 If the Russians trust us, Hacı 
Sami wrote to Enver, then you will take the lead of the military organizations in the Muslim 
lands and you will appoint Cemal Pasha, Halil Pasha, Nuri Pasha, and other gentlemen to 
the command of each front.49 Cemal proposed a similar military approach where he visual-
ized four fronts of revolutionary warfare. The first front was in the South directed against 
India, Turkestan, Fergana, and Afghanistan under the command of Cemal himself. The sec-
ond front was towards Western Asia in Iran, Bukhara, Khive, and Turkmenistan under Enver 
Pasha’s command. The third front was in Asia Minor under the (rather autonomous) com-
mand of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The fourth and last front was commanded by Halil Pasha in 
the East directed at Eastern Turkestan at the Chinese border.50  
There was a clear disconnect between civilian and military approaches in the organization of 
the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. Previously, Cemal Pasha had expressed his 
disenchantment that the revolutionary branch of the CUP had secretly drafted a program of 
action for Turkey behind his back. Cemal increasingly mistrusted secretive committee poli-
tics.51I think, we don’t need a society [cemiyet] or etc. at all, Cemal wrote to Enver. It was 
enough to reach our goals, he said, if they could win over the confidence of the Bolsheviks 
and work with their material support individually as professional soldiers-cum-revolutionar-
ies.52 The liberation of the Muslim lands was for Cemal and Halil Pashas primarily a military 
affair that was strategically based on revolutionary warfare in Asia in conjunction with local 
revolutionaries. The central coordination of the fronts and the local revolutionary move-
ments did not necessarily need a secret society of its own. Cemal was rather interested in 
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establishing associated national revolutionary societies: I think of establishing a central com-
mittee of an Indian revolutionary committee which will unite all delegates of the political 
organizations in India.53 
Similarly, Halil Pasha was not particularly interested in a political organization modelled after 
the CUP with its oligarchical Central Committee, in which every board member was practi-
cally an executive leader of the CUP. Halil would only take orders from Enver Pasha and no 
one else from the Central Committee, as he insisted in a meeting in Moscow. Due to his 
opposition, Enver was elected not only as the political chairman (reis) of the Central Com-
mittee but also as the commander-in-chief (başkumandan) of military operations.54 Halil 
Pasha could not wait to be on the front. On January 11, 1921, Halil asked Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs Karahan whether the Soviet Government would object, if he would decide to 
go to India to join the Indian independence movement. For his mission, he would not even 
need any material support from the Soviet Government except for the facilitation of arms 
delivery from Germany via Russia and Afghanistan, as he explained. Karahan said that he 
personally supports this idea. However, Krassin was currently in London negotiating with 
the British. The British Government was demanding the end of Bolshevik propaganda in 
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. India was not yet mentioned. Thus, for now, the Soviet Gov-
ernment would support this venture. Even five thousand rifles had been arranged, ready to 
be transferred to India, as Karahan assured Halil. When Halil asked whether the Soviet Gov-
ernment would oppose if Enver would also work in India, Karahan promised that both Halil 
and Enver were free to go anywhere they desired.55 «I’m also tired of being in the Caucasus 
all the time», Halil wrote to Enver and said that he decided to go to Tashkent together with 
Hacı Sami and then proceed to Afghanistan, Kashgar, or India.56 Adventure was calling. 
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Meanwhile, Talat Pasha was usually assigned for propaganda work among Muslim émigrés 
in Europe. It was known among CUP members that Talat had distanced himself from En-
ver.57 As the political head of the CUP, Talat remained a thorn in side of Enver and others 
who desired a military campaign with Soviet support. For now, I am still working with Talat 
Pasha, Enver told to Halil with displeasure and instead proposed, we should organize our-
selves so that we can take over the control of the state of affairs if necessary. For this purpose, 
I keep the organization of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in our hands.58 
Nonetheless, Talat remained mostly autonomous and unchallenged in his position in Berlin. 
Within the civilian faction, Talat was still the primus inter pares and the soul of the CUP—
neither formal organization nor election was required. Talat’s influence and network went 
also beyond the European metropoles. One the one hand, Cemal Pasha was entrusting Talat 
with assignments to coordinate in Europe support for his Afghanistan mission.59 On the 
other hand, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was making compliments to Talat’s support from abroad 
and requesting intelligence on state of affairs in the West.60 
As most Muslim nationalist activists were still mostly in Europe, Berlin stayed as the center 
of the movement despite Enver’s attempts to move the center of the organization to Moscow. 
If Moscow was the Mecca of revolutionary pilgrims of different colors, the cosmopolitan-
revanchist milieu of Berlin was a bazaar of dissident émigrés exchanging ideas and goods with 
one another. Different societies such as the German-Turkish Society (Deutsch-Türkische Ge-
sellschaft), League of Asian Fighters (Bund für Asienkämpfer), School of Oriental Languages 
(Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen), German-Persian Society (Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft), 
German Society for Islamic Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde), Egyptian National 
Party (Ägyptische National Partei), Association of Violated Nations (Vereinigung Vergewal-
tigter Völker), and Workers and Peasants Socialist Party of Turkey (Sozialistische Arbeiter- und 
Bauernpartei der Türkei) within the shared networks and milieu of the fugitive leaders ena-
bling vivid political exchanges in Berlin, although none of them were member societies in 
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the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies.61 It was no secret that Talat Pasha had regular 
contacts, for instance, to Egyptian student association (Ägyptischer Bund, al-Gamiya al-Mis-
riya).62 In the prose of British Intelligence these connections were exaggerated as far as that 
Talat «presides over the Turkish Egyptian organization» and that Auswärtiges Amt was «indi-
rectly subsidising Egyptian students in Berlin» and the money was finally distributed by 
Talaat in order that the Egyptians and everyone else may believe that the money comes from 
Pan-Islamic sources. The students in this way are induced to carry out Pan-Islamic propa-
ganda, a claim that some scholars dismiss today63 The expert on the Arab community in 
interwar Berlin, Gerhard Höpp rather dismissed these concerns by the British authorities as 
baseless.64 
Berlin has also been an important center for Indian revolutionary activities since the Great 
War.65 When the CUP leaders were negotiating with a Hindu delegation in Berlin, the latter 
suggested that the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies as an umbrella organization had 
to be associated with the League of Oppressed People in order to connect also with non-
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Muslim anticolonial nationalists.66 The Lega dei Popoli Oppressi was the brainchild of Ga-
briele D’Annunzio and it was imagined as an anti-League of Nations.67 Alleged links be-
tween Gabriele D’Annunzio, Lenin, and Enver were already embellishing fancy news cover-
age.68 Other more or less accurate rumors of connections between the CUP leaders and 
League of Oppressed Nations in Berlin and Rome were also in circulation.69 A congress of 
the so-called Union des peuples opprimés d’Orient that took place in Genoa, May 1922, seems 
also be connected with the remnants of CUP networks in Europe.70 Therefore, instead of 
fearing an imagined pan-Islamism, the official propaganda outlet of the Union of Muslim 
Revolutionary Societies proclaimed, England should rather be afraid of the union of the 
oppressed which is the union of all nations that aren’t English.71  
And it was again the Indian revolutionaries that suggested to Talat Pasha to enter into con-
versation with the Irish nationalists. The deputy chief of the Irish nationalist was invited to 
Berlin. For one and a half months he negotiated with Talat, where Talat tried to convince 
them to invest money and resources in stirring up a revolution in India.72 Talat said once to 
a British emissary that he was rather unimpressed by the representatives of the Sinn Fein.73 
That being said, the CUP leaders continued to observe the Irish War of Independence closely 
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and regularly expressed their solidarity with Irish cause.74 In his declaration for the third 
congress of the Comintern, Enver Pasha underlined that they were in constant touch with 
the Irish heroes in addition to the non-Muslim Asian revolutionaries.75 These claims rather 
seem to serve propaganda than manifesting actual alliances. The only ties to the Sinn Fein 
were through the League of Oppressed Nations in Rome where their colleague Egyptian Abd 
el-Hamid Said was serving as the president.76 Rumors reproduced in a French intelligence 
report from May 29, 1920, that the CUP leaders had supported the Irish revolutionaries with 
huge sums of money were similarly groundless.77 Despite all the shared desires and collective 
efforts, no organizational ties emerged between Irish and Muslim revolutionaries, as it was 
later regretted.78 Nonetheless, these claims at the Comintern Congress were enough to make 
the British concerned: 
I have been reading to-day an account given by Enver Pasha in Moscow at the end of 
June, about the work that was being done under his auspices. I read of the relations of 
his organisation with the revolutionaries of Ireland, the Kopts in Egypt, the Christians 
in Syria and Albania, with great interest because it proves that although the association 
is pan-Islamic, it is allying itself with every kind of revolutionary movement. Enver gives 
an account of an organisation extending from Morocco to China, including such coun-
tries as Java, The Yemen, Somaliland, besides Afghanistan, Egypt and India. The account 
proves conclusively to my mind that this is done under the auspices of the Soviet Gov-
ernment and the Third International which they control.79  
Dr. Nazım later testified that they had contacts with activists from Egypt to India, Syria to 
Iraq, Iran to Algeria and Morocco. The idea of an umbrella organization seemed to have 
appealed to the needs of Muslim-nationalist activists of the time who framed their local and 
national struggles within the larger anticolonial moment. Revolutionary organizations from 
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all these counties are said to have sent delegates to the Union of Muslim Revolutionary So-
cieties.80 In an intelligence report, the member societies of the so-called League of the Sal-
vation of Islam (Ligue lie la délivrance de l’Islam / İttihad-ı Selamet-i İslam) were listed as the 
Egyptian Nationalist Party, Turkish Nationalist Party, Committee of Union and Progress, 
Indian Nationalist Party, League of Afghan Patriots, Union of Muslims of the Caucasus, 
Russian Muslim Congress, and League of Iranian Nationalists.81 This claim sounds rather 
exaggerated. All evidence implies that the members were mostly those notorious Muslim na-
tionalist activists living in European exile with already former ties to the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa 
or the German Intelligence Bureau for the Orient, if not other local political leaders touring 
throughout European capitals for propaganda rally’s and diplomatic negotiations who then 
somehow ended up in a meeting with Talat Pasha or Shakib Arslan. For instance, Enver 
informed Mustafa Kemal on the establishment of ties to Muslim activists in Berlin as follows:  
Relations to the representatives of Muslim countries in Europe was established, especially 
with Indian Mohammad Ali. As a result of these talks, a society was constituted consisting 
of representatives from every corner that decided to direct these movements from one 
center.82 
Enver Pasha was more or less telling the truth, but such name droppings and exaggerations 
about the extent of their network were all too apparent in the communication of the CUP 
leaders with the outsiders. Maulana Mohammad Ali from the Indian Khilafat Movement 
was in Europe from February to October 1920.83 The fate of the Ottoman Empire has long 
been serving as a strong political discourse for Indian Muslims in expressing their opposition 
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to the British Empire.84 The movements of Khilafat delegation was, of course, closely ob-
served by the British Intelligence, as an extensive report was prepared by no one else but 
Major Bray.85 During their tour in Europe, the delegation of the Khilafat Movement met 
with prominent Turkish politicians scattered throughout different European cities.86 The 
Europe trip of the Khilafat delegation was put into templates of existing official conspiracy 
theories. An informant of the British Intelligence in Switzerland, for instance, had claimed 
on April 27, 1920, that the Germans, Turks, and Russians have made up their minds to 
assist by every possible means the Indian revolutionaries.87 The CUP networks were eager 
to establish connection to the delegation as well. In Zürich, it was reported that Mohammad 
Ali was scheduled to meet with Ismail Sidqi, the leader of the Egyptian Revolutionary Com-
mittee, before travelling to Rome.88 When Talat Pasha heard that Mohammad Ali was com-
ing to Italy via Switzerland, he traveled to the Swiss-Italian border to meet him there, but 
could not find him first.89 Then, on August 6, 1920, he managed to meet him in Territet, 
Switzerland, where the two men talked about preparing a revolution in India which would 
be supported by the invasion of a Bolshevik sponsored Afghan army including the Indian 
Hijrat Movement in Afghanistan. There is reason to believe that Mohammad Ali took Talat’s 
overtures quite seriously.90 Later at Rome, Mohammad Ali and his delegation met with Edip 
Servet (Tör) and other Unionists and Kemalists.91 Turkish nationalists in Rome were able to 
collect money from the Khilafat Delegation. Recently, as Dr. Ahmed Fuad reported in late 
March 1921, ammunition and arms, which were purchased in Italy by Abdel Hamid Bey, 
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head of the Rome Bureau, with the 12 thousand lira we received from the India Branch, were 
shipped to Samsun.92 But, when it comes to activities of the Rome Branch, it is hard to put 
the Arab nationalists, Kemalists, and Unionists apart. Historians have not studied post-war 
Rome as a hub of transnational Muslim politics yet.93 
Nonetheless, occasional meetings and shared worldviews were celebrated as extension of the 
organization, while it was rather dubious which societies were associated with Union of Mus-
lim Revolutionary Societies.94 We know that Talat Pasha met with the president of the Egyp-
tian Revolutionary Committee in Constance, in early summer 1920, where the latter ac-
cepted in the name of his Committee to join the Union.95 Enver Pasha once recommended 
Karahan and Chicherin that they should work together with the Iranian Democrat Party 
(Hezb-e Demokrat-e Iran) by supplying them with military and financial resources, but we 
don’t know whether the Iranian democrats were officially associated with them.96 Enver had 
also taken the position of a mediator (and king-maker) among the Muslim nationalists. For 
instance, when it was decided at a congress in Tripoli that either Sayyid Ahmed Sharif al-
Senussi or an Egyptian or Ottoman prince should be the proclaimed monarch in Libya with 
the support of Italy, the Rome Bureau asked Enver to write a letter to Sulayman al-Baruni 
who was supposed to be opposing this deal.97 Nevertheless, it is rather doubtful whether the 
reach of their organization ever went beyond their republic of letters.  
In order to convince the Bolsheviks that other Muslim representatives were united in the 
organization, Enver requested that Abdel Aziz Shawish, Dr. Ahmed Fuad, Dr. Nazım, Emir 
Shakib Arslan, Muhammad Bash Hamba, and Arif Cemil should be invited to Moscow in 
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order to establish a propaganda center in Moscow.98 For some reason, however, the Soviet 
leaders hesitated with issuing visa for these men.99 When Enver was back in Berlin in October 
1920, he met with the Soviet representative Viktor Kopp. Enver told Kopp that the center 
in Berlin will no more exist. Thus, Eşref Bey, Dr. Nazım, Dr. Fuad, Muhammad Bah 
Hamba, Shakib Arslan, and Halil Halid should all be invited to Moscow.100 Meanwhile, Halil 
Pasha had a meeting with Karahan. Because of the ongoing negotiations with the British, 
Halil Pasha feared that the propaganda delegation from Berlin might not find the desired 
welcome in Moscow.101 
The idea to move the center of the organization from Berlin to Moscow had been in Enver’s 
mind since he arrived at Moscow. I have now established a center in Moscow, Enver wrote 
in a private letter to his brother-in-law Kazım Bey (Orbay) in late September 1920. Our 
central bureau is here. But I am regularly on the move.102 Moving the center of the organi-
zation to Moscow was risky. Cemal Pasha, for instance, was opposed to bringing men such 
as Muhammad Bash Hamba, Abdel Aziz Shawish, Shakib Arslan, of Vehip [Kaçı] Pasha to 
Moscow to direct the headquarters there. Cemal instead saw Berlin or Switzerland to be 
appropriate for pan-Islamic activism.103 Bedri Bey also agreed with Cemal and considered 
that the relations to Soviet Russia can suffer, if Russian Muslims would start to approach the 
Central Committee of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in Moscow to express 
their discontent with the Soviet regime.104 In a meeting with Halil Pasha on January 16, 
1921, Karahan asked why the Central Committee of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary 
Societies was not yet moved from Berlin to Moscow.105 After his return from Berlin, Enver 
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managed to get assurance that the finances of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies 
will be covered by the Soviet Government.106 Dr. Nazım tells that they received no funding 
from the German Government.107 Further financial gifts were received from the Afghan Emir 
Amanullah.108 In April 1921, Chicherin proposed to finance the Union of Muslim Revolu-
tionary Societies with 15.000 Lira yearly. As he explained: These elements which are rem-
nants of former group of Young Turk leaders have wide relations in Central Europe, and 
they have influential branches and relations in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco etc. In order to main-
tain their insurgent groups in various countries and send their men to Egypt etc., they need 
money.109 Besides Chicherin, also Radek continued to lobby for Enver’s cause to revolu-
tionize the Muslim masses against Europe.110 
The move to Moscow was partly realized after Talat Pasha’s assassination. Talat’s demise 
required a reorganization of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, since he was the 
head of the movement in European exile. The secretary general of the Union of Muslim 
Revolutionary Societies, Ziya Bey, was complaining that the Berlin Bureau was doing noth-
ing but spending money, while everybody was minding his own business. In my humble 
opinion, Ziya protested, we are not a den of idlers [miskinhane], but a political party.111 
In order to regroup with members and old friends, Enver Pasha made a visit to Berlin and 
Rome. At Rome Enver, renewed the existing alliance with the League of Oppressed People 
and Vehip Pasha was appointed as the director of the Rome Bureau.112 Already in February 
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1921, as Enver reported to Cemal, Rome bureau had become an important center of com-
munication with different Muslim countries.113 
It was only in late June 1921, after the death of Talat Pasha, that the promised delegation 
from Berlin arrived at Moscow. Among the delegation there was Emir Shakib Arslan from 
Syria, Khalid Bey al-Gargani from Libya,114 Dr. Rifat Mansur from Egypt as well as Dr. 
Nazım, Captain Hüseyin Feyzi, and Fahri (Türkkan) Pasha, the famous defender of Medina. 
Enver Pasha made a visit to the secretary of the Comintern. The delegation submitted their 
memorandum. Their visas were given by the German Embassy in Moscow.115 Uncomfortable 
with Enver’s overtures to Bolsheviks, Emir Shakib Arslan stayed only 4 days in Moscow, and 
after his returned he gave a debriefing to the British Press Attaché Major Timothy Florence 
Breen, with whom he and Talat had been in contact previously. Shakib Arslan told that they 
had been accommodated in the Savoy Hotel and received diplomatic ration cards.116 The 
delegation also met with French communists and agreed to cooperate with each other in 
propaganda.117 Shakib Arslan, the so-called Prince of Eloquence (amir al-bayan), was trying 
to find Soviet support for the Arab and Syrian revolution and had meetings with Chicherin. 
Shakib Arslan made, however, clear to Chicherin that he did not represent any Arab coun-
try but was a connoisseur of the conditions and situation of the Arab nations in Africa and 
Asia. Arslan suggested that the Soviet Government should supply military material to Syria 
via Anatolia.118 
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While the delegation from Berlin was in Moscow, the executive committee of the Union of 
Muslim Revolutionary Societies were elected. Enver Pasha, Bedri Bey, Dr. Nazım were 
elected as executive members and Captain Hüseyin Fevzi, Doctor Raik, Khalid Bey al-Gar-
gani as deputy members while Emir Shakib Arslan, Dr. Rifat Mansur, Fahri Pasha and Topçu 
Rıza Bey are also mentioned as board members.119 The statute of the Union of Muslim Rev-
olutionary Societies was personally drafted by Enver, months before the arrival of the dele-
gates.120 Dr. Nazım saw that in Moscow Enver was surrounded by a dozen of men from 
Albania, Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, Tripoli, India and Egypt.121 Ali Fuat Pasha reported 
to Ankara that Enver and his colleagues renounced their desire to go to Turkey and declared 
that they would work in Muslim countries with the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Socie-
ties.122   
A British Intelligence report from Damascus, October 21, 1921, shows how the Union of 
Muslim Revolutionary Societies was propagated to local Muslim leaders in the Middle East. 
As the British Consul in Damascus reported that several of his informants seem to consider 
there is real danger of a Pan-Islamic explosion in the near future. The most recent and urgent 
development was that Zeki al-Halabi and Abdul Fettah—both ex Turkish officers and in 
communication with Mustafa Kemal—were observed to be in touch with a Hindu activist, 
who has recently arrived here from a meeting of the Islamic Society in Berlin. This Hindu 
activist had a message to the local Arab leaders from this meeting in Berlin. The translation 
of the Arabic propaganda document from Berlin announced: 
This branch has been founded in Berlin under the name Jamiat el Islamiat. The Mem-
bers are the chief great Mohamedan thinkers and their great politicians who are con-
stantly at work in order to succeed in these aims. […] 
A military branch has been founded in this Society under the leadership of Anwer Pasha 
and its members are chosen from All Mohamedan of the East and West who have dele-
gates in the General Society and this holy movement has prevailed all over and is in 
communication with all the revolutionary movements in Asia, in Egypt, in India, in the 
East and West and with the rest of the enslaved countries so as to unite the different 
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movements and insure these aims. […] This society is also in agreement with Moscou 
and Ireland and other countries who will aid us with money and arms, and force when 
necessary, without however accepting the principles of the Bolsheviks. […] the prepara-
tions are every day increasing for this revolution of the Great Mohamedan world. The 
liberations of these countries cannot be done except by the guerilla war (Sheta) [çete] 
and this will not succeed unless it is directed by a secret party which orders its movements 
of the same nature in either parts of the world.123 
*** 
During the second congress of the Union of Muslim revolutionary Societies, propaganda was 
formally named as one of the main purposes of the organization. The Berlin Bureau and the 
Liwa-el-Islam was named as the most active and publicly visible propaganda center of all.124 
To be sure, propaganda has been an important part of the CUP leaders’ exile activities since 
1919. But the formal organization of the movement under the Union of Muslim Revolu-
tionary Societies as well as the new financial resources they received from Soviet Russia made 
the professionalization of existing propaganda activities a priority in 1921.   
Propaganda activities was started by Talat Pasha at a time when Enver Pasha was still some-
where in Crimea. After his meeting there with the Belgian socialist Camille Huysmans at a 
congress of the Socialist International in 1919, Talat had come to appreciate the urgency of 
doing propaganda in Europe.125 The Turkish cause was mostly unknown among Europeans, 
as Talat discovered, and the Turkish national resistance offered a sympathetic frame of refer-
ence for anti-imperialist struggle. Since Talat was personally in center of attacks because of 
his complicity in the Armenian deportations, he became quite active in efforts to clean his 
name. This was also the reason that made him to write his memoir, which was rather an 
apologia on the Armenian deportations and massacres than an autobiographical account of 
his wartime activities.126 At one occasion, Talat also personally engaged in ways to interfere 
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into news coverage on the Armenian massacres. His intervention into the liberal newspaper 
Berliner Tageblatt which published many pieces on the Armenian massacres and condemned 
the Young Turk rule was one such move. Arif Cemil Bey urged the chief editor of the news-
paper, renowned German journalist Theodor Wolff, to meet with Talat to listen to his ver-
sion of the story. Wolff and Talat agreed to hold a secret interview which Wolff promised 
not to publish. Although Talat could not convince Wolff to agree with him, Wolff decided 
to be more reserved on the Armenian Question.127 Arif Cemil remembers that the Berliner 
Tageblatt did not publish anything afterwards on the Armenian Question until Talat’s mur-
der.128 Indeed, Theodor Wolff would even deliver a rather reserved editorial to Talat’s assas-
sination.129 The revolutionary socialist journal Die Aktion would even mock Wolff’s Berliner 
Tageblatt as «Berliner Talaatblatt».130 Such individual efforts for propaganda and public opin-
ion engineering put aside, there was also organized efforts to produce and spread propaganda 
on behalf of the fugitive CUP leaders. 
As Chapter 4 has illustrated, Talat Pasha founded himself or arranged contacts with several 
Turkish press bureaus in Berlin, Rome, The Hague, and Lausanne.131 These press bureaus, 
however, were mostly independent and local clubs for émigré politicians of different color to 
voice opposition to the post-war settlement. As much as these initial press bureaus were con-
nected to each other in Turkish émigré networks, they were not organizational parts of the 
later Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. The obvious exceptions are the bureaus in 
Berlin and Rome which later also became important political centers. The transformation 
from press bureaus to organization centers in Berlin and Rome seems to have been fluid and 
difficult to pinpoint. In late 1920, for instance, Enver, who had recently returned from Mos-
cow, had advised his fellow CUP colleagues in Berlin to continue propaganda activities. Dr. 
Nazım was appointed as the chief of the propaganda bureau in Berlin. A German by the 
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name of Schneider with excellent command of French and English was helping the CUP 
leaders place articles in European newspapers.132 In the spring of 1921, both Berlin Bureau 
under Cemal Azmi Bey and Rome Bureau under Vehbi Pasha and Cami Bey were considered 
as important propaganda centers.133 The Rome Bureau had also autonomous links to Ankara 
Government. Arab members of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies proposed En-
ver to found a branch in Adana in order to coordinate the activities and operations of the 
sacred committee (cemiyet-i mukaddesemiz) in Syria, Iraq, Kurdistan, Palestine, Egypt, and 
also Anatolia, but this was never realized.134  
The Berlin press bureau was preparing a pan-Islamic newspaper to boost their propaganda 
activities. The plans for a French-language newspaper under title Réveil d’Orient was also 
underway, with the experienced activist Muhammad Bash Hamba as its chief editor.135 In 
February 1921, it was reported to the Auswärtiges Amt that the Turkish community in Berlin 
under the leadership of Talat Pasha was planning to publish a Turkish and Arabic newspaper 
in order to counter the manipulative news coverage of Entente-friendly news outlets.136 How-
ever, after the sudden death of the latter on December 27, 1920, the newspaper plans were 
temporarily put on hold, as they lacked an appropriate editor.137  
Soon they found the desired editor in Prof, Dr. İlyas Bragon, a relatively unknown political 
figure until then.138 Late Gerhard Höpp identified Bragon as a veterinarian and a pan-Islam 
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activist who had fled from Ottoman Turkey to Berlin in 1920.139 İlyas Bragon was a former 
professor for veterinary medicine at the university in Constantinople of Tatar origin, who 
was a self-proclaimed fanatic Mohammedan.140 The new newspaper was called Liwa-el-
Islam (in Turkish Liva ül-İslam or colloquially also Liva-yı İslam) and it was a bi-weekly 
propaganda journal that was published from March 1921 to December 1922 in Turkish, 
Arabic, Persian, and German issues.141 Initially, the Liwa-el-Islam was planned to be pub-
lished in French and English as well, but this was never realized.142 As Ziya Bey, the secretary 
of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, was coordinating the activities of the bu-
reaus in Berlin and Rome, he reported in detail about the publication of the newspaper to 
Enver Pasha: 
Regarding the question of pamphlet: we decided to print every week five-hundred Arabic 
and five-hundred Turkish copies with a [lithography (rönelu)] machine that we pur-
chased for 2 thousand marks for our budget is unavailable for publishing a printed pam-
phlet. German and French ones will be released when the budget is available. Since it 
became clear that publishing in European languages with a [lithography] machine is 
cheap and it can be released when there is an appropriate occasion. The newspaper 
[Deutsche] Allgemeine Zeitung offered to distribute the news we will receive and the arti-
cles we will translate inside and outside Germany without any costs. They also have their 
own agence télégraphique so that this will announce our news to the world. By this, the 
question of propaganda in Europe will be realized through European newspapers and the 
propaganda in the Muslim world will be through the newspaper we will publish in Arabic 
and Turkish. Each week we will bring out two hundred copies.143 
The first issue of the paper was scheduled for March 15, 1921. However, the release of the 
first issue was delayed after the sudden assassination of Talat Pasha and because the would-
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be editor Abdel Aziz Shawish subsequently fell ill. In addition the previously purchased li-
thography machine delivered very poor results, forcing them to make a deal with a printing 
house.144 Their choice for the publishing house fell upon the Druckerei Kaviani, which was 
formerly funded by the German propaganda offices during the war and had recently became 
private company.145 Kaviani as a self-proclaimed Oriental company (Şarklı bir şirket) was 
publishing also other papers of Berlin’s Muslim community such as the Iranian nationalist 
Kaveh146 and the pan-Islamic Azadi-e Sharq147 as well as books on Islamic studies.148 One 
observe the same network of Muslim activists around these publications, which implies that 
the Orient Club in Berlin was also one of the intellectual centers behind the Liwa-el-Islam.149 
The cosmopolitan-revanchist social milieus of post-war Berlin as well as the former activist 
networks of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and German Intelligence Bureau for the Orient were con-
tinuing to bring out propaganda publications despite the ever eroding governmental funds 
and support in Germany.  
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Unofficially, however, the support from German revanchists for anti-British propaganda ac-
tivities had not disappeared. The credit for distributing Liwa-el-Islam by the Deutsche Allge-
meine Zeitung domestically and worldwide belongs to Enver’s old pal Hans Humann. After 
losing his position as military intelligence chief in the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch, Humann 
found employment as the director of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.150 On June 4, 1920, 
the industrial mogul and national-liberal politician Hugo Stinnes had purchased the news-
paper.151 Previously known as the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (renamed in November 
18, 1918) was a semi-official newspaper with Auswärtiges Amt as one of its shareholders.152 
The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was one of the keen observers of Turkey and displayed very 
strong Turcophile positions.153 There were also other interesting characters who perhaps ide-
ologically did not belonged to the irredentist-revanchist social milieus of post-war Berlin but 
were still part of the networks around Young Turks and their German militarist friends such 
as the social-democrat Orientalist Friedrich Schrader who knew the CUP leaders from Con-
stantinople and worked as a journalist for the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.154 According to 
the heading of letter, the notorious Middle-East expert of the Auswärtiges Amt Otto Günther 
von Wesendonk was also employed at the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.155 
In addition to the cooperation with the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the CUP networks were 
distributing the Liwa-el-Islam also by post and couriers to Moscow, Rome, and Constanti-
nople, and beyond.156 Enver Pasha’s aides were also bringing some copies from Moscow to 
Turkestan.157 The branches of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in Trabzon and 
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Constantinople had access to the newspaper as well.158 Vehip (Tör) Pasha from the Rome 
Bureau had also offered to facilitate the distribution of copies of the newspaper to Albania, 
Arabia, Syria, North Africa, and India.159 British documents show that issues of Liwa-el-Islam 
as well as the similarly anti-British Azad-e Sharq were reported to be seen as far as in Egypt, 
Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and India.160 The Liwa-el-Islam protested in its last issue in December 
1922 that its distribution in Palestine has been prohibited by the British authorities there.161  
Although Talat Pasha has been essential the Liwa-el-Islam had soon become, especially with 
the appointment of Bragon as its editor-in-chief, Enver Pasha’s newspapers, as it was once 
called Enver’s clique, causing further distrust among Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Nazım.162 
Enver not only organized funds for the newspaper from Moscow, but contributed also some 
lead articles.163 As the plans to move the political center of the organization from Berlin to 
Moscow were still under consideration, publishing a newspaper in Moscow had become an 
issue as well. As early as in September 17, 1920, Karl Radek had advised Enver to publish a 
Muslim revolutionary journal in Moscow. Radek believed that Moscow was a better propa-
ganda center than Germany because there was still no connection between Germany and 
Ottoman Turkey.164 Thus, from the Ankara Government Enver requested on behalf of the 
Soviet Government five to six typesetters.165 In need of information on the developments in 
Ottoman Turkey, Enver was also asking his friends to send him newspapers from Constan-
tinople and Ankara.166 Before he returned to Moscow, Enver purchased typeset letters in 
Berlin so that he could print a six page pamphlet in Moscow.167 After his return to Moscow, 
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Enver was publishing pamphlets under the title Revolutionary Library (İhtilal Kütüphanesi) 
in Moscow.168 Louise Bryant remembers from their shared time at the Sugar King’s Palace 
that Enver was constantly writing articles for Turkish papers which he printed on a hand 
press in his own room.169 Unfortunately, none of these pamphlets are known to have sur-
vived either in the archives or private collections.  
While the Liwa-el-Islam went in print in Berlin, Enver Pasha already had new plans to pub-
lish two other newspapers in Moscow. The one newspaper with the title Towards Liberation 
(Kurtuluşa Doğru) would be the new official publication outlet of the Union Muslim Revo-
lutionary Societies. The other newspaper New Turkey (Yeni Türkiye) would be the official 
paper of the People’s Councils Party.170 These propaganda plans in Moscow were threatened 
after the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, was signed which prohibited all 
kinds of Soviet-sponsored propaganda activities in the East. Regarding Enver request to pub-
lish two newspapers in Moscow, Chicherin argued at the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party that these newspapers should be supported despite the treaty with Britain: 
Enver wishes to publish in Moscow two Turkish papers. One of them aims at the Turkish 
people, and the other at the other Muslim countries … The papers will promote the 
struggle for emancipation of the East and will emphasise on the significance of Soviet 
Russia for the liberation of all oppressed peoples. The [forthcoming] agreement with 
England prohibits all propaganda activities outside the boundaries of Russia, but it does 
not say anything about such activities within Russia. The delivery of the papers to the 
Muslim world will not be done by us so [the publication and the delivery of the papers] 
can not be seen as a breach of our agreement [with Britain] … This extraordinary politi-
cian [Enver] understands the situation well and he knows that we require him. We pro-
pose to allow him and to render him all necessary assistance to publish the papers [in 
Moscow].171 
In a following letter to the Central Committee, Chicherin urged once again to support Enver 
Pasha’s newspapers and his movement.172 Eventually, Chicherin’s proposal to continue fi-
nancing Enver and his two publications was formally accepted by the Central Committee of 
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the Russian Communist Party.173 However, it never came to the publication of these news-
papers. The question of publishing propaganda papers was not undisputed either. One crit-
ical voice inside the organization questioned the purpose of publishing propaganda newspa-
pers in various Middle Eastern languages whereas a single English-language periodical would 
be more effective. Thus, it was argued that it is the most reasonable policy to concentrate 
on clandestine organization and to be content with releasing a bulletin in Europe rather than 
a publication for the Muslim world. The objective of revolutionary societies is operation and 
organization, not publication.174 
*** 
Although the movement embodied in the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was not 
an intellectual movement in the strict sense of the word, it is necessary to have brief look at 
the intentions and mentalities behind the propagated political ideas and agendas.  
The choice of word for revolution and revolutionary in the self-proclamations of the 
movement, was ihtilal. It meant revolt or insurrection in the strict sense of the word, 
underlining the (often violent) act of contention. A differentiation between revolt and revo-
lution, the latter, most appropriately expressed in the word inkilab, did not exist in their 
political vocabulary. Both terms were used as synonyms. Being a revolutionary was an im-
portant feature of the political culture of the Young Turks and similar Young movements. 
Revolution was understood in two ways. On the one hand, it was meant as a revolt against 
an unjust indigenous regime. On the other hand, it was also used in describing resistance 
against a colonialist or imperialist foreign rule. In a letter to Enver Pasha, the Afghan Emir 
put a red sign next to his signature, which was a reminder of Emir Amanullah’s own revolu-
tionary (revolüsyoner) times as an oppositional prince associated with the Young Afghans.175 
After returning from his espionage adventures in Turkestan, Hacı Sami went with Enver’s 
wife Naciye Sultan and brother Kamil to a theatre in Berlin to see Georg Büchner’s Danton’s 
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Death. After seeing the drama in setting of the French Revolution, Hacı Sami wrote to Enver 
that Naciye got very excited: So even she is becoming a revolutionary [ihtilalci] bit by bit.176 
They perceived themselves as professional revolutionaries. [A]nd if I could become an Indian 
revolutionary, said Cemal Pasha once, than he [Enver] can become an Iranian revolution-
ary too.177 Their concept of revolution was mostly based on their komitadji background and 
resembled rather guerrilla culture. According to Şevket Süreyya’s retrospective insight as a 
connoisseur of Soviet regime of the 1920s, Enver had a misperception about the revolution-
ary nature of Bolshevism and Bolsheviks. By seeing in Bolsheviks somewhat fellow komitadjis, 
Enver believed that they shared a common code. Just as a thief knows a thief as a wolf knows 
a wolf, Enver saw komitadjis in Bolsheviks: 
As I understood, according to [Enver Pasha] those in Moscow were nothing but a bunch 
of komitadjis. He assumed that the Bolshevik Party came to power by a komitadji coup 
d’état like the secret society of Committee of Union and Progress did. Probably [Enver 
Pasha] was seeing a resemblance between what was going on in Russia and how [the 
Young Turks] took over the palace and the state […]. [Enver Pasha] had even such an 
attitude which one could observe from his expressions, something like a komitadji knows 
a komitadji [Komitacı, komitacının dilinden anlar].178 
The Bolsheviks were, however, a different beast.179 In Moscow, certainly no one would mis-
take Enver for a Bolshevik, nor the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies for a com-
munist organization. However, this did not hinder Enver is consciously playing the role of a 
would-be communist in front of the Soviet leadership. I act like a communist to the Rus-
sians, Enver confessed to a Turkish diplomat. It is a lie. Inside me, it’s something else.180 
Another Turkish diplomat and friend of Enver, Dr. İbrahim Tali also noted once that the 
Bolsheviks consider him [Enver] to be quite leftist (kendisini pek sol tanıdıklarından), thus 
they were making overtures to him in regard to Anatolian affairs.181 Enver’s personal experi-
ence was not that positive. No one really bought that he was a communist:  
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Because I am not a communist and the Europeans severely charge the Bolsheviks because 
of me, I could not even meet with Lenin. Besides they are in no way obliged to give me 
the command of the Noble Forces [Kuva-yı Şerife]. And of course they have no reliance 
[to do so] … Besides, I certainly can’t work as a Bolshevik commander and surrounded 
by the Russian military commission and as an instrument of all their orders. Well, like I 
said, there is also no one asking me either! We will reach our objectives rather better when 
we reinforce our organization as pure revolutionaries.182  
Perhaps, Lenin was concerned about Enver Pasha’s enterprise.183 Anyhow, the collaboration 
with Soviet Russia was based on the shared notion of fighting the common enemy. Com-
rades, a revolutionary organisation of Muslims, which is not Communist, has approached 
the Presidium with a request that it be allowed to present a declaration to the congress, 
Zinoviev introduced the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies at the third congress of 
the Comintern. To repeat, they are not a Communist organisation, but rather an organisa-
tion that struggles against the subjugation of Muslims and against imperialism.184 However, 
we are not communists, Enver made once again clear in an internal document of the Union 
of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. He continued to explain his ideologically diffuse policy 
as follows: We are following a policy that adopts and approves people’s sovereignty accord-
ing to the principle of Socialism and within limits of Caliphate and Sultanate.185 Enver 
wanted simply everything, but did not want to renounce anything.  
Russians regarded Enver as the greatest revolutionary of the world, as one former colleague 
of Enver reported sarcastically, although Enver had openly proclaimed that he was not a 
communist. The reason for this celebration of Enver as revolutionary was rather opportunis-
tic: By exaggerating Enver’s influence in North Africa, India, Iran, and whole Central Asia 
they wanted to present him almost as an Islamic emperor. So that they kept Enver in their 
hands against the European imperialist governments […].186 Similar claims were made also 
by the Turkish ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha. In his memoir, he argues that the Soviet Govern-
ment believed that especially Enver Pasha but also his friends […] could turn Turkey against 
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the Entente, because they believed that they were still known in Turkey as powerful person-
alities and enjoyed the same prominence in the Muslim world. […] By this, they wanted to 
bring the central committee of pan-Islam under their own influence.187  
Both the communists and the Young Turks knew perfectly well that only after a victory over 
the Western imperialism the question of adopting communism would become issue, but not 
before. Thus, both sides acted opportunistically. By taking advantage of the ongoing class 
struggle in Europe, Enver Pasha hoped that the Muslim uprisings would eventually find le-
gitimacy. As Enver advised to Mustafa Kemal, however, it was necessary to establish a pseudo-
leftist oppositional party in Turkey. Enver believed that it was not possible for the Entente 
to come to terms with Soviet Russia, and that the struggle would continue. Because it would 
take many years until the whole world becomes communist, Enver believed that the com-
munist-capitalist struggle was a divine gift (mevhibe-i ilahiye) for the Muslim world. Only 
if the whole world would unite as communists around the Third International, then adopt-
ing communism would become an option, as Enver wrote sarcastically. He continued and 
assured that, if necessary, one could easily abandon the alliance with the Bolsheviks any day. 
The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was not communist, but it was simply work-
ing on common goals as the world communists, as he assured.188 The name of the organi-
zation revealed that it was a Muslim one. Although the collaboration with Soviet Russia was 
a matter of expediency, the working relationship has to be of indirect nature, as an alliance 
with Bolshevism would generate its own counter-discourse. During an evening with M. N. 
Roy at his Moscow quarters, Enver put his cards down and said: The liberation of Asia 
was a task of the Asians themselves. If the Russians were directly connected with the plan, 
devilish British propaganda would incite the religious sentiments of the Islamic world against 
the Bolshevik infidels.189 
When Cemal Pasha heard from Talat in December 1920 that Enver founded in Moscow an 
organization dubbed Union of Muslim Revolutionaries (İslam İnkılapçıları İttihadı), he 
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considered this title to be inconvenient. As you know, we are branded as pan-Islamists (İtti-
had-ı İslamcı), as Cemal warned. Our even slightest move or attempt is immediately inter-
preted as such. If the Bolsheviks, too, who are today our friends, reach a similar conclusion, 
then there will be no area for us to work.190 Cemal was not mistaken, since the Bolsheviks 
had surely an aversion towards the label of pan-Islamism.  
In similar terms, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had also warned Enver Pasha that the use of pan-
Islamism should only be directed against the British and not against the Bolsheviks.191 Later 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself told a Soviet diplomat that he was receiving letters from all 
over the Muslim world, calling him to organize a Muslim congress in Ankara in the spring 
of 1921.192 Mustafa Kemal Pasha positively acknowledged Enver’s organization in this re-
gard: Enver is working to organize all the Muslim countries. I consider this idea to convey 
such a congress for the struggle against Western imperialism positively. When the Soviet 
diplomat warned Mustafa Kemal of the dangers of pan-Islamism that can snowball to reli-
gious fanaticism, Mustafa Kemal answered: No, this movement does not have a pan-Islam-
ist character. We don’t want pan-Islamism, either.193 After hearing about Mustafa Kemal’s 
plans about conveying a Muslim congress in Ankara, Dr. Nazım send a message to Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha, arguing against the congress idea. Dr. Nazım explained that while he was re-
sponsible for propaganda activities in Berlin, he witnessed that the nationalist character of 
the Anatolian movement was a huge factor in winning over public opinion in Europe. If the 
Ankara Government would adopt a rather pan-Islamic image, as Dr. Nazım argued, this 
might go the risk of alienating Westerns sympathizers.194 Dr. Nazım’s message was: Ankara 
needs to continue to appear as a nationalist force in the eyes of Europe.195 Enver’s thoughts 
about Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s Muslim congress were similarly dismissive as rumors of pan-
Islamism would only come to the benefit of Turkey’s enemies.196 This idea was based, once 
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again, in the differentiation between the national struggle inside (dahil) Turkey and the trans-
national Muslim struggle abroad (hariç). The relation between the struggles inside and out-
side Turkey would rather prove to be a disputed issue among the CUP leaders, but their 
differentiation was important. Besides, since I’m convinced that not the Muslims will save 
the Turks, but rather the Turks will save the Muslims, as Dr. Nazım once declared honestly 
in a private letter, I’m foremost a Turkist […].197  
Enver himself wrote to Mustafa Kemal that although Turkey was also facing the danger of 
becoming another Muslim colony, it was not possible for the Ankara Government to follow 
a pan-Islamist policy. Enver believed that pan-Islamism would attract even more the wrath 
of Turkey’s enemies. This had to be done outside Turkey and was the purpose of the Union 
of Muslim Revolutionary Societies.198 Anyhow, no Muslim nationalist desired to be labeled 
as a pan-Islamist, since the term was considered to be an Orientalist slogan to justify Western 
imperialism in the East. The official propaganda outlet of the Union of Muslim Revolution-
ary Societies wrote, for instance, that Britain had invented an imaginary danger of pan-
Islamism (hayali İttihad-ı İslam tehlikesini) in order to legitimate the absolute enslavement 
of Eastern peoples (Şark akvamını esaret-i mutlakede edame için).199  
When Enver Pasha first arrived at Moscow, the first principle of his memorandum which 
highlighted cooperation with the Soviet Government was on the condition that Muslims 
will achieve independent administration within their national borders (İslamların milli 
hududları dahilinde serbest idareye malik olmaları şartıyla).200 The Union of Muslim Revolu-
tionary Societies had two foundational principles regarding the organization of the Muslim 
revolution: First, each nation will take its own fate in its hands. Second, each nation will not 
rely on any force than its own.201 Thus, the Muslim revolution was to be organized in na-
tionalist terms that divided the Muslim peoples into existing national spheres of action. The 
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Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was meant as an umbrella organization, a transna-
tional league or federation of existing Muslim nationalist organizations.202  
Thus, when Cemal Pasha objected that the organization should avoid pan-Islamist connota-
tions and instead encourage the various local movements to show a national color. As the 
motto, he proposed, for instance, Iran belongs to Iranians! (İran, İranilerindir!), as this did 
not necessarily contradict the Muslim nationalist orientation of the movement.203 But the 
balancing act between celebrating distinct Muslim nationalist movements and uniting them 
within an anticolonial Muslim movement was not always easy to manage. In its first public 
announcement, the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies presented its political agenda 
as follows:  
[We are] against all parties and societies, causing a split among the nations of Islam under 
the clause of nationalism [...]. [...] This does not mean that we are against the principle 
of nations [...]. An Arab, Turk, Albanian, Kurdish, Persian, Indian, Georgian, Lase, Bos-
nians or Circassian who is not proud of his national history and the merits of his nation 
for the Islamic community cannot be described as a worthy person. What we simply 
refuse are those dubious scoundrels that cause cleavages among the Muslim peoples under 
the cloak of nationalism to serve the cruel intentions of our enemies or those who instru-
mentalize nationalism for their personal benefits.204 
For common Muslims, the dichotomy of Islam and nationalism was not as strict as scholars 
of Islamic Studies would like to have it. Yet Islam and nationalism are mutually exclusive 
terms, said one profound connoisseur of the Middle East. As a constructive loyalty to ter-
ritorially defined national group, nationalism has been incompatible with Islam in which the 
state is not ethnically or territorially defined, but is itself ideological and religious.205 This 
assumption is, of course, true from a textual understanding of Islam, as Islamists and Orien-
talists both cherish to practice. For common Muslims who lived in the modern times, Islam 
and nationalism were mere different layers of identity, sister ideologies so to speak.206  
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Nonetheless, nationalism continued to plague the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies 
from within. In expressing his resentments to Enver Pasha, one Egyptian colleague of the 
CUP leaders in Berlin noted: There is no wholehearted camaraderie at the Berlin Bureau. 
Both regarding the journal issue as well as all decisions and expenditures that have occurred 
and continue to take place are obvious examples for this. Although there was a regulation 
that limited the number of representatives from same country to only two delegates at the 
executive boards of each local branch, this was violated by our Turkish brothers who were 
the majority, as the critic went on. And instead of establishing an Islamic brotherhood, 
feelings of superiority and factional politics are prevalent in the community.207 Elsewhere it 
was argued by the Ahmed Fuad and Abdel Aziz Shawish that instead of an inter-Muslim 
[beynelmüslimin] society, it was made almost a Turkish society.208 To be sure, there were 
certainly also other reasons behind this criticism, such as discontent over the distribution of 
limited financial resources, competition over prestigious positions such as the editorship of 
Liwa-el-Islam, and social mobility of new members within the committee hierarchy. Dr. Ah-
med Fuad underlined that the Arab members, who has been recently subjected to discrimi-
nation and disrespectful treatment by some of their younger Turkish colleagues were veteran 
revolutionaries who sacrificed their noble lives for the cause of Islam.209 According to the 
well-known Indian revolutionary, Chempakaram Pillai, reported the British Intelligence, 
the Oriental Club in Berlin will be dissolved shortly, as the Turkish element desire to form 
a new and exclusively Turkish Club.210 These tensions lead to the resignation of Dr. Ahmed 
Fuad and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish from the Union of Muslim revolutionary Societies. In 
their resignation, they wrote: 
The reason for the foundation of this Society was Muslim union [ittihad-ı İslam]. This 
idea was abandoned to a certain degree so that the idea was to return to the Muslim 
union that existed thousand years ago. Nationalist politics slowly infiltrated our affairs. 
The expression Islamic International scared us. Obviously, if a religion or an idea is 
spread among more than one nation, then it is called international. […] This means that 
even if this respected Society doesn’t exist, an Islamic International still exists. And its 
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greatest congress takes place annually in Mecca. Therefore, this expression is in our mod-
est opinion only reinvented for the nationalist movement.211  
On the other hand, the Arab members were accused of similar, if not worse, nationalist and 
selfish ambitions. According to our opinion, a Turkish member of the Berlin Bureau re-
ported to Enver Pasha, these men, as the Arab members of the Bureau Emir Shakib Arslan, 
Dr. Ahmed Fuad, and Shaikh Abdel Aziz Shawish were meant, are only trying to get as 
much money as possible from us while not doing anything and informing the other side [i.e. 
the Entente] about our movement. He continued and said: Their sole ambition is to make 
Arab propaganda only and to feed some Arabs with our money and our means.212 Ziya Bey, 
the target of one of attacks of the Arab faction, wrote: The one thing that I regret most is 
that Turkism and Arabism [Türklük ve Arablığın] are still and everyday increasingly growing 
apart. […] Actually, I totally believed with all my being that Arabs and the Turkic world 
[Arabların ve Türklüğün] needed to work together. However, I see it every day and I feel it. 
Arabism is something else and Turkish is something else. Arabs always try to take advantage 
of us.213 The picture gets even more diffuse, as Kamil Bey wrote to his brother that it was 
Dr. Nazım, a Turkish nationalist by definition, who was stirring up the Arabs against Enver 
and his sidekick Ziya Bey.214 Enver personally intervened into the debate by publishing an 
anonymous lead article in the Liwa-el-Islam with the cautious title Let’s be Careful and 
Don’t Let us be Deceived!. According to Enver nationalism was a European trend (moda) 
intended to split the Muslim peoples.215 In another article, Enver described the anticolonial 
struggle of a unified Muslim front as the one and only way.216 The ideal of a Muslim fra-
ternity, as it was cherished and propagated in their public declarations, had proven to be a 
complicated project to realize, when everybody involved in the movement was a professional 
revolutionary at the same time.  
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One last significant aspect of the collective political mentality behind the Union of Muslim 
Revolutionary Societies was its own tendency to conspiracy thinking. At the heart of their 
political sense-making was an Anglophobe and Occidentalist conspiracy ideology, in which 
everything bad in the Muslim world was a result of the devious schemes of British imperial-
ists. The Occidentalism was not racist or dehumanizing at the first place. It was rather based 
on resentments resulting from authentic Muslim critiques of modernity, international order, 
and colonialism.217 In a propaganda publication, animosity against Britain was explained as 
common human reaction against oppression and imperialism: 
If you ask someone from any nation, big or small, who has more or less interest in politics, 
then you will see that great hatred and animosity is expressed towards the English. In the 
countries under the rule of the British riots have already occurred. There is no doubt that 
even more are in preparation.218 
The anticolonial critic of Britain was, however, not limited to general observations. In the 
propaganda journal, Liwa-el-Islam, an Anglophobe philosophy of history in which not only 
every misery in the Muslim world, but also the history of the whole world was explained as 
a conspiracy of the British Empire:  
[...] Every country has a policy that changes according to times and needs. In this respect 
England differs from other countries. England has centuries-old political principals that 
do not change over time or for any reason. No matter which party leads the British gov-
ernment, they never think of changing these principles. [...] It was England that insti-
gated the European nations against Napoleon, who sought to rule the world, because it 
did not want any other nation than England to grasp for world domination. It was Eng-
land, which tolerated the defeat of France in the war of the 1870. Because France was 
the strongest naval power at that time. Every nation that has a strong navy is the target 
of English hostility. It was England that initiated the Russo-Japanese war because Russia 
posed the greatest danger for India, which constitutes the entire wealth and majesty of 
England, so that its subjugation became the actual objective of England. It was England, 
who conspired for World War, because the navy, oversea trade, and industry of Germany 
had increased to such an extent that the English arrogance and pride could not bear such 
a rise of another nation. Another reason for the destruction of Germany's position was 
its support for the awakening of the Muslim world and the Orient.219 
Such Occidentalist conspiracy theories against the British had sometimes their origins in 
German or other dissident Western propaganda.220 The Occidentalist conspiracy ideology 
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was adopting such existing tropes of Western revanchism and reproducing it in Muslim na-
tionalist terms. From Egypt to India, the whole Muslim world subjected to British imperial-
ism in one way or another had adopted these kind of conspiracy ideologies about British 
machinations. Dehumanizing language did not lack either in the propaganda of the Union 
of Muslim Revolutionary Societies, as the British Premier Minister Lloyd George was de-
picted in another article in Liva-el-Islam as the beast feasting on the blood of Muslims 
(İslam kanıyla beslenen bu canvar).221 
***  
Meanwhile, Soviet officials were curious about the German experience in dealing with British 
intrigues in the Middle East. Karahan asked Halil Pasha to make some inquiries regarding 
this.222 German officials were rather becoming reserved about their influence on Muslim rev-
olutionaries, since this had become a major concern for Britain:  
One of the few political assets that we still possess in the eyes of the English and by their 
abandoning we might even purchase some concessions from the English is Germanophile 
feelings of the Orientals that actually still exist to this day. […] It is obvious that this 
concern is essentially unfounded, but it will be accepted as a fact. This is apparent from 
the great nervousness of England which is surveilling the movements of the rather insig-
nificant and uninfluential Oriental revolutionaries that are residing in Germany.223 
Other rather critical voices such as Professor Johannes Lepsius went to the other extreme and 
totally dismissed the idea that the British Government would even consider Turkey as a se-
rious threat. There are also still German amateur politicians who expect that Turkey, alleg-
edly the most dangerous enemy of the British world empire, would redraw the world map, 
said Lepsius and mocked these ideas as childish hopes. His harsh verdict was: Five million 
Turks—because there is hardly any more than this—do not play a role in a policy that deals 
with continents.224 Lepsius was wrong both in demographics and in politics.  
By early 1921, however, British foreign policy started to see the world affairs differently, 
particularly in relation to its role in the Middle East.225 The anti-imperialist opposition was 
growing in Britain as well as becoming a serious global trend. The conservatives, for instance, 
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had increasingly become anxious and critical about the overextension of the Empire since the 
end of the war. It was in December 1920 that the Milner Commission submitted its report 
on the future of Egypt with the advice to grant Egypt semi-independence.226 In addition, 
troublemakers in the East, like Bolsheviks and Kemalists, were looking for a pragmatist rap-
prochement with the British Empire. In the midst of these subtle shifts, peculiar contacts 
occurred between Talat Pasha and some real and alleged British agents. In the CUP networks, 
it was rumored that Talat was seeking to come to an understanding with the British.227  
In December 1920, things started becoming curious. The British official in Berlin with 
whom Talat Pasha regularly conversed asked in one of their meetings: «If you would come 
back to a position of power, would you be able to restore order on behalf of your country?» 
Talat elaborated on what he would do in that situation and advised the British to reconsider 
a rapprochement with Turkey. Once Turkey is respected again, he explained, the order in 
Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus will be restored too.228 The British conversation partner con-
cluded that «[h]is influence was sufficient to put an end to the unrest in the East should the 
occasion arise.» Talat is reported to have explained his proposal as follows: 
The advantages of a reconciliation with the Turkish Nationalists to Great Britain were 
obvious. Mesopotamia, Turkestan, and the Caucasus could be readily tranquilized. The 
oil-fields could be secured to British exploitation. In fact, order and peace in the Near 
East depended on a reasonable settlement. An Amnesty should be granted to the leaders 
and to the political prisoners in Malta. The Vilayet of Smyrna might become a free state 
akin to Danzig. Some Turkish influence be permitted north of the line Alexandretta-
Mosul. He had read Mr. Colby’s note from the U.S. State Department on the oil-fields. 
Turkey was not an industrial country and needed no oil. A settlement in favour of Great 
Britain was a bagatelle if Turkey secured some financial help. 
The struggle of Europe against Bolshevism would be facilitated by the support of the 
Mahomedan republics bordering on Russia which were a natural barrier against Bolshe-
vism or any other form of Russian penetration. He could count on the support of twenty 
million Mahomedan subjects living within Russia. The permission to organise these ter-
ritories was a weapon which Enver could use more readily against Moscow than with 
Moscow.229 
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Nevertheless, Talat Pasha found this sudden interest in his person curious. He suspected that 
the British were maybe planning to use him against Mustafa Kemal Pasha.230 Talat was even 
semi-officially invited to a dinner at the British Embassy in Berlin where he drank champagne 
and talked about politics.231 Although these talks gave Talat an opportunity to express his 
ideas and positions to the British, they did not necessarily seem to go anywhere.232 
One unintended result of Talat Pasha’s talks with the British officials in Berlin was, however, 
that the Bolsheviks became very angered once they heard the news. In December 1920, Kara-
han had expressed his concerns about Talat’s negotiations with the British.233 «When [Talat 
Pasha] let his good relations with the English reach the level of exchanging banquets, Enver 
Pasha told Cemal in a confident letter, I was forced to state to the Russians that I did not 
agree with this behavior of his […].»234 German officials also noted that Enver had dispute 
with the Soviet Government, because Bolshevik spies had discovered Talat’s talks with the 
British.235 Viktor Kopp and Leonid Krassin expressed their concerns about Talat’s activities 
during their visit to Berlin in early March 1921. They believed that Talat represented the 
right wing of the Young Turk movement, while Enver the left. Ziya, who was in Berlin as 
the representative of Enver, had talks with Kopp and Krassin, and reported afterwards:  
Kopp and Krassin arrived. I talked with both of them. […] [T]hey declared that they 
would approve if the right and left wings which are already indeed separated would def-
initely apart. Because, he said, it would not look good, if we have palsy-walsy relation to 
Talat Pasha, who took the leadership of right wing.236 
Enver got increasingly suspicious as well. He told the Kemalist representative in Moscow that 
Talat Pasha was England’s man and that Talat had promised to the British to restore order 
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to Anatolia, if he would be granted with Grand Viziership.237 Enver was used to say to his 
colleagues at the Moscow Brach: We’ve lost Talat; he became a follower of the English.238 
In this sense, perceptions and misperceptions over the position and intention of different 
actors was pushing others to take certain positions and actions. 
One of the reasons behind the mistrust towards Talat Pasha was that he was planning his 
return to Turkey. This was no secret. While Enver was in Berlin during the winter 1920–
1921, Talat talked openly with him about this. Eventually, Enver and Talat both agreed that 
Talat should go back to Turkey.239 Rumor has it that Talat had made secret travel arrange-
ments for March 17, 1921, to enter to Anatolia via the port of Antalya.240 In a later interro-
gation, Dr. Nazım told that they had sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha through Şerif 
Pasha in Antalya, requesting permission to enter to Anatolia.241 In a following but undated 
later to Cemal Pasha, Enver was more precise with his complaints about Talat’s last attitudes, 
especially regarding his rapprochement towards the British. As I saw Talat Pasha in an am-
bition to be on top of a party that would unite everything once he would return to home-
land, said Enver, then I decided to form the organization that I have been planning only 
with those friends, who would work without distrusting each other and so that we don’t have 
to censor our letters.242 
Around the same time a couple of peculiar characters with certain ties to Britain started to 
approach Talat Pasha. For instance, Talat was in touch with a certain Italian by the name of 
Caputto, a freemason friend of his, who was associated with Talat’s friends from the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Caputto visited Talat in Berlin, he travelled to England to 
make some inquiries. Upon his return, it was decided that Caputto should organize confer-
ences and lectures in major cities to make Turkish propaganda. In addition, he proposed that 
an inspection commission of «unofficially friendly foreigners» to be sent to Thrace and 
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Smyrna to prepare a report that would defend the Turkish cause. But the other Young Turks 
in Berlin, such as Dr. Nazım, did not know Caputto and were rather reserved towards these 
overtures.243 Later, Dr. Nazım would hear rumors from Rome that Caputto was allegedly a 
British spy.244  
Another dubious person in this context was a Bulgarian by the name of Davidoff who aroused 
suspicions. Davidoff had contacts to another Bulgarian, Kirtcheff-Varney, working at the 
staff of Lloyd George. Davidoff was a former Bulgarian komitadji and a friend of the Bulgar-
ian revolutionary leader and statesman Stefan Stambolov and after Stambolov’s death he lived 
in Constantinople.245 He had previously worked as informant both for British Intelligence as 
well as for Talat Pasha during the war.246 Previously, Davidoff had tried to act as a liaison 
between Young Turk leaders and Lloyd George for several times, but so far with no results. 
Now in December 1920, Davidoff appeared again claiming that the British invited Talat for 
a meeting in Lausanne. But Talat did not necessarily trust Davidoff’s offer and thus politely 
refused it.247 Nonetheless, Talat entrusted Davidoff a letter of recommendation. Bearer of 
this letter Monsieur Davidoff is my friend, wrote Talat on December 27, 1920. He is aware 
of my opinions and my beliefs about the policy that Turkey should follow towards Eng-
land.248 British Intelligence reported that Talat Pasha wishes to make special agreements 
with England. Also if England agrees, Talat offered the policy of the Moslems in Turke-
stan and the Caucasus will immediately become anti-Bolshi. But senior voices in the Foreign 
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Office noted that they do not want to complicate the present situation by opening negotia-
tion with Talaat.249 Later it was rumored that Davidoff had a role in Talat Pasha’s assassi-
nation, because he would later be seen also in Rome during the assassination of former Grand 
Vizier Said Halim Pasha.250 However, this appears to be a mere coincidence, as Davidoff was 
in Rome to convince the Kemalist representative Cami Bey to continue with Talat Pasha’s 
plan and reach an Anglo-Turkish agreement.251 British documents show that Davidoff was 
neither a spy nor did he have anything to with Talat Pasha’s or Said Halim Pasha’s assassina-
tion other than the coincidence of having been in Berlin and Rome.  
Other geopolitical shifts had occurred in the meantime as well. In late October 1920, Alex-
ander, the King of Greece, had died after peculiar incident where he was bitten by his pet 
monkey.252 In his place former king in exile, Constantine, was recalled by the royalists to take 
the crown. One of Constantine’s close associates in exile was General Ioannis Metaxas, later 
dictator of Greece.253 Metaxas was a German-educated military officer who had opposed the 
Greek invasion of Anatolia.254 Talat Pasha met with General (and later dictator) Ioannis Met-
axas in Berlin.255 Metaxas sent a message to that he did not want to visit Talat at his home 
for the fear of being seen. Thus, the two men arranged to meet at the house of Madame 
Wangenheim. Once the two men were left alone, Metaxas told Talat that both the Turks 
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and the Greeks were played against each other by the Great Powers. After some rather aca-
demic elaborations on possible points of conflict and cooperation, Talat, again, told that he 
was not entitled to engage in official negotiations on behalf of the Ankara Government.256  
A German friend of his, Admiral Hofmann (or perhaps Alfred Hopman) brought one day a 
Russian General, to Talat Pasha’s apartment in Berlin, as the former Grand Vizier was still 
alive. In November 1920, General Wrangel and his White Army including their families had 
found refuge in Constantinople.257 The Russian General had only recently arrived from Con-
stantinople and belonged to the trusted friends of General Wrangel. He told Talat that Wran-
gel’s army was ready to serve under the command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and fight against 
the Allied and Greek occupation. Talat answered that he was not entitled to give a definitive 
answer and gave him contact address of the Kemalist delegation in Rome.258 In Moscow, 
Enver also heard the news that the Wrangel army in Constantinople was looking for a new 
vocation. Dr. Nazım tells that they heard of rumors that the Greeks had expressed interest in 
utilizing the Wrangel forces as a foreign legion against the Turkish national forces. Indeed, 
there were such rumors in Constantinople so that the British occupation forces censored this 
news in the press.259 One of Wrangel’s senior officers had offered the forces also to Enver. 
Also, the Bolsheviks had interest in these forces. A former Ottoman officer from Albania, a 
certain Ekrem Bey, was also in Moscow and offered to start a revolt in Ionnina (Yanya). 
Therefore, Enver ordered Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir to organize Muslims of Bulgaria for a guerilla 
war against Greece. Enver told this all to ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha. Enver also gave the 
name of the man, Naim Cevad, he sent to Constantinople to negotiate with the Wrangel 
forces.260 However on April 29, Naim Cevad was arrested in Amasra at the Anatolian Black 
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Sea Coast for propaganda activities on behalf of Enver Pasha. Turkish Intelligence also ap-
proved that he was on his way to meet with Wrangel’s men in Constantinople, but it was 
rather the program of the People Councils Party he was distributing, which caught the atten-
tion of the officials.261 This Naim Cevad affair made Enver very frustrated.262 There were also 
contacts to Anton Denikin and members of the White movement among the White Russian 
exile community in Constantinople. But as Enver explained, the CUP branches decided to 
not to get involved, because it might have complicated the good relations to the Soviets.263 
Developments in Iraq were troubling British decision-makers as well. There were rumors that 
the Kemalists were trying to promote Sheikh Ahmed Sharif al-Senussi as the new «King of 
Iraq».264 Only last year, the Sharifian Prince Abdullah was proclaimed as the King of Iraq in 
March 1920 by the Iraqi Congress. As this recent appointment double-crossed previous ar-
rangements with Britain, Abdullah had refused the crown. Since the end of the war, Iraq has 
been under military administration of the India Office. After his defeat against the French in 
July 1920, the exiled King of Syria, Abdullah’s brother Faysal, was preferred by the British 
officials in Baghdad as the best candidate for the post of the new Iraqi monarch. Sheikh 
Senussi’s claim for the Iraqi throne challenged these plans. Senussi enjoyed a popularity in 
the Middle East as a revolutionary-religious leader with strong ties to Kemalists and Union-
ists. According to news which the CUP leaders received, Sheikh Senussi made a visit to Brit-
ish occupied Mosul where he called the Iraqi Muslims to wage a jihad against the British, 
which highly alarmed the British officials there. Allegedly, a representative of Sheikh Sennusi 
even proposed to open a branch of Enver Pasha’s Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies 
in Mosul.265 Dr. Ahmed Fuad Bey believed that this was the reason why Bekir Sami on behalf 
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of the Ankara government was invited to London and why Talat Pasha was approached by 
the British in early 1921.266  
In February 1921, Talat Pasha, once again, asked his British informant in Berlin to arrange 
a meeting with his old friend Aubrey Herbert.267 On February 21, 1921, Major Timoty Flor-
ence Breen from the British Military Mission came to Shakib Arslan’s apartment and told 
him that he was looking for Talat everywhere. Talat was in Munich. He needed to find Talat 
and arrange a meeting.268 To his surprise, Talat received a positive answer from London this 
time. Aubrey Herbert would meet Talat in Germany. 
I must spare a moment to introduce Aubrey Herbert (1880-1923) who is considered as one 
of the archetypical British «gentleman spies».269 Like many other gentleman spies, most no-
tably T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) with whom he was also friends, Herbert belonged to the 
British upper class and was trained in elite schools like Eton and Oxford. He was a true 
Orientalist, both in in the intellectual and imperialist sense of the term. He spoke Turkish, 
Arabic, Greek, and Albanian and had widely traveled far corners of the Near and Middle East 
and made friends in important places, including among Albanian nationalists and Young 
Turks. Like many other Orientalists, Herbert constructed his eccentric selfhood based on his 
intuitive understanding of everything Oriental, which qualified him as an expert in political 
and military affairs related to the Near and Middle East.270 Although he never occupied senior 
government posts, he was an imperial jack-of-all-trades in professional terms. He was a mem-
ber of the parliament from the Conservative Party from 1911 until his death in 1923. Alt-
hough mostly a «backbench» parliamentarian, he was not afraid to march to different tunes 
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and follow «maverick» projects. Herbert also had a long working relationship with the For-
eign Office as a diplomat. He was a former attaché in Tokyo and Constantinople and other-
wise he acted as a voluntary informant on foreign affairs and on distant lands he traveled. 
During the Great War he returned to his old unit of Irish Guards. First, he fought with his 
unit in France and was wounded. Then he found his true vocation as an intelligence officer 
in the Middle East for the War Office and the Admiralty. He was nearly in all of the major 
battles in which the British fought against the Ottomans. He served first at the notorious 
espionage hub of the Middle East, the Arab Bureau in Cairo. After that he was a liaison 
officer for the Admiralty during the Gallipoli campaign, negotiating with the Ottoman com-
mand. During the decisive battle of Kut in 1916 he served as an intelligence officer in Mes-
opotamia.271 As a supporter of subaltern struggles from Yemen to Ireland, Aubrey Herbert 
was also a prominent advocate of Albanian independence and he was, hence, proposed by his 
Albanian friends as the man who would be the king of Albania.272 His legacy as the «gentle-
man spy» has been manifested even in his lifetime in his friend John Buchan’s spy-thriller 
Greenmantle.273 Buchan’s literary figure of Sandy Arbuthnot, the polyglot master-spy and 
eccentric connoisseur of Oriental intrigues from Yemen to Albania was based foremost on 
Aubrey Herbert.274    
In London, Sir Basil Thomson invited Aubrey Herbert for a meeting at the Scotland Yard. 
After the reorganization of the British intelligence community in 1919, Thomson was not 
only the head of the Special Branch at Scotland Yard but now also the newly created Director 
of Intelligence at the Home Office. Thus, not only the secret police and its executive powers, 
but also the whole intelligence apparatus related to homeland security was under his com-
mand. Thomson had been quite active in counter-espionage activities during the war years, 
dealing with Ottoman-German operations against British India as well as with Irish revolu-
tionaries. But now in the post-war era the purpose of the newly structured intelligence com-
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munity was more occupied with the Bolshevik «menace». Thomson was known to be a ma-
nipulative and ruthless career bureaucrat.275 We still do not know why, but it was Thomson 
who granted Talat Pasha’s request and asked Herbert to go to Germany and get in touch 
with the fugitive Young Turk leader. Herbert was curious to see Talat again, but he had 
reservations against Lloyd George and his government.276 When Herbert shared this secret 
assignment with his trusted friend Lord Robert Cecil, the latter responded: «Good Heavens! 
Who on earth runs our Foreign Policy? Scotland Yard?»277  
On February 26, 1921, Herbert travelled to a small town called Hamm in Germany, which 
he describes as «a miserable industrial village, that seemed to be inhabited by potential sui-
cides.»278 Talat Pasha had received a telegram informing him about Herbert’s coming, so he 
traveled from Garmisch-Partenkirchen to Berlin and then to Hamm.279 When he and Talat 
met at the hotel that evening, Herbert remembers Talat as follows:  
He had grown much thinner, and his good looks were sinister; his black hair was turning 
grey; his eyes were very bright, glittering while he talked like the eyes of a wild animal in 
the dusk. The urbanity of his manners remained the same. He was neat and well dressed, 
but obviously poor.280  
At that night, the two old friends talked briefly. Talat presented his position on the Armenian 
Question, which still corresponds to the «official» Turkish stories of Armenian treason and 
governmental incapability. The next day the two men took the train to Düsseldorf to escape 
the depressive atmosphere of Hamm. They conversed the whole day enjoying each other’s 
company.281 Talat was sweet-talking the relations between Young Turks and the British Em-
pire in hope of reenacting a Turco-English rapprochement. In his opinion, the Young Turks 
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and the British were reluctant antagonists and it was a misfortune that they fell apart before 
the war. «We Young Turks practically offered Turkey to you, and you refused us», said Ta-
lat.282 He wished England to support Turkey once again. Otherwise, he declared, «Turkey is 
at war with England».283 Talat was openly threatening with guerilla warfare from Anatolia to 
Central Asia:  
Our geography is a fortress to us—a very strong one. Our mountains are the strongest of 
our forces. You cannot pursue us into the mountains of Asia; and stretching back into 
Central Asia are six republics, composed of men of our blood, cousins, if not brothers, 
and united now by the bond of misfortune.284  
This guerilla warfare was like a «child’s game» (jeu de gamin), as Talat beautifully put it and 
«compared it to cutting telegraph wires. That might do very little damage, Talat explained 
but, on the other hand, it might do a great deal of harm.»285 He continued and frankly 
admitted: «we are engaged in propaganda throughout the East, and inciting India, though 
not very effectually […] pursuing a policy of enlisting as many people […] against Great 
Britain, and undertaking all possible reprisals open to her.»286 The solution to this problem 
was, however, simple. Talat assured Herbert that «the trouble in India would cease automat-
ically when [the British] entered into friendly relations with Turkey.»287 When he spoke of 
Turkey, it was never clear what he actually meant, whether the Ankara government or rather 
the CUP networks inside and outside Turkey, or maybe both. But this ambiguity was exactly 
the reason behind his elusive power. In Talat’s explanations, everything was neatly connected 
with each other: the CUP, the Kemalists, and even India. And this corresponded to the par-
anoid imagination of British Intelligence. Talat himself presented his purpose and position 
in these political arrangements and entanglements literally very central: «I do not want power 
or office, said he, I speak for myself, but I am in the centre of things.»288 
While Muslim insurgencies were spreading from North Africa to India since 1919, Talat and 
his friends—despite their wide-reaching network—had practically no active play in these 
uprisings, as we have seen in the previous chapters. But somehow, they convinced their 
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friends and foes (and perhaps even themselves) that they had a voice in these complex inci-
dents. In fact, their voice was now being heard, maybe not necessarily in Tripoli, Baghdad, 
or Hyderabad, but in London.  
At the end of their two-day conversations both men went separate ways with the shared hope 
that their talk might bring back order to the Middle East. «The interview with my friend in 
Düsseldorf took place a little more seriously and thoroughly, wrote Talat to Cavid. In sum, 
for our part we gave our assurance and for his part he gave his trust.»289 Talat was very pleased 
with the conversation as he told his friends afterwards in Berlin.290 And Herbert, on the other 
hand, truly wanted to believe that Talat had no play in the Armenian massacres. Herbert was 
still convinced that Talat «had rare power and attraction» and he possessed the ways and 
means to steer the chaos back into order. Despite all the odds, the mutually cherished cha-
risma, chutzpah, and fantasy of both men seem to have painted them an optimistic picture 
of the near future. The Auswärtiges Amt was well informed about Talat’s talk with Herbert 
so that we can assume that Talat or his followers shared this information also with the Ger-
mans: 
But that also the British government judged this relationship [between Talat and Mustafa 
Kemal] quite different […], may be appreciated from the fact that in March [sic, Febru-
ary] this year the member of the House of Commons Mr. Herbert met in Dusseldorf 
with Talaat to ask him on behalf of the British Government to use its influence for the 
means of the English demands submitted in Angora. According to statements of Mr. 
Herbert, the British would have nothing against Talaat’s return to Turkey. Similar over-
tures have been repeatedly offered to the former Great Vizier also by the British Embassy 
[in Berlin].291 
As a Turcophile imperial Orientalist Herbert saw what he calls «the chasm that separates us 
from Turkey and from Islam» and hoped for ways to abridge this gap. He believed that Talat 
might have been a possibility to do so. However, he also saw major obstacles, but rather in 
«the incompetency of Mr. Lloyd George and his Government».292 When Herbert arrived 
back to London, he wrote in his diary some curious things: 
Friday March 4th, 1921. Reached London on Tuesday, wrote my report that night and 
Wednesday morning, sent it in yesterday. To-day, I went to see Sir Basil Thomson, to 
 
289 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), March 7, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, 
İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 185.  
290 Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Yamauchi, 
The Green Crescent under the Red Star, 176–79.  
291 Note to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1921, PA-AA, R 30648, K016873.  
292 Herbert, Ben Kendim, 328. 
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tell him that I thought that he much better send it to Lord Curzon. It seemed to me 
much better to meet trouble half-way. [Sir Allen] Leeper dined last night. I saw he knew 
something. He is a curious fellow, all light and no heat, all brain no soul, and an Austral-
ian accent in his heart. Basil Thomson quite agreed with me. He also seemed to have 
given it away [to Curzon], pretty freely, on his own, but said that he had been going to 
write and ask me if he could not do what I suggested.293  
Somehow Herbert was uncomfortable, how things were done behind the curtains of Britain’s 
new intelligence community, where he seems to have had limited access to higher echelons 
of decision-making.  
 
293 Aubrey Herbert Papers, quoted in Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 174–75. 
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10. Ides of March: 
Talat Pasha’s Assassination as a Contentious Site of  
Transnational Activism 
On March 15, 1921, a young Armenian student by the name of Soghomon Tehlirian mur-
dered a man on a busy street in Berlin. The victim was no other than Talat Pasha. The 
German court would later let Tehlirian go without any punishment, citing his psychological 
instability resulting from his genocidal trauma. After Talat’s murder, some other former de-
cision-makers of the Young Turk regime, too, fell victim to Armenian avengers. For a long 
time, these political assassinations were understood as singular and unconnected acts of re-
venge carried out by traumatized Armenian survivors. As for some contemporary observers, 
on the other hand, these political assassinations were part of a larger conspiracy—claims that 
remained long unconfirmed. The cloak of mystery was unveiled after the publication of the 
memoirs of some of the Armenian revolutionaries in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury.1 The proud confessions revealed that the assassinations were part of a clandestine cam-
paign of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun, 
ARF), also known as Tashnagsutyun or the Tashnags. The code name of this secret mission 
was Operation Nemesis.2 
 
1 Even children and grandchildren of some ARF members associated with the Operation Nemesis learned 
about the role of their fathers and grandfathers decades later. Marian Mesrobian MacCurdy, Sacred Justice: 
The Voices and Legacy of the Armenian Operation Nemesis (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2015), 2. 
Most important memoirs of the Operation Nemesis agents were published in Armenian in 1950s and 1960s. 
Soghomon Tehlirian’s memoirs were written in third person narrative by Vahan Minakhorian and published 
in Armenian language in Cairo, 1953. Shahan Natalie’s memoirs “On the Trail of the Great Criminal” were 
published as a series in the Beirut-based Armenian journal Nayiri (May-June 1964). Arshavir Shiragian’s 
thrilling memoir was published in Armenian in Beirut, 1965, under the title It was the Legacy of the Martyrs. 
The ARF narrative was first exposed in English language in Lindy V. Avakian’s book, which told the newly 
deceased Tehlirian’s story in first person. Lindy V. Avakian, The Cross and the Crescent (Phoenix: UCS Press, 
1989). Later Arshavir Shiragian’s memoir was translated into in English as Arshavir Shiragian, The Legacy: 
Memoirs of an American Patriot, ed. Sonia Shiragian (Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976). Invaluable new 
documents from Aaron Sachaklian’s private papers were published in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice. Shahan 
Natalie’s private paper are currently in the cataloging and evaluation process by his daughter Sylva Natalie 
Manoogian on behalf of the Shahan Natalie Family Foundation, see: http://ampersand.gseis.ucla, du/sylva-
natalie-manoogian-research-spans-generations-of-family-history-centuries-of-world-history/ For the 
promotion of the fund-raising campaign see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD8gjwKnJEM 
2 Jacques Derogy, a French investigative journalist showed the broader public in 1986 that actually ARF’s 
clandestine network was behind the revenge killings. Derogy was inspired by the work of renowned scholar of 
irregular warfare Gérard Chailand and genocide scholar Yves Ternon. With the help of Tashnag expert 
Gerard Libaridian, Derogy conducted archival research in the ARF archives in Boston. He also critically 
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The Operation Nemesis was a social movement campaign by the ARF, utilizing what social 
scientist call «clandestine political violence» in order to call world-wide attention to the Ar-
menian Question.3 The use of political violence was a concerted communicative performance 
of claim-making. The story of Talat Pasha’s assassination is deeply entangled in nationalist 
narratives, both Turkish and Armenian. As I will show, the assassination of Talat Pasha shows 
remarkably how political interactions and performances can immediately be entangled in the 
imagination of political conspiracies and framing of public discourses. I will argue that there 
is a connected and complex framework of transnational contentious politics that elaborates 
the dialectic processes of sense-making.4    
*** 
I have regarded the assassin organizations as illusion, as phantasm, as exalted opinion of 
individuals who generalized some symptoms, German statesman Gustav Stresemann said 
on July 5, 1922, after he survived an assassination attempt. I must note with deep shock 
that I can no longer hold on to this assessment.5 Rationalization and disenchantment of 
politics dismissed conspiracy theories, as science had dismissed folk belief. But conspiracies 
were still very much real in times of mass politics. While the CUP leaders were secretly con-
spiring schemes in Berlin, they were themselves the target of other conspiracies. Armenian 
 
triangulated his findings with the narratives found in the published Armenian memoirs. Although the result 
failed to meet academic standards, his book was, nevertheless, able to illustrate that it was a concerted and 
premediated plot behind the assassinations, which Armenian nationalist narratives had long subdued and 
forgotten. Jacques Derogy, Opération Némésis: Les vengeurs arméniens (Paris: Fayard, 1986). For its English 
translation see: Jacques Derogy, Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders 
Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations, ed. A. M. Berrett (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1990).  
3 I prefer to use Donatella della Porta’s term «clandestine political violence» instead of the term «terrorism». 
Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6–11. 
Although the Armenian revolutionaries themselves used the term «derroreh» to describe their (heroic) violent 
acts, the term has a very derogative and ambiguous connotation which makes it a contested analytical 
concept. Khachig Tololyan, “Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 4, no. 2 (1992): 13.  
4 For rather more complex approaches see also: Eric Bogosian, Operation Nemesis: The Assassination Plot that 
Avenged the Armenian Genocide (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015); Osik Moses, “Assassination 
of Talaat Pasha in 1921 in Berlin: A Case Study of Judicial Practices in the Weimar Republic” (M.A. thesis, 
California State University, 2012).  
5 Quoted in Emil Julius Gumbel, Vier Jahre politischer Mord (Berlin: Verlag der neuen Gesellschaft, 1922), 
124. Streseman was referring here to the secret societies of the political right, which were responsible for many 
political murders since the November Revolution and even attempted to kill him on June 4, 1922. Heinrich 
Hannover and Elisabeth Hannover-Drück, Politische Justiz 1918–1933 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-
Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1966), 124–28.  
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«ghosts», secret agents and assassins of the ARF, were shadowing them.6 The story of these 
ARF agents complements the story of the CUP in the aftermath of World War I and reveals 
the dynamics and dialectic of transnational contentious politics.  
In the second half of 1920, the Armenian Republic was already doomed, stuck between the 
advancing Kemalist and Bolshevik forces. Although the Sèvres treaty had promised the foun-
dation of an independent Armenia in Anatolia, the Turks had been very successful in their 
military offensive, sealing the tragic fate of Western Armenia for good. The Bolsheviks, on 
the other hand, approved to be eager on Sovietizing the young Republic of Armenia.7 The 
chaos of the aftermath of World War I therefore cast dark clouds over the Armenian Ques-
tion. Armenians had to demonstrate their resistance. The more they would politically mobi-
lize against the crimes they suffered, the more they would find support to establish a new 
national homeland in the post-war settlement—so they hoped.  
Although Western newspapers—echoing their governments—had long been calling that 
«Talaat and his evil associates […] will be hunted down and treated as common murderers 
by the avenging powers», nothing serious had happened yet to bring them to justice.8 The 
courts martial of 1919-1920 did not produce a satisfying verdict, as the responsible CUP 
leaders, who escaped the prosecutions, were moving freely in their semi-illegal exile in Ger-
many, and the other accused CUP members imprisoned in Malta were not effectively being 
put on trial.9 Because of the lack of international structures and determination that would 
 
6 This metaphor is borrowed from Christopher Clark’s «Serbian Ghosts» chapter, in which he illustrated the 
clandestine Serbian nationalist-revolutionary networks behind the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
in June 1914. Christopher M. Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin 
Books, 2013), 3–64. See also: Laure Marchand and Guillaume Perrier, Turkey and the Armenian Ghost: On 
the Trail of the Genocide (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015). 
7 Richard G. Hovannisian, “Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 4, no. 2 (1973): 129–47; Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of 
Armenia, 4 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971–1996), IV, 180–236. 
8 The Times, “Wiping Out the Armenians,” September 30, 1915, quoted in Christopher Gunn, “Getting 
Away with Murder: Soghomon Tehlirian, ASALA, and the Justice Commandos, 1921–1984,” in Yavuz and 
Ahmad, War and Collapse, 900. For British and French high officials echoing this message at the end of 
World War I see: Michael Bobelian, Children of Armenia: A Forgotten Genocide and the Century-Long Struggle 
for Justice (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 53–54. 
9 For the (lack of) prosecution of Turkish war criminals see: James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The 
Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1982), 153–63. For the Ottoman courts martial prosecuting the war criminals see: Vahakn N. Dadrian and 
Taner Akçam, eds., Judgment at Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide Trials (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011). 
For the Malta prisoners see: Bilal N. Şimşir, The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question (Ankara: 
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bring war criminals to justice, the ARF decided to privatize the punishment of war criminals 
by assassinating high-value targets as symbolic acts of revenge and justice.10 In the vernacular 
language of the ARF, the «debt» needed to be cleared off.11 The CUP had to be punished 
and the ARF had to take it into its own hands—not only for vengeance, but to call for atten-
tion for the political cause and to mobilize political and social resources. 
A renowned expert of Turkish-Armenian relations, Raymond Kérvorkian beautifully put it 
when he said: «You must understand. The Tashnags and the Ittihad, they were like lovers 
who hated one another.»12 And if men like Talat Pasha from the CUP had their love-hate 
counterparts in the ARF, one man particularly comes to mind, namely Karekin Pasterma-
djian, also known under his nom de guerre Armen Garo.13  
The spectacular life history of Armen Garo shows how far individual men can develop polit-
ical agency in complex historical contexts. As a student, Armen Garo was already a well-
known activist within the ARF circles in Anatolia and Europe. As a young man, he became 
one of the notorious fedayis of the ARF, including his prominent participation in the Otto-
man Bank hostage crises of 1896. In political exile in Europe, he rose to top positions within 
the ARF. After the 1908 revolution, he became a member of the Ottoman parliament where 
he cultivated close ties to the CUP in general and Talat Pasha in particular. With the out-
break of the war in 1914, Armen Garo had a controversial part to play in the Young Turk 
decision-making processes, as he was one of the most prominent Tashnags who deserted to 
 
Foreign Policy Institute, 1984); Vartkes Yeghiayan, British Foreign Office Dossiers on Turkish War Criminals 
(La Verne: American Armenian International College, 1991).  
10 Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919–1950 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76; Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, 163. 
11 See for instance: Armen Garo, letter (Paris) to the ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), June 4, 
1919, quoted in Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 58. The metaphor of «debt» or sometimes also referred as 
«blood debt» frames the killing of the perpetuators as an «honor killing».  
12 Quoted in Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 155. For CUP-ARF relations see: Dikran Mesrob Kaligian, 
Armenian Organization and Ideology under Ottoman Rule: 1908–1914 (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009); Garabet K. Moumdjian, “Struggling for a Constitutional Regime: Armenian-Young Turk 
Relations in the Era of Abdulhamid II, 1895–1909” (PhD thesis, University of California, 2012); Garabet K. 
Moumdjian, “The Eastern Vilayets, 1909–1914: ARF-CUP Collusion, Russian Stratagems, and the Kurdish 
Menace,” in Yavuz and Ahmad, War and Collapse, 705–80. 
13 For his memoirs see: Armen Garo, Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo, the Armenian Ambassador to 
America from the Independent Republic of Armenia, ed. Haig T. Partizian and Simon Vratsian (Detroit: Armen 
Topouzian, 1990). See also: Christopher Gunn, “A Fedayi Extraordinaire: The Life and Times of Armen 
Garo, 1872–1923” (Paper presented at the conference “The Age of the Komitadji: Entangled Histories and 
Political Sociology of Insurgencies in the Ottoman World (1870s–1920s)” at the University of Basel, January 
22–24, 2015). 
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Russia in order to join the Armenian Volunteer Units against the Ottoman Empire.14 He 
was traumatized by the news of the massacres in Western Armenia and his health suffered 
immensely which would never really recover once again. After the collapse of Tsarist Russia, 
he became the first ambassador of the Armenian Republic to the United States. Despite oc-
cupying a prominent diplomatic position, Armen Garo did not put away his komitadji/fedayi 
persona. Thus, it was none other than Armen Garo who masterminded the Operation Nem-
esis. If Armen Garo had to name his personal nemesis looking back to his life, this was surely 
Talat.15 
 In October 1919, it was decided at the General Congress of the ARF in Yerevan to centralize 
the use of political executions and assassinations.16 There was some opposition, but Armen 
Garo and his sidekick Shahan Natalie (Hagop Ter Hagopian) from the US Central Com-
mittee convinced the majority of the delegates for an operation of vengeance. The congress 
adopted a secret assassination program under the code name Operation Nemesis. The ARF 
started to collect the names of war criminals in so-called death lists. 17 In all the lists, the 
undisputed number one was Talat Pasha.18  
 
14 Yektan Türkyılmaz, “Rethinking Genocide: Violence and Victimhood in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1915” 
(PhD thesis, Duke University, 2011), 154.  
15 The escalation of his personal animosity with Talat Pasha is narrated in: Karekin Pasdermadjian, “My Last 
Interview with Talaat Pasha,” Armenian Review 35, no. 2 (1982): 115–27. 
16 From then on each regional central committee would be accountable to the party congress for their political 
executions. Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 60. 
17 Interestingly, in November 12, 1919, the former Ottoman Foreign Minister Gabriel Noradungyan 
contacted Cavid Bey in Switzerland and asked him to mark the names of those from the list who were not 
associated with the Armenian deportations. Cavid Bey, Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi, 4 vols., ed. Hasan Babacan and 
Servet Avşar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014–2015), IV, 39. There were many such lists with 
certain variations in circulation among ARF networks and sometimes forwarded to Allied powers to support 
their persecution of the Young Turk perpetuators. The original list was prepared by Manoog 
Hampartsoumian in December 1918. See: Armenian Revolutionary Federation, “A List of Those Responsible 
for the Massacres and Deportations of the Armenians,” Armenian Review 35, 3, 4 (1982): 290. For Shahan 
Natalie’s handwritten version of Hampartsoumian’s “The One Hundred List” found in the private papers of 
Aaron Sachaklian see: MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 116–117, 143–147. See also: Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 
59. 
18 Operation Nemesis is sometimes also associated with the killing of two leaders of the Azerbaijani Equality 
Party (Musavat Partiyası) who played key roles in the fall of Baku to the Ottoman Army in September 1918. 
On June 19, 1920, Fatali Khan Khoyski, a former minister in the Azerbaijan People’s Republic, was killed by 
twenty years old Aram Yerganian in Tiflis. Later in July 18, 1921, the former Azerbaijani minister of interior 
Behbud Khan Javanshir was assassinated by Misak Torlakyan outside the Hotel Pera Palace in 
Constantinople. Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 60–61, 117–121. Also the execution of at least three 
Armenian collaborators are associated with the work of Operation Nemesis. Hmayag Aramiantz, the traitor in 
Hnchak Party’s 1914 assassination plot against Talat Pasha, was executed by Arshag Yezdanian. Vahe Ihsan 
Yesayan, a collaborator accused of helping the Ottoman officials in preparing the list of arrests of Armenian 
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As Armen Garo and Shahan Natalie received their mandate for their «special mission» (in 
Armenian: hadug kordz), they chose Boston as their headquarters.19 In this «special corps» (in 
Armenian: hadug marmin) Armen Garo would be the head of the operation, i.e. the guide.20 
Shahan Natalie, former editor of the Hairenik (Fatherland) newspaper in Boston, was the 
professionally devoted master-spy collecting intelligence and coordinating the operation in 
the field. Hamo Paraghamian was the secretary of ARF’s central committee of America and 
the liaison officer between the ARF and «Garo’s mission». Public accountant Aaron Sa-
chaklian was the meticulous head of financial and logistical matters. The operation was 
funded by a «special fund» (in Armenian: hadug kumar) sponsored mostly by American-Ar-
menians.21 All they needed was volunteers:  
We need three members with the following qualifications: someone who has attended 
military officers school, a gunsmith, a chemist who knows how to work with explosives. 
These people must be prepared to work unconditionally and to give their lives. Please 
send names of nominees so a list may be prepared. Of course, this is to remain secret. 
Your nominees should be bachelors.22  
One of these young bachelors was Soghomon Tehlirian. He was born in 1896 near Erzincan 
in the Erzurum Province at the frontier to Russian Caucasus. As a young man he went to 
Serbia to study mechanical engineering. During World War I he traveled to Tiflis and joined 
the ranks of the Armenian Volunteer Units of the Russian armed forces, fighting against the 
Ottoman Empire. In March 1916, as Tehlirian entered his destroyed hometown together 
with the Russian forces, he found out that his whole family was perished and their house was 
now a Russian barracks for soldiers. Like many survivors, despite many searches he never saw 
a family member ever again. From this moment on Tehlirian suffered from epileptic seizures, 
 
political leaders on April 24, 1915, was killed by Arshavir Shiragian on March 27, 1920, in Constantinople. 
Shiragian, The Legacy, 46–47. Harutiun Megerdichian, an Armenian also associated with the Ottoman secret 
police and the arrests of 1915, was killed by Soghomon Tehlirian in 1920 in Constantinople. Avakian, The 
Cross and the Crescent, 60; Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 132. These killings served as initiation rituals for 
most of the avengers who were later recruited to the operation. See: 
http://www.operationnemesis.com/condemned.html. Nevertheless, the Armenian Genocide Museum in 
Yerevan chose not to exclude these side-killings on its Operation Nemesis section. See: 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/26/Operation_Nemesis_exhibition_Tsitsernakaberd.jpg 
19 Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 60. 
20 Later General Sebouh (Arsha Nersesian), an experienced Armenian fedayi and field commander under the 
legendary General Andranik (Ozanian), would take over the leadership from Armen Garo due to latter’s 
illness. 
21 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 136–37; Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 59–60. 
22 ARF Central Committee of America, “Recruitment Announcement,” [undated], in MacCurdy, Sacred 
Justice, 88, 150. 
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anxiety attacks, and hallucinations and nightmares with images of his dead family members. 
Especially the image of his mother continued to haunt him. In his sense, this opportunity 
was a supernatural call to avenge for his family.23  
After the end of the war, Tehlirian travelled to Constantinople. In the Ottoman capital, he 
was soon recruited by an Hnchag-turned-Tashnag activist Yeranuhi Danielian.24 She con-
vinced Tehlirian to kill the Armenian collaborator Harutiun Megerdichian. One night with-
out an order from anyone, Tehlirian shot and wounded Megerdichian to death.25 After this 
successful assassination attempt, Danielian recommended Tehlirian to be recruited to the 
«special corps» of Operation Nemesis.26 Tehlirian traveled to Paris in order to receive further 
instructions by the ARF. After some desperate weeks without a clue where to start from, 
Tehlirian was contacted by an emissary of ARF’s Boston cell and was invited to the US by 
Hamo Paraghamian.27 The delegation of the Armenian Republic organized him a passport 
and a ticket on board of the Olympic. After arriving in the US on August 25, 1920, he traveled 
to Boston. There in the building of the newspaper Hairenik, he met Hamo Paraghamian and 
Armen Garo. He received his instructions from Garo.28 He was given many photographs of 
the Young Turk leaders and their wives to memorize their faces.29 
Meanwhile, Shahan Natali, the field operator of the operation, travelled to Europe to collect 
intelligence on the whereabouts of the Young Turk fugitives and to coordinate Tehlirian’s 
operation on the ground.30 Traveling to Paris and Geneva, Natali was able to collect crucial 
intelligence. He learned that Talat Pasha visited Zurich in early September 1920 undercover 
as an old hoca by the name of Reşid Şemsi Abdülkadir to meet with Necmeddin Molla.31 
Natali was getting intelligence over an asset who had bribed an official from the Swiss secret 
 
23 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 106–15. 
24 Avakian, The Cross and the Crescent, 47–53. 
25 Soghomon Tehlirian, Verhishumner: (Tʻaleatʻi ahabekume), ed. Vahan Minakhorian (Cairo: Housaper, 
1956), 208, cited in Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 132–33. 
26 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 139. 
27 Hanemian [Ardavazt Hanumian], cable (Paris) to Armen Garo (Washington, DC), July 28, 1920, in 
MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 164. 
28 Bogosian, Operation Nemesis, 141–42. 
29 In Aaron Sachaklian’s private papers, for instance, there are sixty-five photos of Turkish targets. MacCurdy, 
Sacred Justice, 148.  
30 Armen Garo, letter (Washington, DC) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), July 23, 1920, in 
MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 163. 
31 Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), September 26, 1920, in 
MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 179–80.  
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police. The policeman was delivering information «about Turks entering Switzerland.»32 And 
his intelligence confirmed the hiding location of the Young Turk fugitives, which Natali 
probably long assumed. Natalie reported to Boston: «According to information received from 
an undercover policeman […] Talaat, Dr. Nazim, Behaeddin Shakir, Djemal Azmi, Bedri 
are in Berlin».33  
In autumn 1920, Soghomon Tehlirian returned to Paris, where the ARF supplied him a fake 
Persian passport to guarantee that he would not be handed over to Ottoman officials, had he 
got arrested. Tehlirian managed to get his papers so that he could get a visa from the Swiss 
Embassy in Paris, on November 17, 1920,34 From Paris, Tehlirian travelled to Geneva. The 
ARF headquarters in Geneva were located at the building of the newspaper Troshag (Flag).35 
Mr. Anton Kosh, the old caretaker of the Troshag facilities, gave Tehlirian a sealed message 
from Shahan Natali who had left for Berlin:  
I am your contact, but I could not wait for you, as a comrade sent directly from the 
Committee in Constantinople has asked me to come at once. He has got onto the track 
of a ‹relative› and you should meet him too. You must come here and enroll in the uni-
versity and resume your mechanical engineering course.36  
Tehlirian obtained a student visa and left for Berlin on December 2, 1920.37 While the Ar-
menian Republic was in great trouble for survival, Armen Garo expressed the emergency of 
the «special mission» as follows: «If Shahan and S [Soghomon] too don’t live up to our hopes 
it means we have arrived at a moral bankruptcy.»38  
The team Shahan Natali established in Berlin consisted of several persons with different as-
signments. Natali was the field operative in command, while Tehlirian was the hitman. But 
 
32 Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to Aaron Sachaklian (Syracuse), October 4, 1920, in MacCurdy, Sacred 
Justice, 186.  
33 Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), September 30, 1920, in 
MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 182 
34 Legation of Switzerland in France, letter (Paris) to the Section of Foreign Affairs (Berne), March 19, 1921, 
BAR, E2001B.1000/1501.323. 
35 Shahan Natali, letter (Geneva) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), September 20, 1920, in 
MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 175. For Troshag see: Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: 
The Development of Armenian Political Parties Through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1963), 217. 
36 Quoted in Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 73. 
37 Soghomon Tehlirian, letter (Geneva) to Hamo Paraghamian (Boston), December 1, 1920, in MacCurdy, 
Sacred Justice, 196. 
38 Armen Garo, letter (Washington, DC) to ARF Central Committee of America (Boston), November 10, 
1920, in MacCurdy, Sacred Justice, 192. 
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there was also Hrach «Hrap» Papazian, codename «the European» because of his gentleman-
like demeanor. He was the undercover spy in the Turkish community of Berlin under the 
assumed name of Mehmed Ali impersonating a Turkish student from a rich family. He was 
associated with ARF’s «Office in Charge of Assassination» at the building of the Jagadamard 
(Battlefront) newspaper in Constantinople and was sent to Europe to assist Operation Nem-
esis.39 Another member of the group Hagop «Hazor» Zorian, a history student in Berlin, was 
the contact person of Hrap, alias Mehmed Ali, and Tehlirian’s local guide in Berlin. Vahan 
«Vaza» Zakarian, one of the founders of the German-Armenian Association, was their contact 
person in the Armenian community of Berlin and in the Armenophile circles around Johan-
nes Lepsius. His excellent command of German made him the key asset in gathering intelli-
gence from Germans and in making logistical arrangements. He would later act as Tehlirian’s 
interpreter in the trial. Not without a reason, one of Tehlirian’s lawyers Dr. Kurt Neimayer 
would even say in court: «Mr. Zachariantz reads the words from the defendant’s lips.»40 The 
diplomatic delegation of the crumbling Armenian Republic, especially vice consul Libarit 
Nazarian and his secretary Yervant Apelian, was helping the Operation Nemesis agents by 
transmitting their ciphered messages to Geneva, Boston, and Yerevan.41 Meanwhile, Tehlir-
ian enrolled at the university in Berlin as a mechanical engineering student and engaged in 
activities to establish an alibi for being a foreign student in Berlin by befriending other Ar-
menian students, going to dance classes, and taking German lessons.42  
Shahan Natali’s experience with transnational clandestine activism corresponds to the expe-
rience of CUP fugitives in establishing their networks in Europe. Travel was time consuming, 
visas were hard to obtain, letters took long to reach their recipient, wired correspondence 
could be intercepted, cash was in short supply but always needed in great amounts to make 
things happen, fake identities were necessary as protection and disguise, gathered intelligence 
was often contradictory or unreliable, trustworthy helpers were hard to find, and bureaus 
were necessary to keep constant communication with different centers and agents. But most 
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of all, contingencies and coincidences determined the course of events—or in Natali’s own 
words:  
Under the present circumstances it’s about 30 hours from Geneva to Berlin. Germany 
allows entry for only seven days, although I was successful in receiving a one-month con-
ditional pass. Imagine that during the time I was in Berlin that news had reached me and 
I needed to arrive in Switzerland; under the fastest conditions I am able to arrive in three 
days, and by then the individuals in question move from one place to the other or they 
return to Germany, so that my work becomes tied to chance. So I am under these con-
ditions. In order to overcome at least in part those difficulties, it is necessary that I have 
a working partner whom I can use as needed; then my money at my disposal must always 
be plentiful, so that he gets to assist me by the force of that money. Up until now I have 
already allocated to the work the equivalent of 1000 Swiss francs through someone else.43  
Especially Natali’s letters are remarkable in that they show how far transnational contentious 
politics was subject to the contingencies on the ground. He reported that «there are many 
difficulties that one cannot understand until they are subjected to these difficulties.» He adds 
that «if in advance the conditions had been a little familiar» to him he «would have absolutely 
arranged things differently.»44 With all their secrecy procedures and clandestine networks, 
Shahan Natali and his team members in Berlin were already ahead of their preys, who had 
long become sloppy with their clandestine tradecraft. 
There is a tendency in the literature telling the story of the Operation Nemesis to claim that 
the fugitives CUP leaders were enjoying a well-protected and luxurious life in Berlin.45 The 
financial situation of the Young Turks in exile is an important matter of contention. Contrary 
to common wisdom, however, neither did the CUP leaders enjoyed the full support of the 
German government, nor did they have millions in gold in secret bank accounts. Most of 
these claims can be traced back to rumors and gossip circulated by anti-CUP politicians and 
publicists.46 One of the most reoccurring themes in the private correspondence of the fugitive 
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CUP leaders is their lack of financial resources. According to Dr. Nazım, Talat Pasha brought 
with him around 70.000 Mark from Constantinople. Few months before his death, the 
money was already spent. Talat was supporting his life by selling his golden cigarette cases 
and his medals and his wife’s jewelry. His mother and two sisters in Constantinople were also 
now selling their valuables to survive.47 Talat was also indebted to some of his friends.48 The 
fact that Talat had serious financial troubles, does not necessarily mean that he lived a parsi-
monious life. The Nemesis agents did find the Young Turk exiles settled in a comfortable 
social life in Berlin—especially given that they were internationally wanted war criminals and 
seasoned revolutionaries conspiring for a world revolution.  
In telling his story decades later, Shahan Natali once said: «Killing Talaat was the easiest thing 
if only we recognized him… Even his name had been changed».49 Nevertheless, it proved to 
be a less difficult undertaking to recognize Talat Pasha and his friends in post-war Berlin. 
Talat was living incognito in Berlin «to obviate embarrassing the German Authorities.» With 
his fake identity Talat managed to travel to Italy and Switzerland. One of his fake papers was 
issued for «Monsieur Dupont a Swiss subject». «His identity was fairly secure», as Talat told 
around. «In Rome a lady remarked his resemblance to Talaat Pasha!», he told light-heartedly 
to a British informant.50  
With the arrival of their wives and children, they were no more the exiled revolutionaries 
who played bridge, smoking and drinking until late in the night in their secret club rooms, 
while conspiring plans about their return to politics. Now with their spouses and children 
joining their political exile, they were also going out for walks in the park, going to the opera 
and the movies, receiving friends for dinner parties, and doing touristic trips around the 
country.51 Talat Pasha’s life in Berlin, for instance, was more settled after the arrival of his 
wife Hayriye Talat (Bafralı) to a more social and cultural life-style. Talat was known for being 
 
47 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and 
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51 See for instance: “Ein Brief Talaat Paschas: den 22. Februar 1921,” Der Neue Orient 10, 1/3 (1922): 5. 
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very attached to his wife.52 Mrs. Talat had secretly fled from Constantinople in 1920 with 
the help of Count Balduino Caprini, the commander of the Italian occupation forces.53  
The Auswärtiges Amt had intelligence that Talat Pasha was no. 1 on the death list of Arme-
nian terrorists, as Blücher wrote in his memoir. So they offered Talat to take refuge in a 
remote widow’s mansion in Mecklenburg, but Talat refused, because he would rather stay at 
the center of the social life in Berlin.54 One month before his death, Talat was already com-
plaining that he had too much visits in Berlin so that he was thinking about moving to an-
other more quite town.55 The CUP leaders ended up living the social life of exiled elder 
statesmen. For instance, when Talat was once warned by his friends about the Armenian 
assassins, he is said to have answered: 
It is the responsibility of the German government to save the life of a person that immi-
grated to Germany as a citizen of an allied country. If Germany is not even strong enough 
to protect the Grand Vizier of its ally Turkey, what can we all do, when the death comes 
around?56  
Even as early as late 1919, there were rumors that Armenian agents were sent to Berlin, dis-
guising as French military officers in order to locate the fugitive CUP leaders, but soon left 
after failing to locate them.57 Talat Pasha was known for «not adopting the principle of pre-
caution» and neglecting the tradecraft of revolutionary clandestinity, as Dr. Nazım once 
wrote.58 Shakib Arslan similarly recalled that Talat, although being warned about Armenian 
 
52 Arif Cemil Denker, İttihatçı Şeflerin Gurbet Maceraları, ed. Yücel Demirel (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 
1992), 33. 
53 Count Caprini was an old friend of Enver Pasha who also helped Enver’s wife Naciye Sultan to escape. 
Murat Bardakçı, “interview with Hayriye Talat Bafralı, October 1982,” in Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı 
Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Özel Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hususi 
Yazışmalar, ed. Murat Bardakçı, 184–230 (İstanbul: Everest, 2009), 216–17. 
54 Wipert von Blücher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo: Erinnerungen eines Mannes aus dem zweiten Gliede 
(Wiesbaden: Limes, 1951), 130.  
55 Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 12, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, 
İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 179–81.  
56 Quoted in Cemal Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlindeki Son Günleri,” Tarih Konuşuyor 1, no. 2 (1964): 133. 
57 Shakib Arslan, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 21, 1921, TTK, EP 02-20, in Masayuki 
Yamauchi, ed. The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922 
(Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1991), 178. I could not find a 
clue regarding this in the sources on Operation Nemesis. 
58 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent 
under the Red Star, 185. Also Murat Bardakçı, the holder of Talat’s collection of private papers, comes to a 
similar conclusion. Talat Pasha was sending, for instance, a postcard with a photograph showing him and his 
wife during a trip and he was also sloppy in using his undercover name in his correspondence. See: Bardakçı’s 
introductory comments to Talat Pasha, postcard (Berlin) to his wife Hayriye (Budapest), October 13, 1920, 
in Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi, 176–77. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
364 
threats to his life, soon became sloppy with security precautions and secrecy procedures.59 
When Aubrey Herbert asked him, if he feared assassinations, Talat answered that he never 
thought of it. Why should any one dislike [me]?, asked Talat. Baffled by this response, 
Herbert said: Armenians might very well desire vengeance, after all that had been written 
about [you] in the papers. But, Talat brushed this aside.60 
When Tehlirian arrived in Berlin in December 3, 1920, he met with his contact man in the 
restaurant of Tiergarten Hotel where he had booked a room. His unnamed contact man 
showed him a newspaper article written by a certain Mehmed Zeki defaming the Young Turk 
fugitives in Berlin.61 Mehmed Zeki was known as a charlatan, as one contemporary observer 
recalls, whose history «is nothing but a characteristic extract from life as it is lived by hundreds 
of rogues in the East.»62 Mehmed Zeki’s polemic book, Bandit Killers as Guests of the German 
Republic, published in Berlin in 1920 mixed many facts he knew and observed with wild 
conspiracy theories.63 Tehlirian’s contact man told:  
Zeki may be a charlatan and a turncoat. We know that among the ‹birds of some im-
portance› he refers to in his article are a former senior official, Ismail Hakka, who is a 
close friend of Bedri Bey and Talaat, Bedri Bey himself, Dr. Shakir, and Jemal Azmi. 
Can you imagine that they are now parading themselves as socialists! Of course, they are 
living incognito, but we have learned that they have a secret meeting place: a tobacconist’s 
and Oriental carpet shop that was opened in the town center by the butcher of Trebi-
zond, Jemal Azmi. For us, it can be used as a starting point for tracking his visitors to 
their ... lair.64 
Accordingly, Hazor, Tehlirian, and others frequently went to a nearby café from where they 
could easily observe Cemal Azmi’s (no. 40 on the list) tobacco shop. They also followed 
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suspicious men and women going in and out of the shop. Soon they would first identify a 
lady they believed to be Enver Pasha’s wife. Enver, no. 3 on the death list, was a more difficult 
target to locate since he was consistently on the move and many false rumors about his where-
abouts were in circulation. The Armenian Vice-Consul advised the Nemesis agents: «I think 
that Enver will not take the risk of coming to Berlin. Despite the precautions you are taking, 
the Ittihadists here have smelled a plot. You must restrict your investigations to Talaat 
alone.»65 Tehlirian and his partners spotted a man they believed to be Topal İsmail Hakkı 
Pasha, no. 47 on the list.66 Hazor soon identified Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, no. 15, coming out 
of Cemal Azmi’s shop.67 One day they identified a man walking along Bahaeddin as Dr. 
Nazım, no. 14, entering an apartment on Uhlandstraße 47.68 Now their bureau was also 
discovered. But they all were not high enough on the death list, the group was waiting for 
the number one—Talat Pasha—to appear.  
One day Hrap, alias Mehmed Ali, delivered Hazor an important intelligence, which he gath-
ered from the Young Turk community. The CUP leaders were planning a meeting in couple 
of days in Rome. Shahan Natali instantly booked a ticket on the same train and found himself 
in the midst of the Turks in the same compartment. As Bahaeddin Şakir came with his bags, 
Natali believes to have identified also Bedri Bey, no. 72, next to him. Then just before the 
train left, a man with a crane appeared on the train station to say goodbye, whom all the 
other Turks called «Pasha». The Nemesis agents became curious. Tehlirian and his friends 
followed this «Pasha» from the train station to his apartment at Hardenbergstraße 4, an ad-
dress they had already came cross several times while following the suspicious customers of 
the tobacco shop.  
Later at his room, Tehlirian compared the man he just saw with photos of Talat Pasha and 
he was sure that it was Talat—although the famous fez and the mustache were missing. One 
of the Nemesis agents Vazan went over to the address in the following days impersonating a 
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Swiss insurance agent looking for an apartment. The landlady revealed that the nine room 
apartment was rented by two «polite and refined» Turks, the first a «distinguished trader» by 
the name of Ali Sai and his wife and the other a physician by the name of Dr. Rüsuhi.69 Ali 
Sai was, of course, Talat Pasha.70 Talat had not registered his address at the Berlin police for 
two years although this was obligatory to do for foreigners within 48 hours. It was only in 
late 1920 or early 1921 that he registered himself and his wife for the apartment in Harden-
berstraße 4.71 Peculiarly, the CUP’s central committee member Dr. Rüsuhi (Dikmen) did 
not even use a cover name, although he was also sentenced to death in absentia by the Otto-
man court martial.  
When Shahan Natali returned from Rome, Tehlirian informed him about the new evidence 
leading to Hardenbergstraße 4, which was reported to Geneva, Boston, Paris and Constan-
tinople. From ARF’s Geneva headquarters, they received a message which reported that Talat 
Pasha was seen in front of the British consulate in Geneva a month earlier, hence making the 
Nemesis agents unsure, whether they were on the right track.72 Later in early March 1921, 
the Nemesis agents received a critical telegram via Paris and Geneva from the ARF headquar-
ters in Constantinople: «The comrades confirmed that Talat lives in Berlin at Hardenberg 4 
under the pseudonym Ali Salih Bey and asked that the Talat affair be ended through all 
possible measures.»73  
***  
It was a busy morning on Tuesday, March 15, 1921, at the apartment of Talat Pasha at the 
Hardenbergstraße 4. Talat Pasha and his wife were awaiting guests for lunch, namely Dr. 
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Ernst Jäckh and his wife and the usual crowd including Bahaeddin Şakir and others.74 On 
that day, Soghomon Tehlirian was surveilling Talat’s flat from his second-floor room at the 
other side of the street at Hardenbergstraße 37. He had rented the room since the 5th of 
March. On that morning the maid walking through the corridor had heard Tehlirian weep-
ing in his room. He had drunken a little cognac with his tea to settle his nerves.75 Shortly 
before 11 o’clock, Talat was spotted by Tehlirian on the balcony, a ritual Talat usually did 
before leaving the house, which Tehlirian had observed several times for the last ten days. 
Tehlirian remembers that Talat seemed depressed, his head hanging. «Apparently life was 
not easy for him after the crime he committed in the desert», Tehlirian concluded later in his 
autobiography.76  
Talat Pasha was indeed not in a good mood, but rather for a silly reason. He needed to go 
out and buy a new necktie before the guests would arrive.77 Before he was about to leave, 
Talat said to his wife: «I don’t want to go at all. […] I mean, I don’t want to be away from 
you.» Talat was known for being very attached to his wife.78 She, although 21 years his junior, 
answered as she remembers decades later: «Ohh, but Pasha, […] now you are exaggerating. 
Are you a child? […] Will you always hide behind my skirt like this?» Talat was already at 
the door. He wanted her to accompany him. But she could not leave, because she was busy 
preparing the lunch.79 Before Talat left, Refik, a young dentist and brother-in-law of former 
Minister of Commerce and Foreign Affairs Ahmet Nesimi (Sayman), arrived. Refik agreed 
to accompany Talat and help him with his shopping.80 Before they left, Mrs. Hayriye asked 
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her husband, if he felt alright. According to later narratives, Talat answered before leaving: 
«I don’t know. I have a funny feeling.»81  
As Talat Pasha left the house, Soghomon Tehlirian grabbed his coat, his hat, and his gun, 
and left the house. Two days ago, he had done the same routine, but then missed Talat, 
because he could not open the gate. This time, however, the gate opened.82 It was shortly 
before 11 o’clock.83 Few days ago, he had received an order from the ARF’s Central Com-
mittee of America: «The time has come to go into action. We order you to kill Talaat without 
delay and to leave the other criminals be, even if it means they escape.»84  
Eyewitnesses would later testify that Tehlirian approached Talat Pasha at a great pace from 
behind, although Tehlirian claimed to have crossed him before and faced him in the eye.85 
There were later rumors in the press coverage that Tehlirian had first chatted up Talat or that 
he shot him in the face.86 But in reality, Tehlirian shot Talat in the back of his head without 
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uttering a word, right at the corner of Hardenbergstraße 17 and Fasanenstraße.87 Talat was 
not unarmed. He had a Browning handgun in his back pocket, but this would not help him 
either.88 The single 9mm bullet, which Tehlirian fired from his «Parabellum revolver» from 
a close distance—maybe «three or four fingers» as Dr. Nazım would later attest—entered the 
back of Talat’s head and exiting it right above his left eye—killing him instantly before his 
body face downwards hit the ground.89 Symbolically the German standard edition military 
handgun had the year of the Armenian Genocide, 1915, engraved as its production date, 
which Tehlirian claims to have purchased in 1919 in Tiflis.90 As a matter of fact, it was his 
field commander Shahan Natali, who gave him the gun on March 12, 1921, with the words: 
«It is examined and ready under the command of your finger.»91  
«The monster fell on the ground», Tehlirian wrote in his memoir.92 After Tehlirian saw Ta-
lat’s dead body on the ground, he became aware that he was about to get beaten by an enraged 
mob of pedestrians. Tehlirian dropped his gun and started running away. Soon he was caught 
and beaten down by the mob.93 A woman who witnessed the assassination from close distance 
had screamed and fainted so that people thought that he had also killed the woman.94 Teh-
lirian was hurt badly in the beating. Someone from the crowd was hitting his face with a key 
ring. By a coincidence, also Turgut (Bleda), Mithat Şükrü’s son studying in Berlin, was 
among the violent mob beating Tehlirian with his «great uncle» Talat’s walking crane he had 
just grabbed.95 Tehlirian was seriously injured with a 22 cm wound on his face as one news-
paper claimed.96 Tehlirian was first brought into the guard house in Bahnhof Zoo and then 
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transferred to Charlottenburg Police Station.97 As he was interrogated the next day the pros-
ecutor’s Armenian interpreter George Kalusdian had brought sweets and chocolate to Teh-
lirian. When the prosecutor asked, why he was bringing treats to a murderer, Kalusdian pro-
tested: What, a murderer? This is a great man, whom we all adore!98 Kalusdian was not 
wrong. Soghomon Tehlirian would never be the same man again—he was now an Armenian 
hero.  
On the other hand, Tehlirian’s assassination of Talat Pasha made Talat in the collective im-
agination of Turkish nationalism an eternal martyr. Emir Shakib Arslan would write to Enver 
Pasha: «It is a fortune that late Talat’s life has been crowned with martyrdom. As long as 
death is the end, it is best to die like this.»99 The martyrdom of Talat was framed in Muslim 
nationalist phraseology and expressed underlying anti-Armenian sentiments. From Baku, 
Azmi Bey, the former Governor of Beirut, wrote to Enver: «I am very sad that Talat Pasha 
has been a victim of an Armenian bullet. Not only that of [Talat] Pasha, the death of any 
petty Muslim by this way is unbearably sad.»100 
In the mental processing of his followers, Talat Pasha’s martyrdom is narrated as his self-
chosen destiny, an inescapable price for his past achievements as a revolutionary. «Poor Talat 
Pasha’s murder really shocked us, Küçük Talat (Muşkara) Bey wrote to Enver Pasha. But 
what can we do, the pitcher goes so often to the well, that it is broken at last.»101 Also Enver 
accepted the assassination as Talat’s inescapable fate: «The assassination that Sai Bey [Talat 
Pasha] was subjected has indeed grieved me in spite of everything. But in that case, what can 
one do!»102 Louise Bryant witnessed the moment in Moscow, when Enver received the news 
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of Talat’s death.103 He did not show any emotion and only said: «His time had come!»104 The 
claim that martyrdom was Talat’s destiny shows the political fatalism of the Young Turk 
leaders in pardoning their own faults and wrongs as God’s will. 
*** 
It was only quarter past eleven, as the former director of maintenance, Salim Bey, arrived at 
the bureau of the Young Turk fugitives at Uhlandstraße 47, where Dr. Nazım and others 
were chatting with each other. The former Jewish deputy of Smyrna Nesim Mazelyah was 
also there visiting them.105 Salim told that someone on Hardenbergstraße was murdered or 
had committed suicide. He saw the corpse and the crowd from a distance. He mentioned the 
color of the coat and the shoes of the dead man lying on the ground. The men in the bureau 
became curious. Then Dr. Rüsuhi arrived, who was living at Talat’s apartment and was pre-
sent when the latter left. He told that Talat left home fifteen minutes ago to do some shop-
ping and would make a short stop to the bureau before going back home. He should have 
come by until then. As Salim asked the color of the coat and shoes Talat was wearing that 
day, Rüsuhi’s answer matched that of the dead body’s which Salim had seen on Harden-
bergstraße. The men rushed in panic out to the crime scene. In Dr. Nazım’s words: «As we 
opened the blanket covering the corpse, we too were shot into our brains.»106  
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Meanwhile, Hazor, who was assigned to observe the tobacco shop, saw that a young student 
came in hurry—probably either Refik or Turgut—and then quickly left together with seem-
ingly upset Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir.107 It was Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir who informed the police over 
the true identity of the victim.108 But the police officer insisted on proceeding according to 
the protocol and wait for the homicide squad to arrive. This meant that Talat’s body was to 
stay there on the ground for couple of hours. In their Islamic cultural coding, this was an act 
of disgrace to the deceased, but they were helpless. They left the crime scene to Talat’s flat to 
give the sad news to his just widowed wife. They were crying and yelling in their attempt to 
explain what had happened. Mrs. Hayriye asked in despair: «Nazım Bey… Is it what I fear?» 
And then she fainted.109  
Around 11:30 Dr. Ernst Jäckh and his wife passed by the crime scene by car, but they did 
not stop since they were already late for their appointment at Talat Pasha’s home only few 
blocks away. At the door Dr. Jäckh could hear «a woman weeping and moaning». When Dr. 
Nazım opened the door, he said: «Praise Allah you are here! Help us get Talaat’s body. He is 
lying on the step a few houses down the street, shot by an Armenian, and the police will not 
release his body until the Homicide Squad arrives. That will take several more hours.»110  
Refik or Turgut, one of the young fellows, had immediately informed Wipert von Blücher 
from the Auswärtiges Amt about that assassination111 Thereafter Shakib Arslan and his friends 
were informed on the incident by the Auswärtiges Amt revealing the connection the German 
officials had to the pan-Islamic activists in Berlin. Meanwhile, the Iranian journalist 
Abdolrahman Saif,112 some Afghan friends, and the Egyptian activist Abdel Aziz Shawish, 
 
107 Derogy, Resistance and Revenge, 85. Sources contradict each other in these minor details, Cemal Kutay tells 
relying on his interviews with Talat Pasha’s wife that Dr. Nazım, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, and Nesim Mayelyah 
were all in Cemal Azmi Bey’s tobacco shop. Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlindeki Son Günleri,” 135.  
108 Tessa Hofmann, “New Aspects of the Talat Pasha Court Case: Unknown Archival Documents on the 
Background and Procedure of an Unintended Political Trial,” Armenian Review 42, 4/168 (1989): 44; Moses, 
“Assassination of Talaat Pasha in 1921 in Berlin,” 31. Babacan claims that it was Salim Bey, who identified 
the true identity of the body to the police. Babacan, Mehmed Talat Paşa, 229.  
109 Bardakçı, “interview with Hayriye Talat Bafralı, October 1982,” 222; Kutay, “Talat Paşanın Berlindeki 
Son Günleri,” 135. 
110 Ernst Jäckh (Berlin), letter to Zeki Pasha (Constantinople), March 17, 1921, in Jäckh, The Rising Crescent, 
269 
111 Blücher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo, 135. 
112 Abdolrahman Saif was the editor of the influential pan-Islamic newspaper Azadi-e Sharq. Gerhard Höpp, 
Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg 1915–1945: Geschichtlicher Abriß und 
Bibliographie (Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 1994), 27; Touraj Atabaki and Solmaz Rustamova-
The Young Turk Aftermath 
373 
who had seen the incident on the street, came to Shakib Arslan’s place to pick him up. They 
were few blocks away from the incident. They went all to the crime scene.113  
Dr. Jäckh and others arrived at the crime scene to have the body transported to the morgue, 
but the police officer guarding the corpse still insisted on protocol. Dr. Jäckh had to call the 
police chief from a nearby telephone and convince him about the political gravity of this 
homicide case.114 On the telephone, Jäckh stated that «the man lying in the street was in a 
way, the ‹Turkish Bismarck› and our loyal ally in the war.»115 Ironically, in their last meeting 
on June 13, 1914, Armen Garo had confronted his soon-to-be nemesis Talat Pasha: «Power 
is turning your head and making you into a megalomaniac. You take yourself for a Napoleon 
or a Bismarck!» Talat answered: «Bismarck? Why not?»116 
In understanding the dialectics of Talat Pasha’s assassination in the contentious episodes that 
followed, the funeral of Talat Pasha was a major performative act.117 The Young Turk com-
munity in Berlin used the funeral to publicly claim that Talat was a great statesman who got 
murdered unjustly. The assassination of Talat shocked the Young Turk community in Berlin 
by demonstrating their vulnerability in face of their assumed power and by subjecting them—
and Talat in particular—to a public process of defamation. Whereas Le Journal de Genève 
announced Talat Pasha’s death under the derogative title «The End of a Bandit»,118 the Lon-
don Times was writing that Talat was unscrupulous politician, who with more education 
and in better surroundings might have become a statesman.119 Talat was depicted by the 
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Entente media as a robber baron, a brutal gypsy turned Oriental despot, who butchered the 
Armenians just for the sake of it. Thus, Talat was a criminal, if not a monster, definitely 
anything far from a modern statesman. Hence no wonder, the word statesman became the 
buzzword of Talat’s commemoration ceremonies. 
In their defense, the mourning Young Turk community and their German supporters in 
Berlin committed themselves to construct a legacy of Talat Pasha as a great man of his era—
a Cinderella story of a simple telegraph clerk turned great statesman. This was a project which 
was not new. German war-time propaganda and official discourse had already set up the 
foundations of this democratic image of Talat. For instance, while openly condemning his 
role in the «Armenian sin», Bernstorff commemorates Talat in his memoir as follows: 
I am thinking primarily of Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha—who was later murdered by an 
Armenian in Berlin—whom I came to highly respect and adore during my occupation 
in Constantinople. With complete integrity, he was a man of rare gifts, which enabled 
him to traverse the steep climb from simple telegraph clerk to senior statesman, namely 
a statesman in the true sense of the word.120  
The editorial of the newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, for instance, protested that Frie-
drich Hussong in an article in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger referred to Talat Pasha as a «revo-
lutionary». The pro-Turkish Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung insisted that Talat Pasha was a 
«statesman» and nothing else.121 The funeral manifested the efforts of the Young Turks in 
institutionalizing the commemoration of Talat Pasha in Turkish nationalist imagination as 
one of the greatest statesmen of his era.  
Funerals as public rituals need to occupy a presentative social space to generate symbolic 
power. It is the funeral which can make a «great man» out of a deceased statesman. Peter 
Wien noted on the funeral of a similar figure of the same era, namely the former Ottoman 
officer, later Iraqi prime minister, and Arab nationalist leader Yasin al-Hashimi (1882-1937), 
that the funeral was also a transitory rite that turned Yasin al-Hashimi into a ‹great man.›. 
In a Durkheimian approach, Wien recapitulates:  
Cults of both heroes and saints depend on locality and the performance of commemora-
tion to gain meaning in national or religious discourse. […] Without action and public 
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participation, the mnemonic or memory-related quality of a place (such as a tomb) dies. 
A funeral is therefore a mnemonic festival.122  
Similar to Yasin al-Hashimi’s funeral, Talat Pasha’s funeral was also organized in the tradition 
of the French republican funerals making him a «great man» in memories of his followers.123  
Talat’s body remained in the Charlottenburg morgue until the funeral four days later on 
Saturday, March 20, 1921. We can assume that it was probably Dr. Jäckh who played the 
key role in organizing the funeral as a semi-official event in Berlin.124 The funeral was orga-
nized from the beginning on as a public ritual to make three claims. First, Talat was to be 
represented as an honest and respected statesman with chief achievements, worthy of a stately 
commemoration. Or in Dr. Jäckh’s words from his obituary: «With Talat a statesman is 
diminished, a born statesman, one of the few real statesmen of historic proportions and size 
in this present time that is so poor in leader personalities. Second, again in Jäckh’s words, 
Germany lost with Talat a loyal ally and a reliable friend, who deserved Germany’s solidar-
ity. Third, it was claimed that Talat was murdered and martyred because he was struggling 
for the defense of the Muslim world against Western colonialism and imperialism. Again in 
Jäckh’s dramatic words, Constantinople and Angora roar with anger and clench their fists—
and along with the Turkish people an Islamic world of Arabs and Tatars, Persians, Indians, 
and Afghans, all have sworn allegiance at Talaat’s corpse at the Berlin cemetery, who was the 
intrepid, tireless champion of the oppressed peoples against English and French imperialism. 
These three claims—or speech acts—were by made Jäckh and the other orators to construct 
a common political identity among the heterogeneous German and Muslim masses attending 
the funeral and to establish a strong political legacy of Talat Pasha.125  
Although Dr. Nazım and others did their best to make sure that Talat Pasha’s body did not 
stay on the ground for long, hence dishonoring him, Muslim burial regulations did not play 
a great role afterwards. Instead of a regular burial within few days, Talat’s body was embalmed 
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«for hundred years», as his wife proudly remembers, ready to be transferred to Turkey when-
ever politics would permit it.126 His body, which now possessed a symbolic power, had to be 
buried in a sacred space, namely the Adobe of Islam—at best, in Turkey. Thus, his body was 
prepared for «bridging time and space» for following and continuing political rituals at his 
final destination in form of a heroic shrine.127 His embalmed body was put in a zinc coffin 
covered symbolically in a red flag with a white crescent and with a Fez at its head end, signi-
fying him as a Muslim statesman.128 Immortalization of Talat’s body was so important for 
the Young Turk community in Berlin that they took conscious measures. A German sculptor 
was employed to build a bust of Talat based on a clay impression of his damaged head. One 
of the two busts prepared were to be displayed at Dr. Jäckh’s home, the other was designated 
for the embassy.129 Dr. Nazım was very conscious about building a civic religion from Talat’s 
commemoration. «Nevertheless, there is no doubt that for those who appreciate Talat’s great-
ness, as he wrote to Cavid Bey, because his bust will have the same effect as Jesus has on a 
devout Christian. This idea will certainly enable a very precious commemoration.»130  
Finding the appropriate symbolic space was the first problem. At that time, there was no 
mosque or Muslim graveyard available in Berlin. Ironically, Talat himself was lobbying on 
behalf of the Orient Club to build a new Muslim graveyard in Berlin, which was still under 
construction at the time of his death.131 Therefore, it was decided that his coffin should be 
brought to a chamber in the graveyard of the St. Matthew’s Church (Sankt-Matthäikirche) 
in Schöneberg.132 The Swiss Ambassador, who dealt with Ottoman diplomatic affairs as a 
protecting power in post-war Germany, requested to arrange the funeral ceremony at the 
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Ottoman Embassy, but the Ottoman diplomats opposed the idea, since Talat was a fugitive 
who was sentenced to death for crimes against humanity by an Ottoman court martial. In-
stead, the prayer ceremony was organized at Talat’s home. The invitations were sent out 
under the name of his widow and the Orient Club.133  
The funeral prayer led by the imam of the Ottoman embassy Hafız Şükrü Efendi134 was 
arranged for 10:30 am. During the prayer, many people were gathered together making the 
large apartment at the Hardenbergstraße 4 seem small. Seeckt noted: Many people in the 
small apartment.135 The many exotic head-dresses was observed by the journalists.136 After 
the funeral prayers, Imam Hafız Şükrü closed the ceremony with the standard ritual of te-
zkiye, in which the imam asks the community of believers gathered at a funeral, whether the 
deceased was known to be a good and honorable Muslim:  Here before you, Mehmed Talaat 
Pasha, was a man of high virtues, a servant of God. Is anyone among you who knows the 
opposite? The gathering collectively negated the question as part of the ritual.137 His status 
in collective memories as an honorable martyr was, thus, testified and sealed by a speech act 
of his friends and followers present at his funeral.  
After the prayers at home, there was a funeral procession. The masses walked along the os-
tentatious funeral carriage transporting Talat’s coffin to his resting place.138 The whole fu-
neral did not necessarily seem to have impressed the Prussian General von Seeckt. Few days 
later, he wrote to his wife: Typically Turkish, unorganized. It started a quarter of an hour 
too early and after the speech no one knew what was going on until Enver’s brother sum-
moned to proceed. Down there a crowd of people, not large, police cordon, photographers. 
Soon later I returned […].139  
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Although Seeckt belittled the crowd on the street, the Young Turk community seem to have 
been impressed by the people gathered for the funeral.140 Emir Shakib Arslan tells that the 
funeral was magnificent and «ten thousands of people» accompanied the funeral proces-
sion.141 More realistic is probably Dr. Nazım’s estimation of four or five thousand people.142 
In addition to German friends and dignitaries, a large number of members of the Muslim 
community in Berlin attended the ceremony. There were alone around 100-150 Muslim 
students.143 In their letters to Enver Pasha and Cavid Bey or in their later memoirs, the whole 
event is described by Talat’s followers as a stately ceremony with many name-droppings un-
derlining the respect and fondness the deceased statesman enjoyed from important dignitaries 
of his time.  
It is worthwhile to recollect the list of prominent participants to comprehend the representa-
tive claim of the funeral and the power networks Talat Pasha was embedded in. The Reich 
President Friedrich Ebert, the Chancellor Konstantin Fehrenbach, and Minister of Justice 
Rudolf Heinze sent official representatives. The exiled Kaiser Wilhelm II was represented by 
his chamberlain Hofmarschall Graf Oskar von Platen-Hallermund. From the Auswärtiges 
Amt, there were many officials present at the ceremony, including Albrecht Graf von Bern-
storff and Wipert von Blücher as well as former foreign ministers Arthur Zimmermann and 
Richard von Kühlmann. The funeral wreath Ernst Jäckh placed near the coffin resonated the 
official German motto: A great statesman and a loyal friend.144 From the military there was 
Hans von Seeckt, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein, Otto von Lossow, and probably some 
others. Some of the German officers were wearing their Ottoman military uniforms as a 
symbol of loyalty.145 Swiss and Italian ambassadors also attended the ceremony. Others who 
could not attend by person sent in condolence telegraphs, including General Ludendorff. 
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Talat’s wife remembers that they even dropped down condolence flyers from an airplane.146 
The name-dropping of official dignitaries served to certify the acclaimed reputation of Talat 
Pasha as a great statesman and as a trusted friend of Germany.  
The highlight of the funeral ceremony was the two-hour long speeches delivered by various 
dignitaries from different countries. Funeral speeches and poems were already a part of the 
repertoire of modern Middle Eastern political rituals.147 This selection of speakers further 
illustrates the political network around Talat Pasha.148  
The former director of the Bagdadbahn Franz J. Günther149 and Dr. Ernst Jäckh delivered 
speeches both on behalf of the Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung. Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir gave a 
eulogy in Turkish but he could barely speak. Emir Shakib Arslan delivered an especially 
touching speech in French—the lingua franca of the larger part of the audience. Shakib 
Arslan underlined the unity of Turkish and Arab people, which the Entente was trying to 
sabotage with the murder of Talat Pasha and other schemes. As a coincidence, Sheikh Abdel 
Qader al-Muzaffar, or according to British Intelligence a dangerous man of Nationalist and 
Bolshevik tendencies for that he was an anti-Zionist and pro-Turkish activist from Jerusa-
lem, had arrived to Berlin from London few days before the incident.150 He delivered a eulogy 
in Arabic. There were also two orators speaking on behalf of the Iranians, one of them was 
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Mirza Hassan,151 the chairman of the Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft. In addition, two un-
named students spoke on behalf the Egyptians. Imam Alim İdris Efendi spoke on behalf of 
Tatars as the imam of the prisoner camp for Russian Muslims, the so-called Weinberglager at 
Zossen. İdris was therefore also no stranger to the German-Ottoman propaganda circles.152 
An Azeri student delivered a speech about two Azeri politicians who were also recently killed 
by Armenians.153 Thus, he pointed out that this murder was not a single case of vengeance, 
but part of a campaign of political assassinations by Armenian committees. There were also 
two Indians among the speakers, one of them Chempakaraman Pillai. Pillai was a renowned 
Indian revolutionary and, since the beginning of the war, part of the Indian Berlin Commit-
tee and an accomplice in the so-called Hindu-German conspiracy.154 He was also a board 
member of the Orient Club in Berlin.155  
The pan-Islamic and anticolonial voices at the funeral was one of the peculiar features of the 
funeral, revealing the shared feeling of community among the Eastern revolutionaries, who 
found refuge in post-war Berlin, where Talat Pasha played an important role, especially 
within the Orient Club.156 An official from the Auswärtiges Amt would remember the exotic 
gathering as follows: On this occasion you saw how many representatives of Eastern peoples 
were within the walls of Berlin at that time.157 How far this commemoration of Talat went 
beyond Berlin and was shared in other Muslim and Eastern countries—Turkey left aside—
remain though uncertain. Nevertheless, in their perception and imagination, as in Shakib 
Arslan’s words to Enver Pasha, Talat’s death was a matter of mourning to the whole Muslim 
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world: «This calamity is not only the calamity of the [Committee of] Union and Progress, 
neither is it only the calamity of the Turkish race. It is the calamity of the Muslim world. 
The deceased was a person whose name was known in all corners of the Muslim world. There 
is no doubt that his murder will have a great echo in Turkey and in the Muslim countries.»158 
The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reported similar claims over Talat Pasha’s reputation in the 
Islamic world:  
The funeral of Talaat Pasha on March 20 of this year turned out to be a great demon-
stration of the confidence of all Islamic peoples in this man. The Ottoman statesman, 
who was cowardly shot by an assassin from behind, was for the peoples of the East far 
more than just a representative of the Turkish nation. He had become the symbol of the 
dawn of awakening that began to rise on the Orient after a long period of oppression.159 
*** 
When Soghomon Tehlirian was caught by the violent mob of pedestrians after he had killed 
Talat, he cried in broken German what he had probably memorized for this long-awaited 
moment: «Me Armenian, he Turkish. No harm for Germany.»160 Nevertheless, the assassi-
nation of Talat Pasha was very much about influencing third parties. The executive minds 
behind the Operation Nemesis premediated a political trial in Berlin. Shahan Natali, Tehlir-
ian’s field commander had therefore gave the clear instruction: «You will stay at your place 
with your foot on the head of the dead body and you will surrender to the policemen who 
come, who arrest you.»161 Examples for such political trials had already existed. For instance, 
the release of Esad Pasha Toptani’s murderer Avni Rustemi from French courts one year 
earlier was believed to have encouraged the Armenian assassins.162 As political theorist Han-
nah Arendt noticed, Tehlirian belongs to a certain type of political assassins who voluntarily 
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«gave themselves up to the police and insisted on being tried» in order to «show the world 
through court procedure what crimes against his people had been committed and gone un-
punished.»163 For Arendt, this type of assassins emerged, because «there was no tribunal in 
the world».164  
In the absence of international criminal law, the transnationalism of Tehlirian’s case made 
the Armenian Question a matter of national law in Germany as well as a matter of moral 
justice internationally. Robert M. W. Kempner, who would later serve as the assistant chief 
counsel at Nuremberg Trials, had witnessed Tehlirian’s trial as a law student at the University 
of Berlin and personally knew the defense lawyers. In his understanding, the importance of 
the Tehlirian’s trial for the history of international law was that for the first time human 
rights violations of a sovereign state was a matter of discussion at a foreign court case.165 By 
the successful activism of Tehlirian’s defenders, the focus of the trial and its public perception 
ultimately shifted from Tehlirian’s petty crime (homicide) to Talat’s great crime (genocide). 
Of course, the term genocide was not yet coined by Raphael Lemkin. The legend has it 
that as a young student, Raphael Lemkin had followed Tehlirian’s trial closely and discussed 
it with his professors.166 He wrote in his autobiography: 
His [Tehlirian’s] trial became, in actuality, a trial of the Turkish perpetrators. The sinister 
panorama of destruction of the Armenians was painted by the many witnesses [which] 
the destruction of the Armenians brought to the court. Through this trial the world fi-
nally obtained a real picture of the tragic events in Turkey.167  
Although the term genocide was not yet there, most of the German commentators reached, 
despite very different opinions, a shared understanding of the reality of the extermination of 
Ottoman Armenians, usually referred as Armeniergräuel (Armenian atrocities), which mor-
ally and substantially corresponded, as one historian concluded, to a «pre-Lemkin definition 
of genocide».168 From the point of view of German officialdom, the politicization of the trial 
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was undesired and measures were taken to minimize its political blast radius. The whole trial 
was limited to its half-length. Instead of three days and fifteen testimonies, the trial was 
brought to an end after one and a half days and nine witnesses.169  
The trial’s timing came at a precarious time in German foreign affairs. The British were 
considering giving the disputed border region of Upper Silesia to Germany as a bargain for 
the upcoming reparation negotiations, while the French was objecting this rapprochement. 
The question of Upper Silesia was one of the concerns for German officials in this regard.170 
German foreign policy was depended on the goodwill of the British in determining the future 
of Upper Silesia.171 It was feared that an anti-Armenian verdict might provoke British resent-
ments. The outbreak of paramilitary violence between Polish irregulars and German Freikorps 
from May until July 1921 made the political situation even denser.172 All this made the up-
coming trial of Soghomon Tehlirian a major concern in Berlin. The chief public prosecutor 
reported to the Ministry of Justice on May 25, 1921: 
Comparing the Polish insurrection with the Turkish (action), especially (at this point in 
time), and in England, where (politics) lends a friendly ear to the Armenians, would be 
(most) undesirable, as long as the Upper Silesian problem (remains unsolved).173 
Even more than the Upper Silesian crisis, the German officials were concerned about revela-
tion of German culpability in the Armenian deportations and massacres.174 Previously, the 
Auswärtiges Amt had commissioned the well-known Armenophile Dr. Johannes Lepsius to 
publish an official book in order to «whitewash» Germany’s role.175 Lepsius took this oppor-
tunity to illustrate the undeniable extent and brutality of the Armenian massacres.176 
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A fierce contentious episode of public sense-making and claim-making took place starting 
from the assassination in mid-March to the aftermath of the trial in late June. This episode 
generated a great deal of media attention. It amounted to what historian Stefan Ihrig calls a 
«media event», in which Talat Pasha’s assassination as well as the Armenian Question was 
debated fiercely in the German newspapers with various cross-paper references.177 Both 
camps engaged in efforts to make sense of not only what Tehlirian did to Talat in Berlin on 
March 15, 1921, but even more of what Talat did to Armenians in Ottoman Anatolia in 
1915. The trial of Soghomon Tehlirian was instantly referred as the «Talat Pasha Trial» (in 
German: Talaat Pascha Prozeß or Prozeß Talaat Pascha), as if it was Talat’s ghost standing 
in the dock instead of Tehlirian, as contemporary observer Armin Wegner aptly put it.178 
The Talat Pasha Trial unexpectedly resulted in the acquittal of Soghomon Tehlirian due to 
his traumatized mental condition and the moral condemnation of Talat for the Armenian 
massacres. The extraordinary circumstances of the process and its unexpected outcome has 
recently attracted a wave of interest by historians as well as historical and legal anthropolo-
gists.179 More than the precarious legal process that resulted in Tehlirian’s acquittal, the whole 
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contentious episode was a showdown arena of transnational contentious politics in which 
transnational activism, international affairs, and national structures were noticeably entan-
gled with each other in a contest to frame the events. 
In their efforts to make sense of the assassination of Talat Pasha, the Young Turk community 
in Berlin must have had access to the police investigation.180 They knew that Tehlirian was 
in Berlin since December or January; they also knew when he rented the apartment across 
the street, and he traveled to Germany from Geneva; they correctly assumed that he received 
the money in amount of 12.000 marks from the Tashnags; they knew that a secretary at the 
Armenian Embassy in Berlin had chattered in the presence of a German police informant 
that Talat and Enver would soon be killed.181 Allegedly, there were rumors that a list of targets 
was found after the investigations of Talat’s murder by the Berlin police and this list was even 
wired to the Italian police to take precautions against the Young Turk community in 
Rome.182 All this approved the existing rumors of Armenian assassin squads and the Young 
Turks maintained that Tehlirian was not a traumatized student acting by his own, as he 
claimed, but instead was part of a larger scheme of political assassinations planned by the 
Tashnags.  
Many followers of Talat Pasha suspected even further conspiracies at work, whereby they 
usually associated the assassination with the intrigues of the Great Powers and other interna-
tional conspiracies. The common explanation was: «England’s felonious hand everywhere.» 
(Englands verbrecherische Hand überall.)183 According to Dr. Nazım, all the Eastern orators at 
Talat’s funeral framed the assassination «not as the consequence of a private or national 
vengeance, but rather as the result of an imperialist policy executed against the Muslim peo-
ples». The main message was: «We will avenge this. However, not like thugs by shedding 
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innocent blood, but rather by breaking the chains of enslavement and gaining independ-
ence.» Especially, the Iranian and Indian orators had accused the British with having a com-
plicity in the assassination.184 Not only the Eastern orators, but also Ernst Jäckh claimed in 
his obituary that the reason behind the assassination was Entente’s fears of Talat’s ever-ap-
proaching return to Turkey: 
The death of Turkish ex-Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha relieved England and France from 
their dangerous adversary [...]. London and Paris breathe a sigh of relief and gratefully 
acknowledge the Armenian assassin.185  
People in Constantinople did not want to believe the news of Talat Pasha’s death.186 Since 
the occupation of Constantinople was on March 16, 1920, nearly one year before Talat’s 
murder, Turkish nationalists connected these two tragic events in a grand narrative in which 
the Turks were subject to continuous imperial schemes of the British. This (near) coincidence 
of dates delivered occasion for nationalist speeches and poems.187 A German newspaper 
shared the same conspiracy theory, which was probably in the air among the frustrated losers 
of 1918: England’s hand reaches far and is often invisible and visible only in retrospect. 
Sometimes, however, one sees its shadow clear and outlined. This is the case in the murder 
of Talaat Pasha.188 
It was not an irrational conclusion to suspect the British behind the assassination of Talat 
Pasha. Thus, it is legitimate to ask, as author Eric Bogosian did: «Was it possible that the 
British intelligence tipped off the Tashnags?»189 The British Intelligence knew the address of 
Talat as late as in October 1920.190 There was also a suspicious increase in interest in Talat 
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by British agents in early 1921, as it was illustrated in Chapter 9. The whole episode with Sir 
Basil Thomson sending Aubrey Herbert to meet Talat is indeed a matter suspicion. Herbert, 
too, seemed to be uncomfortable after his debriefing.191 The British connection was the in-
tuitive explanation for many people, such as Shakib Arslan, who knew about Talat’s talks 
with Herbert.192 Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu), the representative of the Ankara government 
in Rome, reached similar conclusions. When he was woken up by the journalist M. Filip-
pucci-Giustiniani from Il Messagero at 2 o’clock in the morning of March 16 with the news 
of Talat’s assassination. Thinking about who could be responsible, Galip Kemali connected 
the dots, which again led to the work of «foreign hands»:  
I knew that the English were recently in touch with Talat Pasha and even a special agent 
[Aubrey Herbert] had talked to him and he would go to Switzerland to meet with the 
same man. By then it was very possible to have a peace [settlement] very soon and there 
were no statesmen in the country who possessed the determination, the courage, and the 
bitter experience at Talat Pasha’s level. There was no doubt that those foreign hands, 
who would consider [him] harmful to their future policies, had their fingers in this des-
picable murder.193   
The timing of the murder was believed to be significant in indicating a Great Power intrigue. 
It was an open secret that Talat Pasha was residing in Berlin for two and a half years and it 
was argued that it would have been a lot easier for Armenians to assassinate him during the 
revolutionary days of post-war Germany. The British knew that Talat was more and more 
thinking about returning to Turkey. Sforza’s recent effort to convince the Entente to a rap-
prochement with Talat was believed to have backfired and pushed the Entente to get rid of 
 
his apartment. Talat Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), February 12, 1921, in Yalçın and 
Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 179–81.  
191 When Herbert arrived back to London, he wrote in his diary some curious things: Friday March 4th, 
1921. Reached London on Tuesday, wrote my report that night and Wednesday morning, sent it in 
yesterday. To-day, I went to see Sir Basil Thomson, to tell him that I thought that he much better send it to 
Lord Curzon. It seemed to me much better to meet trouble half-way. [Sir Allen] Leeper dined last night. I saw 
he knew something. He is a curious fellow, all light and no heat, all brain no soul, and an Australian accent in 
his heart. Basil Thomson quite agreed with me. He also seemed to have given it away [to Curzon], pretty 
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Talat before he would become too powerful once again.194 Talat’s followers assumed that 
there might be even Greek money involved in this assassination plot.195 In addition, there 
was an influx of dubious men like Caputto and Davidoff around Talat just recently before 
his death, who were somehow associated with the British Intelligence.196 There were also 
other rumors linking the British to the assassination. For instance, a fellow Young Turk and 
former Malta detainee Tahsin (Uzer) wrote in 1922 that the Tashnags prepared the assassi-
nation since 1920 and that  
Three or four months after Talat Pasha’s martyrdom, a noble and rich Indian was mur-
dered by his chauffeur [in Berlin]. In the trial of the chauffeur, the wife or mistress testi-
fied: ‹The English got my husband killed, because he possessed many important secrets 
such as that the English Embassy gave a compensation to the Committee that killed Talat 
Pasha.›197 
The rumors were everywhere. Popular historian Cemal Kutay tells that Eyüp Sabri (Akgöl), 
one of the paramilitary leaders of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, heard from Cevat 
(Çobanlı) Pasha that a certain Esad Bey, the cipher clerk of the Anglophile Grand Vizier 
Damad Ferid Pasha, told him:  
Armenians were about to execute their assassination plan against Talat Pasha in few days, 
and they even choose who shall be the murderer. I gave the deciphered news from a very 
reliable place to Grand Vizier [Damad Ferid] Pasha. Suddenly a glimpse of excitement 
appeared on his face. He didn’t say anything, he folded it twice, put it in his pocket, and 
changed the subject. At least five days later Talat Pasha was martyred just as it was written 
in the cipher that I handed to Ferit Pasha.198  
One would definitely find even more rumors and assumptions about alleged British machi-
nations behind Talat Pasha’s assassination. Without ruling out the possibility that the British 
Intelligence might have had a hand in the assassination, these conclusions by contemporary 
observers were speculative and biased explanations mostly based on coincidences and hear-
 
194 See for instance: Sir G. Buchanan, letter (Rome) to Earl Curzon (London), February 17, 1921, FO 
406/45, 78, no. 52, in Bilal N. Şimşir, ed., British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), Vol. 3: January – 
September 1921 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1979), 135. 
195 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), March 27, 1921, in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent 
under the Red Star, 185–87; Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), [March 21, 1921], in 
Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 105–8 
196 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 27, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı 
Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 127–29; İsmail Canbulat, letter (Rome) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), December 
23, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 444–46.  
197 Tahsin Uzer, “Meşrutiyetin İlk Şehitleri,” Yakın Tarihimiz 3, no. 36 (1962): 314, quoted in Hikmet 
Özdemir, Üç Jöntürk’ün Ölümü: Talat, Cemal, Enver (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007), 105.  
198 Kutay, Şehit Sadrazam Talat Paşa’nın Gurbet Hatıraları, III, 1133–1134.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
389 
say evidence. Bedeviled by the missing facts and tempting coincidences, they developed their 
own conspiracy theories. 
One indirect conclusion of seeing the British as pulling the strings implies that the Armenians 
were seen as incapable of acting by their own. In an obituary Enver Pasha wrote for Talat 
Pasha in Liwa-el-Islam, he claimed that even the 1914 Hnchag assassination plot against 
Talat was originally a conspiracy by Lord Kitchener and the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos. 
Hence, Enver was sure that in Talat’s assassination «also other hands were involved other 
than the Armenian hands». And he added that «it is by no means possible for Armenians to 
undertake this plot for the pretext of Armenian deportations.» According to Enver, behind 
this Armenian student there was Armenia’s «big brother», England.199 This denies any form 
of Armenian agency. In the end, it was obvious for them that «the Armenians have been 
exploited», in fact by no one else but Britain.200 This perception of Armenians as marionettes 
or hired-guns of Great Power intrigues remains a common trope in Turkish nationalist nar-
ratives. The only agency attributed to Armenians—besides terrorism—is propaganda. In 
Turkish narratives—then and now—Armenian propaganda becomes the deus ex machina 
in finally pushing post-Versailles Germany to surrender to Entente pressures, where the ac-
quittal of Tehlirian is seen as the symbolic turning point.201  
To be sure, the Young Turk community and their friends, too, were similarly involved in 
conspiratorial and propagandistic efforts to manipulate the outcome of the trial and the pub-
lic opinion. Although the CUP networks in Berlin were already involved in propaganda ac-
tivities. They were caught off-guard by assassination. The Liwa-el-Islam announced the mur-
der of Talat Pasha in its first issue on page three in small statement.202 As they soon witnessed 
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the Armenian media campaign, the Young Turk community in Berlin channeled some of its 
efforts on propaganda activities. Dr. Nazım reported: 
The Armenians here are working to mitigate the murderer’s punishment. For one or two 
newspapers they wrote articles with pretty heavy accusations against Talat and Enver. We 
are working hard to answer these on behalf his [Talat’s] family. For this we gathered 
together the Turks based in Berlin and elected an executive committee to work collec-
tively. We have appointed the bureau that I am residing in as the headquarters. We will 
do as much as we can (even if it’s only a little).203 
In fact, their own propaganda publications remained relatively marginal before the trial. It 
was only after the acquittal of Tehlirian that the Young Turk community engaged more 
ferociously in propaganda activities.204 The main propaganda on the Talat Pasha Trial was 
published by the Young Turk community’s Arab activists in Berlin. The Arab activists had 
more experience in propaganda publications and were considered to represent the case more 
objectively, as being no Turks. Most vocal one was Dr. Mansur Rifat, who published a pam-
phlet with the overtly suggestive title The Secret of Talaat Pasha’s Murder: A Clue for the 
English Propaganda System. Dr. Mansur Rifat was an Egyptian nationalist and associate of 
German-Ottoman pan-Islamic propaganda activities since World War I.205 For the prepara-
tion of his pamphlet, Dr. Mansur Rifat had requested a photograph of Tehlirian from the 
Berlin police, but the police had declined. The paranoid style in thinking was immediately 
set on course:  
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I wanted to get the photograph of the murderer of Talaat Pasha for my book. I therefore 
sent a man with the manuscript to the police headquarters. A Privy X received him and 
told my messenger, how dare (!) we would write a book against England and whether we 
did not have fears (!). The killer had already been interrogated and had declared Talaat 
had killed his parents!? ... Ten days later they ordered me to the police headquarters, 
where they put me through a rigorous cross-interrogation, certainly much harsher than 
that Teilirian received. Finally, they told me that they could not give me the photograph, 
because a press order was released not to publish the photograph of the murderer!206 
Political measures of German officials to minimize the politicization of the trial have been 
immediately interpreted by the Young Turk community as a conspiracy to safeguard German 
interests towards the British. German officials were in a quagmire with the whole political 
dimension of the trial, and did their best in order to limit political damages, even if it meant 
to disappoint their former allies. The course of the prosecution made Mansur, however, more 
and more convinced that the Germans were too weak to withstand the British pressures. This 
was put forward in his second pamphlet after the trial, which was a collection of newspaper 
articles in support of Talat Pasha’s lost cause.207 After the disappointing verdict of the trial, 
Dr. Mansur Rifat sent a protest telegram to Reich President Friedrich Ebert, claiming that 
the trial was more of a conspiracy (vielmehr eine Verschwörung), than a regular process.208 
Emir Shakib Arslan contributed to the public debate in November 1921 with a pamphlet of 
his own, The Armenian Web of Lies: Frivolous Stand of the Patrons of Armenia, in which Dr. 
Mansur Rifat wrote an afterword.209 Dr. Mansur Rifat’s first pamphlet was also submitted to 
the district attorney Gollnick.210 During the trial, defense attorney Gordon dismissively re-
ferred to Rifat’s pamphlet: 
Gentlemen, […] in fact a few days ago a somewhat ostentatious brochure from the op-
posing side came out, The Secret of Talaat Pasha’s Murder—of course, it is no secret, 
because the matter is cleared up, these are mere sayings. The young Armenian, it says, 
who lent himself to be a murderer of Talat Pasha (it is implied that a certain Great 
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Power stood behind it) has been a tool for the barbaric rage which characterizes his 
race.211  
The Young Turk community received crucial support from their German friends in defense 
of Talat Pasha. The internal sources of the Young Turk community go even further in sug-
gesting the commitment of the German officials in intervening into the prosecution. Mrs. 
Talat tells that the Minister of Justice visited her at home and said: «Madam, don’t worry, as 
you will be present at the judgement, he [Tehlirian] will no longer live. You need to under-
stand that we caught him alive, but we will only let his corpse go.» And the deputy director 
of the criminal investigation department, Bernhard Weiss, promised Talat’s widow: «We will 
take revenge».212 In context of the political murders and state terror that was taking place in 
Germany, these remarks, even if only meant as bold but empty gestures to a sorrowful widow, 
goes to show the general culture of justice in interwar Germany.   
Within the media landscape, the mainstream nationalist papers positioned themselves mostly 
on Talat Pasha’s side, condemning Tehlirian’s crime and defending the Young Turk 
measures against the Armenians. Only a minority of German newspapers were profoundly 
pro-Armenian. The Young Turk community dismissively noted that especially the Jewish 
and social-democrat papers were pro-Armenian.213 The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung under 
the editorial direction of Enver Pasha’s friend Hans Humann was the most radical and ag-
gressive voice among the supporters of Talat that even went as far as grossly justifying the 
extermination of the Armenians.214 Hans Humann went also beyond journalistic propaganda 
and tried to intervene into the prosecution. Humann and General Friedrich Freiherr Kress 
von Kressenstein made a visit to state prosecutor Gollnick on May 30, 1921. The next day 
Humann sent a list to Gollnick with names and addresses of Paul Weitz, Kress von Kressen-
stein, Otto von Feldmann,215 and Felix Guse,216 because they «possibly could be considered 
as potential witnesses in the trial against Tehlirian.»217 Also Franz Günther was considered 
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by Humann as a possible source of information.218 Kress von Kressenstein had a meeting 
with the defense counsel Gordon, because he wanted to be considered as a possible witness, 
but Gordon dismissed him, since Kress von Kressenstein was supposed to be too loyal to the 
Turks. Kress von Kressenstein had the impression that 
defense counsel was planning to broach the subject of the Armenian massacres, and under 
no circumstances would he allow himself to be prevented from presenting a large number 
of witnesses and evidentiary materials to prove that Talaat was the instigator of, and 
therefore the culprit behind, the Armenian massacres. […] Von Gordon spoke many 
times about the worldwide attention the case would attract. […] in view of important 
political consequences that might ensue from an acquittal of the defendant […] [it is] 
necessary to invite many witnesses and expert witnesses who would not speak merely in 
favor of the Armenians but—in order to provide a moment of respite for our former 
ally—would portray an objective depiction of the exigencies that our ally was facing.219 
As a matter of fact, the defense council and the Armenian community in Berlin and its trans-
national networks were all engaged in a collective effort to bring the Armenian Question into 
the focus of Tehlirian’s trial. Hence, some of the accusations about Armenian propaganda 
were not groundless. Although the ARF was behind the assassination plot, this also meant to 
downplay and deny the ARF’s role in order to present Tehlirian in a better light. From the 
Tashnag perspective, the news of the successful assassination of Talat Pasha arrived in a del-
icate time when the fate of the remaining parts of the Republic of Armenia was doomed in 
face of continuing Soviet invasion and international isolation. Armen Garo wrote that despite 
all the bad news, «Shahan’s success is the only consoling event.» Nevertheless, Armen Garo 
strongly urged to keep the role of the Tashnags a secret: 
Apply every means there to prove that that was an individual act; it is not the time for 
party advertising; the situation in our country is very delicate; looking at the latest news, 
our leaders have been forced to work together with the Turks against the Bolsheviks in 
the war that they are waging; consequently, it is not at all the time to let this undertaking 
be ascribed to our party.220 
Thus, the role of the ARF was kept a secret. The possibility of an organized plot behind the 
assassination was never a matter of discussion during the proceedings. In his first letter to 
Armen Garo after the assassination of Talat Pasha, Shahan Nathali wrote from Amsterdam 
on his way from Berlin to Paris:  
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This event not only became a sacred work of justice but also an occasion to propagandize 
the Armenian case; for that reason immediately send to Berlin the literature before or 
after the event, supporting the Armenian cause and also that information containing 
Turkish censorship, so that they are delivered to the lawyers; because on this occasion the 
German people will learn all that they have no information about.221 
The Armenian and Armenophile networks in Berlin were already activated with strong ties 
to the German-Armenian Association and Dr. Lepsius. A new civil coalition emerged and 
prepared a solid defense case and vocal public propaganda on behalf of Tehlirian. When the 
ARF decided to deceive its own role in the assassination plot, Boghos Nubar Pasha’s Arme-
nian National Delegation stepped in and took over the lead. Although the two Armenian 
parties were not necessarily on the same page on many issues, the trial of Tehlirian gave them 
a chance to cooperate. The collective effort was centered on the task of finding appropriate 
witnesses and textual evidence that would prove that there was an intended and centralized 
policy of extermination, and that Talat Pasha was at the top of this enterprise and Tehlirian 
was a victim.  
Some of the evidence submitted in support of Tehlirian’s case still remains to be a matter of 
contention among historians. One of these disputed evidences is Tehlirian’s own testimony. 
Following Armen Garo and Shahan Natali’s strict instructions, Tehlirian not only denied 
any complicity of the ARF, but also altered his own life-history to create a—even more—
tragic narrative of victimhood. In Tehlirian’s fabricated and coached testimony, his voluntary 
service in the Armenian Foreign Legion of the Russian Army was carefully replaced with a 
fictive eye-witness account of the massacres of his family in his hometown. This false testi-
mony would not only have a great effect on the course of his trial, but would also shape 
Armenian nationalist narratives of his victim-turned-hero persona.222 Either way, Tehlirian 
was, like all Armenians worldwide, a victim and survivor of the Armenian Genocide and his 
family was exterminated.     
The other evidence submitted to the court was a collection of Ottoman documents, also 
known as the Naim/Andonian documents (or sometimes referred as Talat Pasha telegrams). 
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Aram Andonian, an Armenian intellectual and survivor of the arrests of April 1915, brought 
to Tehlirian’s defense council a collection of alleged secret telegrams proving that the former 
Minister of Interior Talat Pasha gave direct orders to exterminate the Armenian popula-
tion.223 Andonian claims to have obtained these telegrams from an Ottoman official from 
Aleppo by the name of Naim Bey.224 Andonian’s documents were not accepted as evidence, 
because it would have distracted the course of the trial even more to the question of Talat’s 
guilt.225 Nevertheless, the documents played an important part in the public discourse of the 
trial and in its legacy.226  
However, these Naim/Andonian documents presented at Talat Pasha’s trial cannot be let 
pass without a comment, because their authenticity is very much disputed. The documents 
were immediately dismissed as forgeries by the Young Turk community in Berlin.227 The 
authenticity of the Naim/Andonian documents still constitute a major point of contention 
in the historiography.228 Turkish historians critically analyzed the paleography and diplomat-
ics of the Naim/Andonian documents and demonstrated that they must be forgeries prepared 
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for propaganda purposes.229 Armenian scholars, on the other hand, looked for ways to 
reestablish the reputation of the telegrams, but these efforts did not necessarily convince those 
outside the hermetical circle of Armenian studies.230 Most scholars rather prefer not to use 
the Naim/Andonian documents. 231    
Once we disregard the question of authenticity and the content of the documents, the back-
ground story of how these documents ended up in Berlin reveals interesting details of trans-
national activism. Whereas Turkish official histories tend to see in this «larger organized un-
dertaking» a sinister Armenian conspiracy to deceive the public and spread false propaganda, 
these efforts rather show the working of transnational contentious politics.232  
 
229 Without going into further detail here, their close analysis demonstrated that there were major 
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The Armenian National Delegation has been collecting information and documents related 
to war crimes committed against Ottoman Armenians since 1915, which constituted the 
foundation of the Nubarian Library in Paris. After the war, Nubar Pasha and his Armenian 
National Delegation assigned Andonian to write a book based on documentary evidence. 
«The ‹National Union› has entrusted me with the task of choosing among the documents», 
Andonian wrote in a letter on June 10, 1921, and continues, «[…] I was trusted with the 
duty of bringing these documents [from Aleppo], and to submit them to the delegation of 
the Armenian National Union at the Peace Conference.»233 After the news of Talat Pasha’s 
murder Nubar Pasha wrote a letter to the German Ambassador in Paris, to issue Andonian a 
visa.234 The German Embassy granted this application and after arriving in Berlin, Andonian 
reported to Paris: «Tehlirian’s trial is becoming very relevant to the Armenian Question. The 
defense is well organized and is entrusted to three of the best known lawyers of Berlin.» He 
also added that «[t]his will be the first time that the Armenian Question and the Armenian 
massacres will be discussed in a European courtroom.»235  
The defense council knew that it would be tricky to prove the authenticity of the Naim/An-
donian documents. Hence, Dr. Lepsius brought Andonian’s book and the documents to Dr. 
Walter Rößler, the former German consul in Aleppo from 1910 to 1918. Despite the An-
donian’s emotional lack of objectivity, as Dr. Rößler concluded, «the content of the book 
gives an impression of authenticity», because «[t]he published documents coincide with the 
course of events and share a similarity with reality.» However, Rößler argued that it was 
impossible to certify the authenticity of the documents, «because these telegrams contain only 
the handwriting of the telegraph officials and the individuals responsible for their decod-
ing.»236 In defense of his book, Andonian later said that 
 
233 Marcus Fisch and Ara Krikorian, Justicier du génocide arménien: Le procès de Tehlirian (Paris: Diasporas, 
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[Rößler] forgets that my book was not a historical one, but rather aiming at propaganda. 
Naturally, my book could not have been spared the errors characteristic of publications 
of this nature. ... I would also like to point out that the Armenian Bureau in London, 
and the National Armenian Delegation in Paris, behaved somewhat cavalierly with my 
manuscript, for the needs of the cause they were defending.237 
Despite his skepticism over the authenticity of the documents, Rößler did not disagree with 
the message, «that Talaat was indeed one of those Turkish statesmen, who desired and exe-
cuted according to plan the extermination of Armenians».238 The Auswärtiges Amt revoked 
Rößler’s permission to testify in order to limit the already growing politicization of the 
trial.239 
Nonetheless, with all these efforts Tehlirian’s attorneys were successful to make the trial more 
about the Talat Pasha’s crimes than Tehlirian’s crime. Tehlirian openly admitted that he 
intentionally killed Talat to revenge the death of his family. It was his mother, he told, who 
ordered him to kill Talat. Since Tehlirian’s intention and action was no matter of contention 
the trial concentrated on Tehlirian’s legal liability for reasons of his mental culpability, on 
the one hand, and on the moral reliability of his motivation, on the other hand. Only moral 
acknowledgement of the causes of his mental trauma would enable Tehlirian to be acquitted. 
Both the question of his mental culpability and the moral reasons of his actions were con-
nected to the events of 1915.  
The argument of the defense counsel was that Tehlirian was, according to §51, «at the time 
of the commission of the act […] in a state of unconsciousness or disturbance of the mental 
processes due to illness», which would free him from culpability.240 But the medical testimony 
was ambivalent and did not necessarily support the claim that Tehlirian was unconscious or 
in a disturbed mental state during the killing.241 In support of Tehlirian’s moral cause, other 
testimonies approved the extent and intensity of the massacres in different regions and that 
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Talat Pasha had ordered and managed the deportations and massacres, most notably the 
testimonies of Dr. Johannes Lepsius and Grigoris Balakian, a genocide survivor and pastor 
of Manchester. Although the prosecution made efforts to move the debate away from the 
Armenian Question and Talat’s responsibility, it proved to be impossible to disconnect Teh-
lirian’s crime from Talat’s crime. The cat was out of the bag.  
In the final defense of Tehlirian, his defense attorney Gordon underlined the moral and his-
torical significance of the case to the members of the jury: I’ve already told you, jurors, 
earlier: Your verdict will be remembered probably after thousands of years because of this 
vicious crime.242 Soghomon Tehlirian’s prosecution resulted with the sensational outcome 
that Tehlirian was acquitted by the jury as guilt-free because of his traumatized mental and 
medical condition. Supporters of Tehlirian applauded the verdict and celebrated and con-
gratulated their hero before hurrying him out of the building to a nearby waiting car. Soon 
later, Tehlirian was out of the country. Nevertheless, Tehlirian’s case constituted an im-
portant precedent.243 
After the acquittal of Tehlirian, the Young Turk community in Berlin sharply proclaimed 
their disappointment to the officials of the Auswärtiges Amt.244 In a letter to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, none less than Abu Jihad himself, Max von Oppenheim, revealed his con-
cerns and plied for a revision of the trial before Tehlirian would leave Germany: 
As I have heard from local Turks, their discontent is increasingly on the rise about the 
way the trial of Talaat’s murderer has proceeded and how the acquittal was received by 
the German press.245  
Oppenheim warned that the relations with Muslim peoples all over the world could be dam-
aged by the acquittal of Talat Pasha’s murderer. And Oppenheim concluded: It is a good-
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old maxim that the enemies of our enemies are our friends, and we are not so rich that we 
could go without any sympathy that we still get.246 Oppenheim’s argument was disputed. 
Another voice from the Auswärtiges Amt concluded that no lasting damage to German in-
terests will result from this case. It is especially a mistake to assume that the Anatolian Gov-
ernment of Kemal Pasha is identical with the former Young Turk Committee circles and that 
he cherishes particular sympathy for Enver and Talat.247 Yet, another response argued the 
contrary that Mustafa Kemal had good relations with Talat.248 According to many voices at 
the Auswärtiges Amt, Talat was seen by the people of the East as «one of the great Orientals» 
(einer der grössten Orientalen). It was reported that Aziz Ali al-Misri, who happened to be at 
a spa in Bad Kissingen protested sharply, although he was known to have fallen from grace 
with the Young Turks. Also, another Egyptian politician living in Munich was reported to 
have written the following message: 
I tell you most frankly that the process was to the whole Moslem world a great disap-
pointment. It proved the lack of commonsense in, and the shortsightedness of the court. 
It may be interpreted as nothing but an ugly flattery to England. But it is to be lamented 
that poor Germany, through such an ugly flattery is bound to lose the sympathy of the 
whole Moslem world, if not of the whole Orient. Believe me, if I could go anywhere else, 
I would not have remained here one day.249  
The acquittal of Tehlirian indeed marked a turning point—especially on a discursive level—
that changed the relation of the Young Turk leaders to Germany. Attempts to win back the 
confidence of the Young Turk community, such as organizing a «German-Turkish Talaat 
Celebration», was rejected by the Young Turk community.250 Enver Pasha expressed his dis-
appointment with the German public and republic harshly in an anonymous article. Accord-
ing to Enver, the Muslim world needed to be prepared against the Western conspiracies more 
than ever: 
O, Turks and Moslems, I tell you: A judiciary of a people, at whose side we lost millions 
of heroes and whom we considered a friend forever, has betrayed us! In a land that you 
hold for the friendliest, your rights as well as your lives are not safe. This is proof that the 
brilliant laws and the judiciary in Europe can be a means of cruelty to a Turk, just like 
the European international law is on our nation. Therefore, we must turn to the most 
primitive natural law, and just as we defend in Asia Minor our national law against a 
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world of cruel and unjust enemies by ourselves, so are we forced even in a friendly country 
like Germany to defend our personal rights and life with our own power and with our 
own resources. This shall be our law!251 
Blaming others—namely, the British for pulling the strings and the Germans for being sub-
versive to British machinations—was in reality an outcry of one’s own increasing impotency 
and marginalization. Only one month previous to Talat Pasha’s assassination, Enver wrote 
to his wife: Oh! Such questions that I feel unable to give an answer. It comes to me, as if I 
was virtually a toy of fortune being dragged away and I don’t have the strength to liberate 
myself of being a toy.252 All the power networks in Berlin and the propaganda bureaus es-
tablished all over Europe had proven to be ineffective against conspiracies of their enemies. 
Neither could they feel safe nor could they find justice, they believed. The fear of the lurking 
unknown in the form of further Armenian assassin squads and foreign intelligence intrigues 
continued to haunt the Young Turk community in Berlin. Shakib Arslan asked Enver Pasha 
to be cautious, since the Armenians had many fedayis shadowing him.253  
Indeed, the Operation Nemesis had only started and the Young Turk community was not 
mistaken in their increasing feeling of insecurity.254 Soon other culprits of the Armenian de-
portations were assassinated. The former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha was killed in De-
cember 5, 1921, in Rome.255 After Said Halim’s death, Enver was next on the list and it was 
reported by the Turkish Intelligence that the Armenian fedayis had established a training 
facility at the on the Prince Islands.256 More shocking for the Young Turk community was 
the assassination of Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Cemal Azmi in April 17, 1922 in Berlin.257 The 
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two men were strolling around with their wives in company of the widow of Talat Pasha, as 
they were gunned down by two Nemesis agents.258 The defenselessness in Germany ulti-
mately eliminated the last remaining promises of the old German-Turkish brotherhood. 
Hans Humann, who had sat down with Bahaeddin Şakir only few weeks before and had 
forged out cheerful plans (schmiedeten wir frohe Pläne), was shocked by the murder of their 
Turkish friends: You feel the Turkish eyes looking to you and feel immeasurably embar-
rassed so that you want to run away.259 The men with dark eyes and eyebrows shadowing 
them in Berlin streets and pulling the triggers continued to be imagined as the hands of 
greater enemies in distant places like London. In reality, however, it was their not-so-distant 
past that was haunting them, and an organization which was, in its clandestine and violent 
methods, akin to their own. 
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11. The Blind Man and the Lame: 
The Crisis of Young Turks in the  
Berlin-Moscow-Ankara-Kabul Axis 
When Dr. Nazım and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir left the Charlottenburg morgue after Talat Pa-
sha’s assassination on March 15, 1921, Nazım told Bahaeddin now that Talat was gone, they 
resembled somewhat to Jean Turcan’s statue of «The Blind Man and the Lame» in Paris.1 
According to the old fable a blind man carries a cripple on his back who leads the way for 
the blind man towards their destination. Although the cooperation between the two can be 
understood as a productive collaboration, the French idiom, «l’union de l’aveugle et le para-
lytique», is used to describe uneasy partners. In the crisis after Talat’s sudden death, the Young 
Turk community sorrowfully realized that they were uneasy and handicapped partners. Many 
believed that the Committee of Union and Progress, too, passed away together with Talat 
Pasha.2 Mithat Şükrü, for instance, wrote in his memoir: 
On the day Talat said goodbye to life, the [Committee of] Union and Progress also took 
its last breath. All those who claimed that it was later reanimated has been in delusions. 
Talat was the thinking brain, the watchful eye, and the working machine of this bygone 
party. Once he was gone, neither could the brain think nor the eye see nor the machine 
work.3 
When asked what kind of organization the Committee of Union and Progress really was, 
Talat Pasha had once answered jokingly, I don’t know what it is either, but it is something 
very hard to manage.4 The message behind this joke was that Talat had become the manager 
of the Central Committee of the CUP. He did not get to this position because of his charis-
matic authority or revolutionary experience but because he was able to effectively moderate 
and manipulate between rival cliques and conflicting factions in an oligarchical system where 
everybody was full of himself and believed to be destined to save the empire. Talat’s death 
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resulted in an existential crisis for the remnants of the CUP organization with serious conse-
quences for the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. This chapter will explore the de-
velopments that took place after the demise of Talat on three levels and their intersections: 
CUP’s polity organization, national politics in Turkey, Russia, and Afghanistan, and inter-
national politics on the Ankara-Moscow-Kabul axis.  
The organizational developments were directly connected to the power vacuum created by 
Talat Pasha’s death. The split among different factions were difficult to overcome and the 
ideals were too far to reach. This was also connected to the erosion of Berlin’s quality as a 
political location and the increasing material dependency of the organization to Soviet Russia. 
Such impending problems were increasingly illustrative of the international entanglements 
that limited the CUP’s course of action. When The Times announced Talat’s death on its 
March 17, 1921 issue, there were two other very important news on the very same page.5 
The first one under the heading «Trade with Red Russia: Agreement Signed» reported that 
the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed on March 16, 1921. As it was underlined, the 
treaty had, as its first clause, the prohibition of any kind of propaganda activities in the East.6 
The second article on the very same page, titled «Soviet Plots in the East: Overthrow of 
British Rule in India», warned about Bolshevik propaganda activities in Afghanistan and In-
dia, including Cemal Pasha’s mission in Kabul.7 While the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty made 
Bolshevik propaganda activities in the East difficult, a new Soviet system of treaties with 
Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan certified the official state actors in West Asia forcing other 
transnational and subaltern non-state actors to lose their ground. Although Cemal had be-
come a senior state official in Afghan army, he was losing ground in Kabul as well, since his 
Bolshevik and Kemalist alignments were making him an obstacle in the looming Anglo-Af-
ghan rapprochement. Kemalist Turkey’s increasing international recognition had left no 
room for the fugitive CUP leaders in national or international politics to act on their own. 
Eventually, Enver Pasha’s decision to intervene into national politics in Turkey would prac-
tically result in the end of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. The whole episode 
and its geopolitical and strategic shifts were accompanied by politics of fear. Propaganda wars 
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were now showing their consequence, as the intersubjective perception and misperception 
among the actors was increasingly a matter of contention.  
*** 
Instant reactions to Talat Pasha’s death by fellow Committee members expressed the sorrow 
feelings of loss and despair, but some of the Committee members soon saw opportunities 
created by Talat’s disappearance. A letter from the Rome Branch to Enver Pasha stated that 
Talat’s death was considered as if the Committee of Union and Progress has collapsed and 
the collaboration of its fellows has dissolved. Nevertheless, it was proposed that instead of 
further coupling the strength and power of our Committee with the existence of a single 
member, we will not spare any efforts for the realization of the union of the Islamic commu-
nity.8 In fact, Talat’s demise offered a chance to reorganize the Union of Muslim Revolu-
tionary Societies—especially for Enver.  
In order to assemble fellow CUP colleagues around him, Enver had to make some conces-
sions and build new coalitions. For instance, he saw in Cemal Pasha a strategic partner to 
undertake the reorganization of the movement after Talat’s death. «From now on we’re the 
only two close friends left in this world, declared Enver in a private letter to Cemal.9 This 
theme of loneliness had been an important trope in Enver’s self-perception in exile, especially 
expressed in his letters to his wife Naciye and other close relatives.10 Although I have many 
friends around me, Enver had confessed earlier to his brother-in-law Kazım (Orbay), I am 
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quite lonely.11 Having evoked the same trope, Enver hoped to establish a working relation-
ship with Cemal who had already had a good standing not only in Moscow and in Kabul but 
also with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Ankara. Yet, Cemal had never been an easy partner.  
To a certain degree, the demise of Talat offered also a scapegoat to blame for their current 
misachievements. Although the cherished hadith remember and speak well of your dead 
forced Enver Pasha to be admittedly more restraint in his criticism, he did not withhold his 
opinion in private letters to Cemal Pasha.12 The main argument was that Talat had built a 
personal clique around him and placed himself in the center of affairs: 
Lately, there has been a minor difference of opinion between us regarding our holy strug-
gle for the redemption of Islamdom and our country. [Talat] had the idea of reaching 
the goal by uniting the whole movement and enterprise at his person. His loss in such a 
sudden way took with him also the whole labor and connections which were established 
according to this principle and can possibly result in discontinuing everything that is 
achieved so far. This shows that for the triumph of our holy struggle it is necessary to 
give attention to the organization rather than to the individuals. To do this, let’s concen-
trate on the organization: Let’s embrace it. Let’s train many heroic mujahideen who 
would be a chain joining each other. Let’s achieve our objective and goal for all.13 
Enver Pasha was increasingly stressing the argument of a leaderless and post-charismatic or-
ganization that would produce multiple leaders whenever and wherever necessary, which was 
probably a discursive tactic to attract Cemal. I think that once we can enroot our organiza-
tion in a way that it can be saved from being dependent on the individuals, said Enver, this 
would partly have the consequence of saving the Muslim peoples. This idea was framed as 
particularly selfless. Who knows! None of us has an insurance at hand that one day we will 
not drop dead like late Talat did!14 The pre-revolutionary organization of the CUP with the 
politicized officer corps was idealized as a model by Enver. I think, it was the cultivation of 
the army according to this idea that has now saved Anatolia by creating men such as Mustafa 
Kemal, Kazım etc., Enver explained. The latter two men would be driven to fury if they 
would hear that they owed their upbringing to their fellow schoolmate and committee mem-
ber, Enver. If our organization can only achieve to raise a youth like that in every Muslim 
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country, then the job is done.15 In a following letter to Cemal, Enver again addressed the 
issue of educating the Muslim youth:  
[…] and these young men who will be educated gradually will continue the work even if 
we retire or die. For this reason, I am in favor of the preparation of such an organization 
that is, of course, secret and dedicated to a principle instead of personalities and that 
would accordingly operate on its own at any occasion. As you see, our country is a great 
example for this idea of mine. Although we are not in leadership, trained young friends 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who was prepared for this position, conduct and 
enhance the operation. I am sure that even if we would lose Mustafa Kemal somehow, 
the work will continue. This means that I have the idea that the struggle that we started 
against the European and worldwide imperialism and capitalism needs to be extended 
and vitalized to a major ideal that would work without our day by day political labor.16    
How this revolutionary and political education of the Muslim youth was to be realized was 
not discussed, only to remain, like many others, a distant ideal. Only practical measure Enver 
Pasha noted was that one could only find proper personnel that could be sent to other Mus-
lim countries to educate their youth in Turkey. «I regret to say that except for us, the best of 
all the other countries are behind our youngest and less experienced friends.»17  
In order to push forward the reorganization, Enver repeated the necessity of moving the 
center of the organization to Moscow, but he needed to explain his ow position in this alleg-
edly leaderless organization. «It is not my idea that I personally have the leadership of this 
organization, said Enver, and that I stay and have fun in Moscow».18 However, for the time 
being Moscow was the best suited place, as Enver argued. Germans under the current pres-
sure of the British would no more be able to guarantee the safety of a political organization 
that is against European powers.19  
His real plan, however, was to unite all the former CUP members under his leadership in 
Moscow.20 After Talat Pasha’s murder, Kamil Bey wrote to his brother Enver that the Young 
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Turk community in Berlin allegedly expressed their wish that only if Ali Bey [Enver] would 
come and assemble us.»21 Similarly, Hacı Sami and Küçük Talat believed that Enver needed 
to take the lead of the organization after Talat’s death and thus hurry back to Berlin to as-
semble the fellow Committee members.22 Indeed, in May 1921, Enver made a trip to Berlin 
and Rome to unite the dispersed Committee members abroad and to get in touch with old 
CUP colleagues, who were recently released from Malta where they had been kept captive as 
war-criminals. The civil-military division was still a major issue that needed to be overcome. 
In Berlin, Enver offered the so-called Doctors clique—namely Bahaeddin Şakir, Nazım, and 
Rüsuhi—to forget about the past disputes and work together with him:  
For the cause, I have put aside personal thoughts and animosities so far. After the mar-
tyrdom of the deceased we even decided at our general assembly, where Bedri also par-
ticipated, to write to the Doctors in Berlin to join us and work together. And God will-
ing, in this way our union that has been subjected to partition can become powerful 
again, so that from the martyr’s [Talat] demise a benefit for the Islamdom can arise.23 
The Doctors» had rather been associated with Talat Pasha’s faction so far and were due all 
respect rather suspicious of Enver Pasha’s way of politics. These three doctors were reluctant 
to work under Enver’s command. For instance, Dr. Nazım renounced all his political de-
mands within the organization and proposed that Enver and Cemal should take over the 
leadership of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. He would rather prefer to go 
back to Anatolia and work as a physician or whatever duty the Ankara Government would 
assign him. 
On May 19, 1921, Enver met with Vehip (Kaçı) Pasha in Rome.24 Enver Pasha, who was 
believed to be in the Caucasus, reported The Times, has been in Rome on his way to Swit-
zerland, where he is to meet a number of Turkish politicians.25 The Young Turk community 
in Rome was, however, already under surveillance of the Operation Nemesis, because the 
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number 2 on the death list former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha was residing in Rome. 
Enver was soon identified by Nemesis agents shadowing Said Halim Pasha: 
The first time I saw Enver I was walking around the Hotel Plaza. I noticed two men, one 
of them wearing dark glasses. They were both carefully surveying the area as they walked. 
When they got close to me, I immediately recognized Enver with his dark, upturned 
mustache. […] A few days later I saw Enver in the Villa Borghese. I was on a bench 
reading letters from Constantinople. Carelessly, I had thrown down next to me several 
copies of the Armenian newspaper Jagadamard. It was very stupid, a terrible mistake. 
Any Turk would be able to identify me as an Armenian reading a Dashnag paper. That 
is exactly what happened. Hearing a footstep, I raised my head. It was Enver walking 
toward me briskly. I tried to gather up the newspapers, but it was too late. He looked at 
me and at the newspapers. That day he was not wearing dark glasses; our eyes met. 26  
After talks in Rome, Enver Pasha returned to Berlin. The Doctors had still not made a deci-
sion. But then, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr. Rüsuhi convinced Dr. Nazım that he should 
rather keep an eye on Enver: Enver Pasha is very lonely, certain kind of men might get 
around him. They might mislead him to wrong paths, therefore you should be at his side, 
they told Nazım.27 The latter wrote in despair to Cavid Bey: 
I would prefer to work with all my soul in the homeland. But how? [...] Baha [eddin 
Şakir] and also Rüsuhi decided to work together with Ali Bey [Enver Pasha]. This deci-
sion—if it works out—might also have the advantage of keeping the excesses of Ali Bey 
[Enver Pasha] in check.28  
Enver Pasha was successful in his reunion offer. However, the organization abroad is going 
possibly well, Enver wrote to Cavid Bey from Berlin. In this infertile soil it has struck root 
beyond my imagination.29 Meanwhile in Switzerland, Cavid Bey was under the political 
pressure of the police of the Canton Vaud, suspicious of Cavid’s political ventures. The Can-
ton police was rather interested in getting Cavid out of Switzerland. In order to avoid extra-
dition, Cavid was asked to sign an official statement in which he declared to renounce any 
political activity in Switzerland. As it was still possible that Cavid could become a minister 
once again in case of a regime change in Turkey, as one Swiss official explained, it was better 
 
26 Arshavir Shiragian, The Legacy: Memoirs of an American Patriot, ed. Sonia Shiragian (Boston: Hairenik 
Press, 1976), 92. 
27 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, Osmanlı İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 336.  
28 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), June 7, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı 
Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 130. 
29 Enver Pasha, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Switzerland), May 27, 1921, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı 
Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 77.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
410 
not to be too harsh with him.30 Enver was also informally requested by German officials to 
leave Germany.31  
While the political atmosphere in Europe was turning dark on the Muslim émigré commu-
nities, on June 20, 1921, Dr. Nazım wrote to his wife in Smyrna that he had no more hope 
to return to Turkey either, so that he left for Moscow.32 While Dr. Nazım accompanied 
Enver to Moscow together with some Arab delegates, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was assigned to 
Thrace to prepare networks of underground resistance against the Greeks, and Dr. Rüsuhi 
remained in Berlin.33 Order was restored, brothers were reunited. Or so did it seem. But 
Shakib Arslan would reveal to the Kemalist ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha in Moscow that he 
was rather a follower of Talat Pasha’s agenda, but now as there was no other possibility than 
working together with Enver Pasha, he came to Moscow.34 Previously, other Arab delegates, 
Dr. Ahmed Fuad and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish had resigned from the Union of Muslim 
Revolutionary Societies, because of the developments within the organization that took place 
since the demise of Talat.35  
On June 18, Enver left for Moscow. He would never return to Berlin thereafter.36 The prop-
aganda bureau continued to work on its own and the newspaper Liwa-el-Islam was published 
until December 1922. Berlin also remained as the residence of families and politically passive 
colleagues, and hence continued to be an important hub of correspondence and retreat, alt-
hough it ceased to be politically relevant within the movement. After the series of assassina-
tions which resulted in the murder of Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and Cemal Azmi Bey in April 
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1922, Berlin ultimately lost its appeal as a center of political exile for the Young Turk com-
munity. Eventually, after Talat Pasha’s death and in the absence of Enver Pasha, the Muslim 
émigré networks politically united within the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies got 
soon disengaged, although the organization continued to formally exist.  
*** 
Somehow considered as «state guests» of Soviet Russia, Enver Pasha with his entourage oc-
cupied the two-floored modest buildings at of the wings of the Sugar King’s Palace that had 
formerly served as business offices. Across the front yard in parallel wing there was the quar-
ters of Cemal Pasha and his entourage.37 The overall presence of Enver and his friends in 
Moscow were also far from being a diplomatic delegation. Karakhan was fed up with the 
continued presence of unwelcome guests in his courtyard, M. N. Roy wrote in his memoir. 
They certainly went to the black-market, an offence liable to capital punishment in those 
days, and carried on clandestine traffic with Germany through the medium of the Afghan 
Embassy.38 Enver was buying fur coats at the black market and sending them to Berlin.39 
Even for Moscow standards where decadent Western formalities of politics were seen as prud-
ish, Enver and his delegations constituted a gray area in diplomacy.  
Entitlement and certification were getting more and more important, as the way of interna-
tional affairs was settling down from revolutionary coalitions to formal diplomacy. This am-
bivalence of their diplomatic status was increasingly becoming a problem for the fugitive 
Young Turk leaders. More for Enver than for Cemal. While the latter was an official repre-
sentative of the Afghan Government, Enver with his shallow Union of Muslim Revolutionary 
Societies was neither national nor international. The ambivalent status of Enver in diplomatic 
occasions was increasingly becoming a problem. He was either getting not the attention he 
expected or he was getting too much attention in the eyes of his rivals. At the banquette of 
the Afghan Embassy, for instance, Enver received far more respect and audience than the 
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delegates of the Ankara Government. Turkish diplomats Rıza Nur and Yusuf Kemal pro-
tested that he doesn’t have any official title. We are an official delegation entitled by the 
Representatives of Turkey.40 M. N. Roy remembers that Enver’s behaviour was against the 
unwritten rules of political asylum, as he was maintaining personal relationship with the 
Afghan Embassy in Moscow. But the leader of Pan-Islamism, though fallen, was still in a 
privileged position, Roy considered. The Russians dared not molest him, fearing thereby 
to inflame Muslim sentiments.41  
In the course of early 1921 the dust was settling, as new international treaties were signed. 
This was a process of certification of statehood. On the one hand this process was driven 
forward by the ongoing trade negotiations in London which resulted in the Anglo-Soviet 
Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921. This treaty meant the recognition of Soviet Russia in 
the international community. The price the Soviet Government was willing to pay was the 
renouncement of its propaganda activities in the East. As it will be discussed, this had certain 
consequences on the policies of the CUP leaders. On the other hand, the Soviet Government 
established in early 1921 what one scholar described as a system of treaties linking Turkey, 
Persia and Afghanistan with Soviet Russia and with one another.42 These treaties were liter-
ally based on the idea of strengthening national sovereignties in a mutual anti-imperialist 
struggle.43 The treaties became certificates of prestige and recognition.44 These treaties with 
Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan were seemingly in accordance with the general agenda of the 
Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. I do not believe there can be any rational mind 
that would not accept and admit that Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan will constitute a great 
force by leaning against each other, said Azmi Bey in a report.45 In fact, Enver Pasha and 
Cemal Pasha were in the midst of these diplomatic developments and played important roles 
as intermediators. Enver and Djemal are regarded as hand in glove with the [Bolsheviks], 
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said one British official, and, are in fact, considered to be practically Bolsheviks agents.46 
Nevertheless, as I have argued throughout, they were increasingly losing ground as the inter-
state problems came to a resolve, since they lacked diplomatic status and thrived as non-state 
actors in international chaos.  
The curious thing about the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was, however, that its first clause 
required that each party refrains […] from conducting outside of its own borders any official 
propaganda […], and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from 
any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encour-
age any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the 
British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan.47 Sir Robert 
Horne, the President of the Board of Trade, made serious accusations to his Soviet counter-
part Krassin regarding the existing propaganda activities and demanded their abandonment: 
Sir, […] I am instructed on behalf of his Majesty’s Government to bring to the notice of 
the Soviet Government facts within their knowledge which disclose activities on the part 
of the Soviet Government in the regions of India and Afghanistan which are inconsistent 
with the stipulations in the Agreement, and which therefore must at once be brought to 
an end if the good faith of the Agreement is to be observed.  
The Soviet Government have made no secret in their public statements and in their of-
ficial Press, that the main object of their recent policy is the overthrow of British rule in 
India; and his Majesty’s Government have for a long time past been aware of the intrigues 
in which the Soviet Government, with their agents, subordinates, and associates, have 
been engaged, by various means and from different directions, for the furtherance of the 
object.48  
If we care about anything in the [Anglo-Soviet] Trade Agreement, a Foreign Office official 
wrote to Lord Curzon, it is the possibility that it may stop Bolshevik propaganda against us 
in the East or elsewhere.49 The British decision-makers made it clear to the Krassin, the 
Soviet Commissar for Trade and Industry, that trade would only come for the price of omit-
ting propaganda in Asia.50 Bolshevik propaganda, whether actual or alleged, had caused a 
political reaction of the highest order. The British decision-makers were highly alerted by 
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what Foreign Secretary Curzon called a real hurricane of propaganda, intrigue, and conspir-
acy against British interests and British power in Asia, which was unleashed since the Baku 
Congress.51 Yet, despite the paranoid visions of British intelligence officers, the true extent 
of Bolshevik propaganda still awaits its critical evaluation. This does not imply that the Bol-
sheviks had no subversive ambitions and propagandistic actions on their record. To the con-
trary, instead of summoning hope and inciting revolution among oppressed people, the Bol-
shevik propaganda had caused fear and paranoia among political enemies. It became a prior-
ity of British foreign policy to put a break on Bolshevik propaganda before everything else. 
Collaborating with and putting pressure on other state actors in the framework of formal 
diplomatic relations was an effective method in policing subversive foreign non-state actors. 
If Britain wanted to bring an end to the revolutionary activities of Muslim or Indian nation-
alists, it only needed to coopt their guardian, namely Soviet Russia. 
While the British intentions were clear in terms of what they wanted to accomplish, the 
consequences of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty remained ambiguous. To some degree, it was 
merely a dead letter, as it is argued by some historians. The Soviets continued their anti-
British policies by other means.52 There were, however, certain changes. Cemal Pasha’s «India 
plan», which Enver Pasha was discussing with Karahan in Moscow had to be handled very 
carefully in face of the British demands.53 Enver summarized the new situation to Cemal as 
follows: 
After concluding the trade treaty with the English, Russians do not want to engage so 
openly. For now, they want to build themselves up so that they are not considering to 
wage a war against the English yet and attract their grudge. Nevertheless, they are con-
sidering to help us although not in a large scale as they had promised. Eventually, for 
you, as promised in the agreement they will deliver as the first part of the demands of 
Afghanistan three thousand rifles, 20 machine guns, 20 cannons, and many hand gre-
nades. In order to transport them as soon as possible to Tashkent, they requested men 
from us. This will be discussed here at the War Ministry and they will then immediately 
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start transporting them from the capital to Tashkent. The Russians have the idea that we 
supposedly received these from a tradesman.54 
In mid-April, Enver was still negotiating for the arms deal on behalf of Afghanistan. It seems 
that the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement indeed had an effect. The diplomatic pressure of the 
British was not the sole reason for Enver getting the cold shoulder from the Soviet officials. 
There was certainly a mistrust towards Enver Pasha, as he was not a communist. «Neverthe-
less, the Russian administration, which is wrecked by the revolution, and the labor mentality 
that antagonizes us as the bourgeoisie has more or less its effect in every business.»55 Enver 
advised Cemal Pasha to build up a militia in Afghanistan and look for ways of producing its 
own weapons, because, he said: «To be honest, I am not convinced that you will receive from 
the Russians the amount of supplies you asked for.»56 At the end of the letter, however, Enver 
added a note that Bedri had talked with Karahan and that Karahan accepted to send one 
thousand rifles from the promised three thousand rifles and the money for the India plan was 
also granted and given to the Soviet Ambassador.57 In September 1921, diplomatic notes was 
given by Horne to Krassin, because propaganda activities against the British Empire were still 
far from being abandoned, including Cemal’s activities in Afghanistan.58 These propaganda 
activities were, however, the last remnants of an old policy. Socialism in one country was 
yet to be announced by Stalin in 1924, but Soviet state interests were overruling the ideals of 
the Comintern and that of the world revolution already by 1921.59  
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On March 16, 1921, the same day as the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, the Treaty of Mos-
cow was signed between the Soviet Government and the representatives of the Ankara Gov-
ernment.60 The coincidence of dates might suggest an international conspiracy, but it was 
rather the wish of the Turkish delegation to sign it on the one year anniversary of the British 
occupation of Constantinople.61 Enver Pasha has been involved in the Russian-Turkish talks 
in Moscow from the onset. Yesterday we concluded a Turkish-Russian friendship treaty, 
reported Enver to General von Seeckt on February 26, 1921, after the first draft was ap-
proved. So the Russians will support us with gold and all means.62 Since the negotiations 
in Moscow with the Kemalist delegation was taking place simultaneously with talks in Lon-
don, Enver urged his «friends from the Ankara delegation to finish the deal with Moscow 
as soon as possible before a silly decision is made in London.»63 Enver has already showed 
great sacrifice for the realisation of the Turkish-Soviet relations, said Chicherin in April 
1921.64 In a meeting with Shakib Arslan, Chicherin stressed also the mutual advantage of 
interstate relations between Turkey and Russia: Angora had obtained many advantages and 
Russia had obtained the Trade Agreement with Great Britain.65 
As much as Soviet officials were pleased with Enver’s involvement, the Kemalist delegation 
was not. A Turkish diplomat accused Enver of playing for both sides in the negotiations in 
order to keep himself relevant.66 In their growing self-confidence as representatives of peo-
ple’s government, the Kemalist officials saw the transnational activities of Enver and Cemal 
Pashas as an instrument of Soviet Government and therefore as an interference into their 
national and international sovereignty. They were not necessarily wrong in their assessment, 
since Commissar of Foreign Affairs Karahan had the intentions of using Enver as an asset in 
Russian-Turkish negotiations before the arrival of Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha to Moscow. 
It would be great that Enver Pasha will return to Moscow, told Karahan Halil Pasha in 
January 1921. Because very soon a special delegation headed by Fuad Pasha will arrive, he 
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explained. Karahan’s idea was pretty straightforward: It will be possible to learn the most 
recent policies of Anatolia from this delegation. In negotiations between this delegation and 
the Soviet Government of Russia, some issues will emerge in which including Enver’s judge-
ment and consent will be useful.67 Not without a reason, Karabekir wrote in his memoir 
that during the meetings with the Soviets, the CUP émigrés and the Kemalists were occa-
sionally proposing conflicting policies and proposals.68 Enver himself stated that he advised 
the Kemalist delegation in Moscow to give up Batum in order to find an agreement with the 
Soviet demands.69 It was Chicherin who asked for Enver’s help in coming to an agreement 
with the Turkish Government regarding the border between Kemalist Turkey and Soviet 
Armenia.70 Not only Enver, but also Cemal was similarly involved. In negotiations with the 
Kemalists, Chicherin would often say that Cemal Pasha had already agreed on a point that 
the Kemalists were rejecting.71 The multiplicity of authority was threatening the sovereignty 
of the Ankara Government, as long as Soviets were playing the Kemalist and the Unionist 
delegations in Moscow against each other. 
This uncomfortable situation led the Ankara delegates to renounce any association with fu-
gitive CUP leaders in foreign affairs. For example, without any reason they wasted some 
unnecessary words to the Russians claiming that Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha have no au-
thority to talk in the name of Anatolia in Moscow, Enver complained. But especially I have 
never acted in the name of Anatolia, he said angered. His response to the Kemalist delegation 
amounted to a threat: Therefore, we said that if there will be a government [in Ankara] that 
will not help us or act against us by conspiring with the Entente, then we are, of course, free 
[to act accordingly].72  
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Meanwhile, the available space of independent activity in Muslim countries was shrinking as 
Soviets concluded further treaties in Asia. Soviet relations to Persia were turning from ex-
porting revolution to formal bilateral diplomacy. When Azmi Bey was travelling from Tash-
kent to Baku, he happened to be in the same train as the newly appointed Soviet ambassador 
to Tehran, Theodor A. Rothstein. The Ambassador told Azmi Bey that it was possible to 
prepare a revolution in Persia. Others from Rothstein’s hundred men staff revealed to Azmi 
that the delegation was assigned to prepare a revolution. This delegation, as Azmi con-
cluded, was not an embassy delegation, but a revolutionary one.73 Rothstein’s plans were, 
however, interrupted by a coup. On February 21, 1921, General Reza Khan (Pahlavi) from 
the Iranian Cossack Brigade conducted a successful coup d’état in Tehran and the young 
intellectual Sayyed Ziya Tabatabai was made Prime Minister.74 The coup plotters had ini-
tially enjoyed British support and the formal legitimization of the coup was framed as a meas-
ure to stop the looming Bolshevik influence in Iran. Nevertheless, the new regime proved to 
be more eager in reestablishing Iran’s national sovereignty than becoming the playfield of 
another episode of the Anglo-Russian Great Game. Soon previous commitments to foreign 
powers such as the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 were annulled and the normalization of 
state of affairs was put on agenda. Anyway as you know, Azmi wrote Enver, recently a 
revolution [sic, the coup d’état of February 1921; in original: inkilab] took place in Iran and 
Sayyed Nizam ed-Din [sic, Ziya Tabatabai] who came to government said stop to Rothstein’s 
delegation.75 Although Soviet plans for a communist revolution were perhaps shattered, the 
post-coup regime did not stop the on-going negotiations with Soviet Russia. Only few days 
after the coup, on February 26, 1921, the Soviet-Persian Treaty was signed.76 The treaty 
practically enhanced the sovereignty of Persia with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the 
Gilan region.77 Enver was getting information about the developments in Iran from his 
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friends and Iran constituted a major field of action in his mental map which was now prac-
tically unavailable.78 
Meanwhile, Cemal Pasha in Kabul and Enver Pasha in Moscow had been very influential in 
pushing forward the Soviet-Afghan relations. The relations had been growing increasingly 
uneasy, because Mahmud Tarzi, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, had taken up talks 
with the British and was playing both sides against each other, as it will be discussed below 
in more detail. On February 28, 1921, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty was signed in Moscow.79 
Enver Pasha hoped that this Soviet-Afghan Treaty would have a positive effect on the Anglo-
Soviet negotiations.80 Enver was mistaken. Afghanistan was the only independent state 
named in the treaty where Bolshevik propaganda was declared undesired. It is clear, as 
Cemal wrote to Enver, that the only way for us to establish a secure and beneficial working 
area in Afghanistan is by way of Afghan-Russian friendship.81 Cemal was similarly mistaken, 
because his dependency on Soviet interests would limit his policy options in Kabul. When 
the Turkish-Afghan Treaty was signed on March 14, 1921, this was certainly a cause célèbre 
for Cemal.82 However, again, interstate relations would restrict transnational contentious 
politics, as both Afghanistan and Turkey would soon opt for a settlement with Britain.  
These Soviet treaties sealed the fate of other competing and rival quasi-states: the deal with 
Turkey meant the end of the Caucasus republics;83 the deal with Persia finished the Soviet 
Republic in Gilan, and the deal with Afghanistan enabled the incorporation of the Central 
Asian republics to Soviet Russia. It was easier for Soviet Russia to establish a collaboration 
with national leaders in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan instead of planning and executing a 
communist coup d’état or proletarian revolution with local subaltern groups or professional 
revolutionaries in exile. Behind the withdrawal of Bolshevik propaganda from Turkey, Iran, 
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and Afghanistan, as Bedri Bey told a German official after his return from Kabul, was the 
fact that these countries were previously exposed to Tsarist-Russian propaganda. Hence, Bol-
shevik propaganda was negatively perceived as Russian imperialism.84 As the Soviet leadership 
had few hopes of successful communist revolutions in Turkey and Iran (Afghanistan did not 
even have a communist party), it was a cheap price to pay to establish a safe bufferzone be-
tween Soviet Russia and British India and British Iraq.85  
The international state system was consolidating itself after a period of war and revolution. 
Of course, this is a retrospective insight. Contemporary eyes saw it rather differently. In the 
eyes of Entente intelligence officers, the Soviet treaties with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan 
were perceived as the beginning of a Bolshevik sponsored anticolonial jihad front against 
Britain and France in the Middle East to South Asia.86 Ironically, this was perhaps the very 
same reason why the CUP leaders celebrated these treaties, although they ended being mar-
ginalized as a consequence of these international developments. The more they were prepar-
ing the ground for pro-Soviet and anti-British treaties in Muslim states, the more they were 
losing ground as transnational revolutionaries. The rise of nation-states facilitated further 
consolidation of international relations, not that of transnational contentious prospects.  
This is the most apparent in the consolidation of the Ankara Government as a sovereign state 
which not only curtailed the national ambitions of the CUP leaders, but also the transna-
tional politics of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies in the wider Muslim geogra-
phy. Enver, Halil, and Cemal had asked Mustafa Kemal Pasha to support their activities in 
Muslim countries. Yet, Mustafa Kemal was reluctant to approve it before signing a deal with 
Soviet Russia.87 After talking to Shakib Arslan, Ali Fuat Pasha concluded that the Ankara 
Government has aroused great hopes among the Arab nations so that their opponents, i.e. 
Enver Pasha and his Unionist clique were losing ground. Even Cemal, as Ali Fuat Pasha 
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explained, was proposing to follow the policy guidelines of the Ankara Government.88 Ali 
Fuat Pasha was even involved in efforts to make Ankara the new center of pan-Islam. Mus-
lim delegates in Moscow were invited by Ali Fuat Pasha to go to Ankara instead.89 On June 
27, 1921, at the Grand National Assembly, Fevzi Pasha proclaimed the continuation of the 
oriental policy: 
The widespread rumors which have reached even this Assembly, and according to which 
[…] the Angora Government […] has decided in contravention of its oriental policy as 
pursued since its creation, to cease to afford any further assistance to the Moslems of 
Syria and Mesopotamia, are nothing more or less than the calumnious inventions of our 
interior and exterior enemies. […] With reference to the alleged abandonment of the 
Government of its oriental policy, I may say that in this regard also the Government will 
under no circumstances depart from the policy adopted with the consent of the Great 
National Assembly. […] As with Afghanistan, our Government is about to contract an 
alliance with the Persian nation, and thus to take another step in the direction of the 
ideal of an Islamic United States of the Orient. With great attention than ever before we 
are following the course of events in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and we are prov-
ing our deep sympathy for our brethren in religion who are striving to attain true inde-
pendence.90  
Thus, the British Intelligence reported that preparations for the carrying out of a definite 
pan-Islamic campaign have been perfected by the Angora administration, and that the Ori-
ental policy […] is indeed an integral part of the Kemalist programme.91 Ali Fuat Pasha said 
that pan-Islamist policies would no longer be an instrument of anybody and everybody.92 
At whose expense Ankara should become a center of pan-Islam was obvious. 
In early June 1921, Enver complained that Mustafa Kemal Pasha is not totally helping us 
in our policies abroad. On the one hand, said Enver, he says, don’t come to the home-
land, work abroad. On the other hand, he says to the Russians and others: Enver and Cemal 
Pashas have no positions. Even more annoyed was Enver that Mustafa Kemal was restricting 
their movement in other Muslim counties as well. He argues that if you want do anything 
in the Muslim world, do it with me, complained Enver about Mustafa Kemal’s treatment, 
but then, as he added, the draft text of the Turkish-Afghan treaty was kept a secret from 
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him.93 Ali Fuat Pasha even went as far as telling Enver that he should not write directly to 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha anymore, but should rather report directly to him as the Turkish Am-
bassador in Moscow, implying a chain of command subordinating Enver Pasha and his 
movement to Ankara’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. News that the Ankara Government was 
planning to organize an Islam congress in Anatolia also marginalized Enver’s own efforts. 
Enver came to the bitter conclusion: «But now, as it was not enough for them to take over 
domestic politics, they don’t want to leave room for us in foreign politics either. Enver ex-
plained this behavior of Mustafa Kemal as jealousy, because they think, if we would be 
triumphant in international politics in the future, we would win great fame and fondness in 
the homeland.»94 
*** 
Cemal Pasha’s activities are particularly illustrative how a professional revolutionary could 
rise in national and international politics abroad. Cemal was successful in constituting very 
real threat to British policies without being part of paranoid conspiracy theories. Cemal’s 
military reforms in Afghanistan since the summer of 1920 was a matter of serious concern 
for British policy-makers. In a letter Sir Robert Horne, the President of the Board of Trade, 
wrote to Krassin during signing of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement explicitly underlined 
Cemal as a problem: 
Jamal Pasha, whose mission to Afghanistan was undertaken with approval of Moscow as 
it was felt, no doubt, that his presence would appeal to the religious as well as national 
sentiment of the Afghans, has been in touch with the tribal leaders and, having been 
assured that the necessary funds would be supplied by the Soviet Government has prom-
ised them even larger quantities of munitions than [Yakov] Suritz [i.e. Soviet Ambassador 
to Afghanistan] did.95 
Robert Horne’s allegations were not wrong. Cemal Pasha’s activities in Afghanistan were 
directed against British India. For instance, at the time of the trade treaty, it was known that 
an Afghan diplomatic delegation was on its way to Berlin via Moscow, in order to establish 
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bilateral relations and to make arms deals.96 The delegation was interested in German ma-
chines and engineers for the maintenance and development of textile and weapon factories 
in Kabul.97 Enver had written a reference letter to General von Seeckt for the Afghan chief 
diplomat Mohammad Wali Darwazi.98 In Berlin, the delegation made official visits to state 
officials and proclaimed the enthronement of Emir Amanullah Khan.99 While British officials 
were overtly concerned about the delegation’s visit to Berlin, German Orient experts were 
long disillusioned with the promises of the old Orientpolitik. But except for the disappoint-
ment that Germany is indeed dependent on England, wrote Middle-East expert Otto Gün-
ther von Wesendonk to a former colleague at the Auswärtiges Amt, the [Afghan] General 
won’t bring any positive news back home.100 The British were, however, far from disillu-
sioned about the political ambitions of Afghanistan, where Cemal Pasha as the Commander-
in-Chief of Afghan Armed Forces had become Soviet Russia’s key instigator of anti-British 
policies in Kabul. Indeed, shortly after the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Karahan 
was complimenting Cemal’s achievements in Afghanistan to his comrades in the Russian 
Communist Party:  
The famous Young Turk leader Cemal Pasha (former minister and commander of Turk-
ish forces in Syria) was sent by us to Afghanistan in August 1920 in order to collect 
intelligence and obtain an important military position by winning the trust of the Afghan 
Emir.  
As of now, Cemal Pasha was entrusted with the task of commanding and reforming the 
Western Army located at the Indian border.101  
Karahan’s description of Cemal Pasha’s mission to Afghanistan renders it as secret intelli-
gence mission of the Soviet Government. Indeed, Cemal had personally intervened into the 
Afghan-British negotiations. Be careful, my brother!, warned Cemal the Afghan Minister 
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of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Khan Tarzi in a very hard protest letter. The English have two 
great ambitions, Cemal explained. First, they want you to rip apart the treaty you made 
with the Russians with your own hands. Second, they want to make sure that I go away by 
removing His Majesty’s confidence in me! Cemal further told his Afghan colleague: The 
English shall not materialize these ambitions by any means.102 Tarzi had reopened the ne-
gotiations with the British in early 1921. Mahmud Khan Tarzi was an Afghan intellectual, 
who had spent most of his life in exile in the Ottoman Empire. Tarzi had become the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs in 1919 and Emir Amanullah was married to his daughter.103 In De-
cember 1920, Cemal complained that the Russians were dragging in ratifying the treaty with 
Afghanistan. In ten days, a British delegation was awaited in Kabul, thus Cemal was con-
cerned about losing Kabul to British overtures.104 At the end, Cemal was successful in the 
making of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty on February 28, 1921. Looking back from nearly one 
year after his arrival in Kabul, Cemal could very well consider himself successful with his 
achievements in Afghanistan. In a letter to Enver Pasha in late July 1921, he summarized his 
achievements as follows: 
[…] after long talks with the Emir, I could convince him that the benefit of Afghanistan 
and that of the whole Muslim world lies in coming to terms with the Russians in order 
to receive the means from them that we depend on to be able to bring order and facility 
to the Muslim world. And I could convince him to adopt the policy of maintaining os-
tensibly peaceful relations until our preparations against the English are completed and 
to attack India only after we have revealed the Indian revolution and restructured and 
reordered our forces.105 
In similar terms, Cemal Pasha wrote to Mustafa Kemal Pasha that the greatest achievement 
of his coming to Kabul has been keeping Afghanistan away from the grip of the English and 
the ratification of the Afghan-Russian treaty106 For Cemal, the Afghan-Indian struggle was 
part of a global anticolonial struggle against the machinations of Britain. It is no wonder why 
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the British Intelligence was very much concerned about Cemal’s activities, which was de-
scribed by Major Bray in January 1921 as follows: 
Djemal Pasha is also to have complete control over all Indian work. In order to carry out 
his work he propose the formation of Indian units, improvement of existing defences, 
establishment of a young officers school, and to examine the conditions on the frontier. 
The Amir of Afghanistan is reported to have approved these steps being taken.107 
As global as this struggle was framed, it was always connected in his mind to Turkish national 
interests. It is about causing an Indian trouble to the English who only recently brought 
upon us the Greek trouble and by that it is perhaps about being the instigator of a great 
incident that would grant the whole world a moment to take a breath!, wrote Cemal to 
Mustafa Kemal. This is my purpose. It is about facilitating and supporting your struggle at 
home [dahilde] by working abroad [harici mesai ile].108 In return, Mustafa Kemal pro-
nounced his support for Cemal’s activities in Afghanistan.109 Mustafa Kemal advised Cemal 
to unify the growing national movements in Turkestan and Afghanistan and connect them 
a sort of special organization [bir takım teşkilat-ı mahsusaya raptetmek]. In addition to finan-
cial support from Soviet Russia, Mustafa Kemal urged Cemal not to forget the special his-
toric role fallen upon Turkey in the formation and direction of Muslim Eastern revolu-
tion.110 Hence, Anatolia’s security was also to be defended at the Hindu Kush. A British 
report from Constantinople was speculated about Cemal’s relation to Ankara Government 
after the Turkish-Afghan Treaty: 
There is, however, no evidence that he [Cemal] can as yet be regarded as being an instru-
ment of Angora policy. He stands for the pan-Islamism of the Union and Progress gang, 
and a distinction must still be drawn between these and the Angora leaders, although in 
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so far as the extreme and at the present dominant party in Angora is concerned, there is 
no real difference in the ultimate programme.111  
In Cemal Pasha’s mind, his struggle in Kabul was connected to that of Mustafa Kemal in 
Anatolia and to the general Asian policy of the Soviet Government in Moscow. Now, with 
the treaties concluded between Turkey, Russia, and Afghanistan, Cemal believed to have 
brought himself to a central position. From a fugitive war criminal and professional revolu-
tionary looking for vengeance and venture, Cemal had become an international mediator 
and a military-civil reformer. Cemal was confident enough to threaten the then Foreign Sec-
retary of British India, Henry R. Dobbs. While Dobbs was in Kabul for negotiations with 
the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cemal had openly threaten with revolution in India, 
if Britain would not make an honorable peace with Mustafa Kemal.112 What Cemal did 
not consider was what to do if Ankara and Kabul would come to a settlement with Britain.  
While Cemal Pasha saw the struggle in Afghanistan and Turkestan as part of a global anti-
colonial struggle of Muslims and the national struggle in Turkey, other Muslim nationalists 
who were more committed to their local and regional issue saw these grand schemes as haz-
ardous. Especially, the alliance with Soviet Russia was considered to be treasonous to the fate 
of Russian Muslims in Central Asia. One of them was the Turkestani leader Zeki Velidi 
(Togan). Their thoughts of Central Asia intended to benefit Turkiye, to continue the [First 
World] war which they had lost in the West against the Allies, wrote Zeki Velidi in his 
memoir. He saw a clash of interests between Cemal’s policies in Afghanistan and the policy 
of Jadidist nationalists in Turkestan:  
General Cemal was intending to start an uprising in India with the help of Afghans, and 
to include the Central Asian Turks into his Army of Islam with the aid of the Soviets. 
He was acting seriously. He sent […] letters to be delivered to the chiefs of the Basmaci. 
[…] They were completely imaginary. We regarded the matters of Turkistan only from 
the prism of Turkistan. We were against the idea of melding it with the operations in 
Turkiye, or to eliminate the English dominion in India. […] At that time several of the 
Kazak and Ozbek intellectuals arrived in Bukhara […]. They told us that the General 
Cemal turned out to be an adventurist who had no idea of the realities; which Basmaci 
would go to India to fight against the English?113 
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No wonder that Cemal Pasha saw these less of an issue. The main challenge facing his reform 
policy was not the alliance of Basmachi rebels to his Afghan army, but the modernization of 
Afghanistan and Turkistan so that they could become powerful on their own. Not unlike in 
his war-time military governorship in Syria, Cemal had committed himself to a civilizing 
mission in Afghanistan.114 Cemal was a believer in modernization. Cemal’s fellow traveler, 
Azmi Bey, wrote in a report:  
I always thought and knew that Afghanistan was a fairly orderly government. This jour-
ney of mine disappointed me. Indeed, it depressed me. Let’s wish that Cemal Pasha’s 
leadership [irşadı] and the Emir’s good will and labor it will soon manifest itself in form 
of a government. Today’s Afghanistan is nothing but a great tribe.115  
Even though Cemal Pasha’s reform policies in Afghanistan still deserves a detailed study of 
its own, we know that he was very much devoted to his mission.116 He released new admin-
istrative laws, made fiscal reforms, let foreign books translated, and initiated several military 
reforms during his tenure as the commander-in-chief. The lack of modern military and hu-
man resources was the main problem to be solved. These resources were to be imported from 
Europe, Soviet Russia, and Turkey. For this purpose, the delegation of Mohammad Wali was 
trying to arrange the delivery of arms from Europe. Cemal had sent a report to Karahan with 
an offer to provide military supplies as well as Red Army personnel, which Karahan proposed 
to the Central Committee to grant Cemal’s demands.117 Cemal believed that there was a great 
demand for foreign experts who could offer the Afghan military elites a cultural and social 
education as well. Cemal believed that such foreign experts with cultural skills could only be 
found in Turkey. On his way to Kabul, Cemal had already assembled a group of former 
Ottoman POWs and placed them in new education facilities in Tashkent and Kabul.118 But 
this was not enough. Cemal requested fresh Turkish officers from Kemalist Turkey. On De-
cember 25, 1920, the Turkish General Staff reported that the Afghan Emir requested military 
 
114 M. Talha Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria: Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914–
17 (London: Routledge, 2014). 
115 Azmi Bey, report (Baku) on current affairs in Afghanistan and Bukhara, March 31, 1921, TTK, EP 02-57. 
116 The most detailed account is in Nevzat Artuç, Cemal Paşa: Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), 349–71. 
117 Karahan, letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, April 26, 1921, in Kazancyan, 
Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 43–44.  
118 Cemal Pasha, letter (Tashkent) to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ankara), August 13, 1920, ATASE, İSH, kutu 
no. 570, gömlek no. 58; ATASE, ATAZB, kutu no. 38, gömlek no. 12; TTK, EP 03-28. See also: Hülya 
Baykal, “Milli Mücadele Yıllarında Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile Cemal Paşa arasında Yazışmalar,” Atatürk 
Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi 5, no. 14 (1989): 379–439. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
428 
officers from Mustafa Kemal Pasha.119 Cemal even proposed that the officers should bring 
their wives with them to educate the Afghan women.120 In similar terms, Cemal considered 
the emissary of the Ankara Government in Kabul, Abdurrahman (Samadan) Bey, despite his 
honest efforts not fit for this position, because he was an Ottoman officer with Afghan origins 
who did not necessarily represent the recent Anatolian spirit (Anadolu ruhunu). Instead, 
Cemal proposed: It would be more appropriate if someone would be appointed to the Kabul 
position who exceedingly possesses the new spirit of Turkishness [yeni Türklük ruhuna].121  
Things were going quite well for Cemal Pasha, one could argue. While Talat Pasha was shot 
from behind, while he was living incognito in Berlin and awaiting an invitation to return to 
Anatolia and while Enver Pasha was busy printing some pamphlets in his room in Moscow, 
Cemal was the only one of the Young Turk triumvirate who had come to occupy a state 
position and was preparing the coup against British Empire’s weakest spot, namely India. 
Cemal was more confident about his capabilities in Afghanistan: There cannot be any other 
way of working as a revolutionary at the Indian border in Afghanistan than the way I pro-
posed. If they do not concentrate the operational and actual enterprise of the Indian revolu-
tion in my person, then they will not achieve anything.122 
Things were, however, about to change. As soon as the Soviets established their system of 
treaties with Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, the British Indian officials intensified their 
relations to the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Khan Tarzi. Both Tarzi and 
Cemal got involved in a struggle to win over the confidence of the Emir to their respective 
policies. Yet, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty was still not ratified by the Emir. There was a general 
mistrust towards the Soviets in Kabul, as they were eager to open consulates throughout 
Afghan towns and these were accused of spreading Bolshevik propaganda. One day, the Min-
ister of Security, Shuja ud-Daula, delivered Cemal Pasha the bad news:  
Pasha, let me tell you this clearly, the policy of the Government has completely changed 
due to the influence of our Minister of Foreign Affairs. As of now, we will terminate the 
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Russian Treaty. In its place, we will make a treaty of alliance with the English. The Eng-
lish has already offered us twenty thousand rifles, two hundred cannons, and two hun-
dred machine guns as well as a yearly payment of four million rupee.123 
Cemal Pasha, in his anger, wrote a letter to the Emir, protesting his recent deal with British 
India and declared that he would leave Afghanistan, unless the Soviet-Afghan Treaty is rati-
fied within six days. The next day he was invited to the Palace to give his statement personally 
to the Emir. Cemal explained to the Emir that the Emir was not actually powerful in his 
country, because his army was not powerful. It was that simple in Cemal’s mind. Only if the 
army was modernized—not just armed, as he explained—only then the Emir could be a 
powerful leader. Cemal was able to convince the Emir to reconsider his decision.  
With the arrival of the Soviet delegation, the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to 
give a reception event to the whole diplomatic representatives in Kabul. At this occasion, 
Cemal Pasha was able turn the tables, but in rather unexpected way. Prior to the reception, 
Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi send a very respectful message to Cemal, calling him our 
teacher in all affairs (bizim her hususta muallimimizdirler). The reason behind Tarzi’s cour-
tesy was that he needed Cemal to consult him and the Afghan diplomatic corps on a very 
sensitive issue. We do not know, explained Tarzi honestly, what ceremonies are to be 
followed in such banquettes and especially in occasions with women [alelhusus kadın 
bulunduğu halde]. Tarzi was, despite his social inexperience, a defender of women’s rights in 
Afghanistan and was ready to adopt international standards of diplomacy including festivities 
with the wives of the consular dignitaries.124 Cemal and his staff went over to the Ministry 
and instructed the members of the Afghan diplomatic corps on gentlemen etiquette. Of 
course, we do not know, whether the two political rivals in Kabul had practiced dance moves 
as well, but, apparently a cordial atmosphere emerged in this preparation session and contin-
ued throughout the event—very much to the appreciation of Cemal. He wrote that 
Mahmud Khan Tarzi was not the old Mahmud Khan Tarzi.125 After the relaxation of his 
dispute with Tarzi, Cemal offered the Emir that he will prepare a draft Anglo-Afghan treaty 
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to be proposed to the British representatives. This will show, whether the British had a good 
will, or not. And if the British would reject his draft treaty and come with another harsher 
proposal, Cemal said, he would publish both of these drafts in foreign newspapers to show 
the whole world the British intrigues in Afghanistan.126  
*** 
Only few days before the assassination of Talat Pasha, on March 12, 1921, the Grand Na-
tional Assembly in Ankara decided that Enver Pasha, Halil Pasha, and their friends were not 
allowed to enter to Turkey, because they were considered a threat to domestic and foreign 
policies.127 The description of Enver, Halil, and friends referred to a specific group. Neither 
Talat in Berlin nor Cemal in Kabul were meant by this decree, but a certain clique around 
Enver who had remained in Soviet Russia so far. The reason behind this decision was the 
increasing rumors that Enver Pasha would march into Anatolia with a Red Army force. Fevzi 
Pasha, the Ankara Government’s Minister of National Defense, had intelligence that the 
British were propagating that Bolshevism was getting spread in Anatolia by «Enver Pasha’s 
army» under the name of Green Army.128 The Turkish senior officials assumed that it was 
the British Intelligence behind these rumors who under the mask of proclaiming com-
munism would try to incite insurgencies here and there in Anatolia. All these rumors were 
connected to Enver being in Moscow and then in late summer 1921 in the Caucasus. The 
rumors claimed that Enver was working in the name of communism. It was even claimed 
that British Intelligence officials in Constantinople were spreading pseudo-Bolshevik propa-
ganda to turn the Ankara Government against the Soviet Russia.129 Whether the British In-
telligence spread such news or not, very soon the Ankara Government was reproducing the 
same rumors of Enver’s alleged Bolshevik invasion and making active propaganda against 
Enver Pasha. The Moscow Treaty of Friendship between Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia 
did not help Enver elevate his position. To the contrary, he was even more regarded as an 
 
126 Cemal Pasha, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Moscow), May 17, 1921, TTK, EP 01-02, in Yalçın and 
Kocahanoğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 280. 
127 BCA-030-0-018-001-001-2-38-18. See also: Murat Bardakçı, Enver (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015), 
561. 
128 Fevzi Pasha, letter (Ankara) to Southern Front Command (Antalya), February 27, 1921; May 26, 1921, 
ATASE, İSH, kutu no. 742, gömlek no. 8.  
129 Chief of General Staff Fevzi Pasha, arrest warrant for Enver Pasha and his friends, May 29, 1921, in 
Bardakçı, Enver, 562.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
431 
illicit instrument of Soviet policies. The article VIII of the Moscow Treaty demanded the 
omission of propaganda activities against each other, implying that mutual trust between 
Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia was not yet established.130 The Kemalist leadership in 
Anatolia, especially the Commander of the Eastern Front Kazım Karabekir Pasha were thor-
oughly suspicious of Bolshevism as an ideology and Russia as a regional power. In Ankara 
Government’s perception, Enver became one of the major points of mistrust in Soviet-Turk-
ish relations—not without Enver’s own misdeeds and miscalculations.  
Soviet officials were only beginning to grasp the rising Kemalist-Unionist conflict. In a meet-
ing with Karahan on December 29, 1920, Halil Pasha asked about the Muslim cavalry units 
Enver had previously requested. Halil Pasha did not shy away from over-blown claims that 
once Enver enters Anatolia with these troops Mustafa Kemal Pasha will not be in favor of a 
discord [ikilik] and that Mustafa Kemal was accustomed to obey Enver Pasha.131 If Enver 
Pasha’s going to Turkey would cause a rivalry with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and result in a 
disunion in the country, Karahan told Halil at their next meeting, this would cause the 
weakening of the defence forces of the country and serve the satisfaction of the English. 
Therefore, Russia would not support this.132 In January 1921, the Soviet Ambassador in 
Ankara, Upmal-Angarski, made a comment to Mustafa Kemal Pasha regarding the Union-
ists, noting that there are those, namely the Unionists, who are poisoned down to the abyss 
of their soul with nationalism and pan-Islamism, but for now they are not involved in any 
movement directed against your vanguard battle.133 The Kemalist delegations in Moscow 
was increasingly annoyed that Trotsky still believed that Enver was associated with the re-
sistance movement in Anatolia.134 Thereafter, Rıza Nur made once again clear to the Bolshe-
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vik leaders that Enver had no authority to negotiate on behalf of the Anatolian Govern-
ment.135 Nonetheless, Chicherin noted in a letter to the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party that Enver Pasha and his friends  
have undercover relations with the Kemalists and fields of joint action. In addition, it is 
beneficial that we have relations with an alternative Turkish group except for the Kema-
lists. 
It is true that Enver belongs to more imperialist group, but for he is a more meticulous 
politician, as he can evaluate the realities of our time and appreciate our role far better 
than the Kemalists. No doubt that we will resort to his help and assistance in the future. 
We should continue our friendship with him and connect him to us.136  
The continuous dismissal by the Kemalist delegation in Moscow was rather counterproduc-
tive. The more Enver Pasha felt pushed away, the more he devoted himself to Anatolian 
affairs.137 After the last rejection, Enver proclaimed his independence from the Ankara Gov-
ernment which also gave him the freedom to intervene into Anatolia.138 By this way, we 
declared that we will establish a society or a party to follow our ideals, although we are not 
against the current government in Turkey.139 This alternative party was soon realized. Enver 
and his friends founded the People’s Councils Party (Halk Şuraları Fırkası or sometimes also 
in singular Halk Şura Fırkası), in March 1921 in Moscow. After a meeting with Enver in 
April 1921, in which Enver presented the programs of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary 
Societies and People’s Councils Party, Ali Fuat Pasha believed that Enver can be useful only 
if he continued to work abroad in the Muslim world under the supervision of Ankara. If the 
Ankara Government would not support and sponsor Enver’s struggle abroad, Ali Fuat feared 
that Enver would soon get frustrated and will direct his attention and activities towards Tur-
key.140 Ali Fuat Pasha was right with his instinct. 
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More and more Enver Pasha’s focus was shifting towards Anatolia. Especially, news and em-
issaries coming from Anatolia were informing Enver that there was a great demand for his 
leadership in Anatolia. Most of these news were originating from Trabzon, a CUP strong-
hold, where especially among the guild of boatmen Unionist racketeers had established them-
selves as local rowdies. The leader of the boatmen’s guild was Yahya Kahya, one of the strong-
est racketeers in Trabzon.141 An intelligence report from Trabzon described these men as this 
party is only a gang of vagabonds which Yahya Kahya assembled for the purpose of smug-
gling.142 Trabzon, however, was not the only stronghold of CUP hooligans but one of the 
most significant one. In those days, wrote Feridun (Kandemir) who was an Intelligence 
officer back then, like many places in the East, there was also in Trabzon a state within a 
state [hükümet içinde hükümet]. A warlord, a pretender, a strongman or something were 
showing up with a bunch of ignorants following them; these were believing that they were 
the representatives of the nation, founder of the state, or trying to represent themselves as 
such.143 
Previously on January 28, 1921, Yahya Kahya was involved in the murder of the Turkish 
Communist leader Mustafa Subhi and his friends.144 The whole leadership cadre of Turkish 
Communist Party were put on a boat and drowned in the Black Sea. Ever since, Turkish 
leftists accuse the Kemalist regime for turning a blind eye to the murder of Turkish com-
munists, and some evidence hints that Kemalists had indeed a hand in facilitating the path 
to this mass murder.145 Surprisingly, the relations to Soviet Russia were not damaged by this 
tragic incident, which was framed as a maritime accident in official narratives.146 Less myste-
rious is the fact that the local CUP hooligans under the leadership of Yahya Kahya had blood 
on their hands.147 A central decision by the CUP leadership to kill Mustafa Subhi can be 
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ruled out, as Enver learnt only afterwards that Mustafa Subhi and his friends were killed by 
his own partisans in Trabzon and he was surely relieved as he was now the only Turkish asset 
of Soviet Russia.148  
Due to the encouraging news coming from Trabzon, Enver Pasha and his friends decided to 
send Halil Pasha there. Halil had also an official alibi to travel to Trabzon at the shores of 
Black Sea. Halil was recently diagnosed with tuberculosis in his lungs and he was prescribed 
by the doctor three months of rest under good weather conditions, which was supposedly 
typical for Trabzon.149 In addition, Halil Pasha had received the news that his family had also 
came to Trabzon. To Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Enver announced purpose of Halil’s arrival as 
recovering his health, but also mentioned opportunities to establish further communication 
links.150 In internal correspondence, as Enver revealed to Cemal, Halil’s actual mission was 
to inspect their organization’s standing in Anatolia.151 In another letter, Enver called Halil 
Pasha as the inspector of Anatolia.152  
On March 20, Halil wrote Enver that he would take a boat to Trabzon.153 Halil was, however, 
under the surveillance of Turkish Intelligence. The Turkish Consul in Tuapse sent news of 
Halil Pasha’s coming to Trabzon. Thus, the officials in Trabzon asked Ankara what to do 
with Halil Pasha. Orders were sent demanding that Halil should be taken under custody 
without letting him talk to anyone and he should be extradited back to Tuapse with the next 
ship. After his arrival on the evening of March 22, the local commander told Halil Pasha that 
there was an order from Ankara to deport him. Halil Pasha protested that his children were 
in Trabzon and his wife was coming as well. Hence, he insisted to stay in Trabzon for two 
months. His wish was granted, but he remained in house arrest under the protection of the 
local Laz militias. After Halil Pasha’s wife arrived at Trabzon on April 14, Halil Pasha and 
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his family were deported on April 28, 1921, in a vessel to Tuapse.154 Halil Pasha said later to 
a Kemalist informant in Tuapse: 
They threw me out of Anatolia. This angered the Russians. Because of the treatment to 
me and to Mustafa Subhi, the Anatolian Government lost its earnings in the eyes of the 
Russian Soviet Government. After Bekir Sami’s recent trip to London Russians see the 
Anatolian Government as becoming an instrument of the English. I see it like this as 
well.155 
Having arrived at Tuapse, Halil Pasha was assisted by Soviet officials and quarters were ar-
ranged for him and his family.156 On July 30, Halil moved with his family to Batum.157 
There, he was resided in a villa near the lake park. Halil Pasha was living like the commander 
of a great army together with his staff and aid-de-camps, wrote Vala Nurettin in his memoir 
who occasionally was a guest at Halil’s famous dinner parties where sometimes fifty to sixty 
guests were assembled and alcoholic beverages were consumed in large volumes and political 
discussions went on until late in the night.158 Halil was still under surveillance of the Turkish 
Intelligence. It was regularly reported that Halil was meeting with Armenians, Russians, and 
Turkish communists once a week at his mansion and that he was involved in anti-Kemalist 
and pro-Bolshevik propaganda.159 Even one of the men who came from Trabzon, a Captain 
İsmail Hakkı, who travelled to Tuapse to talk with Halil and then to Moscow to meet with 
Enver Pasha was sentenced to military tribunal.160  
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The [Government of] Anatolia seems to be quite afraid of us, Enver Pasha wrote his wife. 
Enver believed that politics of fear were directing Mustafa Kemal’s measures against the Un-
ionists. Responsible for these was not only Kemalist propaganda, but also their own over-
blown claims. Some of Hacı Sami’s inappropriate words has upset the affairs, he noted 
angered. Previously Hacı Sami had travelled through Anatolia on his way from Russia to 
Germany. After the incident with Halil Pasha in Trabzon, also Küçük Talat, one of the CUP 
leaders in Anatolia, was forced to leave the country.161 Therefore, Enver explained, Mus-
tafa Kemal Pasha came up with all sorts of lies, because he is afraid that I would enter Ana-
tolia. One of these most circulated rumors was that Enver would invade the six Eastern 
provinces with a Russian Army and help the Soviet Government establish a Great Armenia. 
In short, all kinds of allegations.162 Enver came to the conclusion that the Ankara Govern-
ment extradited Halil Pasha, because they feared that Europeans might start a public cam-
paign claiming that the Maneuver of the [Committee of] Union and Progress has started.163 
Enver was not wrong in his assumptions. The propaganda against Enver was a concerted 
effort by the Ankara Government. Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself had ordered to broadcast 
open propaganda against Enver (Enver hakkında açık neşriyat).164 Due to rumors of a So-
viet-sponsored Enverist coup in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal closed down the (official) Turkish 
Communist Party, the Green Army Society and all other oppositional groups which were 
initiated to give the Ankara movement a leftist-populist touch, but became the instruments 
of Enverists and other oppositionals in Anatolia.165 Ironically, it was exactly such behavior of 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, presumably based on his fears of Enver’s alleged coming to Anatolia, 
that was provoking Enver to start an usurpation campaign.  
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The organizational platform for Enver’s usurpation plans was the People’s Councils Party. 
Regarding the political agenda of this party, Enver told Cemal, in Anatolia in the Parliament 
we have a party by the name of People’s Council Party […]. They legally defend our goals in 
Anatolia. While the political program of this party was strongly embedded in socialist phra-
seology, in Enver’s private correspondence it rather sounded like political gibberish. When 
we say People’s Council Party, of course, it should not be understood as something republi-
can, as Enver tried to explain himself. We are in favor of the preservation of the Caliphate 
and the Sultanate, as long as the governance is brought to the people.166 Enver revealed in a 
letter to Cavid Bey that the pseudo-communist nature of the party program was intentional 
in order to «give it a populist form».167 A political party was needed in Anatolia, according to 
Enver, that would support the current government in Anatolia from the left, but also work 
against the spread of actual communist ideas.168 Enver imagined an opposition party in 
Grand Assembly in Ankara, but it shall not be a communist party. If one day working in 
Russia would become difficult, he believed that this party might become a political shelter 
for his return to Turkey.169 Enver was engaged in a very difficult balancing act between An-
kara and Moscow—and he was failing tremendously in explaining himself: 
But Mustafa Kemal Pasha isn’t totally helping us in politics abroad. Since he is in the 
government and forced to do politics with the English, we always regarded it as appro-
priate to have a populist party in domestic politics. And we had negotiated this openly 
with Fuat Pasha and wrote it to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. But for some reason, he became 
pretty suspicious.170  
Mustafa Kemal Pasha had every reason to get suspicious, as it was nearly impossible to make 
sense of Enver Pasha’s political messages. The party’s pseudo-communist program which was 
meant to please his Soviet sponsors, for instance, was interpreted rather seriously by Kemalist 
officials. Totally based on the principles of Bolshevism and communism, noted Kazım 
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Karabekir Pasha on the program of the People’s Council Party which was already in circula-
tion in Anatolia. With a lot of money, they [the Soviets] will organize Enver Pasha a Red 
Army consisting of marauders, he concluded. Karabekir believed that the Bolsheviks were 
trying to accomplish the Anatolian Red Revolution with Enver Pasha now, since they have 
previously failed with Mustafa Subhi and his friends. After the revolution, Karabekir assumed 
that the Soviets would take over the power and eliminate the revolutionaries. Thus, he pro-
posed: Our Government must call Enver to account and extinguish his moral personality 
by confuting his program in the eyes of the people.171 In an another circular to military 
commanders, Karabekir stressed that Karahan the Armenian and Chicherin were trying to 
provoke a Bolshevism revolution in Turkey with the help of Enver Pasha. The program of 
the People’s Council Party was quoted and certain parts were criticized by Karabekir—in-
cluding the passage on the equality of men and women—that were considered to be Bolshe-
vik and seditious. The purpose is clear, said Karabekir. By giving the Government in the 
hands of the people they will inflict revolution. They will demobilize the army with the 
promise of founding a militia. Karabekir finished his circular with a personal attack on En-
ver.172 Immediately thereafter, precautions were taken against the distribution of the program 
of the People’s Council Party in Anatolia.173 There were even plans to deceive Enver by en-
couraging or inviting him to come to Anatolia to arrest him.174 Mustafa Kemal Pasha re-
quested from Ali Fuat Pasha in Moscow to supply him regularly with intelligence on Enver’s 
movement as well as on Cemal’s activities in Afghanistan.175 Instead of offering him safe 
haven for Enver’s return to Turkey, the pseudo-communist program of the People’s Councils 
Party had fueled the fears of the Ankara Government and made his return only more difficult.  
Kazım Karabekir Pasha was very influential in voicing and reproducing various conspiracy 
theories in this regard. He was overtly suspicious of both the Bolsheviks and the British as 
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well as Unionists. For instance, Kazım Karabekir while trying to make sense of Enver’s activ-
ities abroad suspected the influence of foreign hands behind Enver:  
I assumed that the force that made Enver rush from Berlin to Baku had also set the 
Unionists within [Turkey] into motion and was this time trying to establish Bolshevism 
in our homeland through the hand of Enver. A convenient [policy] in such a vast area 
was only possible by foreign hands. 
For Karabekir, these foreign hands belonged to no one but Britain. Nevertheless, Karabekir 
was openly confused regarding some of the implications of this theory of British influence 
and considered other similarly strange explanations: I wonder whether the German diplo-
mats are inciting and instigating the [Committee of] Union and Progress leaders to make the 
Turks become Bolsheviks, believing that this might prolong the war? There were admittedly 
many other contradictions in his theory as well. The English would, certainly, never call for 
Cemal Pasha’s operation in Afghanistan, Karabekir wondered curiously. After quoting sev-
eral letters, however, Karabekir somehow reached the following conclusion: Once laid down 
as such, it once again becomes necessary to believe in the cunning of English diplomats.176 
While the British were in Karabekir’s perception the slick and fine gentlemen cleverly pulling 
the strings behind the curtains, the Russians, regardless of the title and form of their gov-
ernment, were considered as the traditional enemy of Turkey who would never tolerate 
Turkey to grow stronger and become dominant in the East. For Karabekir, neither the So-
viet-Turkish Friendship Treaty, nor the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty needed to be taken seri-
ously, because Britain was provoking a Russian-Turkish conflict in the Caucasus in order to 
safeguard its own geostrategic interests in the region.177  
A peculiar incident in April 1921 illustrated for Ankara regime the reach and threat of British 
intelligence operations. An Indian born Muslim activist, Mustafa Saghir, came to Ankara as 
a delegate of the Khilafat Movement. As the Turkish Intelligence soon discovered Saghir was 
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in reality a British spy assigned for espionage and propaganda against the Ankara Govern-
ment.178 Even more there was a British plan to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Pasha so that Mus-
tafa Saghir tried and sentenced to death penalty by hanging.179 Only few months after the 
assassination of Talat Pasha in Berlin, this discovery of this plot came as a bombshell in An-
kara. The timing of the conspiracy coincided with Soviet-Turkish Treaty.180 Soviet officials 
in Ankara proudly reported to Moscow to have helped the authorities in their investiga-
tion.181 
Meanwhile, Enver Pasha was increasingly disturbed by the good relations the Ankara Gov-
ernment had developed with Soviet Russia. This role was meant to be played by himself. The 
more Mustafa Kemal Pasha came to terms with Soviet Russia, the less space of action was left 
for Enver. In a letter to Cavid Bey, Enver expressed his concerns: 
I don’t like the recent situation in Anatolia at all. I had advised them [the Kemalists] to 
come more or less to terms with the Entente, as I have convinced Moscow [in the Anglo-
Soviet Trade Treaty?], so that they can grant serenity to the homeland that is in need of 
peace. In contrast, Ankara has thrown itself into personal dictatorship and altogether 
towards the Russian direction, but this will not please the Russians and perhaps it will go 
the way that I fear. Anyway, God forbid.182 
Regarding the military affairs in Anatolia, Enver Pasha was even more concerned, as he had 
only access to information through international news coverage, which was mostly pessimis-
tic about the chances of a Turkish success against the Greek forces. The information he re-
ceived from his colleagues in Europe was similarly colored.183 Enver again complained about 
false rumors that the Ankara Government was spreading about him. It is strange, there is no 
fundamental news in the newspapers, he complained hungry for fresh news from the front. 
Mustafa Kemal, that fool, would do a rather better job if he would strive for unification, 
instead of agitating against me and thereby encouraging the enemies.184 After reading an 
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article agitating against himself in the Hakimiyet-i Milliye,185 the official mouthpiece of the 
Kemalist Government, Enver protested in a letter to Mustafa Kemal about the deceptive 
conspiracy theories about him: 
After all, even though you most certainly know that I would never serve the purpose of 
Germans or anyone else, why do you let others lie and poison the minds of my people 
according to your desires? […] 
You won’t achieve what you are looking for, if your propagandists spread such illogical 
lies, for instance, that I would come from Russia to establish a Great Armenia in the six 
provinces.186 
Similar complains about propaganda by the Kemalists, claiming that Enver Pasha and his 
supporters would seize the six provinces with a Bolshevik force and give it away to Armeni-
ans, was mentioned also by Dr. Nazım who learned about these anti-Enver policies of An-
kara Government only after coming to Moscow. What is in Ankara’s mind?, wondered 
Nazım desperately.187 Eventually, Enver went as far as threatening Mustafa Kemal. Anyway, 
if our staying abroad becomes useless for our general purpose of saving first of all Turkey and 
the Muslim world or if we feel that there is a threat, then we will immediately come to the 
homeland. That’s it.188 According to a Turkish Intelligence report Enver even made several 
handwritten copies of this letter and circulated among the Turkish community in Moscow 
and perhaps beyond.189  
Meanwhile, the British officials believed that in the military crisis of the National Resistance 
against the Greeks, the Bolsheviks would prefer to see Enver in control of the Nationalist 
movement, firstly, because he has been much more in their pockets than Mustapha Kemal, 
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as one intelligence officer concluded.190 I think, noted another British official in Constan-
tinople, that there can be no doubt that Enver and Committee of Union and Progress are 
gradually taking command of situation at Angora and that Kemalist Government must be 
[regarded as entirely] in the hands of Bolsheviks.191 Enver is doubtless scheming to be the 
Deus ex Machina, assumed another British official and suggested that Enver wanted to re-
peat his sensational performance of 1913 when he re-entered Adrianople.192 These fearful 
news of a potential Bolshevik take-over in Ankara was making Mustafa Kemal more and 
more as the moderate party. Recent developments were implying, as it was summarized in a 
report to Lord Curzon, that Mustapha Kemal and his Minister, while anxious to show them-
selves not less zealous than the extremist group which looks to Enver Pasha, are in reality 
anxious to cut adrift from the Bolsheviks and so compromise with the Allies.193 After a con-
versation with the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople, the British representative 
reported to London: If Kemalist defeat was indeed decisive there would be very likely be an 
anti-Kemalist movement in Anatolia, but I feared it might result in a Bolshevik-Enver com-
bination with the object of continuing the war to the bitter end.194 In August 1921, a British 
Intelligence agent recently released from captivity reported that Enver was at the moment 
without power. That they attempt a coup d’état is probable; that they will succeed is un-
likely.195  
Enver Pasha’s increasing obsession with the Anatolian affairs was casting a shadow on the 
raison d’étre of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. When Muhittin (Birgen) vis-
ited the Moscow Bureau, there were only three people working there and as Birgen noted, 
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none of them was a revolutionary.196 One of them was Rashid Kaplanov, a Sorbonne-edu-
cated son of a landowner from Dagestan and former Minister of Finance in Musavvat Azer-
baijan. Kaplanov was working as the translator and secretary of Enver Pasha’s bureau in Mos-
cow. The Revolutionary Societies or the Union of [Muslim] Revolutionary Societies was 
always something hollow, he told to Muhittin. He said that he had never seen an actual 
organization at work. The whole society was made up of Enver Pasha and some of his 
friends. For Rashid Kaplanov Enver Pasha had only one idea in his head, namely return-
ing to Turkey and becoming the leader.197 Kaplanov criticized that the Union of Muslim 
revolutionary Societies had no program that can be presented to its potential social move-
ment base. If the purpose of a committee is to incite the Muslim countries to rebel against 
the English and French, wouldn’t it be anything but upsetting the apple cart to intervene 
into the affairs of the one country that is in an excellent rebellion?198 
Another dissident voice was Captain Hüseyin Fevzi. He had been dispatched as a paramilitary 
spy of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa to Tripoli in 1915 to conduct unconventional warfare. He had 
not returned to Ottoman Turkey ever since. Hüseyin Fevzi was the delegate for Tripoli and 
Tunisia at the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. At the second congress of the Un-
ion, Captain Fevzi held the last speech as he represented the Muslims of North Africa, which 
was one of the main topics. He proposed that it should not be a priority of the organization 
to concentrate on Anatolia, since Anatolia had already established independent government 
and organized resistance. Yet, this proposal opposed Enver’s plans to shift the focus of the 
operations towards Turkey. The congress was rather pro forma as the decisions were prepared 
by Enver previously.199 To Enver’s annoyance, however, other deputies like Emir Shakib 
Arslan and Khalid al-Gargani supported Fezvi’s proposal.200 Twenty days after the congress, 
Enver Pasha, ignoring the congress, sent a circular note to all branches of the CUP in Anatolia 
announcing that the name Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was only a mask (bir 
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maskeden ibaret olduğunu) for the Committee of Union and Progress and that it will soon 
reappear with its true name (nam-ı hakikisi ile).201 This circular note was secretly printed 
with a chapéographe by Enver and his friends in Moscow. 202  
In an intercepted letter to Halil Pasha in the name of the Central Committee of the Union 
of Muslim revolutionary Societies, Enver Pasha wrote that instead of appearing under dif-
ferent names, the Committee of Union and Progress with its glorious past should rather 
come out as it is. This move was based on the numerous appeals coming from our organ-
izations and our brothers abroad [hariç] and in the homeland [dahildeki]. Therefore, the 
letter continued, […] the Central Committee decided that to give […] our organization in 
the homeland [dahili teşkilatımıza] […] instead of an assumed name […] its original name 
Union and Progress.203 This decision formally affected only the People’s Councils Party as 
it was the organization in the homeland, but in its consequences the Union of Muslim 
Revolutionary Societies was similarly exposed as a cover organization for the CUP’s plans of 
usurpation. 
Captain Hüseyin Fevzi only accidently discovered this revelation. As being the deputy of 
Tripoli and Tunisia and a member of the League of Oppressed People, he openly protested.204 
After Hüseyin Fevzi’s protest, a meeting of the Central Committee was summoned. Enver 
Pasha defended his policy by pointing out the authoritarian tendencies of Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha and his military failures in the defense of the homeland. Dr. Nazım agreed with Enver’s 
assessment of the situation in Turkey, but expressed his doubts about their own chances of 
success in Anatolia without having a military force. Enver countered, you’re not a soldier, 
you don’t understand it, and made his point: When my homeland is exposed to such a 
danger, I would rather go and shed my blood for my homeland instead of shedding it for the 
Indians […].205 Dr. Raik, on the other hand, who had recently arrived from Trabzon, 
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backed Enver’s ambitions. Only Hüseyin Fevzi objected. He argued that Enver should rather 
coordinate the liberation movement of 300 million Muslims worldwide instead of interven-
ing into the affairs of a single country. Fevzi proposed that every move regarding the Anato-
lian movement must be done in conjunction with its legitimate representatives, namely the 
Ankara Government. While Fevzi was speaking, Enver pulled out his revolver in a calm but 
threatful manner, looked at it and then put it away. He then asked if anyone was in favor of 
Fevzi’s proposal. No one dared to raise a hand. The decision was made. Fevzi immediately 
instructed Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha on Enver’s intentions.206 Hence, not without a reason, 
Ali Fuat Pasha wrote in his memoir that the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies was 
simply another name for the exiled remnants of the CUP.207 
After hearing continuous bad news from the Turkish-Greek War, Enver Pasha proposed to 
travel to Batum to have closer look at the incidents in Anatolia.208 When Enver talked with 
Ali Fuat Pasha, the latter told Enver that he should rather take the whole Unionist bunch 
and go to Bukhara in order to establish a government there.209 Whatever he would do, he 
should stay away from Anatolian affairs. Enver’s decision to travel to Batum, as Hüseyin 
Fevzi remembers, was highly criticized by the Tatar representatives and many others in Mos-
cow.210 Dr. Nazım remembers that Libyan and Egyptian activists proposed that Enver to go 
to Tripoli or Benghazi.211 Ankara Government’s diplomat Rıza Nur tells that the plan behind 
going to Batum has been infiltrating with a group of men to Trabzon. According to rumors 
he heard, Enver had received 700 Russian gold coins, but was robbed on his way near 
Rustov.212 Hüseyin Fevzi tells that Enver received from the Soviet Government 4000 rifles 
and 400,000 franc and 700 Russian gold coins on behalf of the Egyptian revolutionaries, but 
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sent these instead to Trabzon.213 After Enver left for Batum, Captain Fevzi submitted his 
resignation from the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies and aligned himself with the 
Ankara delegation in Moscow.214  
Enver Pasha left Moscow on August 3, 1921, and rumors which were perhaps spread by no 
one but by himself that he actually went to Turkestan.215 When Enver and Dr. Nazım arrived 
at Batum, they first hid in an empty train wagon. After twenty-five days in the hot wagon, 
they moved to a residence in Batum provided by the Soviet Government. Enver was con-
stantly working. I’ve never, not even for a moment, seen this person being inactive, noted 
Dr. Nazım regarding Enver’s working regimen during their time in Batum. He was falling 
asleep the moment he put his head on the pillow, he started working immediately after get-
ting up from bed. If he was left with no work to do, then he was writing report-like letters to 
his beloved wife.216 According to Turkish Intelligence, Enver was staying as a guest, uncover 
under the assumed name Baharov, at one of the residences of the Russian Consulate. Alleg-
edly not even the Russian Consul knew his true identity.217 At his residence, Enver had many 
visitors from Trabzon mostly local Laz militia leaders.  
The Turkish Consul in Tuapse reported to Ankara that the CUP leaders were secretly sum-
moning voluntary soldiers in Baku and Batum. They say to the soldiers that it is to support 
Turkey and to the Russians they say that it is to bring communism into Turkey so that they 
get a lot of money for this.. The same report even claimed that Trotsky came to see Enver. 
Informants said that they had established an imposing clandestine organization (dehşetli 
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gizli bir teşkilat) in Anatolia.218 Further information on Enver Pasha’s activities were uncov-
ered by the Ankara Intelligence, as they got hold of a letter Enver sent to his mother in 
Constantinople.219 These intelligence reports were enhancing the fear of an Enverist inter-
vention. Meanwhile, the Soviet Ambassador Natsarenus reported to Moscow that there were 
rumors in Ankara that a coup d’état of the Enverist faction would soon take place.220 It was 
later supposed by British Intelligence that Natsarenus was supporting the Enverists and was 
therefore recalled to Moscow.221 In eyes of the British, Mustafa Kemal was the lesser of two 
evils. There was indeed a faction of forty Unionists in the Grand National Assembly. For 
instance, Hilmi Bey, the deputy of Ardahan, would even go far as threatening the intelligence 
officer of the Ankara Government in Trabzon. For God’s sake, whom are you relying on so 
that you show your colors against Enver here?, asked Hilmi and continued, whenever we 
desire, we can overthrow Mustafa Kemal and bring Enver at his place.222 By that time, Enver 
had already went to Turkestan with broken heart. Nonetheless, while still in Batum Enver 
was aware of the zeal of his supporters in Anatolia and he was constantly playing with the 
idea of entering Anatolia.  
In September 1921, Enver Pasha and his friends convened a congress of the Committee of 
Union and Progress in Batum. The Congress took place from September 4-8, 1921, in En-
ver’s small apartment in Batum with Dr. Nazım, Halil Pasha, Küçük Talat, and Raik.223 Halil 
Pasha told later that no real congress ever took place in Batum. Enver had prepared the doc-
uments and the others put their signatures on it out of solidarity.224 Following the previous 
decree by the Executive Committee, the name of the People’s Councils Party was officially 
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renamed as Union and Progress Party at this congress.225 Enver himself prepared the draft 
report of the congress in which the change of name back to Union and Progress was mani-
fested. The stamps were already sent to Anatolian branches before the congress decision.226 
Enver told Cemal that they had 29 branches in Constantinople and in nearly every Anatolian 
town they had contacts.227 There were, in fact, intelligence reports in Ankara by late June 27, 
1921, that Enverists in Constantinople were founding secret societies (cemiyet-i hafiye).228 
By this, our spirit will be represented in the new war, wrote Enver to his wife.229 Enver had 
this idea that changing the name of the party from Soviet-style People’s Councils Party to 
Committee of Union and Progress would signalize the Ankara Government that he was not 
planning to bring Bolshevism to Anatolia: I hope Mustafa Kemal sees this so that we will 
put a stop to the rumors which Kazım Karabekir is spreading about me establishing Bolshe-
vism in Anatolia with a Red Army.230 He was severely mistaken with this assumption. It was 
a foolish move, he made. Nothing could be a worse message to Mustafa Kemal than the 
resurrection of the CUP.  
Nonetheless, it was still Enver Pasha’s hope to organize a Russian Muslim unit under his 
command and march to the help of the National Forces. Because the Turkish-Greek battle 
front was rather lengthy in Western Anatolia, as Enver explained Chicherin, he requested 
some Bashkir cavalry units.231 When Chicherin asked Ali Fuat Pasha on August 17, whether 
it was allowed for Enver to enter Anatolia with Muslim troops, Ali Fuat Pasha protested 
harshly. This would endanger the unity of the Anatolian movement, as he instructed the 
Soviet commissar.232 Meanwhile waiting for a definitive answered, Enver increasingly became 
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pessimistic about any Russian support for Anatolia. He concluded that Soviet Russia was 
simply occupied with its own troubles.233 Chicherin recapitulated the events as follows:  
In order to meet with a couple of friends he [Enver] had travelled to Batum; and he had 
promised me that he would support Kemal as long as he [Kemal] would struggle against 
the occupation and only if Kemal would betray this, then he would fight against Kemal. 
Enver shook our confidence in Batum.234  
There were rumors by then, as Chicherin heard afterwards, that a coup against Mustafa Ke-
mal by the pro-Entente Constantinople faction was in the making, thus, Enver’s friends had 
urged him to enter Anatolia to save the nationalist movement.235 Ambassador Ali Fuat Ce-
besoy in his memoir confirms the existence of such rumors in Moscow. These fears of a pro-
Entente coup strengthened Enver’s hand in the eyes of Soviet leaders for a while.236 Never-
theless, the Soviet leadership decided against Enver’s intervention. The final rejection reached 
Enver in the night of September 26, 1921:  
Late at night a secret telegraph came from Chicherin. In this, […] he informed me that 
he didn’t think it was appropriate for me to travel to Anatolia. My previous suspicions 
found their approval. This means perhaps that the Russians don’t want me to go there 
believing that the Anatolian front might get broken. At the same time, while I am located 
in Russia, they have an ace in the hole against Mustafa Kemal, believing that I am their 
lap dog [zağar] eager to attack when needed.237 
This insight that Enver was a sort of trump card238 was severely disappointing and disillu-
sioning for Enver to process. But Enver, ditching the prospects of the Soviet support, decided 
to enter Anatolia by boat via Trabzon.239 But once again, luck was not on his side. Whenever 
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I attempt to go to Trabzon, the weather turns bad, wrote Enver in despair to his wife.240 
And then the news of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s victory at the Battle of Sakarya became public.  
The geopolitical context was once again shifting without Enver. While Britain was increas-
ingly becoming concerned about further supporting the Greek forces, France had already 
approached the Ankara Government to bring an end to the fights in the Southern Front. A 
French Intelligence report from October 18, 1921, still believed that the programs of action 
of the Bolsheviks, Turks, and Germans, have remained in accord in order to try in common 
to raise the Muslim world against the Entente Powers.241 Yet, the solution was seen in Quai 
d’Orsay rather in coopting Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his Government. The Ankara Govern-
ment signed the Ankara Treaty with France on October 20, 1921. This treaty meant that the 
new Turkey was now also recognized by the West as a legitimate state actor. Andrew Orr, a 
historian of French Intelligence, writes that French government’s opening to the Kemalists 
was an attempt to prevent a feared Middle East-wide rebellion.242  
As much as the Turkish victory was good news for all Turkish nationalists, it also meant that 
Enver had lost the game. He could never go back to Turkey—at least not empty handed. On 
the other hand, the Ankara Treaty with France endangered Mustafa Kemal’s good relations 
with Soviet Russia. A British official noted: Disappointed at recent success of Mustapha and 
Enver Pasha’s consequent loss of prestige Bolshevik Russia is fearful lest Franco-Turkish sol-
idarity should defeat her ends in Turkey.243 The Soviet Government was, in fact, concerned 
that they once again had to rely on Enver Pasha. Chicherin wrote to his comrades:  
If the [Grand National] Assembly ratifies the [Ankara] treaty, then we will have to face 
the Enverists issue. And then, we will once again face the money issue in this regard. If 
we do not give Enver large sums of money, then all our efforts will be wasted. If he comes 
to government, he will face the same or even greater money problems like Kemal; and 
without our great assistance or credits he will not be able to hold on for long. If we choose 
to support Enver, we have to be sure about one thing: Can we afford to pay the high 
price of this support? This issue needs to be discussed very carefully. But, if we work 
closer with Enver, this will be the result of the coldness between us and the Kemalists.244 
 
240 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 25, 1921, in Bardakçı, Naciyem, Ruhum, 
Efendim, 300.  
241 Orr, “‘We Call You to Holy War’,” 1117. 
242 Orr, “‘We Call You to Holy War’,” 1120.  
243 Hign Commissioner of Iraq, letter (Baghdad) letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (London), 
October 11, 1921, FO 371/6532, 3402, in Bilal N. Şimşir, ed., British Documents on Atatürk (1919–1938), 
Vol. 4: October 1921 – October 1922 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1984), 14.  
244 Chicherin, letter to Lenin, October 20, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 48.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
451 
Enver Pasha’s desire to enter Anatolia was not necessarily supported by some of his close 
friends either. Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat Bey were allegedly against Enver going to Ana-
tolia as well as Dr. Nazım. However, it was Hacı Sami who was encouraging Enver for daring 
moves. Eventually, Enver made his mind and told Halil Pasha: Uncle, you are right that 
despite my good will it might have terrible consequences if I go to Anatolia. Enver contin-
ued: Therefore, I gave up the idea of going to Turkey. I will go to Turkestan. There, I will 
talk with Cemal Pasha who will come from Afghanistan and then I will return to Moscow 
and perhaps back to Germany.245 
 
245 Aydemir, “Son Osmanlı Paşası Halil Paşa’nın Hatıraları,”, quoted in Bardakçı, Enver, 259.  
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12. Impasses of Diplomacy and Insurgency:  
The End of the Young Turk Politics in Exile 
What would the Russians say, if I went to the Afghan border under the pretext of meeting 
with Cemal Pasha?, Enver Pasha asked Dr. Nazım in Batum, after revealing that he was 
actually thinking about joining the Basmachi rebels. Dr. Nazım considered it a breach of 
hospitality of Soviet Russia and advised against such a dishonorable act. Nonetheless, they 
decided that a meeting with Cemal could be still meaningful.1 They sent an invitation to 
Cemal and made appointments. Meanwhile the military and political situation in Anatolia 
seemed to offer a sudden window of opportunity for Enver to cross the Black Sea. Enver 
decided to try his luck in Anatolia and let Dr. Nazım go alone to the Afghan border. How-
ever, Enver could not sail off due to the weather conditions and soon the window of oppor-
tunity was closed for good. After Mustafa Kemal Pasha had turned the tables with his victory 
at the battle of Sakarya, Enver had to postpone his return to Anatolia indefinitely. From 
Batum, Enver wrote to his wife that he wanted to travel first to Turkestan in order to meet 
with Cemal there and then travel back to Germany via Moscow.2 What Enver did not know 
was that Cemal was already on his way to Moscow, and that they would once again miss each 
other. The two men saw each other for the last time in spring 1920 in Berlin before Enver’s 
flight where he was later imprisoned in Latvia for three months. The two men would never 
see each other ever again. 
This last chapter tells the story of how the exile activities of the Young Turk came to its 
ultimate end. At the center of this episode lies Enver’s fateful decision to join the anti-Soviet 
insurgents in Turkestan. This move created such a path-dependency that whole network of 
Young Turk activists was affected irreversibly. Although Cemal Pasha had achieved to be a 
respected and recognized political actor in international politics, Enver’s adventure—as it 
was called even by then—limited his space of movement in international affairs. Rumors of 
 
1 Dr. Nazım, letter (Berlin) to Cavid Bey (Constantinople), August 8, 1922, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., 
İttihadçı’nın Sandığı: İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Özel Arşivlerindeki Yayınlanmamış Belgeler ile Atatürk ve 
İnönü Dönemlerinde Ermeni Gayrimenkulleri Konusunda Alınmış Bazı Kararlar (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası 
Yayınları, 2013), 102.  
2 Enver Pasha, letter (Batum) to Naciye Sultan (Berlin), September 22, 1921, in Murat Bardakçı, ed., 
Naciyem, Ruhum, Efendim: Enver Paşa’nın, Eşi Naciye Sultan’a Rusya ve Orta Asya’dan Yazdığı Sürgün 
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what Enver was actually doing in Turkestan would continue to affect the state of affairs in 
Moscow, Ankara, Kabul, and elsewhere. Cemal’s attempts to renounce Enver’s actions and 
achieve his political rehabilitation in Moscow and Ankara was interrupted by his mysterious 
murder in Tiflis on July 21, 1922. While Enver was able to make a lot of noise with the 
Basmachi insurgency, the reactions and consequences he would generate were rather unin-
tended and undesired.   
*** 
In Kabul, Cemal Pasha received a telegraph from Enver Pasha calling him to meet either in 
Kabul or at the Afghan-Russian border in order to consult something very important. Cemal 
sent a telegram back and requested to meet in mid-September at the border station. İsmet 
(Karadoğan), Cemal’s aid-de-camp, asked why he did not make Enver come to him, but 
instead take the trouble of traveling two weeks to a border outpost in the middle of nowhere. 
Son, said Cemal to İsmet, do you think I would ever let Enver come here? Enver’s repu-
tation and ambition could have easily upset the whole status quo in Kabul. The arranged 
rendezvous was at a border train station near River Amu Derya. After two weeks of travel, 
Cemal and İsmet arrived at the rendezvous, but Enver was not around. A former Ottoman 
POW showed up and delivered the news that not Enver, but Dr. Nazım had arrived few days 
ago. But instead of waiting for Cemal, Dr. Nazım had proceeded to Bukhara. At Bukhara, 
Dr. Nazım was welcomed by the local officials and dignitaries. He received a large amount 
of donation in gold by the Bukhara notables on behalf of the Union of Muslim Revolutionary 
Societies.3 Cemal took the train to Bukhara the next day. There, Cemal was received by a 
joyful crowd of Turkestanis. Some of them had attended Ottoman schools during the Ha-
midian era and a group of former Ottoman POWs was also among the crowd. From these 
men Cemal learnt that Dr. Nazım had once again traveled further to Tashkent. Cemal and 
his aid-de-camp İsmet took the next train to Tashkent. There, again, Cemal was welcomed 
with a ceremony and this time Dr. Nazım was also among the crowd.4 Cemal immediately 
 
3 This gold issue is told later also in Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı, letter (Kabul) to Enver Pasha (Turkestan), May 26, 
1922, TTK, EP 04-07. 
4 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Ahmet Eyicil, Osmanlı İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti Liderlerinden Doktor Nazım Bey (1872–1926) (Ankara: Gün Yayıncılık, 2004), 343; İsmet 
Karadoğan, “Cemal Paşa’yı Ruslar Öldürmüştü,” Yakın Tarihimiz 2, no. 14 (1962): 36. 
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asked, where on earth Enver was. He went to Batum, answered Dr. Nazım and continued: 
He will go over to Anatolia. Cemal Pasha got furious. 
Are you crazy? Are you ruthless? When the homeland is in such a situation, how can you 
dare something like this? Don’t you see that Anatolia is in a struggle against enemies who 
surrounded them on four fronts? It is treason to go there in such a situation.5 
Cemal Pasha decided to go to Moscow. He wanted to travel to Europe and make arrange-
ments for arms transports to Afghanistan. And perhaps he could bring Enver to reason before 
he would go too far. Cemal and Nazım took a special train to Moscow. Twelve days later 
they arrived at Moscow.6  
It was early October 1921. Cemal Pasha arrived at the Soviet capital with the official title 
the commander-in-chief of the Afghan army.7 Only one and a half year ago Cemal had 
come to Moscow as a professional revolutionary looking for a calling. But the Moscow he 
had left in August 1920 had changed in the meantime. Cemal’s local patron was as usual 
Chicherin who arranged Cemal’s talks with other senior Soviet officials regarding the arms 
delivery to Afghanistan. Trotsky is really the devil himself, as Cemal later noted, but he 
could still convince him to support the Afghan mission. Cemal had also a three-hour meeting 
with Stalin, where he pleaded for more support for Afghanistan.8 Cemal was previously 
praised by Chicherin to Stalin for he has been working closely with the Soviet Ambassador 
in Kabul.9 Nevertheless, Cemal was increasingly losing his patience with the stalling tactics 
of the Soviet officials, as the promised arms and supplies delivery for Afghanistan was still 
not realized. Cemal wanted to meet with Lenin to finally seal the deal. Well-known Cemal 
Pasha arrived from Afghanistan and wishes to be received by you, Chicherin wrote to Lenin. 
After praising Cemal’s achievements in Afghanistan and stressing his influence on the Emir, 
Chicherin said: All his thinking is set on the struggle against the English imperialism and in 
 
5 Karadoğan, “Cemal Paşa’yı Ruslar Öldürmüştü,” 36–37.  
6 Dr. Nazım, interrogation at the Independence Court, August 8, 1926, in Eyicil, Doktor Nazım Bey, 350, 
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8 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), November 14, 1921, in Cebesoy, Moskova 
Hatıraları, 295–96. 
9 Aleksander N. Kheifets, “Leninskaya vneshnyaya politika i natsional no-osvoboditelnoe dvzhenie,” Narody 
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all important decisions in Kabul he used every means to turn Afghanistan towards us. Cemal 
was praised by Chicherin as a serious cause of concern for the British interests in the region.10  
In fact, Chicherin was not exaggerating a bit. On September 7, 1921, only few weeks before 
Cemal Pasha returned to Moscow, the British Government had issued a diplomatic note to 
the Soviet Government, because propaganda activities in the East had not yet ceased after the 
Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. Most outrageous evidence for the continuing Soviet in-
trigues in the East was described in this diplomatic note as Cemal’s mission in Kabul.11 After 
hearing about this note, Cemal protested that he was not an instrument of Soviet policies. 
He wrote a note to the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that he has been acting in 
Kabul only under the authority of Emir Amanullah and in conjunction with the Ankara 
Government. His mission, as Cemal feigned innocence, was only aimed at Afghanistan’s 
military modernization and national defense. And defense was necessary, as Cemal put it, 
since only recently Britain has offered arms and supplies to Afghanistan for the anti-Soviet 
policies in Turkestan.12 Cemal was, of course, not as innocent as he presented himself. In a 
personal memorandum to the Afghan Emir, which Cemal wrote at the instance of Chicherin 
during the very same time, he proclaimed:  
I think that the key to the World Revolution lies in India. Cutting them off from India 
will please all the non-English nations. If the English will lose India, they will get para-
lyzed and will never again disturb other nations. If we evaluate this from the point of 
view of a revolutionary, we see that if India would drop out which is the source of life for 
thirty or forty million people on the Great Britain island then these people will be con-
demned to a famine. The English Government which has troubles to feed two million 
unemployed people will suffocate because of the ten or twelve million unemployed and 
ever hungry people that will be thrown down its throat.13 
In face of these not so secret ambitions of Cemal Pasha, the question that troubled Chicherin 
and Lenin was whether Cemal’s coming to Moscow had violated the no-propaganda clause 
of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. Chicherin argued that Cemal Pasha was a high offi-
cial statesman of a befriended state and it would be inappropriate to forbid him to come to 
Soviet Russia. Diplomatic status was simply a force of its own. Chicherin explained that 
 
10 Chicherin, secret letter to Lenin, October 14, 1921, in Rem Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri: 
Yeni Belgeler, (1920–1922) (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000), trans. by Arif Acaloğlu, 45–46. 
11 See: Izvestia, September 29, 1921. See also: German Embassy in Moscow, report on the exchange of notes 
between the English and Russian governments regarding propaganda in Asia, October 3, 1921, PA-AA, R 
31585-6.  
12 Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 285–86.  
13 Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 300.  
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Cemal was disappointed that Moscow still did not completely deliver its promise to Afghan-
istan. Chicherin advised to entertain Cemal with honorary gestures to keep up his mood and 
recommended Lenin that he should invite Cemal to a meeting.14 Comrade Chicherin, 
wrote Lenin in the beginning of his answer and said directly, I am against a meeting. The 
current state of affairs would not permit grandiose gestures towards a man in the likes of 
Cemal nor was delivering the promised military supplies possible. If I keep my promise it 
will be harmful. If I reject it will be harmful as well, pondered Lenin and suggested: The 
best would be to find an excuse or a way to hinder this meeting from taking place.15  
Cemal Pasha had soon more serious concerns than the stalling tactics of the Soviet leadership, 
however, since there were many bad rumors that kept him troubled. Cemal was concerned 
about rumors which the British were spreading around in Kabul during his absence. Cemal 
warned the Afghan Emir: I beg you not to give attention at all to the rumors and assump-
tions that are based on useless and all sorts of interpretations and revelations.16 In Cemal’s 
absence from Kabul, however, an Anglo-Afghan Treaty was signed on November 15, 1921.17 
This treaty established the sovereignty of Afghanistan as a fully entitled member of the in-
ternational community, as one German official noted.18 Afghanistan had once again entered 
the British sphere of interest. Some observes assumed that Cemal could not return to Af-
ghanistan because of British pressures on both Afghanistan and Soviet Russia.19 
Rumors about Enver Pasha were in the air as well. The Enver-Kemal conflict had become 
public as late as in the autumn of 1921. The British High Commissioner in Constantinople 
reported to London in late November 1921: Then, again, there are persistent rumours that 
 
14 Chicherin, secret letter to Lenin, October 14, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 45–
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15 Lenin, note to Chicherin, October 16, 1921, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 47. 
16 Cemal Pasha, letter (Moscow) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), November 14, 1921, in Cebesoy, 
Moskova Hatıraları, 297.  
17 L. W. Adamec, “Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921: The Outcome of Peace Negotiations Following the Third 
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Enver Pasha is proving to be a thorn in the side of Mustapha Kemal.20 The British Intelli-
gence had this time lost track of Enver’s conspiracies, and was presenting old news which was 
probably only confirmed recently. All that can be assured is that Enver is making a strong 
effort to re-enter Turkish politics, and has supporters in Angora and doubtless in the army, 
especially among those who favour a more whole-hearted co-operation with the Bolshe-
viks.21 One of these rumors that was prominent in December 1921 was that Enver staged a 
coup d’état in Batum and took over the government of the Adjara province of Georgia.22 The 
British Intelligence corrected these rumors: The rumour to the effect that Enver Pasha has 
carried out a coup in Ajaristan has not only been proven to be without foundation but no 
such coup appears to have been attempted. The same report confirmed that Enver seems 
really to have paid visit to Batum […] is understood to have gone to Moscow.23 The infor-
mation on Kemal-Enver conflict was late and partly misinformed as Enver did not return to 
Moscow. 
Around the same time, a Times article reported that the Anatolian movement was divided 
into two camps, namely that of Kemalists and Enverists. It was also a rehash of old news from 
last summer, namely that former CUP members, Enver, Halil, Küçük Talat, and Dr. Nazım, 
metamorphosed into delegates of the People’s Soviet [Council] Party of Union and Pro-
gress and that they were summoning the Government of Angora to recognize their Party. 
The article went on and said: Rumours that Enver Pasha was posing as a Communist have 
long been prevalent, but this proof of his conversion to that creed is unexpectedly com-
plete.24 Dr. Nazım remembers that after reading such news he decided to correct this mis-
understanding. He called the Turkish Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha and asked him to find a 
 
20 Sir Horace Rumbold, letter (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon (London), November 29, 1921, FO 406/48, 
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British journalist. Dr. Nazım explained to the one available British journalist in Moscow that 
they would never renounce Mustafa Kemal’s authority. He said that The Times was trying 
to manipulate the public opinion by claiming that there was split among Turks and thus 
encouraging British policies.25 The belief that they were in a dialogue or interaction with the 
British through journalists was emblematic. In the aftermath of the events of summer 1921, 
the CUP émigré networks collectively invested efforts to correct the public opinion that a 
conflict existed between Mustafa Kemal and Enver. The only enemy they could fight against 
were now the public rumors—a fight that they had actually long lost. In a lead article, the 
German-edition of the Liwa-el-Islam announced the following disclaimer: 
Some rumors claim that there are antagonisms between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha; Enver Pasha and his political friends are said to be Bolsheviks; they are said to 
have organized forces in the Caucasus to march to Anatolia and to seize power; further 
Enver Pasha had overthrown the government of Adjara [in Georgia] and taken the ad-
ministration into his own hands; political friends of Enver Pasha are said to have orga-
nized a congress in Berlin and protested his acts, etc. Such lies that come from certain 
hostile sources, has been officially denied by the Government of Anatolia. Since such 
shameful rumors can do no harm to the patriotism of Enver Pasha and that of his political 
friends, we would not care to deny them; but some German and Turkish newspapers 
have also given such nonsensical news space in their columns, so we thought that we are 
obliged to declare such rumors for completely untrue.26 
Only after my arrival at Moscow I learned about the undertaking of Enver and Halil Pashas 
in Anatolia, Cemal wrote in a concerned letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and promised: I 
am working with everything at hand to hinder this undertaking.27 Enver’s transgressive 
schemes were threatening to diminish Cemal’s own deal with Mustafa Kemal. Cemal’s move 
to declare Enver as rogue had worked out. Mustafa Kemal’s answer was very positive. In a 
letter to Ali Fuat Pasha, Mustafa Kemal declared: If Cemal Pasha continues to demonstrate 
the honest behavior he put forward so far, we will support him. Needless to say, he must cut 
his relationship with Enver Pasha etc. […] We will strengthen Cemal Pasha by gradually 
telling the people of his achievements in Afghanistan.28 
Cemal Pasha’s concerns about Enver Pasha’s undertakings took soon a turn from bad to 
worse when he received a telegraph from Enver. The latter was apparently in Bukhara now, 
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asking whether Cemal would soon return to Afghanistan. If not, Enver himself would go to 
Kabul. Cemal wrote that Enver should immediately return to Moscow. Enver had already 
ruined the relations with Ankara, he should stay away from Kabul. Bengalese revolutionary 
M. N. Roy supposed also that Enver would rather do harm in Afghanistan: At Kabul, he 
was sure to intrigue against Amanullah, should the latter not fall in line with his treacherous 
plan.29 Enver wrote back to Cemal that he could not find proper transportation to Moscow. 
Cemal urged Chicherin to organize Enver’s return to Moscow as soon as possible. Enver was 
disappointed that he was ordered back to Moscow, while Kabul was left alone for the Brit-
ish.30  
One morning, however, Chicherin called and invited Cemal Pasha to his office. Chicherin 
told Cemal: Enver Pasha and his friends went hunting and never returned. Cemal assumed 
that something bad was going on. Perhaps they had an accident or something similar, he said 
to Chicherin and continued to ignore the elephant in the room. Both men had most certainly 
assumed that Enver had possibly run away to the Basmachi rebels. But could he be so reckless? 
Muhittin Bey who was at Tiflis heard the news of Enver’s disappearance in Bukhara and 
remembers that there were already rumors about him joining the Basmachi.31 It was simply 
in the air. Meanwhile Dr. Nazım received a secret message from Enver ordering—in a mili-
tary tone—him and other Young Turks to leave Russian territory as soon as possible.32 The 
dice was cast. At the same time a secret courier brought a message from Enver to Halil Pasha 
in Batum. Halil had assumed that Enver was going to Bukhara only with the idea of joining 
the Basmachi in his mind, although Enver never revealed his intentions.33 In the secret mes-
sage, Enver gave orders to Halil to immediately start inciting an insurgency in the Caucasus. 
As the Caucasus was the main supply route to Anatolia, Halil decided to disobey the order 
and sent a message to Enver with the appeal to return to his family in Berlin.34  
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One or two days later in Moscow, Chicherin showed Cemal Pasha a telegraph from the Rus-
sian representative in Bukhara that said: It is assumed that Enver Pasha and his friends raided 
an outpost station near the Amu Derya river, stole the weapons, and crossed the Afghan 
border. These were still underplayed speculations, as everybody feared the consequences of 
such a reckless move. Cemal was now in a difficult position. He had to prove his loyalty by 
protesting Enver and, if possible, by convincing him to surrender. Cemal decided to send 
Bedri Bey and Dr. Nazım to Bukhara to make Enver leave Central Asia.35 I write this letter 
to you as I am a little offended, wrote Cemal in his letter to Enver and continued: 
In order to verbally inform you about my thoughts, fears, and worries I am sending Doc-
tor Nazım together with Bedri to Bukhara. For God’s sake, quit the stubbornness and 
persistence. For once in forty years please listen to the words of this friend of yours who 
truly loves you with all his heart and soul. Come back together with Doctor Nazım as 
soon as possible. Please don’t send Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat to Iran. Make sure that 
they also return to Moscow. […] Be aware that if you insist on staying in Bukhara, the 
fruits of our labor from the last one and a half years will be completely ruined. If we ruin 
and destroy this last undertaking of ours by our own hands, then we will have no other 
chance than to say farewell to this life.36  
Cemal Pasha’s desperation was understandable. He explained the situation to Mustafa Kemal 
in similar words: If I cannot get Enver Pasha out of Bukhara for good, then I will end up 
ruining my achievements in the last one and a half years. I am working with everything in 
my force to succeed. I am about to send Halil, Küçük Talat and others associated with Enver’s 
undertaking away from the Caucasus.37 In return, Mustafa Kemal noted to Ali Fuat Pasha 
that Cemal’s attitude towards Enver and his friends was very appropriate.38 
In his letter quoted above, Cemal Pasha further told Enver to return to Berlin as soon as 
possible so that they can convene a congress in Europe with those CUP members who has 
been released from Malta. Cemal offered Enver to reorganize the movement together with 
the European exiles.39 Whether this was a bait to get Enver out of Bukhara or whether Cemal 
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himself still hoped of a revival of the CUP is open to question. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, for 
instance, got the impression that Cemal was not very eager to do away with his oath to the 
CUP. Together with the Soviet emissary Mikhail Frunze Cemal had sent another letter to 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha in which he apparently allowed himself to express his vision for Turkey 
from a Unionist perspective. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was annoyed by Cemal’s arrogance. Ap-
parently, he believes that the Turkish Grand National Assembly is led and administered by 
caprice and desire. I cannot let the people summon under the banner of Union and Pro-
gress.40 The spirits of the CUP were still around. 
Although Enver Pasha was far away in Turkestan, he was continuing to trouble Turkish pol-
itics. Turkish Intelligence reported that the royalist opposition in Constantinople would take 
advantage of the Enverist movement and will try to take over the imperial government under 
the Grand Viziership of either Ali Rıza Pasha or Mahmut Muhtar [Katırcıoğlu] Pasha. Later, 
these rumors, which also included a forged declaration by Enver Pasha which was in circula-
tion, were dismissed by Turkish Intelligence as fabrications of Entente propaganda.41 On the 
same day, Turkish authorities ordered to be careful with intelligence about Enver Pasha.42 
Enverists in Eastern Anatolia were still proposing in January 1922 to allow the secretly 
founded Muslim Revolutionary Society in Anatolia (Anadolu’da hafi olarak teşkil ettikleri 
İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri) by Enver, Küçük Talat, Halil, and Dr. Nazım to operate openly and 
formally with the permission of the Ankara Government.43 Intelligence reports were contin-
uing to hear news about Enverist groups here and there. For instance, a branch of People’s 
Councils Party was founded in Constantinople in early 1922.44 There were inquiries about 
the whereabouts of Enver, as the rumors once again spotted him allegedly in different 
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places.45 Intelligence reports about Unionists and Enver supporters in Constantinople and 
in Anatolia were continuing to come to Ankara as late as 1922.46 
Meanwhile, the British Intelligence was still unaware of Enver’s current activities in Turke-
stan, as it was reported on the occasion of the arrival of the Soviet delegation in Ankara: 
Little is heard of open Bolshevik support of Enver Pasha and his party. Nonetheless, con-
spiracy thinking of the British officialdom was still finding its way out, as the British High 
Commissioner noted on the nature of the Enverist opposition in Anatolia that it seems more 
than probable that the strings of the opposition are pulled by Turks and Salonica crypto-Jews 
in Berlin and Switzerland.47   
Hence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was continuing with his own propaganda against Enver Pasha. 
Mustafa Kemal told Frunze that this man is addicted to power; he is an adventurist. As he 
did with us, he is now deceiving you. 48 Frunze who apparently was not yet informed about 
Enver’s recent undertakings in Bukhara, was rather in an urge to explain himself after hearing 
Mustafa Kemal’s accusations about Enver’s intervention attempts from Batum. Frunze ex-
plained that it actually has been the Comintern, and not the Soviet Government, that had 
supported Enver so far and that Enver was always warned not to intervene into Turkish 
affairs. This was only the part of the story, of course. However, now after learning about 
Enver’s attitude towards Turkey, Frunze said to Mustafa Kemal, I assure and promise that 
after my return to Moscow I will work to liquidate all his privileges for good and stop all 
kinds of support for him.49 At the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara, Mustafa 
Kemal openly distanced himself from Enver’s past and present policies. He told the Ankara 
deputies in December 1921:  
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We don’t belong to those crook [sahtekar] people who follow fantasies and appear to be 
able to do things which we actually can’t. Gentlemen; we summoned the whole world’s 
animosity, grudge, and hatred onto this country and onto this nation, because of appear-
ing to have done great and fantastic things before even doing them. We didn’t pursue 
pan-Islamism. Maybe, we said, we do, we will. The enemies than said, we will kill them 
to stop them. We didn’t pursue pan-Turanism. We said, «we do, we are, we will» and 
again they said, we will kill you. This is the whole deal. Gentlemen, the idea that set the 
whole world in fear and panic is nothing else. Instead of following ideas that we don’t 
and can’t reach and increasing the pressure of our enemies against us, let us rather return 
to our legitimate boundaries [haddi meşrua]. Let us know our limits.50 
This quote is not only one of the first markers of the post-Ottoman nationalist isolationism 
of the Kemalist doctrine, but also underlines the elusive power the CUP leaders possessed in 
the eyes of their enemies by threatening with deceptive conspiracy theories of pan-Islamism 
and pan-Turanism, which now was about to enter its final act. 
*** 
Cemal Pasha decided to leave for Europe with the promise of arranging funds and supplies 
for his modernization plans in Afghanistan. As he reported to the Afghan Emir about his 
upcoming trip to Europe, Cemal wanted to look for financiers to establish a state bank of 
Afghanistan, attract investors and engineers to build a railroad between Mazar-i Sharif and 
Kabul, and arrange a scientific research mission to map out natural resources.51 All evidence 
shows that Cemal, despite British pressures on Kabul and regardless of the rumors about 
Enver joining the anti-Soviet rebels, was more than serious with his modernization plans and 
ambitions for Afghanistan. Despite his Afghan diplomatic passport, Cemal requested two 
additional passports from the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, and his request was granted.52 
Traveling was no more an adventure.  
After arriving in Germany, Cemal Pasha stayed for 25 days with his family in Munich. In 
Berlin, Cemal had the chance to talk with the Afghan delegation of Mohammad Wali 
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Darwazi.53 He also had meetings with the industrial mogul Hugo Stinnes and with Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Walther Rathenau. Both men, although representing politically opposing 
parties, told Cemal the very same thing. It was impossible for Germany to invest in Afghan-
istan under the burden of the reparations. Cemal contacted also August Meißner Pasha 
from the Hedjazbahn project and invited him to Afghanistan to make inquiries about con-
structing a railway from Mazar-i Sharif to Kabul. But as it soon become clear, without Ger-
man investors hiring German engineers was impossible.54 On March 13, 1922, German Am-
bassador in Moscow Dr. Kurt Weidenfeld informed the Auswärtiges Amt that the news broke 
public that Enver Pasha had joined the insurgents in Fergana.55 In trying to make-sense out 
of these recent developments, German officials speculated that Enver was possibly supported 
by the British.56  
While still in Berlin, Cemal Pasha was approached by Théodore Tissier, a French deputy and 
a member of Briand’s cabinet. Tissier interviewed Cemal on behalf of Prime Minister Bri-
and.57 In the meantime, however, Briand resigned and former President Raymond Poincaré 
became the new Prime Minister. Cemal also talked with the Ambassador of the French Re-
public and the French Government decided to officially invite Cemal Pasha to Paris.58  
Cemal Pasha made first a visit to Switzerland where he had a meeting with the Undersecretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Cemal informed the Swiss officials about the upcoming 
visit of the Afghan Delegation and plead for the affiliation of Afghanistan to the League of 
Nations, Universal Postal Union, and International Red Crescent Organization.59 On his 
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way to Paris, he stayed for six days at Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın)’s place in Menton in the Pro-
vence. Cemal complained to Cahit that Enver’s cross-over to the Basmachi insurgents might 
scare off the Soviet Government and attract their animosity towards him as well.60  
Arrived at Paris, Cemal Pasha met several times with Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré.61 
Having official papers certifying him as Ahmed Cemal Khan, the commander-in-chief (ser-
dar) of the Afghan Empire, was certainly opening diplomatic doors in the West.62 In his 
meetings with French officials, Cemal tried to mobilize economic investments for Afghani-
stan as he did previously in Germany.63 Cemal was playing on the card that French-British 
relations were still restrained. Poincaré requested Cemal to wait for the on-going Peace Con-
ference to end. Thus, Cemal stayed for four weeks in France.64 During his stay, Cemal had 
many meetings with several French dignitaries, including former Prime Minister Briand, 
Marshall Huber Lyautey, General Henri Gouraud, industrialist and former minister Louis 
Loucheur, the former ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Maurice Bompard.65 As Cemal 
told afterwards to a German official, however, he could not attract the interest of the French 
Government.66 He only managed to secure a promise to send a scientific delegation to Af-
ghanistan.  
Mustafa Chokay, the leading Turkestani politician in exile had also heard that Cemal Pasha 
was in Paris. The two men arranged a meeting at Cemal’s hotel room in Paris. After exchang-
ing words about the situation in Turkestan, they soon discovered their fundamental differ-
ences. When Chokay expressed his intention to start a nationalist movement to throw off the 
Russian dictatorship in Turkestan, Cemal protested and advised him and his friends to work 
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together with the Soviet Government.67 Chokay believed that Cemal’s sole purpose of being 
in Afghanistan was rather to punish the British Empire by liberating India. Chokay would, 
however, prefer to liberate his own national country instead. Cemal countered that Chokay 
had long been away from Turkestan and did not know the current situation. Cemal believed 
that there was an unrighteous animosity towards the Soviet Government in Turkestan. The 
only way for Turkestan or Afghanistan to achieve national modernization was through col-
laboration with Soviet Russia. When Chokay asked about Enver Pasha who was already ru-
mored to be leading the Basmachi rebels, Cemal said that he vehemently opposed Enver’s 
actions.68  
Later Cemal Pasha wrote that the Enver question had been troubling his mind all the time, 
while he was in Europe.69 While the news of Enver had joined the Basmachi were getting 
public, Cemal was concerned whether he would be allowed to return to Moscow.70 In letters 
sent to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Cemal was repeatedly denouncing Enver’s actions. Mustafa 
Kemal showed these letters to Soviet representative Abilov and said: this is the evidence of 
what an irrelevant person and a despicable adventurer he [Enver] is. Although Enver was to 
be condemned, Cemal could be rehabilitated and utilized, as Mustafa Kemal noted. I ask 
you to explain your situation when you speak with him [Cemal]. It is possible to remove the 
old influences of Enver from his mind and to benefit from him in Eastern affairs. Yet, Mus-
tafa Kemal was presenting himself to the Russian Ambassador as a grand player in the Muslim 
world. We [the Turks] have a great influence in the East. Therefore, we can work there more 
successful than others. Of course, this cannot be done with a pan-Islamist spirit, but rather 
within the framework of the right of the people to determine their true national destiny.71 
Enver’s activities in Turkestan could affect Turkish foreign policy as well. If Enver would 
win over the Afghan Emir to his rebellion, as Ali Fuat Pasha reported, this would endanger 
also Turkish-Russian relations. Thus, the appointment of the new Turkish Ambassador to 
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Kabul became an urgency in the Ankara-Moscow axis.72 Cemal declared yet in another letter 
to Mustafa Kemal: Two mistakes Enver did […] in the last two years left no possibility for 
me to work together with him. From now on, there is no chance to see me in a union of 
labor or forces with him. Cemal went on to ask Mustafa Kemal to release a declaration 
through the Ambassador Ali Fuat Pasha in Moscow regarding his activities in Afghanistan 
that proclaimed: Cemal Pasha is entirely in union and alliance [müttehid ve müttefik] with 
Ankara.73 Information which the Turkish Intelligence would collect in the following months 
would even more justify Mustafa Kemal’s fury against Enver. In some intercepted letters 
between Enver and Hacı Sami as well as told by informants, Enver himself was arrogantly 
pondering about his relationship with Mustafa Kemal:  
The essence of my purpose is to unite the Muslims and connect them with each other. 
First, I wanted to come to Anatolia. But my presence there would result in many personal 
clashes. Therefore, for now I decided to work in Central Asia and achieved to constitute 
here a Muslim Government. I appreciate Mustafa Kemal Pasha and I am fond of him, 
because most of his decisions are identical with my own notions. He has been against me 
since the Balkan Wars. I can’t understand his opposition. While I was the commander-
in-chief, I had the power to do everything, but I left him act freely. Why is he afraid of 
me? All the administrative organizations and developments are the sow of the seeds we 
casted. God willing, he will understand the truth once the enemy left the country.74 
In the meantime, the news of Enver’s military success as the leader of the Basmachi rebels 
came as a bombshell in Moscow. The Soviet regime had to recapitulate its investments in 
Enver in the last two years. The Soviet Intelligence was now discovering—perhaps in a bitter-
sweet relief—that Enver’s influence in Turkey did not go far beyond exaggerated rumors. 
A Soviet report from Ankara in May 1922 noted:  
Enverism is not strong in Central Anatolia. In some places, there are some dispersed 
societies without any connection among each other. It is said that there are some rem-
nants among the officers. But I think that these are basically exaggerated rumors. As of 
now, they do not have a serious importance in Anatolia. Unionism lives on in secret. 
Nevertheless, it has not yet taken the form of actual propaganda, agitation, or action.75 
Even if Enver did not pose a direct threat to Ankara any longer, it was still necessary to take 
action against Enver’s reputation in the Muslim world. But for fears of stirring further anti-
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Russian feelings, the Soviet Government could not publicly endorse Enver Pasha. Therefore, 
Karahan requested from the Soviet Ambassador Aralov in Ankara to let the Ankara Govern-
ment release an official rejection of Enver Pasha’s policies in Turkestan:  
Since Muslim masses generally believe that Enver’s venture in Bukhara is supported by 
the Ankara Government and by Mustafa Kemal and that Enver Pasha is the executor of 
Ankara’s orders, we request that Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara Government takes a 
clear stance against Enver Pasha’s venture in Bukhara at the parliament or in the press by 
making an informative statement or by other means.76  
I stand against Enver; I regard him as an adventurist and I’ve always talked about this with 
you, Mustafa Kemal Pasha answered to Soviet Ambassador Aralov. When Frunze and Mi-
khailov proposed me to let Enver enter Anatolia and make peace and cooperate with him, I 
told them clearly that I will not make peace. And I recommended them to send him away 
and be cautious with him. Mustafa Kemal was righteous as he was now proven right. His 
fears were now justified by Enver’s misdeeds and anybody who had trusted Enver was noth-
ing but a fool. Yet, he said with confidence to Ambassador Aralov, Soviet Russia realized 
the truthfulness of my words and was forced to invest more efforts against his adventurism.77 
Later, Mustafa Kemal read Aralov a letter from Cemal Pasha from Dresden, dated April 12, 
1922. In the letter Cemal once again condemned Enver’s turn against the Bolsheviks as ad-
venturism. Cemal advised to send a courier to Emir Amanullah to warn him about Enver’s 
intrigues as soon as possible. Mustafa Kemal suggested that Cemal should be sent to the 
Afghan Emir to settle the Enver situation.78 In order to demonstrate his loyalty to the Soviets, 
Mustafa Kemal offered to send Ali Galip (Pasiner) Pasha, the former Governor of Konya, as 
an Ambassador to Bukhara in order to counter Enver’s influence in the region.79 The Soviets, 
however, suspicious of further Turkish elements in Turkestan did not issue the visa for Galip 
Pasha’s diplomatic mission.80  
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When Cemal Pasha arrived at Moscow, he saw Ali Fuat Pasha at the train station, who was 
leaving Russia. The buildings of the Turkish military attaché were raided by Cheka officials 
on April 21, 1922, due to an espionage accusation. As a protest, Ali Fuat Pasha had decided 
to leave the country.81 The British Intelligence supposed that the Cheka raided the attaché 
because they believed that Enver Pasha had made an agreement with the Ankara Government 
and his anti-Soviet campaign was coordinated by Ankara.82 Before Ali Fuat departed, he sug-
gested Cemal to return to Europe as soon as possible.83 Trouble was in the air.  
Before Cemal Pasha had returned to Moscow, Halil Pasha was brought in from Batum to be 
interviewed. While he was trying to escape with his wife to Anatolia, Halil was arrested by 
the Georgian Cheka, but he was released soon afterwards. His intention was to hand in the 
correspondence with Enver Pasha to Kazım Karabekir Pasha as a voucher of his loyalty to 
Ankara. Karabekir believed that Halil could be of use in order to ensure the isolation of Enver 
Pasha.84 Halil sent away his family back to Anatolia, as he feared further measures by the 
Cheka, and went to Moscow. In a conversation with Chicherin and Karahan, Halil proposed 
to travel to Bukhara and convince Enver to retreat to Afghanistan or Iran, but his proposal 
was declined by the Politburo.85 Dr. Nazım was also not allowed to meet with Enver, as 
Cemal had previously proposed. 
Since you have arrived only recently from Europe, maybe you aren’t sufficiently informed 
about Enver Pasha’s latest aventures, said Karahan after receiving Cemal Pasha in Moscow. 
Let me briefly instruct you, he said and continued: After escaping from Bukhara in a 
strange way, as you know, Enver Pasha joined the insurgents in Eastern Bukhara and declared 
war against us.86 As Cemal feared, Karahan was very angered and this would have serious 
consequences. I arrived in Moscow, wrote Cemal to a German friend. The situation has 
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entirely changed. The adventure of Enver Pasha has upset all the old projects.87 Cemal’s aid-
de-camp İsmet (Karadoğan) was more open in his letter to the same German friend: 
We are here for one week and found out that almost a radical change had occurred in 
official circles due to Enver’s adventure who is at the head of the bands in the province 
of Bukhara and declared war against the Russians. By his actions he ruined our achieve-
ments for the last two years as well as damaged our Muslim policy in Central Asia. His 
stupidity played into the hands of England and put us all in the greatest embarrassment. 
[…] That, my dear friend, is the pickle in which Enver and his criminal band have put 
us, which will have no other result than the bloodshed of hundreds of thousands of Mus-
lim victims, because the Russians decided to crush the revolt of Bukhara with armed 
forces.88 
The Soviet Government was also accusing the Afghan Government for supporting Enver 
Pasha and, thus, violating the Afghan-Soviet Treaty.89 The Afghan Government was officially 
denying any support to Enver, but, as one Afghan diplomat in Berlin explained in a confi-
dential conversation to a German friend, there was a strong social movement in Afghanistan 
and Turkestan that was in favor of Enver. Kabul was once again the center of intrigues, as 
the German informant reported to the Auswärtiges Amt. The Afghan diplomat in Berlin 
claimed that rumors about worsening of their relation to the Soviets were originating from 
England.90 Karahan was also concerned about the possible schemes by the British which will 
result from Enver’s actions in Turkestan: 
As of now, the influence of the English has increased amazingly in Afghanistan. We don’t 
regard it as possible that Enver Pasha is working on behalf of the English. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the well-known devilry of the English we will find and have found ways to 
benefit as much as possible from this undertaking.91 
The fugitive CUP leaders in Russia were subject to harsh treatment and interrogations in this 
time. The Cheka interrogated Cemal, Halil, Nazım and others for three to five hours and 
accused them of complicity with Enver Pasha’s actions in Eastern Bukhara. They all denied 
any knowledge of or links to Enver after he left for Turkestan. The Cheka officials were 
unimpressed.92 Halil and Dr. Nazım were forced to leave Russian territory as soon as possible 
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as they were declared persona non grata.93 Cemal was similarly in the hot seat, but he could 
maneuver himself more effectively out of the trouble by publicly disclaiming and condemn-
ing Enver. He had openly told everything he knew to the Cheka and agreed repeat it publicly 
to clear his name. For this purpose, Cemal gave an interview to Izvestia.94 Cemal’s interview 
was not different than what he was saying in private letters, thus he did not shy away from 
forwarding the statement also to Mustafa Kemal.95 This political enterprise of Enver Pasha 
is not in the name of any Turkish or Muslim political group, Cemal declared to Izvestia. I 
assure you that this move of Enver Pasha is only associated with his person. After this article 
was published it was suggested that Cemal could move more freely in Soviet Russia.96 But he 
was only tolerated, and no more actively supported—or in Karahan’s words: 
Cemal Pasha!... You may stay here, you may go to Afghanistan, you may return to Ger-
many… Proceed as you wish!... But from now on don’t expect any support from us. If 
you go to Afghanistan, we will not deal with Afghanistan anymore, as long as our rela-
tions are as good as they were before you left there.97 
Cemal Pasha answered to Karahan that he would go to Afghanistan, but he would first travel 
to the Turkish border to have a direct conversation via telegraph with Mustafa Kemal Pasha. 
The Soviet Government accepted this and allowed Cemal to travel to Tiflis. In Tiflis, Cemal’s 
aid-de-camp İsmet was given secret reports about the situation in Central Asia and on Rus-
sian-Afghan relation as well as on Enver Pasha’s movements to be delivered to Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha in Ankara.98 Perhaps, Cemal could return to Turkey—so he hoped. 
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*** 
As Enver Pasha decided to try his chance in Turkestan, the Soviet Government was initially 
supportive of such initiative—as it seems, it was not a fait accompli of Enver to travel to 
Bukhara. Let the embarrassing guest go to remote Central Asia, as he desired so very eagerly, 
wrote M. N. Roy in his memoir while trying make sense of the Soviet decision.99 One idea 
was that Enver might serve Soviet interests by negotiating with the Young Bukharan opposi-
tion and the Basmachi insurgents on behalf of the Soviet Government.100 Enver travelled to 
Baku on his way to Bukhara, according to Muhittin (Birgen), who met Enver at the Turkish 
Embassy in Baku, remembers that Enver was traveling under strict incognito and made 
rather a confused and tired impression.101 From Baku Enver took the ferry across the Caspian 
to Krasnovodsk in order to reach his long desired destination, Turkestan.102 
Unlike some later imaginations and rumors, Enver Pasha’s arrival at Bukhara was not the 
occasion of celebrations by the local people with Long Live Turan! shouts.103 Enver arrived 
late at night on October 11, 1921, with the secret password to enter the gates of the city 
walls.104 After arriving in Bukhara, Enver figured out that he had missed Cemal Pasha and 
Dr. Nazım. Initially, Enver intended to stay in Central Asia for two weeks and then return 
to Berlin.105 Rumors and disinformation along the lines that Cemal was sent to Moscow by 
force irritated Enver and made him more suspicious of the Soviet interests in Turkestan. 
Enver got the impression that the Russians prevented Cemal’s meeting with Dr. Nazım at 
Tashkent and that they were sent on to Moscow immediately.106  
After his arrival, Enver Pasha was invited to several government officials and was informed 
about the situation in Bukhara. The Bukhara Emirate was captured by the Red Army in the 
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summer of 1920 by a coalition of the Red Army under the command of Mikhail Frunze in 
conjunction with the local Young Bukharans (Yosh Bokhoroliklar). The Young Bukharans 
were part of the Jadidist (jadidci) movement, supporters of the new ways in the Muslim 
reform in Russia.107 The Jadidist movement was revolutionized during the course of the Rus-
sian Revolution.108 While some supported the Soviets others joined insurgents. As a political 
movement the Young Bukharans, like Young Khivans and others, were modelled after the 
Young Turks.109 After his defeat, the Emir of Bukhara Said Alim Khan, and according to 
legends his female and boy harem,110 had escaped first to Dushanbe and then to Kabul.111 
The local tradition of brigands and high-way raiders, called basmachi, was previously politi-
cized by the Young Bukharans in opposition to the Amir. After the Soviet invasion, the 
Basmachis become more and more dominated by the Qadimists (qadimci), the proponents 
of the old ways, hence fundamentalists and royalists. A British report on the situation of 
the Basmachi explained that 
It is necessary to distinguish between two classes of Basmachis in Ferghana. The genuine 
political Basmachis, the original Soviet rebels against Soviet rule, are represented by Sher 
Mohammed […]. He is at present practically powerless, owing to lack of ammunition, 
but he and his men do little looting and are in fact popular among the inhabitants, who 
feed them and otherwise keep them supplied. On the other hand, there are the purely 
bandit Basmachis, under such leaders as Ahmad Pahlawan […], who terrorise the coun-
tryside. These men originally went out, like others, from hatred of the Bolsheviks, but 
shortage of food and other necessities was too much for them and the patriot became 
merged in the brigand. […] The latter Basmachis are hated by the people of the towns 
and by the militia.112 
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The term Basmachi literally means raiders and it was primarily a derogative term given by 
outsiders.113 The Soviet Government played an important role in manifesting the term 
Basmachi (Basmachestvo) as the official description of the insurgents in order to publicly 
frame them as highway brigands and tribal bands.114 The tribal and partisan warlords were 
called qurbashi (leader of a camp). Basmachi warlords should also not be exoticized and Ori-
entalized, for there was in most former regions of Tsarist Russia a rise of warlordism that 
went beyond the neat Red vs. White struggles of the Russian Revolution.115 Nonetheless, the 
term Basmachi has gained very soon currency internationally that transcended the initial de-
rogative connotations so that even Enver used to term in his correspondence.  
Besides the Soviet officials, Enver Pasha had several secret meetings with the political oppo-
sitionals in Bukhara. One of them was the leader of Turkestan Union Ahmed Zeki Velidi 
(Togan).116 Zeki Velidi was rather critical about the success chances of Enver’s secret plans 
to join the Basmachi. Zeki Velidi supported the idea that Enver should rather struggle against 
Soviet Russia in Turkestan, but he was critical about Enver collaborating with the Basmachi 
brigands against the Red Army. The Soviets can easily deceive our friends, as Zeki Velidi 
explained. They will announce your movement as Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist. Those are 
not popular here. […] Russians are showing Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism as abhorrent so 
much that those who have contacts with the Russians find it necessary to stay away from 
those conceptions.117 Furthermore, in the eyes of Zeki Velidi, a collaboration with the exiled 
Emir was undesirable. The thorny side of our problems involves the Emir of Bukhara. 
Ahmet Zeki explained to Enver: He left; we do not want him back, he cannot return. He is 
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an enemy of modernity and you. Here, he has partisans who are loyal to him. They will be 
opposing you.118 Instead, Enver should go over to Afghanistan, as Zeki Velidi suggested, 
and coordinate regional and international support from abroad. Albeit his arguments, Zeki 
Velidi had the impression that Enver was rather under the influence of his fellow traveler 
Hacı Sami.  
Hacı Sami Kuşçubaşı like his even more notorious older brother Eşref (Sencer) Kuşçubaşı 
was a paramilitary spy for the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.119 He had spent the war years first in cap-
tivity in British India and then he was an undercover in Chinese and Russian Turkestan. He 
had allegedly been active during the 1916 rebellion against the Tsarist regime in the Kyrgyz-
stan.120 If a person like me whose name is never even heard of can cause a revolt in Kyrgyz-
stan with only one signal, said Hacı Sami in Batum, you, Enver Pasha, who has been the 
commander-in-chief of the Ottoman Empire, whose fame is spread around the whole Mus-
lim world, and who is the son-in-law of the Caliph, could by God raise hell in whole Turke-
stan within a day. Hacı Sami had been pushy to make Enver go to Turkestan and start an 
insurgency: What are you waiting for Pasha? Will this chance ever come again?121 Hacı 
Sami was surely known to be an exaggerator and a professional adventurer so that his words 
were not always taken at face value. Enver himself was not uncritical about Hacı Sami’s 
promises: If we are to listen Sami, he is founding sultanates in India and in Central Asia, 
and all our friends are in favor of him. Whatever! Let’s hope that Allah grants Islamdom and 
the nation the most beneficial path somehow.122 Back in Batum, Halil Pasha had already 
warned Enver about Hacı Sami’s urge for reckless adventures. While Halil was in Turkestan 
a year ago in company of Hacı Sami, the latter had also tried to incite Halil to join the rebels. 
Listen Enver, said Halil, I beg you to resist being carried away by these incitements. Un-
cle, am I a child?, said Enver and assured Halil that this will never happen.123  
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Now in Bukhara during the secret meetings with Zeki Velidi, Hacı Sami was telling the exact 
same stories. I am a plain Turk, yet I was able to rouse entire Kirgizstan. Your fame and 
influence can aid us to cause a tumult Turkistan-wide. This time, however, their conversa-
tion partner was no one less than Zeki Velidi a renowned expert of Turkestani history and 
politics. Zeki Velidi immediately protested to Hacı Sami’s version of the events. The 1916 
uprising was a generic social movement without propaganda, as Zeki Velidi explained, that 
started as a popular reaction to the Tsar’s conscription order and that Hacı Sami was known 
to have joined the revolt only at the very end.124 Nevertheless, Zeki Velidi’s advice to Enver 
to go to Afghanistan and work from there was dismissed, as Enver had already made up his 
own mind. 
Enver Pasha was himself a dreamer enough to tilt against the wind. Long before coming to 
Bukhara, Enver knew that he himself was in fact very popular in Turkestan. Enver had al-
ready got a foretaste of his fame among the Turkic tribes while he was at the Baku Congress 
one year ago. He was celebrated like a savior. There were also other relatively more reasonable 
voices other than Hacı Sami who had seen Turkestan and also reported to Enver that his 
reputation in Turkestan was a matter of political sacrality. Azmi Bey was one of them. He 
had previously reported that a kind of mahdi belief about Enver Pasha existed among local 
Muslims in Central Asia. Azmi wrote in late March 1921 that people believed that Enver 
Pasha would come and save them one day. I know very well that it is said every single day 
either you had arrived or you were coming. Azmi also noted on the political potentials of 
this belief. Dear Pasha, the Muslims of this region consider after Allah and the Prophet, you 
as the representative of the Caliph as a complete and perfect being. And there is no doubt 
that after a small signal, millions of Turks and Muslims will summon around you.125 Par-
tially under the influence of such beliefs, Enver wrote to his wife, after having read the Tur-
kestan travelogue of Sven Hedin in Moscow, that: I wonder if I can establish a Turkic gov-
ernment in Central Asia consisting of forty million people?126 
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Enver Pasha’s final quest in Turkestan is commonly labelled under the slogan of pan-Turk-
ism without any critical assessment. It is said that Enver wanted found a Turkic empire in 
Central Asia. Behind this assessment, there is the burden of Orientalist and imperialist prej-
udices of the time depicting Enver as the Napoleon of Asia. This assumption has survived 
as a common wisdom until today in academic and popular history-writing. As much as Enver 
cherished and romanticized ideas about uniting the Turkic people, Enver was even more an 
adherent of uniting the Muslims.127 In Enver’s mind the Basmachi struggle in Bukhara was 
part of a grand movement of Muslim masses rising against Western (and now Soviet) impe-
rialism. Whether in Tripoli or Turkestan, Enver—in his self-perception—was struggling for 
the very same cause. 
While in Bukhara, Enver Pasha also devoted many ideas to the modernization of the region—
not very different from Cemal Pasha, although Enver lacked the latter’s governmental au-
thority.128 But he was also concerned about the political situation in the region. Only recently 
some members of the Young Khiva Party were arrested.129 Enver ambitiously wrote a letter 
to the People’s Commissariat in Moscow requesting the withdrawal of the Red Army from 
the region in return for a Independent Bukhara which would facilitate the liberation of 
Muslim Asia from the British imperialism […] under the revolutionary guidance of Soviet 
Russia.130 He had also established contact with Ali Reza, the commander of the militia in 
Bukhara.131 Meanwhile, Enver was slowly but surely cutting his ties to Soviet Russia. On 
October 29, he ordered his brother not to send anybody to Russia anymore.132 But things 
turned serious only when Enver asked the Russian Consul Jurinev about Cemal’s return. The 
answer was shocking, as the Consul said, let alone allowing Cemal to travel, we also know 
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what business you have been pursuing here. Enver was naturally threatened by these re-
marks. He feared that both Cemal and he was in danger.133 Enver was not mincing the mat-
ters either. In a letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, a Turkburo representative reported 
that  
Enver threatens us with causing great troubles. He wants that we retrieve from Central 
Asia and that the Turkestanis and Bukharis determine their own fate. This really sur-
prised me. We could not convince this Turkish lion to work according to our goals. 
Perhaps this revolutionary who could took refuge in Bukhara due to our carelessness, 
cherish ever more feelings of revenge and he is looking for a chance to get revenge.134  
Now as Turkey was no more an option after the victory of Mustafa Kemal, Enver feared that 
he would never be able to come back to Turkestan again if he returned to Europe. He simply 
wanted to go to the border and inspect the situation of the rebels. From now on, as Enver 
instructed his brother, correspondence with him was to be conducted via the Afghan Embas-
sies in Moscow and Bukhara.135 Russians were not to be trusted anymore. Enver had already 
made his decision. On November 7, 1921, he wrote to his wife: By God, I will leave Bukhara 
tomorrow. Let’s see what God will reveal at this new attempt.136  
Enver Pasha in company of Hacı Sami, Yaver Muhittin, deputy police director of Bukhara 
Khalil, Nafi from Manastır (Bitola), Cavalry Captain Hasan, and some others, in total 25 
person, told the Soviet authorities that they were going on a hunting expedition and left 
Bukhara with their horses and their field equipment.137 Enver informed the revolutionary 
committees in Bukhara and Khive with a secret message of the new revolutionary movement 
he was directing.138 The immediate Soviet response was relatively small. Though not igno-
rant of the conspiracy, as M. N. Roy observed, the Russians did not want to precipitate the 
situation. […] Enver Pasha was still only conspiring, building castles in the air.139 On Tues-
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day, October 28, Enver Pasha and I left Bukhara, wrote Hacı Sami, and went over to East-
ern Bukhara in order to incite the whole Muslims of Turkestan to an insurgency against the 
Russian Government.140 The Soviet version of the same story was sharply contrasting: That 
adventurist, not staying idle for a moment, while the better sons of Turkey were fighting for 
the freedom of their motherland, arrived in Bukhara as a visitor and decided to take advantage 
of the difficult situation and laid his blood-stained hands on the Bukharan Revolution.141  
Enver Pasha went on his way from village to village and recruited fighters who were all re-
quired to give an oath.142 Enver, Hacı Sami, their aid-de-camps as well as a group of former 
Ottoman POWs soon summoned around 90 men. The strongest of all the Basmachi leaders 
in the region was the leader of the Lakay tribe, İbrahim Lakay, who was leading the brigands 
on behalf of the Emir of Bukhara. He was known to be a difficult and ignorant man and the 
local notables had warned Enver about him. But as they were crossing through Lakay terri-
tory, Enver felt obliged to approach the bandit leader. After Enver and his men found shelter 
at the Karamuntu winter quarters, invitations were sent to İbrahim Lakay to have an audience 
with Enver Pasha.143 
Meanwhile, Enver wanted to get in touch with the former President of the Bukhara Republic 
Osman Khoja (Kocaoğlu) at Dushanbe.144 After Osman Khoja resigned from the Bukhara 
Soviet Government, he had joined the Basmachi rebellion.145 While Osman Khoja has opted 
for the anti-Soviet insurgents, many other Jadidist would remain loyal with the Soviets to 
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radically reform their homeland from its backwardness. Enver’s arrival had upset these rela-
tions.146 Jadidists and Young Bukharans were now fighting on both sides of the conflict.147 
Hence, Hacı Sami and some of the men parted from Enver headed to Dushanbe to meet 
with Osman Khoja.  
When İbrahim Lakay arrived on November 30 to Karamuntu, Enver Pasha said: İbrahim 
Bek, I will give you my soldiers in your war against the Russians and those Jadidists who 
cooperate with the Russians. İbrahim Lakay had only heard of the fame of Enver Pasha 
through the news and stories of those elders from Bukhara and Samarkand who had went to 
the hajj to Mecca via Constantinople. İbrahim Lakay could not believe that the man he was 
talking to was this legendary general and the son-in-law of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. With 
his Prussian mustache, English-style tight riding trousers, and Western hunting jacket, Enver 
did not matched the image of an Ottoman warrior in Lakay’s imagination. I thought he was 
one of the Jadidists from Bukhara, said İbrahim Lakay during his interrogation to the Cheka 
in 1931.148 Thus, until his real purpose and identity was approved, Enver and his men were 
disarmed and taken into custody by İbrahim Lakay at Koktash.149 Lakays were not revolu-
tionary Basmachis and preferred to avoid military clashes and lived off brigandage and rack-
eteering. 
Meanwhile, Hacı Sami together with Osman Khoja and Ali Reza’s militia attempted a coup 
d’état in Dushanbe.150 Russians were, however, supported by the brigands of the Lakay tribe. 
After three days of fighting, the insurgents had to retrieve with Hacı Sami and Osman Khoja, 
fleeing to Afghanistan. After these fights, some of Enver Pasha’s men, Nafi Bey, Khalil, Firuk, 
Osman Bey, and Mustafa Shaquli, run into Lakay brigands who—as it was later pardoned—
mistakenly (bir yalnışlık neticesi olarak) robbed them of all their property, including their 
clothes down to underpants.151 Lakays were practically brigands in the rural areas and bigot 
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hooligans when they came across villages. Not without a reason, the civil-war plagued setting 
of Central Asia was later cinematographically imagined as Soviet Russia’s Wild East.152  
Enver Pasha stayed in captivity under the Lakays for more than a month, where he was forced 
to accompany İbrahim Lakay from one village to another as show quest.153 Out of fear of 
being labelled as a Jadidist by the bigot men of Lakay and to avoid further propaganda, Enver 
secretly burned the photographs of his wife and children—the ban on images was a disap-
pointing reality of Turkestan for Enver.154 Enver and his men received almost a hostage-like 
treatment (adeta esir muamelesi) at the hands of the Lakays. Enver wrote to the Afghan Emir 
a letter with the plea to write a decree to the Lakays to release Enver Pasha.155 Soon emissaries 
of the Emir of Afghanistan and the Emir of Bukhara arrived at the Lakay camp with reference 
letters for Enver. The Afghan emissary brought a letter by the Afghan Emir and another letter 
by the Afghan Minister of War Mahmud Sami, both confirming Enver’s identity and prom-
ising help for the anti-Soviet struggle. Only afterwards İbrahim Lakay ordered the release of 
the prisoners. When the Afghan emissary invited Enver on behalf of the Afghan Emir to 
Kabul, Enver’s answer was: I will go nowhere; I have no business in Kabul! […] I came here 
to fight the Russians.156 Impressed by this reaction, İbrahim Lakay and his men sworn an 
oath to Enver Pasha in his struggle to liberate the Muslim world from enemy (alem-i 
İslam’ın düşmandan kurtulmasına).157 Enver understood early on that it is pretty difficult to 
deal with the Lakays.158 Regarding the difficult start with the Lakays, Enver told the Emir 
of Bukhara that even though our hearts were broken, we are determined to work on behalf 
of the redemption of Islam and to forgive them.159 However, İbrahim Lakay would continue 
to cause problems for Enver. 
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In his letters to Afghan Emir, Enver Pasha warned that the supports of the Bukhara Emir 
here have started rumors that your Majesty and his Government as well as myself were Jadid-
ists and claim that I allegedly desire to become the Sultan of Bukhara.160 Thus, Enver had 
to get rid of the rumors and ensure the alliance of the Emir of Bukhara to certify his leadership 
in the eyes of the local warlords. In a following letter on the same day, Enver explained to 
the Afghan Emir the geopolitical situation as follows: Emir of Bukhara is already at war with 
the Bolsheviks. It is important that he shall neither come to terms with the Bolsheviks nor 
becomes an instrument of the English.161  
Enver Pasha sent a letter written in a Turkic dialect to the Turcoman tribal leaders signed 
with the title Son-in-Law of the Caliph of the Muslims (Halife-yi Müslimin Damadı): For 
this, it is required that you, our brothers […], give all the power in your hands for the defense 
of Islam and Islamic law in the name of the of the general salvation of Islam.162 Soon after 
Enver’s release, a tribal council was summoned with the attendance of leading tribal leaders, 
warlords, and local notables. At this meeting Enver proclaimed: 
Muslims shall never be deceived by Bolsheviks and never cooperate with them again. 
Otherwise, Turkestan will remain under Russia’s enslavement. […] It is ordered that all 
believers and Muslims should unite under one body and fight against the infidel. […] I 
do not desire to take the throne of Sacred Bukhara. It is enough to throw out the Russians 
from this land. I will herewith invite the Emir of Bukhara Alim Khan from Kabul to take 
back his throne. Great Turkestan has become a prey of the Russians for 50 years. It is 
enough now!163   
Enver Pasha was appointed as the commander of the qurbashis. In demonstrating their obe-
dience to their new leader, some Basmachis would even go far as to appoint Enver as the new 
Emir of Bukhara. Yet, Enver would politely decline such overtures, since he would rather 
prefer to remain as the servant of Islam.164 Notwithstanding, Enver would himself adopt 
many honorific titles, both secular and sacred, including sayyid, the title reserved only to 
 
160 Enver Pasha, letter (Koktash) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), December 23, 1919, TTK, EP 04-02.  
161 Enver Pasha, letter (Koktash) to Emir Amanullah Khan (Kabul), December 23, 1919, TTK, EP 04-02.  
162 Enver Pasha, letter to Turcoman tribal leaders, n.d., TTK, EP 04-02.  
163 Ülkü, KGB Arşivlerinde Enver Paşa, 34. 
164 Bardakçı, Enver, 338.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
483 
direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammed.165 Enver’s narcissism and his need for tradi-
tional prestige symbols were working hand in hand where he could simply let make up new 
stamps and titles.  
The battles were not easy for the Basmachi. There was a lack of resources and military know-
how. Even the geography and communication were constituting severe problems. Letters 
were sent by horseman couriers and international correspondence was only possible through 
Kabul. Enver once wrote in confusion about navigation to Hacı Sami Bey: I can’t say where 
I should be going?166 As there was no calendar, Enver was starting to mix up the days in his 
diary-like letters to his wife.167 Furthermore, the Basmachi movement was plagued with chief-
tain rivalries, inter-tribal conflicts, and socio-economic grievances.168 Enver was acquainted 
with the problems of tribalism in unconventional warfare campaigns from his experience in 
Tripoli, but he was now totally disillusioned and disappointed about the moral and material 
state of the Central Asian tribes—he was now dearly missing his Benghazi Bedouins.169  
Nonetheless, Enver Pasha’s troops were able to achieve military successes after their first re-
organization. They could take Dushanbe in early 1922.170 Some Red Army units in Eastern 
Bukhara, consisting of Kazak soldiers, collectively turned to Enver and joined the 
Basmachi.171 The popularity of the Basmachi movement was on the rise, respectively anti-
Soviet feelings were increasing among the Central Asian population. In the last months since 
Enver’s disappearance, the Soviet Russia had increased its reach into the Soviet Republics in 
Central Asia. The Communist Party of Bukhara (and Khorezm) were put under the direct 
control of the Russian Communist Party in February 2, 1922. The political and military 
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administration of Bukhara was transferred to directly to Moscow and to the Turkestan Bu-
reau (Turkburo).172  
Enver Pasha was also concerned about making his struggle against the Red Army public 
throughout the world. In a letter to his brother in Berlin, Enver wrote that he wants to write 
on the battles with the Russian in Eastern Bukhara for the Liwa-el-Islam and for Humann’s 
newspaper [Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung] including a sketch.173 This article including Enver’s 
hand-drawn sketch with Turkish and German descriptions could, however, only be pub-
lished in August 1922 in the Liwa-el-Islam.174 The cause for this delay was that the corre-
spondence via the couriers of the Afghan diplomatic corps was taking several months to reach 
Europe.175 Thus, the turn against the Bolsheviks came late in the Liwa-el-Islam. The animos-
ity against Russians and Bolshevism was explained as follows: 
Although the Russians enjoyed more benefits from the Islamic-Bolshevik cooperation, 
they did not abandon their destruction policy towards the Muslims under their admin-
istration. Enver Pasha, who listened to the complaints of the people every day, constantly 
tried to convince the Bolshevik dignitaries to bring an end to the calamities that have 
been inflicted on the Muslims. The promises by the Russians never delivered fruitful and 
constructive results. Finally, at the first given opportunity Enver Pasha made his long-
desired Turkestan trip. Wherever he passed, he closely observed the destruction by the 
Russians and the atrocities that are inflicted upon the Muslim population. Following the 
requests of the population to put an end to these atrocities, he once again approached 
the Russians on friendly terms. Despite all his efforts, he could not make the Bolsheviks 
listen. After that he decided to operate against the Bolsheviks.176 
The Liwa-el-Islam’s political position—even after Enver declared war against Soviet Russia 
became public—was never based on pan-Turkism, as Muslim nationalism continued to be 
the main ideological pillar of the movement.177 Enver’s operations in Eastern Bukhara were 
described in the same issue of the Liwa-el-Islam as follows: 
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The insurgency in Eastern Bukhara was very wide-spread. However, since the insurgents 
were in separate small detachments and there was no iron hand that could unite these 
dispersed forces, Russians were not very affected by these insurgencies. With the arrival 
of Enver Pasha, the dispersed forces have been put together and the struggle started to 
deliver positive results.178 
For the first time since November 1918, Enver Pasha was leading a campaign of unconven-
tional warfare against the infidel enemy. He was once again scheming grand ideas. Now the 
things are going the way I wanted, Enver reported to his remaining colleagues at the Berlin 
Bureau. He told that he was planning to form a new Bukhara Government which then in 
tribal confederation will form the first independent Government of Turkestan.179 There 
were even plans to dispatch fifty officers from Constantinople to Turkestan.180 In many let-
ters to his wife, Enver was even inviting her to come and settle in Kabul, and later move to 
Bukhara once it was liberated.181 Enver was requesting delivery of small arms from Germany, 
considering to bring a mining engineer to explore the natural resources of Turkestan, and 
even thinking about purchasing a Zeppelin to transport the goods from Germany to Eastern 
Bukhara.182 Enver’s older brother Nuri Pasha, who was now also in Berlin, wrote that if it 
would work out with the purchase of the Zeppelin, he would fly with it to Bukhara and bring 
himself the supplies.183 Apparently, only the sky was the limit. In face of the Rapallo Treaty, 
signed on April 16, 1922, between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, these requests from 
Germany were simply impossible. The Soviet-German treaty which Enver had envisioned 
for so long had now came at a time, when it double-crossed Enver’s own plans. When the 
news arrived that Cemal Pasha and Dr. Nazım renounced Enver Pasha’s turn against the 
Soviets, Enver believed that they were deceived by the Russians.184 Deception was now de-
picted as the main feature of the Bolsheviks. The Liwa-el-Islam would write: For the reali-
zation of their intentions, the Bolsheviks concealed their true intentions with clever lies and 
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many promises in order to instrumentalize many Ottomans who were inclined to them with-
out any doubts.185 
By March 1922, the Basmachi under the leadership of Enver Pasha increased their pressure 
on the Soviet outposts. The Red Army’s response has not been very strong in the region yet. 
If you will not leave these regions, you will be responsible for shedding ever more blood for 
nothing, declared Enver in an ultimatum to Lenin, Trotsky, and Radek. If you would ac-
cept, perhaps we might consider a conciliation, otherwise the circumstances will deteriorate 
from day to day.186 Few days later, Enver sent an ultimatum to the Russian Consulate in 
Baysun to leave the region within 24 hours.187 It was reported that Russians left the Consulate 
behind.188 But Enver could still not take Baysun, the gate to Western Bukhara.189 Neverthe-
less, the news that the Basmachi insurgency was now more organized than ever was travelling 
fast.190  
Afghanistan was already intervening in Soviet affairs, hence violating the Soviet-Afghan 
Treaty, by giving refuge to the exiled Emir Alim Khan and support for the Basmachi rebels 
through its embassy in Bukhara.191 From the Afghan Government, Enver Pasha requested 
arms and supplies.192 The Afghan Government sent, in fact, some troops. However, the 
Lakay Mujahidin mistakenly engaged in a firefight with the arriving Afghan troops, causing 
few casualties.193 After the first victories against the Red Army in the Spring of 1922, Enver 
wrote a letter to Emir Amanullah Khan: 
The situation in Bukhara and Turkestan turned entirely to our advantage. […] With 
internal support, the Russian rule over Bukhara and Turkestan will come to an end and 
under our leadership a Union of Eastern-Muslim Governments [Şark İslam Hükümeti 
ittihadı] will be founded. Thereby, a new government will emerge that will soon […] 
challenge the whole world like the German federation did.194 
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Enver Pasha was, however, seemingly disappointed, as the Afghan delivery of men and sup-
plies remained clearly below his needs.195 Afghan operations had to remain a secret, because 
the British were supporting Afghanistan only because they believed to be in competition with 
Soviet Russia. If it came out that the Kabul Government had abandoned the Soviet-Afghan 
Treaty, the British might lose interest in Kabul. Because the Government of England is not 
entirely our friends. They are depended on us only for our current friendship with Russia, 
said a letter from Kabul to Enver.196 After the Afghan forces took part in the fights against 
the Red Army, Enver reported to the Emir that the Afghans fought heroically against the 
Russians.197 Afghan passports were found on dead insurgents and some Afghan fighters were 
even taken prisoner by the Red Army—further straining the Soviet-Afghan relations.198 On 
April 19, Mahmud Tarzi, the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked the British repre-
sentative Colonel Humpfrys, if Britain would support Enver Pasha’s enterprise in Bukhara 
which would result in the formation of a buffer-state between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. 
This proposal was, however, declined by the British official as it would equal a declaration of 
war in its consequences.199 
Enver Pasha had sent Hacı Sami to Kabul to coordinate relations with the Afghan Emir as 
well as with exiled Emir of Bukhara. Nonetheless, Enver was apparently a little uneasy that 
Hacı Sami might go too far in his efforts to instigate the Afghan Government.200 Besides 
Hacı Sami, Enver’s second man in Kabul was Bedri Bey. Enver instructed Bedri Bey in Kabul 
to publish a declaration that propagated about the Russian colonial aims pursued by the 
Bolsheviks in Bokhara and Turkestan, which he [Enver] considers to be a threat to both 
Afghanistan’s and Turkey’s interests.201 When Enver tried to approach Raskolnikov, the 
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Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, via Bedri Bey, that the Soviet Government should open nego-
tiations with him in the name of the independent governments of Bukhara and Turkestan. 
Raskolnikov answered that Enver may not be recognized as a representative of those states 
which either have friendly relations with Russia or are members of the same federations. 
Negotiations with Enver would be possible only after his capitulation.202  
In the spring of 1922, Enver Pasha organized an inter-tribal assembly which took place in 
Kafirun, with ten-thousands of dignitaries attending it. Enver is said to have hold a speech 
there and then prepared a declaration on behalf of the assembly.203 Enver’s rise was making 
Emir Alim Khan more and more distrustful. It was rumored in Soviet publications that En-
ver’s self-given title Commander in Chief of all the Islamic troops, son-in-law of the Caliph, 
and representative of the Prophet and some of his socially progressive decrees have offended 
Alim Khan’s own claim to authority.204 On the other hand, Alim Khan’s resources as an 
exiled monarch were limited so that his support was decreasing towards summer 1922.205  
The Soviet regime was not disinclined to come to terms with Enver Pasha. Soviet authori-
ties, as Şuhnaz Yılmaz rightly concludes, seemed to be more concerned with Enver’s pres-
tige in the Muslim world than with his military capabilities.206 A Soviet journal said: 
What will be the outcome of this enterprise? From a military point of view, there can be 
only one opinion, that the large Soviet Federation which knew how to contain the Eng-
lish and the French attack when fighting Denikin, Kolchak and Wrangel, is strong 
enough to destroy the enterprise of Enver Pasha. […] It is not the military aspect of this 
affair which makes us worry, it is more the political aspect. […] In effect, the past glory 
of Enver as man of the Muslim state, can still attract crowds of ignorant dehgans [peas-
ants] in some remote regions today.207 
On April 12, it was proposed to get in negotiations with Enver Pasha. The Soviet regime was 
ready to compromise to settle the situation without arousing further discontent among its 
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Muslim population.208 The commander of the Garrison at Baysun even offered Enver to 
remain in Eastern Bukhara, where he was free to establish a new Government.209 But Enver 
insisted on the Soviet surrender of whole Bukhara. The newly appointed head of the coun-
terinsurgency operations Yakov Peters wrote to Stalin that the solution must be searched in 
the political sphere, not in the military: 
If you look at it from the outside, I think we are making a great mistake by intervening 
directly into the independence of Bukhara. By this, we are inciting the people against the 
Russians and create an excuse for Enver’s invasion. By contrast, if we would maintain 
Bukhara’s external independence and display friendly gestures with its internal affairs, we 
would enable an opportunity for them to accept Soviet rule.210  
When Emir Shakib Arslan confronted Chicherin at the Genoa Congress in April-May 1922, 
Chicherin admitted that making peace with Enver Pasha would be the best.211 Nariman 
Narimanov was sent to Bukhara as a part of a negotiation commission to make a deal with 
Enver. The two men knew each other from the Baku Congress. However, Enver was not 
interested in a deal. On May 19, 1922, Enver sent another ultimatum with Narimanov.212 
Enver’s ultimatum said:  
In the event of Soviet Russia finding it unnecessary to respect the wishes of the Muslim 
peoples, who are under the oppressive yoke of dishonest Commissars, and who have 
sprung to arms to free their territory from the alien power of Moscow, I must warn you 
Mr. Commissar, that two weeks after the handing over of the present memorandum from 
the Supreme Council, I shall act according to my own judgement.213  
Meanwhile, the Soviet regime had started take more radical measures against Enver Pasha. 
Senior Soviet officials, G. Ordzhonikidze and Slava Eliava, were sent to Tashkent to make 
inquiries. They reported to Stalin that the insurgency in Eastern Bukhara became more or-
ganized under Enver’s leadership. Their verdict was simply the death sentence of Enver. It 
is necessary to eliminate Enver in order to achieve liberation, hence preparations have been 
 
208 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 56. 
209 Commander Zaisov, letter (Baysun) to Enver Pasha (Eastern Bukhara), May 1922, in Bademci, 1917–
1934 Türkistan Milli İstiklal Hareketi Korbaşılar ve Enver Paşa, II, 172.  
210 Yakov Peters, letter (Bukhara) to Stalin (Moscow), April 3, 1922, quoted in Tursun and Moldabaeva, 
“Enver Paşa’nın Orta Asya’daki Milli Mücadeleye Verdiği Desteğin Moskova Arşivlerinde Belgelenmesi,” 
334–35. 
211 Shakib Arslan, Emir Şekib Aslan ve Şehid-i Muhterem Enver Paşa, 92–93.   
212 Joseph Castagné, “Le Bolchévisme et l’Islam: Les organisations soviétiquesde la Russie musulmane,” Revue 
du Monde Musulman (La Mission Scientifique du Maroc) 51 (1922): 229–30; Joseph Castagné, Les Basmatchis: 
Le mouvement national des indigènes d'Asie Centrale depuis la révolution d'Octobre 1917 jusqu'en Octobre 1924 
(Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1925), 49–50.  
213 Quoted from Glenda Fraser, “Basmachi II,” Central Asian Survey 6, no. 2 (1987): 37–38.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
490 
made in this regard.214 Thereafter, Stalin presented to the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party the following proposal regarding Enver Pasha: 
In order to facilitate a turn towards Soviet sovereignty among the popular masses and in 
the military struggle against the Basmachi, instructions will be given to Central Asian 
Bureau and the national Central Committee of the three republics to execute on behalf 
of Soviet sovereignty a political campaign against Enver in conjunction with Soviet de-
partments. For this,  
a) Enver will be declared an English agent and an enemy of the Eastern peoples;  
b) Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khive will be cleansed from anti-Soviet Turkish-Afghan 
elements.215  
The claim that Enver Pasha was a British agent was purely an invention, although in his 
desperation Enver would thankfully accept any help from London. Whether Enver accepts 
it or not, he is today an agent of the English imperialism that has colonized millions of Mus-
lim people in India, Egypt, and Asia Minor, said a Soviet document, implying that Enver 
was functionally serving the interests of the British even if he was not following British or-
ders.216 Others turned to conspiracy theorization in making sense of Enver’s actions. The 
socialist republics of Central Asia are facing a new venture from the Imperial English, con-
nected this time with the name of Enver Pasha, announced one Red Army journal, Enver 
has the insolence to address the Soviet Federation with propositions which are visibly dictated 
by Lloyd George and Barthou.217  
Meanwhile, the Young Turk émigré networks were quickly eroding due to the political iso-
lation of Enver Pasha in Eastern Bukhara. The Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies 
were giving their last breath. The secretary general Ziya Bey described to Enver the pitiful 
situation as follows:  
After Cemal Azmi and Bahaeddin Şakir Beys were martyred, the activities of the Berlin 
Bureau completely ceased. Rome does not recognize us anymore. Only Azmi Bey is left 
here. Rüsuhi Bey is about to leave for Ankara after the letter he received from Kara Kemal. 
Rome [Bureau] continues to work as the society of Oppressed Nations with the half a 
million gold coins they received from the Russians a while ago. İstanbul [Branch] is of 
no use due to pennilessness. I had attempted to send you arms and men from there. 
 
214 G. Ordzhonikidze and Shalva Eliava, telegraph (Tashkent) to Stalin (Moscow), May 12, 1922, in 
Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 52.  
215 Stalin’s proposal for Turkestan-Bukhara incidents, enclosed in protocol of the Central Committee of the 
Russian Communist Party, no. 7, May 18, 1922, in Kazancyan, Bolşevik-Kemalist-İttihatçı İlişkileri, 54.  
216 Quoted in Tursun and Moldabaeva, “Enver Paşa’nın Orta Asya’daki Milli Mücadeleye Verdiği Desteğin 
Moskova Arşivlerinde Belgelenmesi,” 238.  
217 I. Sol’ts, “Anglo-Envreskaia avantiura i osvobozhdenie narodov vostoka,” Kommunist (April–May 1922): 8, 
quoted in Lageard, “The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red Army Journals (1920–1922),” 8. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
491 
However, for the lack of money it is not possible. […] Küçük Talat is in İstanbul and he 
is working fully together with us. […] However, lack of money is restricting all our ac-
tivities. […] As I said though, if money won’t come, we will need to bid farewell to all 
these organizations. […] For now, dear Pasha, we ask you to send immediately money 
to the Berlin Bureau as well as to the Rome and İstanbul bureaus. Nobody here knows 
what to do.218 
The Soviet Government went full force on the Basmachi after May 1922. A purge against 
Jadidist elites compromised of having anti-Soviet motivations started as well as former Otto-
man POWs who had settled in the region were arrested.219 A full-scale battle against the 
Basmachi forces took place on June 15. The head of the Soviet counterinsurgency operations 
Yakov Peters published an article in the Izvestia, mocking Enver’s claim to be commanding 
all the armed Musselman forces in Central Asia whereas he was actually sharing the leader-
ship with four bandit chiefs.220 On July 14, Dushanbe was taken by the Red Army. Enver 
and his troops were outnumbered and outgunned five hundred to five thousand.221 Enver 
had neither machine guns nor artillery. During a briefing at the Military Academy in Moscow 
in August 1922, the lecturer General Mikhail K. Lewadowski discussed why Enver was not 
conducting guerilla warfare tactics, but rather creating windows of opportunity for conven-
tional battles again and again, even though his forces were clearly inferior from the onset.222 
On July 14, Enver requested Afghan Emir to negotiate a deal for him and his men with the 
British officials in Kabul.223 On July 26, Enver and his men engaged yet in a firefight, as he 
wrote his last letter to his wife.224 The military battle was lost, it was now a struggle for sur-
vival, if not a suicide. 
*** 
Before leaving for Tiflis, Cemal Pasha made a visit to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow and 
told the chief diplomat Dr. Rıza Nur that he would like to go to Ankara. Cemal was already 
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in touch with Mustafa Kemal, as he told, and was leaving for Tuapse to wait for a response 
from Ankara. You’re going there for nothing, Mustafa Kemal won’t let you in, said Rıza 
Nur dismissively and noted in his memoir the following thoughts which he most certainly 
did not dare to tell in Cemal’s face: The man [Mustafa Kemal] is busy with cleansing and 
removing his rivals in Turkey. Would he ever shoulder the burden of a man like Cemal? 
Cemal has no qualities either in military or elsewhere, he is just a komitadji. If he would find 
an opportunity, he would throw off Mustafa Kemal from the government position.225 The 
day before Cemal left to Tiflis, he wrote a letter to Fahrettin (Türkkan) Pasha to congratulate 
him to his new appointment as the first Turkish ambassador to Afghanistan.226 Fahrettin 
Pasha was a very strong pick for the ambassador position in Kabul. He was famous for being 
the relentless defender of Medina against the British-Sharifian forces. Fahrettin had also been 
associated with the Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies. This was certainly a man with 
whom Cemal could collaborate in Kabul.227  
As it seems, going back to Turkey was a matter of political certification and rehabilitation for 
Cemal Pasha, so that he can go back to Afghanistan and work there again. Before leaving 
Moscow, Cemal was able to convince the Soviet Government about his integrity. Karahan 
told him: Sir, we are very grateful for that you have been one of the most important sup-
porters of the friendship between us and the Ankara Government and we hope that you will 
continue your great work for the enhancement of the friendly relations between the Asian 
Muslim world and the Russian Soviet Republic.228 
On July 10, Cemal Pasha arrived at Tiflis, and the Turkish Military Attaché reported that 
Cemal desires to travel to Ankara, if not possible then to Kars, to talk with Mustafa Kemal.229 
In Tiflis, Cemal was hosted as an official state guest and was given official papers. Cemal 
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continued to complain about Enver’s actions: He ruined all our honor as revolutionaries 
(Hepimizin inkılapçı şerefimizi berbat etti).230 Apparently, there was a kind of honor among 
revolutionaries in Cemal’s understanding, and Enver had ruined it.  
On the night of July 21, Cemal Pasha and his two aid-de-camps Süreyya and Nusret were 
invited to a dinner at the Turkish Consulate in Tiflis. Süreyya had arrived from Ankara that 
morning, so he had many news on Anatolia and about the war. A letter Süreyya brought 
from Ankara said that Cemal should continue his good work in Afghanistan. After the dinner 
Cemal and his friends said goodbye and walked to their residence provided by the Soviet 
Government. Tiflis was still under martial law so that there was a curfew during the nights. 
The Turkish Ambassador Muhtar Bey offered the guests to stay overnight. Cemal politely 
rejected, since he had official papers. The diplomats Firuz (Kesim) and Osman Kemal ac-
companied Cemal and his friends for a block and then they parted their ways. Only a minute 
or so later Firuz and Osman Kemal heard shots fired around the corner. They first ran back 
to the Embassy and returned with embassy guards and found the three men lying dead on 
the ground. Cemal had tried to reach to his revolver but was killed immediately. Nusret and 
Süreyya were shot dead as well. The hand case with the documents Süreyya Bey had brought 
from Anatolia was missing too.231 
The question who actually murdered Cemal Pasha and his friends has been a matter of ru-
mors and speculations ever since. Turkish historians mapped out the different evidence and 
narratives that has been put forward by contemporaries.232 The main suspects in these rumors 
and speculations were the Armenian Tashnags, the Soviet Cheka, and the British Intelli-
gence—although the British were imaged only as the instigator of the Armenians. These 
conspiracy theories, rumors, and speculations unveil the political intentions and preconcep-
tions of the time.  
The official reaction of the Soviet Government was an expression of condolence. The Soviet 
Government of Georgia organized an official funeral ceremony with a military parade.233 The 
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funeral prayers were held at the Shah Abbas Mosque in Tiflis.234 Russian Ambassador Aralov 
in Ankara delivered to Rauf (Orbay) Bey, on August 5, their great sorrow since Cemal Pasha 
was a great son of Turkey and a fervent supporter of the Russian-Turkish friendship.235 The 
Soviet Government payed five thousand gold to Cemal’s widow as a compensation.236  
The officials of the Transcaucasian Soviet identified alleged culprits as Tashnag extremists 
who had killed Cemal Pasha as a revenge for the Armenian massacres. After Cemal’s assassi-
nation, the arrest of 199 Tashnag members was reported to have taken place in the Turkish 
newspapers.237 The next day, two Tashnag fedayis Larakin Lalayan and Sergo Vartanyan were 
arrested, but are said to be released afterwards.238 Turkish-Armenian historian Kevork 
Pamukciyan gives the names of the Armenian assassins as Bedros Bogosyan and Ardashen 
Kevokyan.239 Although both Turkish and Armenian nationalists still want to see Armenian 
revolutionaries behind the assassination, the evidence is rather speculative.240 Contrary to 
some popular claims, Cemal Pasha’s assassination was not organized by the Operation Nem-
esis, although it certainly served the same purpose.241  
The Ankara Government sent a note the Transcaucasian Federation to punish the Tashnag 
assassins responsible for the assassinations. In a comment in The Times, it was noted that 
Ankara’s diplomatic note appears in some degree to be modelled on that addressed to Serbia 
by Austria-Hungary in July 1914.242 Budu Mdivani, the President of the Transcaucasian 
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, told Mustafa Kemal Pasha that the murderer of Cemal 
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Pasha was a Tashnag member and a former officer who was now arrested.243 Ankara Govern-
ment’s official reaction to the incident was in fact very harsh. Despite all the disclaimers, 
Kemalist regime’s crypto-CUP tenets were revealing themselves once again in these moments 
of Armenian terrorism. Kazım Karabekir Pasha proposed to transport the remains of Cemal 
Pasha to Erzurum to be buried there in a symbolic grave that would constitute an eternal 
commemoration of the Tashnag massacres in Erzurum.244 The General Staff forwarded Kar-
abekir’s proposal to the Cabinet.245 In the end, it was decided by the Grand National Assem-
bly to transport the remains of Cemal Pasha and his fellow men to Turkey.246 The remains 
of Cemal Pasha and his two friends were brought to Erzurum on September 21, 1922.247 
Due to fears of further Tashnag assassinations, it was allowed for Halil Pasha, Dr. Nazım, 
and Küçük Talat Bey to return to Turkey.248 
The Soviet Government saw not only the Tashnags, but also other hidden hands behind it 
all. Nikolai Ravich, a Soviet diplomat serving in Ankara, claimed that it was the British In-
telligence that organized the assassination of Cemal Pasha.249 It is doubtful that the Soviets 
had any evidence that led to British agents. In fact, the rumors of British complicity seem to 
be propagated purposefully. In a meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Com-
munist Party in Moscow, Karl Radek was given the task by Karahan and Stalin to prepare a 
press release that Cemal was assassinated by Tashnags with the support of English agents.250 
In an article published in Germany, Karl Radek wrote:  
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At the hands of a nationalist died Talaat Pasha, the head of the Young Turk Revolution 
and the Young Turk Government. He is now followed by Djemal Pasha, the Governor-
General of Baghdad [sic, Damascus], one of the leading spirits of Young Turk Party, who 
is probably also murdered by Dashnaks. Slowly the old generation disappears from the 
stage that tried to resist the European imperialism and to save the independence of Tur-
key without compromising the privileges of the old ruling class and its political methods. 
And the youngest leaders of the Young Turk Party, Enver Pasha is undertaking a foolish 
adventure that we will make him not only a traitor of the Turkish people, but a traitor 
of all oppressed Muslim peoples. [...] Djemal Pasha, a man with a sharp and cool mind, 
condemned this policy of Enver. It was also condemned by the Government of An-
gora.251  
Despite these official expressions of condolence by the Soviet Government, there were serious 
suspicions that the Cheka was behind the killings. It is doubtful whether Jemal Pasha was 
killed by Armenians, whom he sometimes used to protect from massacre, commented The 
Times on July 27, 1922, and went on with an alternative theory: It is hinted that Jemal 
Pasha was suspected of wishing to reconcile Enver Pasha with Mustapha Kemal Pasha on an 
anti-Bolshevist basis, and that he was, consequently, eliminated by the Cheka.252 This was, 
of course, a white-washing of Cemal Pasha. There was no public or secret information that 
Cemal was considering an anti-Bolshevik course. Another news at the very same page an-
nounced under the title The New Era in Kabul summarized the prospects of Cemal’s mur-
der from the British official point of view perhaps more precisely. The article advised that 
Afghanistan should take a lesson from Cemal’s murder and drop the Bolshevik policies: In 
the chaos of the Near and Middle East, which is hindering the re-settlement of the war-weary 
nations of Europe, a wise and peaceful government in Afghanistan has boundless opportuni-
ties.253 
However, the accusations that Cemal Pasha was killed by the infamous Soviet secret police 
Cheka did not only come from the British opinion-makers. Under the rising social pressure 
after the victory of the Nationalist Forces, Armenian (and even Tashnag) newspapers in Con-
stantinople preferred to reject the possibility of any Armenian role and accused instead the 
Bolsheviks.254 Also some Turkish nationalists who were traditionally suspicious of Russia saw 
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Cheka behind the assassination. For instance, Cemal’s adjutant İsmet (Karadoğan), who was 
by the time of assassination delivering messages to Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia, assumed that 
the Cheka was behind the assassination. He imagined the Bolshevik leaders saying: How do 
we know that these men [Cemal and his men] would not act as Enver did… We should 
better get rid of them.255 Some officials in Turkey believed also that it was the Soviet Gov-
ernment that killed Cemal because of Enver’s participation in the Basmachi movement.256 
These were all rumors and speculations—if not even wishful-thinking—of distant observers. 
After a fire incident, possibly even a case of arson, in the Soviet Embassy in Ankara on August 
15, 1922, Ambassador Aralov suspected an international conspiracy led by the French that 
caused the recent rise of anti-Soviet resentments in Ankara.257 While the Bolsheviks turned 
to conspiracy theories, there was a political mindset in Ankara that favored suspicion against 
the Bolsheviks.  
There is, however, some others who were closer to the lion’s den that also heard that it was 
the Cheka that assassinated Cemal Pasha, although their evidence was also very suggestive 
and similarly based on rumors. For instance, Dr. Rıza Nur later heard from an informant 
that the killers were unassuming Armenians, one of them a baker, but it was actually the 
Russian Government that gave the assignment. Rıza Nur found this information convincing, 
since by then Cheka was rumored to be behind numerous political murders.258 Indeed, the 
collective mentality and cult of Cheka that legitimized political violence was fully established 
in 1922.259 Before leaving Moscow, Halil Pasha had heard from an informant that the Soviet 
Government decided to assassinate Cemal and then blame the Armenians. Allegedly Halil 
Pasha could warn Cemal, but the latter did not take it seriously, as he could not imagine that 
the Bolsheviks would kill him.260 Similarly, Turkestani politician Mustafa Chokay tells that 
he had warned Cemal during their meeting in Paris about traveling to Afghanistan through 
 
255 Karadoğan, “Cemal Paşa’yı Ruslar Öldürmüştü,” 38. Yarın bunların da Enver gibi yapmayacakları ne 
malum… İyisi mi temizleyelim. 
256 Sami Sabit Karaman, İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa: Trabzon ve Kars Hatıraları, 1921–1922, 2nd ed. 
(İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2002), 70. 
257 Semen Ivanovič Aralov, Vospominania sovetskogo diplomata 1922–1923 (Moskva: Izd-vo IMO, 1960), 
122–23, cited in Gökay, A Clash of Empires, 122–23. See also: Rauf Orbay, Cehennem Değirmeni (İstanbul: 
Emre Yayınları, 1993), II, 80.  
258 Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, III, 932. 
259 Iain Lauchlan, “Chekist Mentalité and the Origins of the Great Terror,” in The Anatomy of Terror: Political 
Violence under Stalin, ed. James Harris, 13–28 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 26–28.  
260 Kut, İttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e Bitmeyen Savaş, 273.  
The Young Turk Aftermath 
498 
Tiflis, because in Tiflis Soviet agents might kill him, because only there the Soviets could 
execute such an operation and still put the blame on the Armenians. As Chokay tells, Cemal 
thought that this was ridiculous.261 Both Halil’s and Chokay’s alleged warnings to Cemal 
about Cheka assassins are to be taken with a grain of salt as these were written years and 
decades later.  
Years later Chokay read in a book under the title In the Service of Cheka and Comintern 
(Na sluzhbe Cheka i Kominterna) by a former Cheka official E. Dumbadze that Cemal Pasha 
was assassinated by the Georgian Cheka by the order of the Moscow Government. A famous 
hitmen Sergo Lobadze was assigned for this task and later it was fabricated in the news cov-
erage that the Armenian Tashnags were responsible.262 Sergo Lobadze was arrested and exe-
cuted by the Cheka one month after the incident for some other reason.263 Rumors continued 
that Cemal was killed by Russians. A Georgian refugee in Hopa at the Black Sea coast claimed 
that he could deliver secret documents that reveal Russian complicity.264 Zeki Velidi (Togan) 
tells that he came across one of the assassins of Cemal Pasha, a certain Garabet, in Afghanistan 
and adds that he was a Soviet agent.265 I do not want to dismiss the possibility that Cheka 
was complicit in Cemal’s assassination, nevertheless, we must note that for anti-Soviet activ-
ists, like Chokay and Togan and others, rumors and legends about Cheka’s political violence 
gave the ideal template in making sense of Cemal Pasha’s mysterious assassination.  
The Young Turk émigré community rather chose to believe that it was the British Intelli-
gence that killed Cemal Pasha. Shakib Arslan was in London, when he heard about Cemal’s 
assassination. At the time Shakib Arslan and his colleagues were protesting the French Syrian 
mandate over Syria and the British mandate over Palestine. At the Hotel Cecil, Arslan was 
confronted by a British General: Cemal Pasha is killed, I hope that Enver will soon join 
him. Shakib Arslan assumed that the British Intelligence was behind the assassination, be-
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cause in the eyes of the English the Muslim menace was greater than the Bolshevik men-
ace.266 Similarly, Cavid Bey noted in his diary: The martyrdom of poor Cemal Pasha has 
been approved. He has been martyred by an Armenian bullet, but it is more unjust than the 
others. Perhaps there is the English hand in it. But I am sure that the finger that pulled the 
trigger belonged to an Armenian’s hand.267 As Talaat Pasha, like Jemal, has already been 
shot, as The Times announced the current state in the body count, Enver Pasha is now the 
only survivor of the C.U.P. triumvirate.268 But Enver’s days were already counted.  
The newspaper Peyam-ı Sabah under the editorship of Ali Kemal Bey, the only anti-Kemalist 
Turkish paper now appearing in Constantinople, as the British officials put it, became con-
fused as what to support in the looming final victory of the Ankara forces in summer 1922. 
The newspaper has been conducting a propaganda warfare against Ankara Government for 
years. Now in his current frustration, Ali Kemal had even published a peculiar editorial that 
celebrated Enver Pasha’s struggle against Soviet Russia. The British officials supposed that 
Ali Kemal was trying to build an alliance between two anti-Kemalist blocks, namely pro-
Entente royalists and pro-Enver Unionists.269 Turkish Intelligence did not miss this news by 
the Peyam-ı Sabah either.270 This article coincided with other rumors that Küçük Talat Bey 
and Enver’s brother Nuri Pasha were rumored to be in Constantinople as well as news of 
Enver trying to reach out to the British in the Indo-Afghan region. Yet, enough evidence had 
come together to construct a new conspiracy theory. This conspiracy theory assumed a (po-
tential) alliance between the Sultan Vahideddin and Enver Pasha was (to be) formed as a 
possible means of destroying Mustafa Kemal. For the lack of positive evidence, it was, 
nevertheless, admitted that the suggestion that they are coming together as being for the 
moment no more than a theory which must be tested by close observation of future develop-
ments. Possible ramifications of a Sultan-Enver pact was still not better off for the British 
than the current situation. I doubt if we could swallow Enver for the sake of the Sultan, 
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even to get rid of Kemal.271 Although such an alliance was purely imaginary, nonetheless, 
by chance Enver was having the Friday prayers called in the name of the (Ottoman) Caliph, 
as he sarcastically told his wife, not without expressing his dislike of Vahideddin.272 On the 
other hand, Enver’s brother Kamil Bey in Berlin considered this article by Ali Kemal as a 
signal from the British officials for a rapprochement with Enver Pasha.273  
Meanwhile, there were other rumors about the alleged alliances of Enver Pasha. A secret 
Treaty is stated to have been signed in the beginning of June at Soujbulak, near Lake Urma, 
on the Persian frontier, between Mustapha Kemal and Enver Pasha, reported, for instance, 
The Times from its Berlin correspondent, on August 1, 1922. By its terms both leaders agree 
to direct their activities towards the strengthening of the Pan-Islamic movement. Otherwise 
both are to retain their independence, Kemal adhering to his Treaty with Soviet Russia and 
Enver Pasha continuing to fight the Bolshevists.274 Nothing could have been more far from 
the truth. Again from Berlin, The Times reported on September 18 that the the suspected 
rapprochement between Mustapha Kemal and Enver Pasha has been consolidated into a def-
inite alliance. […] Enver Pasha’s sphere is Central Asia and Persia, while Asia Minor and 
Mesopotamia form that of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.275 Since both these news were telegraphed 
from Berlin, it is not unlikely that these news were fabricated by the Young Turk community 
in Berlin. Similarly, Le Temps reported on August 5 a telegraph from Constantinople that 
claims that a triple alliance between Ankara, Moscow, and Enver took place and that Enver 
was granted with the Government of Bukhara.276  
On August 3, 1922, General Bronsart von Schellendorf sent a letter to Enver Pasha, congrat-
ulating him for his prideful struggle against the Russian yoke. This new Muslim govern-
ment of yours which will prepare a promising future for all Turks aroused nothing but great 
sensation. Bronsart told that some Turkish friends in Berlin were thinking about going to 
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Turkestan and joining Enver. I had the desire to accompany them and offer my humble 
service to you, but I fear that I am too old to serve the purpose.277 Thus, the news in Daily 
Telegraph that General Bronsart was directing the military operations of the Afghan volunteer 
units in Enver Pasha’s army was surely nonsense as well, although it corresponded to the 
General’s wishful-thinking.278  
One day after General Bronsart von Schellendorf’s letter, on August 4, 1922, Enver Pasha 
was killed. Before diving into the ocean of rumors, it is still necessary to look at the evidence 
at hand. The situation for Enver and his friends was getting worse each day. In July 1922, 
the Pravda proudly reported that Enver was trying to organize the Basmachi in Fergana and 
Samarkand, but his troops were abandoning him.279 Whether some fighters had deserted or 
not, Enver was also sending away his fighters to their villages due to the Feast of Sacrifice 
(Eid al-Adha).280 One last eye-witness of Enver’s last days was Molla Nafiz (Türker), a Jadidi 
teacher who joined the Basmachi and belonged to the staff of Enver Pasha as his intelligence 
officer.281 According to Molla Nafiz’s field diary, the fights continued on August 2. The next 
day, Enver and his guards rested at the nearby village and attended the festivities and feast 
prayers at the local mosque.282 The next day, on August 4, Enver and his few men made 
preparations to meet with the other fighters. On their way, their old Tajik guide warned 
them of a Red Army cavalry unit heading directly towards them. Enver spotted the recon-
naissance troops with his binoculars. He pulled out his saber and ordered his guardsmen to 
charge. Enver galloped to the Red Army troops. He could slay two soldiers before he was 
shot in the breast by the next cavalry on his way. Turcoman riders arrived at that moment 
and slayed the Soviet unit and chased them away. A Mullah came from the nearby village to 
the site of fighting with dead bodies. He found Enver and wrapped the dead body into the 
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garment of his turban. He carried the body to the cemetery of his village. The next day, 
Enver’s fighters collected Enver’s body and buried him with a small ceremony on top of the 
Chegan hill near the same named village, today in Tajikistan.283 Molla Nafiz’s field diary 
contradicts the Red Army’s field diary in regard to the military outcome of the clash and who 
found Enver’s body first:  
04.08. […] Enver attacked our First Squad together with 100 experienced fighters and 
defeated it. But then our Third Squad charged and Enver Pasha got five wounds and was 
killed in action. After that, the enemy escaped to the mountains without even taking the 
body of Enver Pasha. In the pockets of Enver’s clothes letters from his wife and other 
women was found. In addition, his revolver was found on his body.284  
Abdullah Recep (Baysun) who was there among Enver’s fighters also acknowledges that they 
had lost the fight and that they run away without Enver’s body. The next day they met the 
village mullah who showed him the body of Enver. Russians had not recognized him; they 
only stole his German boots and hunting jacket.285 Few days after the burial a public gather-
ing took place at Enver’s grave with prayers and mourning. Most sources say that twenty or 
thirty thousand people were gathered.286 For the Mazar-i Sharif based newspaper Ittihad-i 
Islam, it was important to underline: His body was recovered and buried with all honour.287  
Enver’s death was also surrounded by a cloud of intentional and unintended pieces of mis-
information, rumours and an odd combination of myth and reality, noted Şuhnaz Yılmaz.288 
Like in the death of Talat and Cemal, there has been several rumors and theories about En-
ver’s death—which still continue to this day.289 For instance, there are rumors that Enver was 
decapitated. These rumors come from a Cheka agent, an Armenian by the name of Grigori 
Agabekov (Nerses Ovsepyan), who led the reconnaissance and intelligence operations in the 
region.290 Furthermore, it is said that the Red Army officer who was responsible for the death 
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of Enver Pasha was another Armenian by the name of Hagop Melkonian who was later dec-
orated for his services.291 The claim that Melkonian was acting on behalf of secret orders from 
the Operation Nemesis is, of course, rather absurd.292 
However, the above cited Red Army field diary shows that Enver Pasha’s death was confirmed 
immediately. For some reason, the Soviet officials were rather reserved with announcing the 
news publicly. Perhaps, they were concerned that news of Enver’s death would only stir up 
more Muslim animosity towards Soviet Russia. When Karahan finally told Rıza Nur that 
Enver Pasha was killed, Rıza Nur asked astonished: Why didn’t you make this public? 
Karahan answered that they wanted to be sure that it was really Enver Pasha. Men were sent 
to identify his body. Love letters to his wife, his stamp as the son-in-law of the Caliph, and 
his custom made kalpak were confiscated as evidence and brought to Moscow.293 A document 
from the archives of the Tajik Communist Party shows that the officials learned about the 
death and commemorations of Enver from an article in The Times on September 18, 1922.294  
The Manchester Guardian, where Enver Pasha’s friend from Moscow Arthur Ransome was 
working, was probably the first Western newspaper to announce the death of Enver, already 
on August 18.295 Other than that, however, there was a general confusion in the press. Even 
after death, Enver continued to star in conspiracy theories. Like pop culture conspiracy the-
ories that claim that Elvis lives or Tupac ain’t dead, rumors circulated that Enver was still 
alive and leading the remnants of the Basmachi insurgents. At the beginning, these were 
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deceptive conspiracy theories, spread around to avoid mass hysteria among the popular 
masses and fighters and to spread frustration and confusion for the Red Army commanders. 
Hacı Sami ordered the remaining fighters to keep Enver’s death a secret. One of them Qadir 
told in the autumn of 1923: 
Sami Bey suspected treachery. He said that the Committee must give out that Enver was 
not dead; simply that he had disappeared. This was necessary in order to keep the move-
ment going; if it were known that Enver were dead it would collapse altogether. Qadir 
stoutly maintained that Enver had been assassinated by Bolshevik agents.296 
For instance, two Ottoman ex-POWs told to British officials in September that Enver Pasha 
was wounded, but for the time being already recovered.297  
The impact of this deceptive strategy, probably enhanced by the oral culture of the Central 
Asiatic nomads, was immediately effective. It was only in mid-October, when news of Enver’s 
dead become a rumor in the Indo-Iranian region south of Turkestan. All sorts of rumours 
are still current about Enver Pasha, as The Times reported from Peshawar in October, but 
Afghan official circles are now satisfied that he was killed at Raljiwan in July. The same news 
concluded: The rumors of Enver Pasha’s death are now so frequent that they must be taken 
seriously.298 Few days later, it was also reported from Simla that Enver Pasha was killed by 
Red Troops when going to prayers at the mosque on August 4, 1922.299 It was, nevertheless, 
noted: The opinion was for a long time widely held that the Pasha had allowed reports of 
his death to circulate in order to mask his activities.300 Even a newspaper in the Soviet center 
of Tashkent was reporting on October 29 that a deal was made with Enver. Peace has at last 
been made between Enver Pasha and ourselves […] Our proposal is that he is to take com-
mand of the Muslim troops who agree to assist Mustapha Kemal in the occupation of the 
neutral zone of Chanak.301 From Peshawar, it was reported also that there are many who 
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think the report is a ruse to cover his disappearance with a view to a fresh adventure else-
where.302 Enver Pasha Alive, was the message that was telegraphed from Meshed on No-
vember 9 to The Times: Enver Pasha is undoubtedly alive, and is conducting a peace con-
ference with the Bolshevists. He is reported to have refused the Governorship of Bokhara.303 
The British Intelligence reported also from Meshed that he was not only alive, but also the 
President of the Republic of Turkestan.304 Such rumors continued, as Salahi Sonyel argues, 
until April 1923.305 But also far away the world of rumors of the Asiatic steppes and deserts, 
the idea that Enver Pasha was still alive and fighting for the liberation of the Muslim world 
was common. A Sarajevo newspaper announced on September 16, 1922:  
The situation in the British Dependencies is dangerous from without as well as from 
within. Clouds are gathering on their outskirts. The ruler of Turkestan, Enver Pasha, is 
forming against England a coalition of Moslem States including Persia, Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, Khiva, and Bokhara. Already an Afghan concentration is re-
ported on the Indian frontier. For the past hundred years England has been digging a 
grave for Turkey. She is likely to fall into herself.306 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
During my first year of my PhD studies, I was doing some preliminary research at the Ottoman 
Archive in İstanbul—by then still located at the beautiful buildings within the Sublime Porte com-
plex in the Cağaloğlu district. While I was curiously scrolling through the digital catalogue one day, 
a professor of history sitting next to me asked what I was researching. I simply answered, Young 
Turks, and specified my answer with the remark, Committee of Union and Progress after 1918. 
The gentleman nodded approvingly and said: Well, you must know then that the Young Turks 
were all crypto-Jews, Freemasons, and Zionists. I was, of course, aware of this unholy trinity of 
conspiracy theories in Turkey and its projection onto Young Turks by conservative circles. Yet, I 
was still naïve enough to try to explain the gentleman that not all CUP members were crypto-Jews 
or Freemasons and the question of Zionism was not that straightforward. He shook his head in 
disbelief. I saw it all, he said authoritatively. I saw it in the British archives. It writes on hundreds 
of documents. Discussion was meaningless, but it was an eye-opening experience for me. I had to 
take the conspiracy theories seriously—but again, perhaps not so much.  
*** 
As I’ve noted in the introduction, I’ve benefitted a great deal from the existing literature on the 
topic—both popular and academic histories. Nevertheless, this study has certain historiographical 
implications. The historiography on the topic, both popular and academic, has certain common 
fallacies which I tried to avoid. First, there is a general focus on Enver Pasha in the literature. This 
is, of course, given Enver’s direct action method of playing politics—as Louise Bryant put it 
beautifully—to a certain degree in the nature of the beast.1 Hence, Enver remains in the spotlight 
 
1 Louise Bryant, Mirrors of Moscow, Reprint (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973), 160. 
The Young Turk Aftermath 
507 
anyhow. Nevertheless, he had to share his stage time with others. By incorporating Talat Pasha’s 
activities in Berlin, their collective struggle becomes, as I have illustrated, more entangled within 
the complex and fascinating world of revanchist milieus, anticolonial social movements, and Mus-
lim émigré networks in Europe. This is an important aspect in understanding this movement as a 
transnational contentious politics campaign. Although there is yet no definitive study on Cemal 
Pasha’s activities in Afghanistan, Cemal’s story is essential in understanding the interaction between 
transnational activism and international relations, especially on the Ankara-Moscow-Kabul axis. 
Understanding the reciprocal interactions required to go beyond the biographical approaches to 
the Young Turk triumvirate and incorporate other actors into the narrative, including German, 
British, Russian, Armenian, and Kemalist perspectives. The second common feature of the litera-
ture is the focus on five milestone events and to assume a linear progression between them: The 
first milestone is their escape from Constantinople in November 1918; the second milestone is the 
meeting with Radek in the summer of 1919 where the alliance with Bolsheviks is established; the 
third milestone is the Baku Congress in September 1920 which is considered as the heyday of 
Islamic-Bolshevik cooperation; the fourth milestone is Enver’s failed attempt to enter into Anatolia 
in September 1921; the fifth and last milestone is Enver’s death in Turkestan in August 1922, 
which was depending on the standpoint of the historian either a desperate suicide or a prideful 
martyrdom. Yet, there is always nearly a year between these milestone events, which are commonly 
summarized or skipped in narratives. By giving attention to the processes in-between, I under-
lined the complexities and contingencies in the development of the events.  
In processes of sense-making, historians—like contemporary observers—can also fail to distinguish 
fact from fiction. In all these accounts the figure of Enver Pasha himself remains enigmatic, full of 
contradictions, the dates imprecise, the facts veiled in mystery, wrote one historian on the general 
source material.2 Indeed, especially when the foreign intelligence reports are read not in their cor-
responding context, contemporary misconceptions—or even conspiracy theories—can get repro-
duced. As it has been seen most of the intelligence reports with fascinating theories about the alleged 
machinations of the CUP leaders corresponded to a time when the CUP leaders has been relatively 
inactive or unsuccessful. The private papers of the CUP leaders—what I have called the Young 
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Turk republic of letters—offers a way forward to unveil most of the uncertainties.3 Another fallacy 
in making sense of fact and fiction lies in the tendency of the literature in over-evaluating the 
interrelations of the Young Turk leaders with post-Versailles Germany, Soviet Russia, and Kemalist 
Turkey as international conspiracies.4 As John Ferris correctly put it, these parties were aligned 
with but not allied to each other.5 Hence, I critically reviewed the quality of these political align-
ments.  
***   
Since the armistice we are continually getting mysterious news from Enver Pasha, said Falih Rıfkı 
(Atay) in 1922.6 Therefore, I’ve incorporated speculations, gossips, rumors, and conspiracy theo-
ries—as modes of sense-making in social complexity—into the analysis. The perception of most 
actors under study was based on rumors and speculation, as they had to rely on unverifiable infor-
mation. They were interacting in a world of political uncertainty, where intentions and actions of 
distant actors remained a matter of guesswork. Hence, also their own actions and reactions were 
stimulated mostly by perceptions and misperceptions of the actions of others. The amount of ru-
mors about the fugitive CUP leaders was, as it has been demonstrated in detail, is a testimony of 
how much curiosity and suspicion they aroused internationally. Like no single other person be-
tween the years 1918 and 1922, the CUP leaders, especially Enver Pasha, were the international 
men of mystery. Rumor is the first step towards conspiracy theory and both rumors and conspiracy 
theories constitute an important feature in the dialectic of conspiracy. Sooner than later the rumors 
turned into conspiracy theories, as esoteric explanations of political complexity. Some of these con-
spiracy theories even found their way into the historiography. During the War of Independence 
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many intrigues were set around Enver Pasha, said the opening sentences of Kazım Karabekir’s 
book, Enver Pasha during our Independence War, and continued: It will be seen in the documents 
that foreign hands played terrific roles in all these undertakings in order to drag our national move-
ment into a fiasco.7 Karabekir may have belonged to the opposition against Mustafa Kemal in the 
early Republican years, but when it came to Enver, he also contributed to the official historiograph-
ical consent. Foreign and hidden hands, including those behind Enver, were seen as working against 
the Turkish national sovereignty over Anatolia. On the other hand, the official circles in Entente 
countries saw the CUP leaders as the hidden hand behind the assumingly unexplainable opposi-
tion to colonial rule in Muslim lands. There were, of course, real conspiracies both by foreign states 
and by Enver and his friends, but, as it has been illustrated, the picture was more complex. 
***  
In their self-imposed exile, the Young Turks committed themselves to a campaign of transnational 
contentious politics in the name of the anticolonial Muslim nationalist movement. Contrary to the 
paranoid assumptions of their enemies, the conspiracy at hand was rather disenchanting. In their 
path from empire to exile, the Young Turk leaders lost their party apparatus, local resources, and 
most importantly their state-actor status. Their committee organization was splintered into factions 
and groups and persecuted by the post-armistice regime in Ottoman Turkey. The leading cadre 
was criminalized by court-martials and internally plagued with interpersonal disputes. Their trans-
national networks were maybe impressive in reach and variety, but increasingly less functional for 
political mobilization. Transnational communication from Europe to the Middle East was partic-
ularly difficult and interrupted. War and revolution as well as border regimes made illicit transna-
tional mobility dangerous. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the CUP leaders possessed limited 
financial resources and were dependent on the benevolence of old friends and interest of others. 
Their alleged partners and patrons, Germans or Bolsheviks, were mostly incapable or reluctant to 
provide the demanded resources and had often conflicting interests. Their strategy to find Soviet 
support for anti-British activities caught a window of opportunity but, in its core, it was banal and 
imprudent so that political differences could never be put aside with the Soviet regime. Although 
they were leading an organization to unite and represent numerous Muslim revolutionary societies, 
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they had barely any contact to—let alone control over—local revolutionary organizations in the 
Middle East. They were spatially disconnected from the oppressed popular masses from North 
Africa to Central Asia, whom they repeatedly valued in their propaganda. They were even undesired 
by the local insurgency leaders. 
Thanks to the discourse of their elusive power, however, the fugitive CUP leaders indeed became 
powerful in the eyes of their blind believers and paranoid enemies. A part of the curiosity and 
suspicion they were arousing internationally was due to the notoriety of the political background 
of the CUP leaders as reckless professional revolutionaries. But to a certain degree, this suspicion 
was based on the very nature of international politics which the fugitive CUP leaders with their 
transnational clandestine networks were transgressing. As their transnational and clandestine 
agency could not be accepted as it actually was, hence, it was imagined to be more conspiratorial 
and far-reaching. Thus, paranoid epistemologies emerged and some of these rumors turned into 
conspiracy theories. Behind distant uprisings and distinct movements many observers assumed 
falsely the hidden-hand of the CUP leaders. 
Only the conspirator and his counter-conspirator believe that they are in the midst of a great con-
spiracy. The elusive power projected by the fugitive CUP leaders was too easily taken for granted 
by the British intelligence community and later also by the Kemalists and Soviets—though the 
latter two were less sensationalist in this regard. The wishful-thinking of the conspiracy plotter and 
the paranoid thinking of the conspiracy theorist were working hand in glove with each other. Their 
notoriety made the Young Turk leaders first prized as revolutionary non-state actors, but soon 
started to haunt them by making them more capable than they were in the eyes of their allies and 
enemies. Rumors—real or not—resulted in their political isolation and persecution. The rumors 
made the Kemalists in Anatolia more cautious in their relation to their CUP colleagues, hindering 
their return to Ottoman Turkey, restricting their space of movement. Bolshevik leaders’ distrust 
limited their political maneuverability. Not without a reason, the British made the prohibition of 
propaganda in the East their first principle in negotiating with Soviet Russia. As A.L. Macfie put 
forward, the paranoid intelligence reports on Enver’s pan-Islamic-Bolshevik activities pushed the 
British policy makers to consider a rapprochement with Mustafa Kemal Pasha.8 It was the same for 
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the French before concluding the Ankara Treaty.9 In the dialectic of conspiracy, the more active, 
more visible, and more vocal the CUP leaders became after the summer of 1920, the more the 
epistemic gap between conspirators and conspiracy theorists was closed. While the disenchantment 
about Enver’s ever-less surprising intrigues became public, the news slipped more and more to the 
lower and less seen columns of the newspaper pages.  
***  
By the time Talat, Cemal, and Enver were dead, a new world order was nearly settled. Kemalist 
Turkey came out victorious out of its War of Independence and could manifest its sovereignty at 
the Treaty of Lausanne. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 after the abolition of the 
Sultanate. Other post-Ottoman countries were not as lucky in establishing their independence: 
Syria came under French mandate; Palestine became a mandate under British control; Iraq became 
a British mandate with Faysal as its new King; Transjordan was newly created for the other Sharifian 
Prince Abdallah; Sharif Husayn reigned over Hedjaz only to be overrun by the Saudis; Egypt en-
joyed semi-independence in 1922, but British continued to rule without governing. Meanwhile, 
Russia united with the other Soviet republics in the Soviet Union in 1922 and continued to extend 
its control over the Muslim regions from Crimea over the Caucasus to Central Asia.  
The aftermath of World War I ended in the Middle East with the Kemalist abolition of the Cali-
phate in March 1924. This was certainly a great shock for Muslims throughout the world.10 It 
created a very strong rupture in the perception of the state of affairs that ultimately gave pan-
Islamism its coup de grace. Fruitless consequent attempts to revitalize the Caliphate would further 
support the claim that pan-Islamism has been a hoax from the start. Orientalist fears of a world-
wide Muslim menace was dismissed by the other Orientalist prejudice Orientals cannot organize 
themselves politically. Nationalism would become the new paradigm in the Middle East in the 
region’s supposedly inescapable marriage with Western modernity. One British Intelligence offic-
ers, Andrew Ryan, who had been very vocal in the official conspiracy theories confessed what kind 
of conceptions and misconceptions were coloring his views: 
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I feared political pan-Islamism. It looked as though Mustafa Kemal might make that his instru-
ment as Enver had almost certainly dreamt of doing. I did not see much difference in, so far as 
I remember, between Kemal’s group and the old Committee of Union and Progress, apart from 
a struggle for leadership. Nor did I see much essential difference for practical purposes between 
pan-Turanianism, which was now coming to evidence, and pan-Islamism. Both aimed at an 
extension of Turkish influence over wide Islamic areas, even though the areas might be different. 
They seemed to me like two horses which could be harnessed to the Turkish coach, the ultimate 
preference to be determined according to which should prove the better puller. Last, but by no 
means least, I was concerned for the future of the Christian minorities if they were left under 
uncontrolled Turkish rule.  
I cannot now claim that all these views were right. I can only say that they were tenable at the 
time. Subsequent events disproved some of them, notably the fear of pan-Islamism. That virus 
was driven out for an indefinite period by the stronger virus of nationalism.11 
Not without a reason, the CUP leaders has been considered as one of the villains and losers of the 
Great War—condemned for their crimes and misdeeds. Their last attempt to turn the tables after 
the armistice by a transnational uprising of Muslims against the Entente resulted in failure as well. 
In the new order of the interwar period there was no room for Enver, Talat, and Cemal anymore. 
They were all eliminated and marginalized. Nevertheless the Young Turk aftermath, as it has 
been told here, had also certain afterpains and phantom pains. After the remaining CUP leaders 
had returned to Turkey, Cavid Bey and Dr. Nazım were executed in 1926, as it was discovered that 
they were conspiring to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Pasha in İzmir.12 The verdict of the Independ-
ence Tribunal that sentenced the CUP leaders to death practically wrote the official history of this 
Young Turk movement in Turkey:  
It has been established as its details are included in the protocols that as soon as they anticipated 
the capability of the national resistance the fugitives of the Great War committed themselves to 
these undertakings and activities starting in Berlin and then continued in Moscow and Batum. 
Once again with the purpose of seizing the destiny of the homeland, they were engaged in ac-
tivities that would impossibly repair and compensate the catastrophes they caused from which 
the nation was trying to save itself.13 
Thus, the history of Young Turk exile was reduced to a foreign intervention to a struggle of national 
self-determination by rogue revolutionaries. The Kemalist regime would even be proven right with 
its paranoia about further subversive schemes by former CUP members only one year after the 
İzmir assassination attempt. In 1927, Hacı Sami secretly entered Anatolia from the Greek islands 
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with a paramilitary band, possibly with the purpose of assassinating Mustafa Kemal Pasha or con-
ducting a coup. He was subsequently captured and executed.14 Hacı Sami had taken the command 
of the Basmachi insurgents after Enver’s death, but soon he was forced to retrieve to Afghanistan 
in face of the Soviet advance.15 He could not legally return to Turkey, as he was put on the list of 
150 persona non grata. Enver’s family clan, with the exception of Kamil who married Enver’s 
widow, all returned to Turkey, but remained publicly loyal to the Kemalist regime.16   
Although they were condemned and marginalized by their successors, the Young Turks simultane-
ously represented the new face of the Middle East. The Young Turk zeitgeist prevailed in the post-
Ottoman Middle East.17 In Turkey, this was more obvious as the new Kemalists were all ex-Un-
ionists or crypto-Unionists at best. British Intelligence verdict on the Kemalist-Unionist relations 
in 1922 was that no hard and fast distinction can be made between the two Turkish parties and 
that practically all the political leaders and prominent officials in Anatolia were closely connected 
with the C.U.P. up the time of the Armistice.18 The first three presidents of the Republic of Turkey 
until 1960, namely Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, and Celal Bayar, were all members of 
the CUP. The Young Turk era ended in Turkey perhaps only with the military intervention of 
1960. 
The Young Turk legacy continued in the Ottoman Middle East as well. Several Iraqi Prime Min-
isters were CUP members or classmates of prominent Young Turks. The new generation of Iraqis, 
as Middle-East historian Phebe Marr concluded, no matter how vociferously they might denounce 
the Young Turks, resembled nothing so much as an Arab version of the Young Turks themselves.19 
The Nadi al-Arabi Club in Palestine was called by a British official as bearing resemblance in its 
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own country to the C.U.P. in Turkey.20 The initiation oath ritual of the CUP, where a hand was 
put on Quran and on a revolver, was later copied by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and by 
secret societies of Indian Muslims.21 In a Soviet report from 1925, it was complained that Enver 
Pasha’s tomb has become a local place of pilgrimage.22 One of the mentors of Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
the former President of Egypt, was none but Aziz Ali al-Misri, a prominent CUP member and an 
Ottoman officer trained and served in revolutionary warfare alongside with Enver and Mustafa 
Kemal.23 The communist leader of Albania Enver Hoxha, born in the year of the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908 and Nasser’s successor as Egypt’s president Anwar al-Sadat born in December 
1918 after the end of World War I were both named after Enver Pasha.24 Not only in regard to 
military and revolutionary politics, there was a certain continuity of the Young Turk legacy, but 
unfortunately also in regards to the treatment of non-Muslim and tribal minorities. The Young 
Turk style of top-down measures of assimilation and suppression as well as populist mob violence 
against minorities continued to plague the post-Ottoman lands in the following decades.25  
While the British and French intelligence services were still reporting on the phantom pains of the 
Union of Muslim Revolutionary Societies up until 1925, the transnational movement of anticolo-
nial Muslim nationalism propagated by the Young Turks served, as Zafer Toprak argues, as a pre-
cursor of the decolonization and independence movements of the Muslim world in the twentieth 
century.26 The significance of this particular microhistory of a bunch of professional revolutionaries 
is that it offers an understanding of contentious politics at the meso level of transnational activist 
networks and their interaction with the macro level of international relations in the aftermath of 
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World War I. A dialectic process of deception, speculation, and paranoia connected distant actors 
and events in a formative moment in world politics. On the meta level, the Young Turk aftermath 
illustrates uniquely how some of the most essential continuities and discontinuities were drawn in 
the making of epistemes of the post-Ottoman Middle East. 
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